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Recomendaciones de la
Asamblea de la Union Europea Occidental en Materia de Inteligencia
- Aware of the importance of
intelligence in the evaluation of strategic situations in
potential crisis areas;
- Recalling the crucial
requirement for intelligence in planning the war against
international terrorism;
- Noting the need for
situation assessments to be carried out jointly so there can be a
common European response;
- Aware of the importance of
intelligence both in the planning and conduct of military
operations by the European Union;
- Recalling the importance
of human intelligence and the ability to interpret information;
- Aware that the gathering
of intelligence will invariably run up against ethical issues and
that consequently there is a need for it to be subject to
parliamentary scrutiny and for the services concerned to abide by
the relevant laws and regulations;
- Noting that the operations
in Afghanistan have demonstrated the immense capabilities
generated by the use of leading edge technologies such as unmanned
aerial vehicles and data communications networks;
- Welcoming the fact that
situation evaluation in regard to crises is to fall within the
purview of the Secretary-General and High Representative for the
CFSP (SG/HR) of the European Union and the importance the
Intelligence Division is to have within the European Union
Military Staff (EUMS);
- Calling for the
development of intelligence exchanges between the EU and NATO;
- Regretting the EU's
limited capability, notwithstanding the transfer to the Union of
the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, for processing images for
military use in times of crisis;
- Noting the total absence
of joint intelligence gathering structures at EU and WEU level;
- Regretting the low level
of European cooperation over intelligence satellite programmes;
- Noting, however, the
existence of optical image and radar exchange agreements between
several European Union members,
- Urge EU member
governments:
- strengthen the organisation set
up in the European Union for processing intelligence by organising
regular meetings of the chiefs of intelligence services and
thematic meetings dealing with the fight against terrorism,
defence intelligence and all potential crisis areas;
- set up a proper intelligence
synthesis cell under the SG/HR, organised along the lines of the
EUMS Intelligence Division;
- increase resources devoted to
intelligence gathering systems - human resources, listening (signals
intelligence) satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles - while
encouraging every opportunity for cooperation at European level;
- develop their special forces and
military intelligence units so as to attain the Helsinki headline
goal and encourage cooperation between them by organising
appropriate exercises;
- develop the military
capabilities of the Torrejón European imagery centre thus enabling
it to deal with interpretation of all forms of images;
- define a proper European
intelligence policy by establishing a European Intelligence Agency
under the responsibility of an Intelligence High Authority;
- define national intelligence
policies that are at least partially harmonised and coordinated by
such an agency so as to make possible synergy and complementarity
in the use of national resources;
- transform the Torrejón Centre
into a real European Defence Imagery Office.
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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by
Mr Lemoine, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
- The murderous attacks
on the United States on 11 September 2001 have served to point up
not only the difficulties in acquiring and exploiting intelligence
in the face of international terrorism but also where the
shortcomings lie. In order to avoid such difficulties, Europe
needs to set up effective structures for the coordination of
intelligence between the various states involved.
- Furthermore the cold
war has given way to a number of regional crises: the Gulf war,
conflict in former Yugoslavia, crises in Africa or the war in
Afghanistan. In this disturbed and changing international
environment, European security and defence policies have become
directed towards crisis management and prevention. In parallel,
particularly since the end of the period, intelligence has
acquired a worldwide dimension.
II. European
intelligence requirements
1. What is
intelligence?
- There are two sorts of
intelligence. The first is general intelligence. It covers various
fields: political, social and economic, its aim being to provide
governments with high volume information concerning the domestic
or external sphere. Such information has mainly to do with
surveillance of areas involving risk: organised crime, illegal
migration or international terrorism, which has, since 11
September, been the subject of particularly close attention, even
more so than in the past. The second type: specific defence
intelligence, is intended to contribute to international crisis
prevention, leading to situation evaluations so that decisions can
be taken, as necessary, about action, in particular military
action and, where necessary, engagement. Intelligence therefore
involves assessing situations in order to fully inform decision-making
authorities.
- Moreover the notion of
intelligence covers information gathering and processing.
Information gathering requires observation - being able to detect
warning signs, and surveillance - keeping a round the clock watch
on areas or individuals of particular interest. Information
processing consists of collecting, comparing and collating data
into "synthetic" intelligence.
- Intelligence can be
described as essential raw material for governments. Possession
and control of intelligence gives the governing elite the freedom
of assessment essential to independent political decision-making.
- Intelligence
procurement and exploitation should therefore obey the following
principles:
- Coordination: for optimisation
of sources and the necessary cross-checking of information that
makes it intelligence. Security both of intelligence and its
sources implies that control over the latter should be
centralised. Coordination must be such as to meet national
requirements and those of the highest authorities.
- In order to be able to act on
intelligence quickly and appropriately it has to arrive at the
right time, in the right place, with the right person.
Information must be passed on in good time to inform the
decisions that have to be taken. Speed of delivery may thus
range from a few seconds to several days.
- Anything can be intelligence.
Its inclusivity means that intelligence is everyone's business
and no scrap of information can be ignored.
- There must be wide access to
information, since it belongs not to the person who gathers it
but the one who needs it.
- It is vital that intelligence
should be reliable, which means sound intelligence that can be
cross-checked against different sources. Complementary sources
are an operational requirement.
- Lastly, security of
intelligence means that sources, organisation, staff making use
of the information and the intelligence itself all need to be
protected.
- Intelligence can be
classified according to type of source:
- imagery intelligence (IMINT)
including all forms of imagery, especially optical and radar
satellite imagery;
- human intelligence (HUMINT);
- electromagnetic intelligence (ELINT)
including signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications
(radar and remote sensing) intelligence (COMINT);
- optical, electro-optical and
infrared measurement signature intelligence (MASINT);
- acoustic intelligence (ACOUSTINT);
- open sources intelligence (OSINT).
- Defence intelligence
is normally subdivided into three categories:
- documentary
intelligence, gathered in peacetime,
to provide general information on potential crisis zones:
political movements, local geography, armed forces and militias
and military information;
- situation
intelligence, gathered at times of
crisis and differentiated according to the level of reflection
of the HQ making use of it: strategic (EU HQ, Operation Command
HQ), operational (in-theatre force command HQ) or tactical (HQ
deploying a force component in a local operation);
- real time combat
intelligence assisting in-theatre
combatants carry out an action (damage assessment, position of
combatants).
- The intelligence cycle
covers various functions (identification of need, gathering,
processing and exploitation) which are organised in a specific
order in a temporal cycle known as an "intelligence loop". Going
through the cycle with increasing frequency makes for a better
understanding of a situation.
- This phase is one of
general observation. Intelligence depends on two types of action:
the first, surveillance, involves real-time detection of danger;
the second, which involves precise data gathering, towards
specific ends, is for determining how armed forces are to be used.
