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From The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World 1931 by Edgar Vincent D'Abernon
In 1684 [i.e. 1683 (WPT)] the Ottoman invasion made its furthest advance west. The Battle of Vienna was one of the occasions when Europe owed safety to Polish valour. Already at Chocim . . . Polish arms attained an important victory over Asiatic assailants, but the danger was even more grave before the walls of Vienna, and John Sobieski earned the gratitude of all who value the maintenance of European civilisation. It is difficult to estimate the relative importance of these events . . . as compared with the Battle of Warsaw in our own time, but the surmise is justifiable that in its influence on the civilisation of Europe the victory before the walls of Warsaw in 1920 was no less vital than the historical contests in which Poland in earlier years acted as a bulwark to the west.
On the essential point there is little room for doubt ; had the Soviet forces overcome Polish resistance and captured Warsaw, Bolshevism would have spread throughout Central Europe, and might well have penetrated the whole continent. In every
large city of Germany, secret preparation had been made by Communist agents—a definite programme had been prepared—leaders had been chosen—lists of victims had been drawn up—undermining intrigue would have been followed by ruthless assassination and murder.
There is abundant evidence that the Moscow Government, in concentrating their forces upon Poland, had views extending far beyond the capture of Warsaw. Their ambition—their confident expectation of victory—extended to the countries west of the Vistula and beyond the Polish frontier.
The circumstances were peculiarly favourable to revolution. The minds of men were so weakened by the terrific strain of the years of war, that they had become a ready prey to any subversive doctrine. The old order, which had landed the world in so grave a catastrophe, had lost authority—(etc). Bolshevism had not yet proved its incapacity—(etc).
To set against the propagandist zeal of the Bolsheviks, there was, on the side of Western European civilisation, nothing but a divided camp. (Etc.)
Among the working-classes, political opinion was animated rather by sympathy for the Soviet doctrine than by aversion. Moscow propaganda had worked with persistence ; large sections of the population were contaminated. Even among the classes hostile to fundamental change there was no adequate grasp of the appalling danger to civilisation which threatened. (..) The fanatical zeal which Communism inculcates and inspires was not understood by any save those who had come into close contact with it, nor was the fact appreciated that an avowed and organised attempt to set class against class had been initiated by propagandists in Moscow.
( pages 11-13 )
The Soviets endeavoured to draw the maximum advantage from what they believed to be their military superiority. They did this with so thin a veneer of pacific intention that no one but a friend with a telescope to his blind eye could have been deceived by it.
The whole Middle East was amazed at the apparent simplicity of large sections of public opinion in Western Europe, and their incomprehensible blindness to quite obvious facts.
So far as blame is concerned, this appears to attach solely to those friends of the Soviets who were foolish enough to claim for them the quality of being sincere and straightforward advocates of universal peace on
the basis of non-interference and non-propaganda, and of respect for the rights, convictions and independence of others.
This character, the Soviet leaders themselves would be the last to claim. Indeed they wold deny it with the utmost indignation, as implying that they had been faithless to the sacred duty of converting the whole world to their doctrines. (Etc.)
( pages 104-5 )
The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World : WARSAW 1920
By Edgar D'Abernon
( London : Hodder and Stoughton 1931 )
Westport, Connecticut : Hyperion 1977 pages 11-13.
From MADAME CURIE A Biography (1938) by Eve Curie
‘The universities, the academies and the cities bestowed their finest honorary titles on her, and Marshal Pilsudski became her cordial friend.’
Translated by Vincent Sheean
Garden City, New York : Doubleday, Doran 1938.
From POLAND : Key to Europe, 1939 by Raymond Leslie Buell
... Upon the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Piłsudski went to Tokyo and asked for arms in order to organize a revolt.12
While Japan did not accept this proposal, Piłsudski subsequently organized about two hundred rifle clubs in Austrian Poland, which became the basis of the Polish army. ...
12 In a memorandum given the Japanese authorities in Tokyo, he contended that of the 126,000,000 inhabitants of Russia, less than 60,000,000 were really Russian. W. Bączkowski, " J. Piłsudski and the Problems of Russia," Wschód-Orient, No. 2, 1938.
New York, London : A. Knopf 1938, 1939, pages 63-4.
Comment : the ethnic composition of Russia (originally known as Muscovy) has been not so much the Aryan (Indo-European) Slav as largely the Turanian. Please see http://www.hunmagyar.org/turan.html (WPT, 9 Nov 04.)
From PILSUDSKI, 1941 by Aleksandra Piłsudska
The beginning of 1920 saw improvements in some aspects of the national situation and increased difficulties in others. The army had gained in strength and experience. A uniform system of training had been established, urgently needed arms had been brought from France. But the winter had been hard, unemployment had risen, and even Paderewski's liberality of ideas had not prevent friction in the Government. The dispute with the Czechs was still at a deadlock, Germany, consumed with bitterness over the Treaty of Versailles and the disposal of Danzig and the Corridor, but unable to strike back at the Allies, was concentrating all her venom against Poland. The Bolsheviks were winning the battle in diplomacy. An extensive and efficient propaganda campaign which they launched against Poland was already having disastrous effects among Allied statesmen. The Socialist Press in England was attacking Pilsudski and clamouring for support for the Russian workers; the phrase "polish imperialism" had been coined, and even the most moderately inclined politicians were beginning to hint that the Poles were being unreasonable.
