Development of the Concept and Theory of Alienation in Marx's Writings

March 1843 to August 1844

Nasir Khan

Dedicated to

Professor Guttorm Flöistad

in friendship and admiration of his humanism

CONTENTS

A PREFACE

The writings of Marx occupy a paramount position within the history of ideas, not only because of their momentous impact upon the historical process, but also owing to their intrinsic value and truth.

Marx's activity as a scientific and philosophical writer persisted during four decades - from the youthful, first attempts to come to grips with social and political reality to the gigantic enterprise of his maturity; from his partly unpublished writings to found a new doctrine of History to the masterly exposition of the capitalist mode of production and the concomitant critique of prevailing political economy. In the course of this time span, Marx, like most thinkers, changed in many ways, and this fact raises the question of continuity. To what extent is the work of Marx a unified whole? To what extent does it fall apart into several different, even mutually exclusive, doctrines? These are not merely the questions of concern to the historian and the biographer; they direct our attention to our understanding of essential features of our society, such as, for instance, the proper relationship between politics and technics, or between individual personality and sociality.

Nasir Khan has devoted himself to the study of some of Marx's early writings, with special reference to his treatment of man's alienation. The notion of alienation came into the foreground after the publication in the 'thirties of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, where it plays a decisive rôle. Since then, Marx's use of the alienation concept has been a permanent topic of investigation and discussion, bearing on the sense of Marx's humanist stance, and its relation to a positivist conception of science.

Nasir Khan's monograph is another contribution to this field of research. His study is not intended as an introduction to the problematic, but rather addresses the advanced reader, who has already acquired a basic knowledge of Marx and Engels' 'materialist conception of history' in general, their main works, the history of Marxist thought and practice, and the concept of alienation as an aspect of human subjugation and suffering.

The author deals with this subject matter in a thoroughly scholarly manner. His work is based upon a close scrutiny of the original texts, and displays an impressive command of the

enormous literature commenting on what Marx wrote. He himself purports, not to revolutionise the current interpretations, but to restate them a little more clearly than the preceding authors, by utilising what they have said in their texts. In this way, the present work makes a specialised contribution within the world-wide research activity.

The field of inquiry is strictly limited, concentrating on what Marx wrote on alienation within an interval of 17-18 months, between March 1843 and August 1844. This narrow scope permits a very detailed account, following the sinuosities of Marx's itinerary as he strives for clarity, passing from the critique of politics to that of private property, and arriving at an understanding of alienated human existence, founded upon a conception of what a truly rich human existence would be. To participate in the discussion about whether the notion of alienation is essential merely in Marx's early writings is not the main purpose of Nasir Khan. He does however make his standpoint clear, stating, and in my opinion rightly, that the concept and doctrine of alienation are fundamental to Marx's thought from the beginning to the end.

The 'death' of Marxism has been proclaimed over and over again, and today, in the wake of the rapid political changes in Eastern Europe, this proclamation is perhaps made more triumphantly than ever before. But it is clear that the perishing of these regimes cannot disprove the truth of Marx's doctrines. For one thing, the strong revival and renewal of the Marxist movement in the 'sixties and 'seventies took place rather in spite of, and not because of, the achievements of these regimes. Hence, their dismantling changes little or nothing on the scientific level, even if it may serve as a pretext for those who for other reasons want to break with Marxist thought. Moreover, the economic and social conditions in Western Europe nowadays do not at all warrant any *en bloc* rejection of Marxian conceptions. Governmental policies based upon 'the general theory of employment' no longer ensure approximately full employment, with the consequence that new social strata resembling Marx's 'reserve army' of wage labourers have appeared. The 'welfare state', the declared function of which is to guarantee certain basic rights and thus to make the class struggle less urgent, shows alarming signs of weakness. All experts agree that socio-economic inequality has increased and that class cleavages have become sharpened contrary to the optimistic perspectives on our future some decades ago.

Yet, the validity of Marxian conceptions does not, to my mind, ultimately depend upon such events and trends, Rather, the basic conceptions of Marxian thought, such as that of human alienation, should be understood as an internal critique of the basic Liberal notions of the Individual, the Market, and the State. These notions are constitutive of a social order, the hypocrisy and insufficiency of which are uncovered by Marxist thought. This Liberal order and its capitalist mode of production are still expanding throughout the world. For this reason, the Marxian critique is still 'alive' and indispensable for the understanding of the human world, and this holds both for the critique of political economy and the critique of human alienation, the theme of the present study.

Oslo, June 1991

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This book is an abridged edition of my *doctor philosophiae* thesis that I had submitted to the University of Oslo in March 1991. A successful *disputas* (a public examination for a doctoral degree in Norway) was held in May 1992. In view of the helpful criticism of my learned opponents Professor Sven-Eric Liedman (Sweden) and Dr Knut Vennesland (Norway) on this occasion, I have made some corrections and alterations in the text. I am particularly thankful to Professor Sven-Eric Liedman, a leading authority on Marx and Marxism, for his written comments on the thesis which I have used with great benefit while revising the book for the present edition. I thank the Solum Publishers for their enthusiastic co-operation to publish it. I also thank the Research Council of Norway for a grant in connection with its publication.