- Hence situation
monitoring is a determinant strategic preliminary which makes it
possible to simulate, prepare for and, if necessary, engage in
action. Upstream, documentary intelligence is used to study the
crisis environment, set up data files on targets and the
operational databases that are necessary to information and
armaments systems.
- Intelligence thus
provides a body of information to draw on for strategic assessment,
which in turn can be used for putting strategic options to
political decision-makers. During this phase it is necessary to
give those taking the decisions access to the sum total of
observations, analyses and plans made to enable them to do so and
define clearly the aim of a given operation and the resource input
required.
- Once action has been
decided on, a plan of operations must be prepared on the basis of
what is known about the position of the adversary and of one's own
armed forces. Operational planning staffs thus draw on the
intelligence gathered. They also take part in defining it to the
extent that their needs will direct the search.
- Situation
intelligence makes a major contribution to the detailed monitoring
of a crisis. Here too, intelligence forms part of a "loop" making
it possible first and foremost to present governments with a
picture of the forces in play, political and military risks and
lastly how the situation is likely to develop.
- On the basis of this
information the authorities responsible for the political
direction and strategic conduct of the campaign take decisions
that will lead to changes in plans and hence to further action
that will in turn change the situation.
- The crisis exit phase
that follows the end of armed conflict often coincides with the
introduction of a peacekeeping force, with the agreement of the
parties involved, and a political authority responsible for a
reconstruction strategy within the conflict area. The political
authority gives a mandate to a civilian team in situ for
implementing that strategy.
- Such interventions in
the civilian sphere are primarily directed towards confidence
building and the affected population "getting back to normal".
Their aim is to set up the political and economic structures
necessary to achieve stability and pave the way for the withdrawal
of the peacekeepers.
- During the course of
this phase, the nature of the intelligence changes. There is a
need at this stage to monitor the behaviour of the various
factions and become involved in police investigations made
necessary by inevitable score settling. Synthesis of such
intelligence provides an overview of the situation and notably of
the political climate in the area involved.
- Fundamental to
decision-making in regard to any military operation is knowledge
of the environment since it enables combatants to optimise the
assets they have, to target their effort, to anticipate
developments and husband their force.
- This knowledge of the
environment is an aspect of military intelligence with a bearing
on:
- positioning, in other words
awareness of the movements of allied combatants;
- dating, necessary for overall
synchronisation of armaments systems;
- navigation, making for more,
and more accurate strikes, thereby helping to protect units;
- meteorology and cartography,
other essential fields for environmental analysis.
2.
International crisis management: general and specific defence
intelligence
- In the event of an
international crisis the need for the European Union to be able to
take autonomous decisions was clearly set out in the St Malo
Franco-British Declaration (1998): "... the Union must be given
appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of
situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for
relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication ...".
- However Europe's
ambitions can only be moderate for obvious financial reasons:
information of American origin is always welcome but Europe must
be able to take an interest in specific issues or to check data
originating elsewhere on a case by case basis, and the situation
within the Union is quite different from that in NATO where, by
definition, the United States is the main intelligence supplier.
- The "special
relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom
does not facilitate that perception of the need for European
autonomy in the intelligence field, nor the setting up of a system
for European cooperation, to the extent that the United Kingdom
does not want to invest in observation satellites and cannot share
all the intelligence it possesses with Europeans. This situation
can lead to differing perceptions of a crisis, even if this does
not explain all the differences in assessment arrived at by
European Union members.
- These difficulties
would be lessened were there more trust between the United States
and some European countries. For the time being the absence of a
security agreement between the EU and NATO does not help to
promote such dialogue. Furthermore, recent experience of the air
campaign in Kosovo (March-June 1999) together with the difficult
issue of the choice of targets has pushed European countries to
seek autonomy in terms of intelligence, as the upsurge of interest
by Germany in observation satellites (SAR Lupe programme and the
agreement between France and Germany) goes to show.
- The international
crisis-management capability of the European Union, particularly
as regards intelligence, is justified in the Presidency
conclusions to the Helsinki summit (December 1999):
" The European Council
underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity
to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to
launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to
international crises ...".
- The aim is therefore
to ensure the European Union has permanent decision-making
autonomy. Any organisation set up must be capable of preventing
crises, for which a surveillance and early warning
function is required; then, if the crisis breaks out, it must
be able to take a decision on engagement, having recourse
or otherwise to its military capabilities (crisis evaluation phase),
then, as necessary, conduct operations efficiently with the
necessary political control (crisis management phase).
- During the course of
the phase preceding any decision to intervene, usually referred to
as the "pre-decision phase", the first requirement is to obtain
information and then to assess the local situation accurately. To
avoid being taken unawares, the Union must establish a permanent
organisation responsible for monitoring potential crisis zones,
organised by geographic area in peace time.
- In practice such
assessment will be based on non-confidential information such as
general documentary information of a political, economic, social
and military nature. However, the Union will need to rely on the
member states to gather such confidential information, whether
civilian or military, from the diplomatic and intelligence
services. This will demand the setting up of a special
intelligence gathering agency within the European Union. Moreover
close links will need to be established with other international
organisations concerned with the same potential crises, especially
NATO. The extent of the task and the large number of interlocutors
in this area make it necessary to provide for a computerised
European intelligence gathering and processing network.
- A capability for
carrying out military operations, as clearly set out in the
Helsinki Declaration, includes the requirement for HQs to have the
intelligence necessary for planning and carrying out operations.
The complete array of defence intelligence both documentary and
situational, concerning a theatre of operations, is a necessary
basic tool for the operational planning that will be the first
task of the Operation HQ Commander. This multinational HQ will
need a large intelligence division, whose effectiveness will rest
on links with national services, member states and certain
multinational agencies, beginning with the EU Military Staff (EUMS),
NATO and the EU Satellite Centre in Torrejón.
- Finally the
intelligence required by forces projected into the theatre of
operations will be supplied to them by the Operation HQ Commander.
However it is essential to make provision for a local intelligence
gathering and processing facility to be available to the Forces
Commander. At present, apart from the regiments and special units
responsible for this type of mission, modern technical assets,
like unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and mobile receiving
stations for satellite images make it possible to obtain virtually
real-time intelligence in-theatre.
3.
Requirements to counter terrorism
- Following the 11 September
attacks a number of top-level EU meetings were held at which
decisions were taken on how to organise the fight against
terrorism in Europe. On 14 September, just a few days after the
attacks, the EU heads of state and government issued the following
joint declaration:
- "We shall make the European
Security and Defence Policy operational as soon as possible. We
will make every effort to strengthen our intelligence efforts
against terrorism.
