Henri Poincaré

From Antinomies of Formal Logic (1921) by Leon Chwistek

When Bertrand Russell published his theory of logical types,¹ it might have appeared that the difficulties which had since ancient times been inherent in the foundations of logic were finally resolved. Nevertheless some additional assumptions of Russell's theory, known collectively as the principle of reducibility, could have at once inspired a certain distrust in view of their utterly arbitrary character.   (Etc.)   Henri Poincaré, the first critic of the theory of types, spoke against the axiom of reducibility, making the objection that Russell introduced a synthetic a priori statement into the axioms of logic.²   (Etc.)

     ¹ 'Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types', American Journal of Mathematics, 30 (1908), pp. 222-62.
      ² H. Poincaré, Dernières Pensées, ch. iv.

POLISH LOGIC 1920-39,
Editor Storrs McCall, Oxford 1967, p. 338.

From PIERRE CURIE by Marie Curie 1923

      [The spring of 1900.]   At this moment the Chair of Physics in the physics, chemistry and natural history course at the Sorbonne, obligatory for students of medicine, and familiarly known as P.C.N., was vacant; he applied, and was appointed, due to the influence of Henri Poincaré, who was anxious to free him from the necessity of quitting France. At the same time I was given charge of the physics lectures in the Normal School for Girls at Sèvres.

Translated by Charlotte and Vernon Kellogg
New York : Macmillan 1923, p. 109.