Whatever its merits or drawbacks, this study is, first and foremost, my personal tribute to the Norwegian philosopher Professor Guttorm Flöistad of the University of Oslo. Without his humane attitude and friendly support I could not have either undertaken or completed it. It was by sheer chance that I came in contact with him in a teachers' seminar in the autumn of 1984, where he spoke on the theme of communication between Christians and socialists. I found him a skilful and an articulate communicator of his philosophical views. His over-all world-view was principally broad and non-sectarian in the political and social context. My acquaintance with him started from that time. And our friendship since then has become deeper. When I apprised him of my intention to do doctoral research, he encouraged me to do so. I did encounter initially some obstructions from the academic and administrative bureaucrats. But they were only doing their job. However, through the good offices of the influential professor, these difficulties were overcome and I was able to pursue the research work independently. My debt of gratefulness to him for all the help and inspiration is enormous. As a token of friendship and affection, I am delighted to dedicate this book to him.

I have been singularly lucky to have had the benefit of the advice and suggestions of the distinguished Norwegian sociologist and philosopher Professor Dag Österberg over a number of years. Most of his major works are in Norwegian, except his *Metasociology*: *An Inquiry into the Origins and Validity of Social Thought* (1988) which is in English. His writings are a model of lucid and profound philosophical discourse. It is a great privilege to know him who is, in my

view, one of the most original and perceptive thinkers in Europe at this time. With his firm grasp of Marxist theory, his resolute help has been inestimable in my work. He was deeply involved in his own research activities for various projects. Yet, despite his own pressing engagements, he graciously and unobligingly read and commented on this thesis, and also wrote the Preface for it. I highly appreciate the contribution of Professor Dag Österberg, and express my deep gratitude to him for his comradely guidance, support and encouragement. It also needs to be said that amidst the bourgeois clatter of academic juggernauts, the academic Left is duly proud to have this ascetic intellectual in its ranks.

Beside these two academics, I am also thankful to many other writers, both past and present, whom I have come to know only through their books and articles. Their names comprise the Bibliography of this study. I acknowledge my thanks to the staff of the University Library, Oslo, and *Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek, Oslo*, for supplying me with the necessary literature I needed.

I financed my part-time research work by working part-time at Nordstrand School over the last few years. Rector Kjell Dalan and the Inspector of Education Petter Nakken had contributed a great deal in creating a stable and secure social milieu in the school for all, free from ethnic, religious and political pressures. Being a mother-language teacher for immigrant pupils, I found it a pleasant experience to work in very congenial surroundings created by the school administration and the staff. Rector Dalan who has retired now has been a remarkably cultivated person I ever came across in Europe. I have often marvelled at his intellectual curiosity, erudition and open-mindedness. I thank him and Petter Nakken for their genuine concern for the general welfare of all.

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Wenche Karin Nesse, the Counsellor to the Institute of History of Ideas, deserves my special thanks. Whenever I had an occasion to visit the Institute, she always welcomed me with a cheerful smile. Among my near ones, my son Kabir Khan (b. 1971) has also been positively interested in my work. He also taught me how to use a personal computer for word processing.

Finally, I would like to mention Sardar Kamal Khan from Poonch who had spent many years of his life in the prisons of the Maharajah of Kashmir for opposing the feudal oppression and organising the movement for the liberation of Kashmir. He was released from prison after the emergence of the independent states of India and Pakistan at the end the of the British colonial rule in 1947. However, when he raised his voice for the basic human rights of the people and the immediate need for the welfare of the refugees who had arrived in Pakistan, the new rulers, the Pakistani and Kashmiri civil-military power elites chose to silence his voice. He was thrown in prison again from 1950 onwards for many years without any trial or any due process of law. This fearless legendary peasant revolutionary, his ideals and example have always been the main source of inspiration in my life. He was my father.

Nasir Khan
Oslo, February 1994

Abbreviated Titles of Works by Marx, Engels and Hegel

MEGA I, 1, Marx/Engels, *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. D. Rjazanov, Frankfurt A. M., 1927.

MEGA 1, 2, Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Berlin, 1982.

Werke 1, Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 1, Berlin, 1964.

CW Marx/Engels, *Collected Works* in 50 volumes, Moscow, 1975...

SW Marx/Engels, *Selected Works* in 2 volumes, Moscow, 1958.

SC Marx/Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1975.

Critique 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*' in CW3, pp. 3-129.

OJQ 'On the Jewish Question' in CW3, pp. 146-74.

Introduction 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*' in CW3, pp. 175-87.

Comments on Mill 'Comments on James Mill, *Elements of Political Economy*, in CW3. pp. 211-28.

EPM *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Moscow, 1974

PR Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, New York, 1967.

PG Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, New York, 1977.

INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding all the controversies surrounding Karl Marx and his legacy, one thing which can be said with certainty is that no other figure looms so large in the intellectual and political landscape of world history in this century as he does. His social theory, a synthesis of ideas from philosophy, history and the new social sciences is a unique theoretical construct in the history of nineteenth century. His theoretical work was intended to have a practical effect on the course of social developments in the capitalist society. Sheldon Wolin comments: 'He founded a new conception of politics, revolutionary in intent, proletarian in concern, and international in scope and organisation' (quoted in Thomas 1985, 13). Marxist ideas were introduced in various European countries. For instance, in Russia, by the mid-1880s his ideas were advanced by Plekhanov, Vera Zasulich and Akselrod. By the end of 1880s Marxist conceptions had become quite popular with university students and intelligentsia in St. Petersburg. The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party founded in 1898 was Marxist. The Marxist ideas had made inroads into the socialist movement in the 1870s in France. In Germany, soon after Marx's death, the SDP as an explicitly Marxist party came into existence. The emergence of social democratic parties, originally all being Marxists, in Belgium (1885), Austria (1889), Hungary (1890), Bulgaria (1891), Poland (1892), Romania (1892-1900), Holland (1894), etc. show the impact of Marxist thought. In fact, 'by the 1890s it was no longer possible to dismiss him as just another proletarian agitator: the size of the political parties that recognised him as their prophet and the seriousness of the economic investigations that he had initiated had made him a massive force that demanded to be related in some way or other to the major traditions of European thought. As the decade wore on, a number of "bourgeois" economists and social thinkers of the most varying intellectual orientations found themselves compelled to come to grips with his doctrines' (Hughes 1977, 67).

For evaluating the Marxian legacy in our time, it is important to ascertain, and draw the line between what Marx stood for and what he is made out to be by the one-party, authoritarian states. In this context the cleavage we meet is enormous, as Flöistad remarks that 'when we see for what Marx and Marxism are being used and misused by the totalitarian states world-over' (Flöistad 1983, 359). We have witnessed during the last few years the collapse of bureaucratic-

socialism, the system of *nomenklatura* in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR. The colossal changes which have occurred so far constitute one of the major turning points in this epoch. One of the far-reaching implications relates to the question of Marxism's responsibility for the ills of the collapsed regimes. However, the aim of this book precludes any discussion of these momentous contemporary development. My overriding concern here is to explore the rich heritage of Marx's thought on the problem of alienation in his early writings over a limited period as part of research work in philosophy and the history of ideas.

One fertile ground of research in Marx studies, and a major attraction for Marx scholars, has been the question whether or not Marx's works can be regarded as forming a continuous whole ever since the publication of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* in 1932. Most of the writers have defended or expounded the continuity problematic in one form or the other. One notable exception in this debate was the eminent Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. He intervened as a matter of political necessity to combat the French revisionists and their views on the status of Marxism. His refutation of the continuity thesis, therefore, has to be seen in its political context. His writings polemicised the problematic intensely, with the result that it added to an enlivened interest in Marxist philosophy in the European academic world. Alex Callinicos is correct to assess him so highly: 'It is to Louis Althusser more than to any other individual or group that we owe the current renaissance of Marxist philosophy' (Callinicos 1985, 'Preface', v). The Althusserian school emerged, defending and elaborating the scientific character of Marxism. Among the well-known writers who have defended the continuity thesis are Avineri, Cornu, Garaudy, Howard, Hyppolite, Kamenka, Korsch, McLellan, Maguire, Mandel, Meszaros, Plamenatz, Ollman, Tucker, Lewis, Kolakowski and Cornforth. Whereas the Althusserian school advocates an 'epistemological break' in Marx's writings; the concept of alienation is viewed as falling under the pre-scientific, early period. I mention this only to highlight the proliferation of literature around this controversy. However, in the present work this controversy is only of peripheral interest and there does not seem to be any need to enter into any lengthy discourse on the topic.

My treatment of Marx is essentially devoid of any attempts at mythicising him. There is no need for that. An over-zealous supporter or opponent of a political, social or religious cause

may be a big asset for his respective group, organisation or denomination. But this sort of activity intrinsically is inimical to any meaningful discourse in philosophy or science. What Bacon calls 'idols', the idols of the tribe, cave, market and theatre, stand opposed to human reason and mind. Marxism in this respect can specially be singled out. It has and continues to arouse deep passions of devotion and loyalty in some or down-right rejection (and this very often with scanty knowledge of Marxism) and animosity in others. I have tried to present Marx's views on alienation as dispassionately as possible and have not let my own likes or dislikes dictate the inquiry. In this matter, I have found Bacon's advice a sound one: 'Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider' (Bacon 1972, 150).

In a number of ways, this study has its own particular features. First of all, I reject any dogmatic approach to Marxism; and instead view Marxism as a living and developing theory in view of social practice. Marx had articulated the practical requirements of the labour movement in its struggle for emancipation in his lifetime. I have aimed at explaining, analysing and noting the development of Marx's ideas regarding alienation in religious, political and economic spheres up to 1844, and in this process have taken notice of any shift in the meanings as we pass from one article or essay to the other. Marx presents a comprehensive theory of alienation only in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. I have compared the positions which Marx had previously held against the one he espoused in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.* By comparing and contrasting these positions I have endeavoured to show the developmental stages of the concept of alienation in Marx. A concept is regarded as a mental construct. What defines the status of a concept is the nature of essence or content it comes to embody. By comparing and contrasting I have shown how the religious concept of alienation received a definite content and theoretical form in Marx.