- The European Union will
accelerate the implementation of a genuine European judicial
area, which will entail, among other things, the creation of a
European warrant for arrest and extradition, in accordance with
the Tampere conclusions, and the mutual recognition of legal
decisions and verdicts."
- This declaration of
principle clearly brings out two complementary aspects of
requirements for intelligence to counter terrorism:
- a requirement for strategic
intelligence: knowledge of networks: how they are organised
and where they are located; background and ideology; their
targets and hence threat assessment; likely damage; their
modus operandi and, overall, the consequences for member
states' security - description of possible scenarios; how they
are funded (financial arrangements, banking scrutiny, role of
so-called charitable institutions etc.). In this respect
intelligence must be gathered outside the member states'
territory. This is the job of the "intelligence" services which
must also seek to obtain specific intelligence about countries
harbouring terrorist network bases: political regimes, links
with terrorists, possible development but also aspects such as
infrastructure and military assets, etc.;
- a requirement for counter-infiltration
security which is mainly a policing aspect. It involves
obtaining intelligence about networks that are already operating
on the territory of the EU member states or their allies in the
fight against terrorism: members of such networks, their habits
and addresses, surveillance and shadowing, international police
cooperation, etc.
- To organise the
necessary cooperation arrangements the EU's Justice and Home
Affairs Council adopted a package of measures on 20 September. The
document in which they are set out contains a section entitled "Cooperation
between police and intelligence services". It describes the need
for cooperation at the level of the EU Police Chiefs Task Force
and between intelligence services. It also refers to the need to
set up a team of anti-terrorist experts in Europol.
III. Current situation
and joint projects
1.
Intelligence services and cooperation between them
- European countries
have different types of intelligence services some of which could,
ultimately, provide a basis for setting up a coordinated or
possibly common organisation for the European Union.
- Germany,
whose present intelligence services were set up in the post-war
era, boasts of several agencies. The first is of a general nature,
the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) which is a federal
intelligence and security service operating outside German
territory, whose task is surveillance of so-called "states of
concern", organised crime, money-laundering etc. The second, the
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) or Federal Office for
the Protection of the Constitution, deals with internal security.
It has responsibility for counter espionage and the fight against
subversion and answers to the Minister of the Interior. Military
intelligence is the province of the Amt für Nachrichtenwesen
der Bundeswehr (ANBw) or Office of Intelligence of the Federal
Armed Forces and on the Amt für Fermeldewesen der Bundeswehr
(AFBw) or Office of Radio Monitoring of the Federal Armed Forces,
whose activities are mainly concentrated on military electronic
intelligence.
- In France, the
function of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure
(DGSE) or National Defence General Secretariat is gathering and
exploiting intelligence with a bearing on France's security and
detection of activity outside the country directed against French
interests. The Direction de Surveillance de Territoire
(DST) or Directorate of Territorial Security, has responsibility
for detecting and preventing activities on French soil that are
likely to threaten France's security. Lastly, the Direction du
Renseignement Militaire (DRM) or Directorate of Military
Intelligence, responsible for gathering and detecting military
information or general political, social and economic intelligence
necessary to the Ministry of Defence, which might influence the
way military operations are organised, is France's third
intelligence service.
- The Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS, formerly MI6) which reports to the
Foreign Secretary is the United Kingdom's strategic foreign
intelligence service. The Security Service (formerly MI5) which is
answerable to the Home Secretary (the UK Minister for the
Interior), deals with terrorism in the United Kingdom, the fight
against international terrorism, counter espionage and organised
crime. The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) deals exclusively with
all areas with a bearing on defence, including economic, political
and even technological issues. There are several other services:
Scotland Yard's Special Branch, which was set up to counter
Northern Ireland terrorism, the National Criminal Intelligence
Service (NCIS), covering organised crime and the electronic
eavesdropping centre, Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ). Coordination of these services is through the Joint
Intelligence Committee which centralises and coordinates
intelligence, identifying needs and producing regular intelligence
assessments. It meets weekly at the level of agency chiefs and
representatives of the relevant ministers and provides a model for
and stands as a symbol of the British intelligence community.
- Spain
has only recently passed a law reorganising its intelligence
services. The Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa
(CESID) or Higher Defence Intelligence Centre, answerable to the
Defence Minister, now becomes the Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI) or National Intelligence Centre, an agency
with a more general approach dealing with terrorism, extremist
movements, counter-espionage and economic intelligence, operating
both at home and abroad. The Ministry of the Interior is
responsible for the Comisaría General de Información (CGI)
or General Commissariat of Intelligence which carries out
investigations within Spain (subversion, ETA, narcotics, and
economic and financial crimes) and also has a foreign intelligence
unit (Islamic fundamentalism, international cooperation, economic
monitoring etc.). Lastly, defence intelligence is the province of
Escuela de Estados Mayores Conjuntos (EMACON) or Joint
Staff College.
- Italy has two main
services, the Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza
Democratica (SISD) or Intelligence and Democratic
Security Service which deals specifically with protection of
internal security and the SISM (Servizio per le Informazioni e
la Sicurezza Militare - Intelligence and Military Security
Service) responsible for intelligence work of a more specifically
military nature or relating to external security.
- These different
examples show that the intelligence services referred to have
similar structures and identical interests. Military intelligence
frequently falls into a special category, separate from internal
and external intelligence services. Such is the case for France's
DRM, Germany's ANBw or the United Kingdom's DIS. General
intelligence work on member countries' home ground tends to
address similar issues irrespective of country. This is so
particularly in the cases of the French DST, the UK SS and the BfV
in Germany. This similarity of structures provides the basis for
present and future cooperation between corresponding services in
the various European countries carrying out the same kinds of
work.
- In the particular
case of military intelligence services it is important to note
that the main sources of information are defence attachés
accredited to embassies in various countries. Some European
countries still have highly sophisticated defence attaché networks
which are the prime source of information about potential
conflicts and local terrorist movements, together with
representatives of the "civil" services who keep a low profile,
often under the cover of diplomatic status.
- The general public is
largely unaware of the organised complicity throughout the 1980s,
between European intelligence and security services in the fight
against international terrorism. It was based on an instantaneous
safe communication network - the Internet before its time - which
has now become institutionalised. So said Prefect Bernard Gérard,
a former director of one of France's domestic intelligence
services, the DST, thus revealing the existence of fairly
extensive cooperation in one limited area. Fora have thus been
established to deal with specific subjects by bringing together
the intelligence services of different countries. Such groups are
known to a greater or lesser extent.. Although there are frequent
references to them in the literature within the public domain, it
is rare to find a description of their precise membership or
organisation.
- The most famous of
all such fora is doubtless the Trevi Group whose name stands for "Terrorisme,
Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale".