The Russians, following up their diplomatic success, decided to put themselves in a still more favourable light with the Allies and made Poland a peace offer, although they were concentrating a large force at the Polish frontier. It was rejected, and for that rejection Poland has been severely criticized. The Allied Supreme Council adopted an admonitory tone, which they no doubt felt to be justified. Europe was sick of the very name of war. The other nations had ceased to fight, why could not Poland lay down her arms? Various motives were attributed to Pilsudski, principally that of pride, which was absurd. Unlike Hitler and Mussolini, he was utterly devoid of personal ambition, had no wish to see himself in the role of a world conqueror, and no thought of extravagant territorial claims. All he wanted was to win back for Poland that which had been taken from her. But he had another
deeper reason. His fear and distrust of Bolshevism, which he believed would destroy any state in which it took root. He emphasized his convictions in an interview which he gave to the correspondent of an English newspaper in the hope that it might promote a better understanding of Poland. . . .
"I think that the methods which have made Russian Socialism a policy of terrorism and the total destruction of social life would be unthinkable in civilized countries" . . . he said . . . "Ask the Socialists of Great Britain whether they wold like to have Lenin and Zinoviev reorganize their Government for them
on the lines of Bolshevism. I think they would say 'No.' Do you wonder that I am afraid of the Bolsheviks coming here uninvited to reorganize the Polish Government?"
PILSUDSKI : A Biography by his Wife,
by A. Piłsudska (with Jennifer Ellis),
New York : Dodd, Mead 1941, pp. 295-6.
From THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, 1949 by Edward Henry Carter
Both Poland and Czechoslovakia had, at their rebirth in 1919, the guidance of able statesmen. Pilsudski, Marshal and Dictator, led Poland in war and politics. President Mazaryk [sic] exercised in Czechoslovakia a fine democratic influence ; (etc).
London : Pitman 1949, p. 76.
From The Decisive Battles of the Western World, 1954-6 by J. F. C. Fuller
On August 2 Pilsudski entered Warsaw to learn that the Narew was in his enemy's hands. On the following day Lomza was lost and the whole of the Polish First Army fell back on the capital. Annihilation seemed imminent ; yet again the situation was not without hope, for the rapidity of the Bolshevik advance, nearly 300 miles in 30 days, had so disordered Tukhachevski's supply system that it was near dissolution. The situation was such that Tukhachevski could neither stand still nor retire ; to halt and reorganize was out of the question for it would mean starvation. All he could do was to push on.
Further, the political situation favoured a continuation of the attack. In Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Germany the workers refused to allow munitions to pass through their countries to Poland. "On August 6 the British Labour Party published a pamphlet which stated that the workers of Great Britain would take no part in the war as allies of Poland." In Paris the French Socialists, through their organ L'Humanité, spoke of a "war against the Soviet Republic by the Polish Government on the orders of Anglo-French Imperialism, and cried 'Not a man, not a sou, not a shell for reactionary and capitalist Poland. Long live the Russian Revolution. Long live the Workman's International' "1 while in Danzig the dockers refused to unload munitions. Of all European peoples the Hungarians alone were friendly to the Poles, because under the hideous régime of Bela Kun they had tasted the fruits of the Bolshevik revolution2
1 The Poland of Pilsudski, Robert Machray, pp. 112-113.
2 On May 27, 1919, Lenin had written to the Hungarian Communists as follows : "Be firm. If there are waverings among the Socialists who came over to you yesterday, or among the petty bourgeoisie, in regard to the dictatorship of the proletariat, suppress the waverings mercilessly. [Etc.]". (Collected Works, Lenin, vol. xvi, p. 229).
London : Eyre and Spottiswoode 1956, Vol. III, p. 348.
Note the West has been largely blind to the villainies of the Soviets and of their agents sent worldwide.
This may mean you, the reader. Ignorance may be not a crime, as T. Paine had observed, but a refusal to inform self on vital issues is.
Several dates in the text by D'Abernon were wrong. Unfortunately, I have doubts about the copy of his "Warsaw 1920" which I have been using ; literary forgeries seems to have been a standard article in the communist actions of corrupting the West and, unfortunately, one must be totally sceptical of any materials dealing with these subjects.
Unfortunately, that does apply to the works by the best men of the time. Those would be especially targeted for forgeries by the agents of the 'bolshevism', possibly assisted by some 'Prussian' elements ; these forces forming in many instances one. (WPT 10 Dec 04).
Selected bibliographic
Author D'Abernon, Edgar Vincent, Viscount, 1857-1941.
Title The eighteenth decisive battle of the world : Warsaw, 1920 / by Viscount D'Abernon.
Publisher Westport, Conn. : Hyperion Press, 1977.
Description 178 p. ; 23 cm.
Series Russian studies
Series Russian studies.
Note Reprint of the 1931 ed. published by Hodder and Stoughton, London.
Includes index.
ISBN 0883554291 :
Author D'Abernon, Edgar Vincent, viscount, 1857-
Title The eighteenth decisive battle of the world:
Publisher London, Hodder and Stoughton, limited, 1931.
Description 178 p. ports., maps (3 fold. in pocket) 22 cm.
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