In view of the result, it becomes easy to approach the question of continuity or break in Marx from a new angle. This, while setting aside the either/or positions, focuses on Marx's ideas as various and interactive phases of his intellectual development. I have maintained that Marx's ideas regarding humanist perspective and the question of alienation show continuity, but with important differences in the content and form of the concept and theory of alienation in the

period under review. This approach enables us to see the vigour and vitality of Marxism as a living theory and not as a collection of sacrosanct dogmas of a closed system.

Marx, above all, advocated the *Aufhebung* of the existing alienation which shows its dichotomous character in separating between 'doing and thinking', between 'being and having', 'between public life and private life', and between 'theory and practice'. This dichotomy was to be overcome by a unified 'science of man', in place of the reified science and philosophy as Marx suggested in the Manuscripts. This task was achieved by Marx and Engels in formulating the fundamentals of 'historical materialism'. As Maurice Cornforth writes: 'Once the scientific intention of Marxism is grasped, the theory of mankind and society, which itself presupposes scientific theory about nature, becomes the premise for which philosophical theory about thinking -- about, in Engels' own phrases, "thought and its laws" and "the relation of thinking and being" -- takes off, rather than the conclusion drawn from prior philosophical theory' (Cornforth 1980, 45). Marx's contribution in the matter of a scientific theory of man and society 'marks a new departure in relation to all previous sciences.... It completes the establishment of fundamental theory for the scientific investigation of the whole of living nature, including mankind, it inaugurates a stage in which science becomes equipped to treat scientifically of everything which concerns us in life -- not only of "external" nature, but of ourselves and our entire activity in which we each sustain and live an individual life and relate ourselves with one another and with "nature" ' (ibid., 144; see also 145-53).

Marx deals with the same problems which had occupied earlier philosophers in metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, etc. But at the same time there is an important difference which we should not lose sight of. Flöistad points to it thus: 'In many ways, he breaks with [that] tradition and infuses something new. Philosophy should not merely be *theory* but first and foremost it should be a philosophy of action. And as a philosophy of action philosophy should intervene and *change* the world' (Flöistad 1983, 359). Thus the old problem of theory and practice achieves a totally new dimension in Marx. From now on, philosophy of action comes to epitomise Marxian programme in its multi-dimensional aspects signifying the unity of theory and practice. The ground work for this view was laid in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*.

Second, Marx's critique of contemporary world is seen through the human perspective, in which alienation of labour obstructs the emergence of any true human community (*Gemeinschaft*) and thwarts the individual fulfilling his human potentialities. Man is reduced to a dehumanised existence. The individual and his social role form the nucleus of Marx's thinking. Fritz Pappenheim rightly says: 'This is the plight of the "dehumanised human being", of the alienated man, which was Marx's deepest concern and which became the central theme even of those of his writings which on the surface seem to deal exclusively with problems of economic history or economic theory' (Pappenheim 1968, 83). Here the problem of man in Marx should not be seen in the narrow, factionalist discussion of 'humanist Marx' with another equally one-sided and illusory 'scientism' of some neo-Marxist writings. In my exposition, the humanistic concern of Marx is unmistakably emphasised. If we can pinpoint one theme which shows the continuity in Marx's thought as a whole, then that is his concern for the human being, explicit or implicit, as the primary presupposition of his early, middle or mature age. I emphasise this point in the final chapter of this study as well.

Another aim of this study is to offer an adequate background to Marx's immediate intellectual environment. First and foremost, it is the Hegelian heritage which forms the philosophical milieu of Marx's early development. Of course, that does not rule out other influences. Merely due to the fact that Marx's first systematic work is a critical commentary on Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, I have thought it best to present Hegel's political philosophy in Part 1 of chapter 3, followed by Marx's exposition in Part 2. A good grasp of Hegelian ideas is indispensable for a critical appreciation of Marx even at this early stage. Marx's critique of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and the conception of alienation therein is analysed in chapter 7.

But between Marx and Hegel stands Feuerbach. At the early formative stage of Marx, Marx's critical approach to Hegel is mediated through Feuerbach's philosophy. Marx regards Feuerbach as the pulveriser of the Hegelian speculative philosophy; the liberator from the Hegelian 'system'. I have considered it worthwhile to present Feuerbach's philosophical views on religious alienation, man as *Gattungswesen* and his other views in some detail. Feuerbach in the history of ideas deserves a prominent place in his own right, being not merely as a secondary figure to supplement Marx. I have tried to redress the balance by offering an outline of his main

theories in chapter 2. The impact of Feuerbachian views on Marx, no doubt, is substantial. For instance, Marx's critique of Hegel takes place only under the Feuerbachian 'transformational method'. Marx's ideas on the question of religious alienation, his theory of man and his discussion of human nature, which form the bulk of this study, are closely related to Feuerbach's philosophy. Even though Feuerbach is not accorded the importance, which, in the opinion of some writers he deserves (e.g. Wartofsky 1977), he continues to be of interest in our age for his critique of religion philosophically, despite its theological language. The humanist tradition has begun to see the relevance of Feuerbach in the cultural history of the present age. The theologians of established religions and of the divine mysteries meet in Feuerbach the theologian of man, who by any means happens to be a formidable figure to reckon with.