Established in 1975, it brought together the Ministers of Justice
and the Interior of the European Union, in order to strengthen
police cooperation. Its fields of action were organised crime,
terrorism and narcotics. With the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty, the Trevi Group's status was modified and it became
permanent. Six groups of experts work on particular topics. They
are responsible for organising the exchange of intelligence and
harmonising the legislations and regulations of the various
European countries. It was the crucible of the Schengen Agreements
and today is in the process of discussing the European arrest
warrant.
- The less well-known
Berne Club was set up in 1971 and today comprises 18 countries.
Once Greece has joined, all the EU countries will be members.
- This "club" provides
the framework for a number of thematic meetings based on the
concerns of the day. Informal contacts take place between small
groups. However, it appears that the situation reports drawn up by
heads of department are only to provide information to member
states as there is no particular European political authority to
which they are addressed, such as the High Representative for the
CFSP, Mr Solana. It is true that intelligence accompanied by
situation assessments might affect countries' policies and that
this raises difficulties in terms of member states' sovereignty.
- The Kilowatt Group,
set up in 1977, comprises 15 countries (the EU members, Canada,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the US (CIA and FBI) and Israel
(Mossad and Shin Beth). In this group, exchanges are not
reciprocal, which is helpful to smaller countries. Each country's
intelligence services makes information on terrorism available to
the others. In actual fact, the "group" is little more than a
telex network.
- There is also the
Conference of Western Mediterranean Interior Ministers, set up in
Rome in 1982 on France's initiative, to combat Islamic
fundamentalism and organised crime, and whose members are France,
Spain, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.
- Lastly NATO's Special
Committee brings together the security services of the
Organisation's member countries. It has responsibility for
counter-espionage and terrorism, especially for protecting -
primarily American - troops deployed abroad. However, the large
number of participants and differences of opinion about how
terrorism should be defined limit the degree of confidentiality of
the information exchanged.
- These types of fora
are numerous and those mentioned no doubt constitute but a small
number among others whose existence has not been publicly made
known. They are proof that cooperation exists and can be
organised. However, although the Trevi or Berne Group's existence
is acknowledged, the content of the information exchanges of
course is not. Such groups have been described as "shadowy
European organisations"2
and as their existence is hidden it is difficult for them to fit
into official European policy.
- Another body which is
in contrast extremely well known is Europol. Cooperation
established in the area of European intelligence takes as its
model the Europol Convention, signed in 1995, which took effect on
1 October 1998. The Convention sets up "a European Police Office"
with the aim of improving "by means of the measures referred to in
this Convention, the effectiveness and cooperation of the
competent authorities in the Member States in preventing and
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious
forms of international crime". Its functions are as follows:
- "to facilitate the exchange of
information between the Member States;
- to obtain, collate and analyse
information and intelligence;
- to notify the competent
authorities of the member states without delay of information
concerning them and of any connections identified between
criminal offences;
- to aid investigations in the
Member States;
- to maintain a computerised
system of collected information."
- The Convention is
implemented in individual states through a "national unit", which
is the only liaison body between Europol and the competent
national authorities. Such units second at least one liaison
officer, responsible for representing his country's interests to
Europol. Europol manages the databases providing the means of
information exchange on suspect persons to facilitate arrests. In
practice, within the framework of Europol there is little exchange
of thinking or overview. Europol is run by the Ministers of
Justice, it is not a centre for exchanges between intelligence
services.
- Informal cooperation,
usually on a bilateral basis, has gone on between the intelligence
services for some time. Such cooperation is not exclusively
between Europeans but is international. Thus cooperation has
existed between the United States and its allies for years.
Cooperation between Europeans is so frequent as to be referred to
as a "patchwork of agreements"3.
Countries bordering on one another often have an interest in
working together and this leads to cooperation between some
European services. For example Spain's CGI, whose main task is to
combat ETA terrorism, has an external intelligence brigade that
exercises surveillance over the movements of foreign terrorist
groups and collaborates with allied services, particularly in
France. This collaboration also occurs in regard to migratory
movements.
- Bilateral exchanges
are numerous and it would appear that every country has
arrangements for such exchanges. How does such cooperation arise?
How frequently and what form does it take? Who authorises it and
arranges it? We are unable to reply to all those questions.
- The growing number of
potential zones of conflict and instability, and of information
flows, complicates the task of the intelligence services. One
solution that they must logically envisage is shared missions, or
dividing up zones between them, especially as European
intelligence services each have their own area of interest
corresponding to a particular traditional area of influence, for
example Africa in the case of France (DGSE), Latin America in that
of Spain (CNI).
- However, on the
whole, the prevailing policy in Europe is one of every man for
himself, and a number of factors explain the reluctance of
services to cooperate. First of all, a distinction should be made
between "raw" information and assessments based on that
information. It is easier to share analysis than raw data.
- Moreover, there is
one rule from which intelligence services should not depart and
that is the protection of intelligence sources. Identities should
be kept secret in order to guarantee security. This seems logical
and natural. However, protection of sources involves technical
resources. And whatever type of source are involved, knowing them
can provide an insight into a state's intelligence policy. This
principle is one of the main obstacles to the sharing of
intelligence. Services will not give information that they think
may be traced back to source. In such cases, the likelihood of
cooperation and exchange is lessened. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that a state which has sophisticated intelligence resources will
agree to share sensitive assessments with other countries, unless
it thinks it will get back something of interest in return.
- Finally, one new
development is that the European Union is organising cooperation
among the member states' intelligence services. This was a
decision taken in the wake of the 11 September attacks at a
meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 September ,
the conclusions of which state:
"The Council would reiterate
how important it is for the quality of Europol analyses that the
police authorities and also the intelligence services of
the Member States should quickly pass on any relevant
information on terrorism, ... The Council has decided to set up
within Europol, for a renewable period of six months, a team of
counter-terrorist specialists for which the Member States are
invited to appoint liaison officers from police and
intelligence services specialising in the fight against
terrorism, ...".
2.
Intelligence in the framework of EU politico-military structures
- The above study of
intelligence requirements for international crisis management has
shown how important it is to have reliable, up-to-date
intelligence. As far as the European Union is concerned the need
for independent decision-making and political control over
interventions arising demanded that specific structures be set up,
forming a veritable "intelligence chain" adapted to the needs of
the various crisis-management stages. At present the European
Union has a crisis-management structure which is answerable to the
Secretary-General of the Council/CFSP High Representative (SG/HR)
and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which operates as
described below.