Of all the early works of Marx, the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* present most difficulties with what Istvan Meszaros calls, their 'deceptive simplicity' (Meszaros 1970, 12; for the difficulties of interpretation, see ibid., 12-20). For Louis Dumont, and with some justification, they are the 'formless draft' as they were written by Marx for his own use, and were not meant for publication; nevertheless, he emphasises their importance 'as precious evidence relating to the question of how Marx became Marx, of how, in particular, he built up his basic presuppositions regarding the place of economic phenomena among social phenomena in general' (Dumont 1977, 113). Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to Marx's critique of political economy and the problem of the alienation of labour. I give considerable space to the discussion of Marx's concept of human nature which Marx outlines in the E*conomic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. Chapter 7 exclusively deals with Marx's critique of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and the problem of alienation in this work. In chapter 8, I conclude the study with an appraisal of the theory of alienation within the specified area and period.

Finally, a few words about the procedure. Except for a limited number of cases, the citations from Marx for the period March 1843--August 1844, are from Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 3 (CW3) and the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (translated by Milligan). Beside these, I have used other translations of Marx's early works for comparison and evaluation of translations. In places the translations of McLellan and Bottomore are more effective and easy to understand, but I have opted to use the translations from Moscow to avoid

terminological confusion: the terminology used in various translations, as I have shown in 1.2. is varied. A few quotations from the German have been used to assist the clarification or emphasise some point. All references from the secondary sources are included in the text.

I have not thought it necessary to provide any exhaustive lists of the possible reading material, because in the form of presentation I chose, too many references would have made the text cumbersome in form. But there are other standard works with a different method of presentation having detailed references and footnotes, which should also be consulted. The range of secondary sources used in the work is quite wide, and is also of unequal character. Alongside some prominent philosophers and scholars a few writers of research articles have also been included. All the italics represent italics or underlinings in the original or the secondary sources unless otherwise stated. The abbreviations used are shown on a separate list.

CHAPTER 1

THE THEORY OF ALIENATION

The central point in the present study is the problem of alienation in Marx's early works and the specific content of it which forms an important stage in the intellectual development of Marx. As an introduction to the specifics of this project, a brief historical survey seems desirable. The ever-increasing use of the term 'alienation' in contemporary social sciences and empirical surveys in advanced industrial societies are often pointers to the social phenomenon facing modern man as a multi-dimensional problem.

In the social sciences, the term 'alienation' has been stretched to the maximum in order to describe and comprehend important manifestations of industrial and post-industrial society. Peter C. Ludz points to the danger in it: 'The popularity, the immediate accessibility and the generality of the term must always be limited if the demands of scientific rigour are not to be sacrificed. This dilemma is increased by the fact that, within the social sciences, the term and the concept do not convey one specific meaning. Indeed, one can question whether "alienation" is a concept at all' (in Geyer, et al. 1976, 4). Even though any unanimity of views on such a wide concept is beside the point, the ambiguities of the concept are, nonetheless, formidable. This has led some to plead for its elimination from the social sciences altogether. Irving Horowitz writes: 'Despite the incredible degree of confusion which exists about the term "alienation" -- a confusion which has caused many influencials in sociology and psychology to try to do without it -- there is a danger in a premature scrapping of the term. There are few enough words in the vocabulary of social sciences having wide generic implications. In some sense the very confusions about the word alienation represent an acute, albeit painful, testimonial to a conceptual complication which exists in consequence of the autonomous development of the social and behavioural sciences' (Horowitz 1966-67, 230). Since Horowitz wrote this, the phenomenon of alienation has increasingly been the focus of attention in philosophy and sociology. The Polish philosopher Adam Schaff attributes this, and with good reason, to the

publication of Marx's early works: 'The theory of alienation was brought into contemporary philosophy by the mediation of Marx....[It] has achieved unusual triumphs during the past few decades. This is a new phenomenon, connected indirectly with the publication of Marx's early texts. Vittorio Rieser correctly draws our attention to the fact that in the index of the American Sociological Review for the years 1936-1955 we do not find a single article on alienation, while in the subsequent years, just as in other American periodicals in the field of sociology, psychology, etc., articles of this type abound' (Schaff 1980, 87).

Among the most common usages as at present, powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation and cultural estrangement, for example, can be mentioned (see Blauner 1964, 1-3 and Seeman 1959). Powerlessness is the feeling that one's destiny is not under one's control but under the control of other external agents. In his comparative analysis of alienation in different industries, Blauner finds powerlessness as the inability of the workers to control the work process. Meaninglessness refers to lack of understanding or lack of any consistent meaning in the action, work, etc., man is involved in. In case of the industrial worker, it is his lack of sense and purpose in regard to the work process. Normlessness is the lack of commitment to shared social values. Social isolation is the pervasive malaise of loneliness or exclusion in social relations. However, it will be erroneous to identify social isolation with self-estrangement because all isolates are not alienated. Alienation may be the result of social pressure of groups as the co-editors of Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society point out: 'Indeed, alienation may result from the social pressure of groups, crowd or mass as David Reisman suggests in The Lonely Crowd. By the same token alienation should not be confused with "social disorganisation", since, ... estrangement may also result in highly organised bureaucracies. Alienation is often associated with loneliness; but again, not all lonely people are alienated' (Josephson & Josephson 1962, 14). Seeman regards normlessness as the pressure on the individual to adopt illegitimate means to achieve the cultural defined goals he has set himself; isolation happening when the individual is unable to accept these cultural goals. Self-estrangement, the main theme of alienation, understands the individual, in one way or the other to be out of touch with himself. 'Whatever the approach, central to the definition of alienation is the idea that man has lost his identity or "selfhood". Many writers who deal with the problem of