The Policy Planning and Early
Warning Unit (PPEWU) which came into existence as a result of
the Amsterdam Treaty and was set up in October 1999, works
directly to the SG/HR. Its task is to provide assessments of the
Union's interests in regard to the CFSP, to give early warning of
crises and produce documents setting out, with reasons, the policy
options available. It comprises a number of sections: the
Balkans/Central Europe - CFSP - Horizontal Issues and Latin
America - Russia/Ukraine/ Transatlantic Relations/Asia - the
Mediterranean/Barcelona process - Middle East/Africa. The unit has
20 or so staff and senior civil servants from the Council and
Commission Secretariats. It relies on diplomatic, economic,
political and social information, either freely available or
obtained through member states' diplomatic missions.
- The formation and
setting up in 2001 of three new bodies within the Council
Secretariat: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU
Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS),
represents substantial progress for European defence. These bodies
were created at the Nice Summit (December 2000) and were all
declared operational at the Laeken Summit (December 2001).
- The Political and
Security Committee (PSC), comprising senior civil servants of
ambassador status and answerable to the European Council (heads of
state) and the General Affairs Council (GAC) at ministerial level
has responsibility for all issues in connection with the CFSP:
"... a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the
international situation in the areas covered by the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and contribute to the definition of
policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request
of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the
implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the
responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission"4.
- In the event of a
crisis its task is to exercise "political control and strategic
direction" of EU-led operations. It examines all the possible
options for a response by the Union and puts them to the Council.
It issues directives to the Military Committee which itself
addresses recommendations and opinions to the PSC.
- The Military
Committee (EUMC) consisting of chiefs-of-staff of the
armed forces, represented by their military delegates5
is "the forum for military consultation and cooperation
between the EU Member States in the field of conflict prevention
and crisis management"6.
More generally it exercises military direction over all defence
activities undertaken in the EU framework. As we saw, it provides
advice and recommendations to the PSC (at the latter's request or
on its own initiative on all EU military matters, for instance
assessment of potential risks and the assessment and review of
capability goals.
- In the event of a
crisis, at the PSC's request, it issues an initiating directive to
the Director-General of the EUMS to draw up and present strategic
military options. It evaluates those options and forwards them to
the PSC together with its evaluation. On the basis of the military
option selected by the Council, it authorises the drafting of an
initial planning directive for the Operation Commander. The
Chairman of the Military Committee is the spokesman for that
committee and in that capacity is military advisor to the SG/HR.
- The European Union
Military Staff (EUMS) is the main source of military expertise
in the European Union. In the event of a crisis it performs early
warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for
Petersberg tasks, including the definition of a
politico-military framework and development of strategic military
options. The EUMS has numerous functions which obviously
increase in a crisis-management situation. The range of functions
it has been assigned entails a major intelligence requirement
which will need to be provided by "the appropriate national and
multinational intelligence capabilities"7.
An Intelligence
Division has therefore been created within the EUMS. It
assists with situation assessment, early warning (strategic
monitoring) and provides operational support in the event of
European engagement. However it does not handle documentary
intelligence.
The division has a staff of
thirty or so (23 officers and 7 junior officers). There is at
least one expert from every member state. The experts all work for
the Director-General of the EUMS but also have a secure link to
their own national intelligence services. They are thus able to
receive intelligence contributed by their own country and request
intelligence if necessary. This arrangement made it necessary to
set up special infrastructure and each member state identified
which of its own particular agencies would be responsible for
providing intelligence. From intelligence received, the division
is to provide situation assessments that reflect a common European
position. The documents produced are forwarded to the
Director-General of the EUMS, the Military Committee, the
Situation Centre and the national intelligence agencies.
- The Situation
Centre (SITCEN) is the key to the synergy between intelligence
from civilian and military sources. Answerable to the SG/HR and
led by his Special Adviser, it is responsible for supplying him
with any intelligence required for situation assessment and
monitoring. It includes a cell for gathering and analysing
intelligence contributed by national intelligence services,
staffed by personnel made available by the member states. The
staff, other than those of the cell described, are drawn from the
PPEWU and the EUMS Intelligence Division The SITCEN synthesises
the information and circulates it. In the event of a crisis being
declared it becomes a crisis monitoring cell and therefore
operates round the clock..
- In terms of EU and
NATO relations the special part to be played here by BICES
(Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System),
NATO's computerised secret intelligence network, should be noted.
The information is not in fact supplied by NATO. The Allies put
selected documents on this network. All the experts feel it is
most important for SITCEN or the Intelligence Division to have a
terminal connected up to this network. This is not yet the case,
since arrangements are as yet nowhere near being finalised,
largely due to the fact that some EU members are not members of
NATO. For the moment the only interim security agreement between
the EU and NATO makes no provision for intelligence exchange
between the EUMS/SITCEN and NATO (SHAPE/IMS)8.
However it should be noted that such agreements, and membership of
the BICES network, formerly existed between NATO and WEU.
- For the time being
the EU has taken over the WEUCOM network which existed between the
WEU Secretariat-General and the member country capitals, with 11
countries connected up to it. This is now known as ESDPnet.
However this system is regarded as too slow to cope with real time
political and military control of operations. Studies are in
progress concerning the setting up of a fast flow computerised
system between EUMS/SITCEN and the member states.
- The matter of "top
secret" intelligence from member country services under such an
arrangement has not been settled. Mr Solana has therefore decided
to set up a cell made up of "synthesis/assessment" specialists to
act as an Intelligence Committee. This cell, under the authority
of his Special Adviser, will consist of some 20 or so people, a
number of whom will have special ties with the national
intelligence services.
- Thus a viable
organisation has been set up to support those in charge of
developing strategic options and politico-military choices as a
crisis evolves. This should make it possible to provide an
efficient advisory service to political decision-makers involved
at the level of the General Affairs Council or in the European
Council at the level of heads of state.
- Such an organisation
will have as its main task to secure an intelligence function in
the pre-decision phase in the event of a crisis. Furthermore, in
the event of EU-led military intervention, the strategic
evaluations it provides will form the basis for operational
planning work in the Operation HQ. However this HQ will need more
detailed, practical intelligence for leading operations and
discussions are at present going on in the EUMS as to how the
"intelligence cycle" should be organised at Operation HQ and
battlefield Force HQ levels within the framework of the ISTAR
(Intelligence, Surveillance and Targeting) concept.
- The arrangements are
going satisfactorily in practice and well-qualified staff have
been seconded from the member states and provide good coverage in
terms of their expertise of the various crisis sectors. The EUMS
has already requested intelligence from the national services and
these requests have in large part been met. Lastly, meetings of
military intelligence service chiefs of the member states are
beginning to be held regularly under successive presidencies.
- At present European
cooperation as regards the use of defence intelligence is
proceeding nicely, although it is based only on voluntary
contributions from the member nations and does not cover the
intelligence-gathering phase, a field in which European
cooperation still takes place very much on an ad hoc basis.
Will the EU countries develop the habit of regularly supplying
quality intelligence about the various crisis theatres? Given how
essential to EU autonomy the answer to that question is, one might
draw the conclusion that the way in which intelligence is shared
will be decisive for the EU's future defence arrangements.
3. Resources,
cooperation and projects in intelligence gathering
(a) Space
imagery
- Satellites are
essential for gathering the intelligence necessary for crisis
prevention and management, specifically for general situation
monitoring, battlefield assessment or assessment of refugee
movements, monitoring embargoes, preparing humanitarian work or
military intervention.
- Moreover, they are
the sole permanent means of surveillance of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. They are able to observe factories in
production in any part of the globe and the activities of test
centres, or the setting up of ballistic missiles. They are also
essential in verifying compliance with arms control treaties.
- There are several
categories of observation satellite, which make their advantages
and disadvantages complementary. While optical satellites have
good resolution they are "blind" at night and in overcast weather.
Radar satellites, whose resolution is inferior, have an "all
weather" capability. Infrared sensors, which record a non-visible
part of the optical spectrum and form images from variations in
temperature, provide "night" vision.
- All recent crises,
from the Gulf war to the Balkans and the conflict in Afghanistan,
have served to confirm the importance of space observation. They
have also revealed the United States' unrivalled dominance in this
field and Europe's dependence. Thus the EU ministers, meeting in
Laeken in November 2001, stated that a real investment needed to
be made in high resolution space imagery programmes, if Europe was
to gain a proper strategic intelligence capability of its own.
- Helios 1 is the
shining example of successful cooperation. This programme
involving France (with a 78.9% share), Italy (14.1% share) and
Spain (7% share) covers two military optical satellites Helios 1A
and 1B. Both were launched from the Kourou base and placed in
orbit - one in July 1995 and the other in December 1999.
- In total, more than
30 French, Spanish and Italian firms contributed to development of
the Helios 1 programme. The savings made by each participant made
it possible to keep costs within the estimated ceiling of
approximately 1.52 billion euros, including the launch.
- The principle
underlying this form of cooperation is joint use. The system
ground segment comprises the main centres at Creil in the Paris
region, Patricia di Mare, near Rome, and Torrejón, close to
Madrid, and the image receiving centres at Colmar (France) Lecce
(Italy) and Maspalomas (Spain), and a French movable battlefield
station (STT - station de théâtre transportable). The main centre
for France at Creil manages and coordinates the entire Helios 1
system and undertakes the daily programming of satellites in
response to requests from individual countries on a basis
proportionate to the financial share of each.
- The example of
tripartite cooperation over Helios 1 would appear to demonstrate
that cooperation over technical information gathering assets can
foster a degree of harmonisation of the participant nations'
intelligence policies and strategies. Today, 30% of images are the
result of joint requests as compared with 17% in 1997. During
operations in Kosovo all images taken were jointly commissioned.
- Thus, as Europe's
first military observation satellite, the Helios 1 system seems to
be relatively successful since its performance, although not equal
to that of its American counterparts, is well thought of and
cooperation has proved to be of interest for the three countries.
However the Helios 2 programme France is committed to as a
replacement for Helios 1 is having difficulty attracting the same
interest. Nevertheless, Belgium and Spain which have decided each
to take a 2.5% share in Helios 2 are likely to be the first to
join forces with France in the project. The first of the two
satellites (optical and infrared) is scheduled to be put in orbit
around 2004.
- Apart from the Helios
1 programme, European space imagery projects are divided between
various national programmes: SAR Lupe in the case of Germany,
Ishtar for Spain, Cosmo Skymed for Italy and Helios 2 for France.
The various forms of cooperation envisaged are different from
Helios 1. Whilst with the Helios 1 programme it was possible to
talk about virtually "integrated" cooperation, in other words
sharing common resources, the newer cooperation projects are
better described as complementary rather than cooperative. Thus
the countries concerned are to develop a space imagery (either
optical or radar) programme, supplementing it with exchanges of
images available through bilateral agreements. With Helios, France
opted for optical technology and therefore has no radar
satellites, which goes to explain the cooperation agreements
concluded between Germany and Italy, whose intention it is to
develop the radar side.
- At their Mainz Summit
(June 2000), France and Germany made known their intention to
contribute to setting up a European intelligence capability with
their future military space imagery systems Helios 2 and SAR Lupe.
With this in view, France and Germany will exchange SAR Lupe radar
and Helios optical data. Such exchanges will be limited to
existing data and there are no plans for each country to programme
the other's satellite.
- Thanks to the Germany
military SAR Lupe system, available in 2005, Europe will fill a
gap in high-resolution radar observation.
- The agreement signed
between France and Italy at the Turin Summit (January 2001)
defines the principles of cooperation governing a large
multi-sensor system supported by small satellites for radar and
optical tasks. The system is based on two civilian military
satellite programmes to be put into space between 2003 and 2006.
One is the Italian Cosmo-Skymed system, which provides for four
radar satellites, and the other the French Pléïades programme,
consisting of two high resolution optical satellites.
- Based on the
existence of their respective national observation satellite
programmes, France and Italy signed an agreement to exchange
satellite-based information. The agreement also covers the ground
segment which is to be developed jointly by the two parties. This
is a dual-use (civilian and military) system designed both to
protect defence interests in terms of security and priority of
task requests, and to meet civilian and commercial users'
requirements. Use of the system will in fact be open to several
categories of user but task requests from the defence ministries
will be dealt with as a matter of priority. This form of
cooperation is open to all EU member states and to European
multilateral organisations, heralding progress towards setting up
a European space policy.
- In
conclusion, such forms of technical
cooperation give impetus to European space intelligence but are no
guarantee that a genuinely common European space system will be
set up in the future. They are, however, proving themselves
indispensable for the simple reason that no European Union member
has the means to equip itself at national level with the whole
array of intelligence gathering and processing components. The
continuation of the Helios 2 programme, with the involvement of
Belgium and Spain, along with the Pléïades/Cosmo Skymed and
Helios/SAR Lupe agreements, is an encouraging sign and the
formation of a global European space observation system might
ultimately be envisaged by starting to link up the ground segments
of the various existing systems.
- Apart from the
different forms of European cooperation over the different
technical means of intelligence-gathering, it should be remembered
that the Torrejón Satellite Centre provides a real opportunity for
integration of the information processing aspects of European
intelligence. Recently transferred to the European Union, the
Torrejón Centre is responsible for processing images obtained
through space observation for the EU's Situation Centre and
Military Staff. The information it provides can be used for
developing strategic options. In this connection the EU Military
Staff, and in particular its Intelligence Division, is responsible
for guiding the Centre's research in security and defence matters
by letting it know what its needs are. Moreover, in terms of the
conduct of any military intervention, the Operation HQ should be
put in direct contact with the Torrejón Centre.