self-alienation assume, implicitly or explicitly, that in each of us there is a "genuine", "real" or "spontaneous" self which we are prevented from knowing or achieving. But how does one achieve selfhood? The most satisfactory answer has been provided by social psychologists, notably Charles H. Mead and George H. Mead, who argued that one acquires a self or identity through interaction with others' (ibid., 14-15). Josephson and Josephson explain further: 'Implicit in most approaches to alienation is the ideal of an "integrated" man and of a cohesive society in which he will find meaning and satisfaction in his own productivity and in his relations with others. As Emile Durkheim expressed it, man in a "solidaristic" society "will no longer find the only aim of his conduct in himself and, understanding that he is the instrument of a purpose greater than himself, he will see that he is not without significance" ' (ibid., 16).

Despite the employment of the term "alienation" in a number of different contexts, some common features of these uses are also detectable. As Arnold Kaufman says: 'To claim that a person is alienated is to claim that his relation to something else has certain features which result in avoidable discontent or loss of satisfaction' (Kaufman 1965, 132). And Kenneth Keniston remarks: 'Most usages of "alienation" share the assumption that some relationship or connection that once existed, that is "natural", desirable, or good has been lost' (Keniston 1965, 452). Alienation arises as a result of something and it is always alienation or estrangement from something. In order to establish a certain degree of precision, I present an historical perspective on alienation in 1.1. followed by some definitions, and terminological distinctions in 1.2.

1.1. An historical overview of the concept

The term "alienation" is relatively of recent origin but the concept of alienation is of considerable antiquity. As a concept, according to Erich Fromm, it found its early expression in Western thought in the Old Testament's story of the golden calf and its discussion by the Hebrew prophets as idolatry: 'The essence of what the prophets call "idolatry" is not that man worships many Gods instead of only one. It is that the idols are the work of man's own hands -- they are things, and man bows down and worships things, worships that which he has created himself. He transfers to the things of his creation the attributes of his own life, and instead of experiencing himself as the

creating person, he is in touch with himself only by the worship of the idol. He has become estranged from his own life forces ... and is in touch with himself only in the indirect way of submission to the life frozen in the idols' (Fromm 1961, 44). Long after the prophets, Ludwig Feuerbach was also to arrive at the analogous conclusion regarding God as the creation of man, which leads to man's duality through the self-externalisation of himself as God.

Lichtheim argues that the concept of 'alienation' can be traced back to the writings of Plotinus (204-70 A.D.), the founder of Neoplatonism, 'whose doctrine of emanation assumed a procession from an ultimate undefinable source or principle to a multiplicity of finite beings: the undivided One unfolds into its various manifestations by a downward process linking the supersensible Being with a hierarchy of lower spheres and ultimately with the world of nature and material existence, matter being the lowest stage of the universe and the antithesis to the One' (Lichtheim 1968, 264). Neoplatonism, which was originally hostile to Christianity, did exert a great influence on Christian patristics and on the development of speculative philosophy in the feudal society both in Muslim and Christian countries.

In the Judaeo-Christian theology, man is said to have been 'alienated from God' or 'fallen from Grace'. The Messianic mission consists, apart from salvaging souls for the Kingdom of Heaven, in rescuing man from this self-alienation. Thus Meszaros points to 'alienation' in the New Testament where Paul the Apostle in the Epistle to the Ephesians says: "'Remember ... that ye were without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenant of promise, having no hope and without God in the world: but now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far off are made neigh by the blood of Christ".... Christianity thus in its universality, announces the imaginary solution of human self-alienation in the form of "the mystery of Christ" ' (Meszaros 1970, 28). From the English translation of the New Testament text used by Meszaros, it is not clear whether he is tracing the *term* or the *concept* to this point. Tronn Overend uses the Greek texts to settle the question: 'The Greek terms used here are: *"appallotrioomai"* and "*politeia"* which are cognates for "I am being alienated from" ("appallotriomai") "the citizen body" ("politeia"). It can be concluded, then, the *term* "alienation" goes back to the New Testament, while the *concept* back further, to the Old Testament' (Overend 1974-5, 306).

The claim that the concept reaches back only to the Old Testament is questionable, because during this period there were other cultures which were highly developed with their own views on man and his place in the world. Adam Schaff is of the opinion that the ancestry of the concept reaches our remote past. He writes: 'Today we have at our disposal solid historical material which takes the origin of the concept of alienation even further back [than the Biblical story of the golden calf]. If the theory of alienation has become fashionable today, then it is a fashion which goes back to the views not of our grandfathers but of our remote ancestors. Not only "*habent sua fata libelli*" but also "*habent sua fata ideae*". Even Western culture has not been rigorously examined in this respect and new perspectives are opening up which reveal analogous conceptions in Buddhism, Islam and the classical philosophies of China, India, etc.' (Schaff 1980, 24).