- However, progress
still needs to be made at the Satellite Centre to reach the
national military centres' level of efficiency in exploiting space
imagery. Because of its largely civilian character, and the lack
of enough appropriately trained staff (military image
interpreters) the Torrejón Centre has difficulty in providing the
virtually real time imagery necessary to the conduct of military
operations during a crisis. There is a need therefore to set up a
proper military intelligence division within the Satellite Centre,
with seconded military staff from the various member countries,
able to work flexibly round the clock and capable of being
requisitioned in times of crisis.
- Finally, in order to
be able to provide complete image dossiers the Centre should not
confine itself to space imagery but must also be able to integrate
and correlate this with aerial imagery (gathered from piloted or
unmanned aircraft). The Torrejón Centre must ultimately become a
true European imagery agency.
(b) Aerial
imagery
- Most air forces have
long had a piloted component assigned to air reconnaissance which
now involves photographic, infrared and radar technology. France
has a wide range of vectors and sensors. The former include the
Mirage F1 CR and the Mirage IV P and as far as sensors
are concerned these craft are equipped with pods: camera
(resolution approximately 1 metre) infrared and radar (on
Mirage F1 CR only: resolution 3-6 metres). Besides the 5
Mirage IV P, whose range, cruising altitude (50 000 feet) and
speed (Mach 2) are still unchallenged and the two Mirage F1 CR
squadrons (40 aircraft), in service until 2005 and 2010/2012
respectively, France also has updated Super-Etendard on
aircraft carriers. All air force planes given over to tactical or
strategic reconnaissance are to be replaced by the Mirage
2000-N by around 2005-2006. These last are equipped with new
generation RECO-NG reconnaissance pods with optical and infrared
capability and using digital technology.
- For future aerial
surveillance of the skies, the future rapid reaction force is to
have UK and French-supplied AWACS (Airborne Warning and
Control Systems) (one or two each). For battlefield surveillance
it will not have the American J-STARS (Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System) but there will be the possibility of drawing
on the French Horizon heliborne battlefield reconnaissance system
which proved its worth in the Balkans, and, from 2006, the British
airborne ASTOR (Airborne Stand-Off Radar) system, capable of
processing and delivering virtually real time, all-weather radar
images.
- Drones, or unmanned
aerial vehicles, are pilotless aircraft, whose flight is
pre-programmed and hence cannot be changed during a mission, or
piloted remotely, in other words to which an operator in a control
cabin gives orders and which retransmits video images of the
terrain it is overflying.
- In terms of
operational tasks, the Americans have assigned the four Ds to
UAVs: dull, dirty (radioactive environment or toxic
in the case of nuclear or bacteriological attack) dangerous
and dollars. UAVs can be used at times of crisis for
potentially dangerous and politically sensitive missions when the
capture or loss of a crew could lead to escalation, in diplomatic
or military terms. The fact of their being pilotless means that
missions can be of long duration since technology now makes it
possible to override the physiological constraints inherent in
human beings. The reduction in costs UAVs make possible, and their
size, limit the economic and operational consequences of their
loss.
- Drones were used as
long ago as 1962, over Cuba, and their use in reconnaissance work
has gradually spread. They were used by the Israelis during the
Arab-Israeli wars (particularly in Lebanon) and by the Americans
to detect enemy anti-aircraft systems in Vietnam. Reconnaissance
UAVs have since made a useful contribution in all recent conflicts
(the Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo) right up to the operation "Enduring
Freedom" in Afghanistan, where for the first time a "fighting
drone" (UCAV or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle), here the American
Predator aircraft, equipped with Hellfire anti-tank
missiles, was used.
- slow, short-range UAVs;
- fast medium-range UAVs;
- mid-altitude long endurance
(MALE) UAVs;
- high-altitude long endurance
(HALE) UAVs.
- Slow
short-range UAVs meet the need, for
example, "to see beyond the next hill", or for precise
identification of targets, real-time monitoring of effectiveness
of fire or local jamming of enemy radio-communications. Europeans
are well-provided for in this category. France has Fox and
Crécerelle UAVs (produced by the French firms CAC Systèmes and
Sagem). Germany has Brevel (produced jointly with the French firm
Matra) and the Taifun. The British have developed the Phoenix
system, a UAV which can be retrieved without an airstrip or
special equipment, using a parachute and an inflatable cushion of
an original design. Italy is bringing out the Mirach 26 and Spain
the Siva. Lastly the Netherlands has ordered four squadrons of
Sperwer UAVs from Sagem.
- Fast drones
are meant to carry out tactical intelligence missions for ground
troops deep behind enemy lines. Here Europe has the CL-289 UAV
(France and Germany) the Mirach 150 (Italy).
- Europe has only a
very limited number of mid-altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs.
The French army has acquired four Italian-made Hunter UAVs. This
type of drone is suited to zone surveillance as it can stay in the
air for five to six hours at 15 000 feet. It is equipped with a
video camera which transmits images to the control post. It also
has a laser beam which can light up targets to be attacked by
aircraft fitted with laser-guided weapons.
- In contrast,
Europeans do not have any HALE UAVs comparable to the United
States Global Hawk, which was used in Afghanistan, flying at a
height of 20 000 metres (or twice the height of commercial
flights). This type of drone can make flights of up to 35 hours at
a distance of 2 000 km from base.
- Many projects are
under study in Europe but so far there have been no official
cooperative ventures. Thus, in the Capabilities Action Plan
adopted by the EU member states at the defence ministers'
Capabilities Improvement Conference (November 2001), it was
decided to launch joint studies to be directed by a different
member state for each deficiency recorded. France was given the
task of directing the study on UAVs.
(c) Electronic
interception
- Ears are just as
important as eyes and electronic interception technology provides
amazing possibilities for the purpose of intelligence. In this
context reference has to be made to the Echelon network which can
intercept communications, conversations, signals, faxes, e-mails,
etc. across the planet. But although this unique system is a
perfect example of how highly advanced technical cooperation can
work in the field of electronic espionage, the problem is that it
is wholly Anglo-Saxon. (In fact, Echelon involves the
American National Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom's
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australia's Defence
Signals Directorate (DSD), Canada's Communications Security
Establishment and New Zealand's Government Communications Security
Bureau (GCSB)).
- What is the
situation in Europe? It has to be said that at the present time
there is no real technical cooperation in this area as each
country takes the view that the electromagnetic situation in a
given zone is a matter for its sovereignty. This means that any
European potential will be confined to national equipment and
approaches existing side by side. As far as space is concerned,
they are virtually non-existent. Nevertheless, one can at least
list the systems that do exist. To begin with, it should be
remembered that intelligence-gathering by intercepting
transmissions, or SIGINT (signals intelligence) falls into two
categories:
- COMINT (communications
intelligence) involves techniques of evesdropping, recording,
identification, decoding and message analysis;
- ELINT (electronic
intelligence) covers radiogoniometry, identification and
analysis of sources of electromagnetic emissions.