Analogous to the Biblical account of man's alienation from God, we find a theory of alienation in the ancient Greek philosopher and scientist Empedocles whose idea of man's fall from the Golden Age and the cyclical historical development leading to his repossession of the original state are of some conceptual significance. Seneca (*ca*. 4 B.C. to 65 A.D.) adapted and gave an account of the theory of the Golden Age which he conceived to have existed before the sophistication of civilisation. He depicted this idyllic state of nature where human beings were not corrupted by the institution of private property and the greed for it. In the Golden Age people were innocent and happy, living a simple and loving life. In Seneca's formulations the social institutions, governments and laws are a result of man's estrangement from his state of nature. Seneca's glorification of the primordial state played an important role in the works of Grotius, Locke, Hume and Rousseau.

In the scholastic literature and the development of Christian theology, St. Augustine's book *De Civitate Dei* (City of God) had immense influence throughout the Middle Ages. St. Augustine developed the Christian conception of world history comprehended fatalistically, as pre-ordained by God. He counterposed his 'City of God', the universal rule of the church, to *Civitas terrena*, the City of Earth, the sinful, secular state. He taught that the miseries which men suffer at the hands of government and slavery were due to the corruption of human nature (see also Markus 1964, 90-93). His theology in turn became 'an important source for the Lutheran

interpretation of Christianity and therewith for the German Protestant tradition, which in the nineteenth century was secularised in the philosophical writings of Hegel and Feuerbach' (Lichtheim 1968, 264).

In the present context, I shall briefly mention the meaning of the word 'alienation' which we come across in the theological literature, signifying the estrangement of 'sinful' man from God. Paul speaking of the Gentiles says: 'They are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, due to their hardness of heart' (cited in Schacht 1980, 15). The meaning of 'alienated from' in the passage refers clearly to be separated or cut off from the life of God. Calvin commenting on another text of Paul says: '[The] spiritual death is nothing else than the alienation of the soul from God' (ibid., 16). The Pauline view of the Incarnation as Christ emptying himself of the divine properties was expressed in the Greek verb *ekenosen* (in the Latin Vulgate translated as *exinanivit*). Luther employed the term as *hat sich selbst geäussert* (literally 'emptied' himself) which led directly to Hegel's use of the noun *Entäusserung*. In Feuerbach and Marx *Entäusserung* bears the same meanings as *Entfremdung* (see Lichtheim 1968, 264). Cottiers sums up the concept of '*Kenosis*' succinctly: 'According to this theory, in incarnation divinity itself becomes limited, undergoes an amputation. The attribute of immutability is renounced. God ceases to be God. The name of the theory derives from the passage in the epistle to the Philippians, where Paul uses the verb *ekenosen*. Hegel's God is *kenosis*, an act of emptying oneself in an exteriorization; this *kenosis* is not limited to the individual Christ, however, it is generalised' (cited in Schaff 1980, 25).

Among the major influences which shaped Marx's concept of alienation, besides the German romanticists, was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As I devote considerable space to Feuerbach and Hegel in the present study, I will briefly present here the problem of alienation in Rousseau's political philosophy. The prime objective of this is to come to those ideas which have a close connection with Marx's development of the concept. The theological accounts mentioned above show the pedigree of alienation to Marx's theory very remotely. However, in the political and social philosophy of Rousseau the complex problem of alienation and dehumanisation appears with striking intensity. Meszaros writes: 'His influence was instantaneous and lasting, against a background of increasing social contradictions and of economic development which turned the

promise of the industrial revolution into the nightmare of "the dark Satanic mills". Thus the themes of alienation so early and forcefully taken up by Rousseau were already "in the air" -- as if bellowing straight out of the chimneys of those Satanic mills -- and through whatever metamorphoses remained with us ever since' (Meszaros 1986, 253). Rousseau's exposition of his social doctrine, no doubt, is the predecessor of Hegel's and Marx's theories of alienation.

It is more appropriate to see Rousseau's views on alienation in a general context rather than as a specific theory of alienation. Rousseau like the theorists of natural rights, recognised the concept of social contract, using the term 'alienation' like the transfer of one's rights in a juridical sense. The Polish philosopher Bronislaw Baczko observes: 'Rousseau uses this [the word alienation] in the etymological sense and in the context traditionally established in the theory of law: "alienation" for him was the act of relinquishing or sale which might pertain either to things or to specific human rights, an act which rested, among others, at the foundation of the social contract' (cited in Schaff 1980, 27). In this, Rousseau's use of the term in the sense of 'transfer' is as in Grotius. But he rejects the view as propounded by Grotius on the possibility of man alienating his rights to a sovereign. Liberty was not subject to sale or transfer. In his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, he criticises Pufendorf for the view that we may divest ourselves of our liberty in favour of other persons, just as we transfer our property by contract. Rousseau writes: 'Besides, the right of property being only a convention of human institution, men may dispose of what they possess as they please: but this is not the case with essential gifts of nature, such as life and liberty, which every man is permitted to enjoy, and of which it is at least doubtful whether any have a right to divest themselves' (Rousseau 1973, 95). To alienate one's property does not involve any degradation, but by the alienation of our liberty 'we degrade our being' (ibid., 95).