Furthermore, as with imagery,
eavesdropping relies mainly on airborne and space-based
facilities. There are also naval vessels (the French navy's
Bougainville for example is equipped with communications
interception equipment) and fixed monitoring centres.
- Airborne facilities
take the form of transport or rapid aircraft which intercept
radioelectric emissions, identify them and then locate their
origin. In peacetime electromagnetic intelligence aircraft can be
used to detect the beginnings of a crisis owing to signs of a
sudden increase in radioelectric activity. Overall, Europe has
some twenty aircraft capable of carrying out electromagnetic
reconnaissance missions. Germany has Breguet 1150 Atlantic
aircraft dating back to the 1970s and since modernised twice. In
addition to the Falcon 20 and Tornado, the United
Kingdom can rely on seven Sentry AEW.I (E-3D AWACS) as well
as three Nimrod R.1 aircraft which were commissioned in
1974 and last modernised in 1995. Sweden has two Gulfstream IV
called S102 B. Finally, France has two C-160 Transall Gabriel
and a DC-8 Sarigue. It also has the possibility of
fitting its aircraft with the ASTAC cradle which specialises in
electromagnetic reconnaissance.
- In contrast to
imagery, eavesdropping is the poor relation in the field of
European space intelligence. A few national projects are still in
the experimental phase, such as the French Cerise and
Clémentine programmes which were respectively part of the
Helios 1A launch in 1995 and the Helios 1B launch in 1999. Both
pick up electromagnetic signals over a range of frequencies used
in tactical radiocommunications and by cell phones. Although these
satellites are not on a par with the American SIGINT satellites,
they are due to be complemented around 2003-2004 by a cluster of
four Essaim satellites specialising in COMINT. Eventually,
they could all be part of a European space-based electromagnetic
intelligence system which would form a valuable complement to
observation facilities. But as in the area of "image
intelligence", proper technical cooperation will only become
possible with the creation of a real European intelligence agency.
IV. Conclusions and
recommendations
- Two observations to
emerge from the course of the present report are first, that there
is no joint EU-level intelligence-gathering organisation and
second, that exchanges of intelligence between national
intelligence services is still the most common practice. These can
be qualified, however, by another to the effect that there is some
joint work going on between European nations, at the level of
satellite programmes or UAVs, most frequently in the context of
agreements on programmes involving two or three countries or the
systematic exchange of imagery (agreements between France and
Germany and France and Italy).
- When it comes to
pooling intelligence, the recent establishment, under Mr Solana,
EU/WEU Secretary-General and CFSP High Representative, of the
SITCEN and EU Military Staff (EUMS) and a well-organised
intelligence section, constitutes substantial progress, provided
that the member states have the political will to provide them
with reliable intelligence at times of crisis. The problem is the
same as with NATO, where there is no real sharing, the main
supplier being the US, which controls the intelligence it
releases, making it available to the allies through BICES.
- As far as image
processing and interpretation is concerned, the Torrejón Centre,
which is not a military body and deals only with, mainly civilian,
satellite images, is very inadequate.
- Lastly, new
technologies, involving UAVs and satellites, used with ultra high
performance command and control assets, have overturned
operational doctrines by making it possible to deal with images
virtually in real time, as the use of such methods by the US in
Afghanistan, which allow weapons-systems to be brought into play
less than 15 minutes after the targets have been identified on the
images, goes to show.
- The principles are
as follows:
- Human intelligence and human
ability to interpret information remain the basis for
intelligence and priority should be given to them. It is not
enough to have the technical wherewithal for intelligence
gathering. It is necessary to know how to interpret the
intelligence gathered.
- Intelligence and policy cannot
be separated. Intelligence is indivisible; it is the political
decision-maker's raw material. The military aspect is only one
of many.
- The search for intelligence
invariably runs up against ethical considerations. There are
ethical limits to the kind of means that can be used to gather
intelligence. There is the issue of democracy, requiring
parliamentary control and perfect knowledge on the part of the
services concerned of the relevant law and statute.
- To move forward on European
intelligence, the EU must have joint intelligence assets
(imagery and eavesdropping facilities) use of which must be
managed jointly and made available to all members. The principle
on which the Torrejón Centre is run should be generalised.
- The situation
ideally would be to set up a proper reliable and effective
"Intelligence Europe" with the appropriate architecture. However,
this cannot be envisaged in the short term as everything has yet
to be built in an area which is extremely sensitive as far as the
boundaries of national sovereignty are concerned. Consequently
there is a need to plan measures that can be achieved in the short
term, such as:
- give meetings of national
intelligence chiefs official status and plan thematic meetings
"at 15" on topics such as:
- the fight against terrorism
- defence intelligence
- on-going crises (Middle East,
Balkans etc.);
- set up an intelligence service
for crisis areas under the Secretary-General/High
Representative, with member countries' intelligence services
represented, along the lines of the European Military Staff
Intelligence Division;
- expand the EMS Intelligence
Division so that it can monitor all potential crisis theatres;
- develop and "militarise" the
Torrejón European imagery centre so that it can deal with all
types of images;
- urge all European governments
to invest an increasing share of their defence budgets in
intelligence gathering systems such as satellites, UAVs etc.
taking advantage of every opportunity for European cooperation;
- in the operational field and
in the framework of the headline goal, develop special forces
and units responsible for intelligence gathering and encourage
cooperation between them through the organisation of appropriate
exercises.
- Looking towards the
longer term, there is a need to set up a real "Intelligence
Europe" with a permanent structure. First, a European intelligence
policy has to be defined, prepared and agreed at the highest
level, in other words by the Council. A European high intelligence
authority would have responsibility for putting forward policy for
adoption by the Council, then applying it under the direction of
the Political and Security Committee (PSC). That authority should
have available to it a European Intelligence Agency, still to be
set up. It would have responsibility for the gathering, synthesis
and dissemination of intelligence to the various services in the
member countries.
- States should define
harmonised national intelligence policies. The establishment of
national structures more similar in nature should encourage
overall harmonisation, and the ideal would be to set up a
"National Intelligence High Authority" in each country. National
resources should be complementary, able to work together, and
their activities capable of being coordinated, at least in part,
by the European Intelligence Agency.
- Lastly there is a
need to set up a proper "European Imagery Office" by expanding the
Torrejón Satellite Centre's areas of activity, while the Centre
itself should undertake both civilian and military work.
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