But it should be noted that the prime target of Rousseau's argument is the individual sovereign who cannot claim the liberty of the people. Schacht observes that 'Rousseau is not arguing that there are *no* circumstances under which sovereign authority over oneself may properly be alienated. On the contrary, he considers such alienation to be "vain and meaningless" *unless* this authority is transferred to a *community* (rather than an individual), in which all are on an equal footing. And he maintains not only that such alienation *is* possible in this case, but also

that it is a condition of the very existence of a community' (Schacht 1971, 19). In this way 'each man giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; ... he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has' (Rousseau 1973, 174). It means that the individual has not contracted himself out of his natural liberty. As the civil power and responsibility reside in the community, the individual by his contract places himself under the control of the sovereign, his action means only that he, like other person, places himself under the control of himself and his fellow citizens.

Rousseau in his criticism of man's present existence, views his relation to nature, in particular, as one of alienation. Man in his primal natural state, according to Rousseau, depends upon the products of nature, and he satisfies his needs without encroaching upon the interests of others. Man in this phase is neither good nor bad. He has a free will, because his will is affected by no other social considerations or relations except his own needs.

In the natural state man's free will is not infringed by his dependence upon nature. But the problem arises as soon as man develops his dependence upon other people. It leads to complex organisations and institutions within society. Under these conditions, division of labour and private property develop. Under the changed situation, marked social differentiation appears. *Amour propre*, i.e. egoistic self-love, replaces *amour de soi*. The development of human faculties and their practical application leads to satisfaction of egoistic interests and needs: 'It now became the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To be and to seem became two totally different things; and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the numerous vices that go in their train. On the other hand, free and independent as men were before, they were now, in consequence of a multiplicity of new wants, brought into subjection, as it were, to all nature, and particularly to one another; and each became in some degree a slave even in becoming the master of other men' (Rousseau 1973, 86). Jealousy, vile propensity to injure one another, rivalry and competition arise. 'Insatiable ambition ... not so much from real want as from the desire to surpass others' leads to 'a secret jealousy, which is the more dangerous, as it puts on the mask of benevolence, to carry its point with greater security' (ibid., 87). Rivalry and competition lead to conflicting interests. Rousseau declares: 'All these evils were the first effects of property, and the inseparable attendants of growing inequality' (ibid., 87). Marx in his

early writings develops his criticism of the capitalist society and the inherent problem of alienation in it by focusing on egoistic man and the problem of competition. The imprint of Rousseau's ideas is conspicuous.

The good that exists in the state of nature, according to Rousseau, is vitiated by human civilisation. This, in fact, is the synthesising idea in Rousseau's system. The opening sentences of his *Emile* read: 'God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil. He confuses and confounds time, place, and natural conditions ... he will have nothing as nature made it, not even man himself, who must learn his paces like a saddle-horse, and be shaped to his master's taste like the trees in his garden ' (Rousseau 1970, 5; see also Meszaros 1970, 53-61). The departure of man from nature and the creation of his social institutions enslaves and debases man. The human civilisation destroys the original goodness of man. (Marx also takes up the theme of man's alienation in relation to nature in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, which I discuss in chapter 5.)

But this condemnation of the evils of society does not lead Rousseau to advocate a return to a state of pristine existence. He offered contradictory perspectives on most issues and he can be easily interpreted as defending contradictory positions. Regarding the present problem facing man today in its acute form is the conflict between the individual and the society. Rousseau suggests that by transferring or alienating authority to the community, the individual is totally transformed. 'These clauses [of the social contract], properly understood, may be reduced to one -- the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community' (Rousseau 1973, 174). In this context, Rousseau uses the term 'alienation' in the sense of detachment, but that does not convey all the meanings involved. Schacht comments: 'Rousseau is not completely clear about what is involved in this alienation, and precisely what is to be alienated.... In some cases it may be construed in the sense of "transferred to the community"; while in others it may be understood in the sense of "renounced before the community". For certain rights (e.g. that of punishing wrongdoers) may be transferred to the community; but "natural liberty" can only be renounced before it. Rousseau has both things in mind, on different occasions' (Schacht 1971, 19-20).

In fact, Rousseau's discussion of alienation moves beyond the mere detachment or transfer of rights; it involves the full integration of social totality of the community. From this viewpoint, man's debt to the community is far greater, because from now on his rights, morality and his status as a man are consequences of his being a member of the totality, the body politic. As Joachim Israel puts it: 'It is from this totality that the individual then obtains his life and his being. This in turn will lead to the substitution of his physical and independent existence for a partial and moral existence. Those who dare to change an individual will take away man's power in order to endow him with those powers which he can use only when co-operating with other people' (Israel 1971, 21). In the transformation of the individual in the body politic, man becomes a social creature with a social conscience; he is no more led by his egoistic and individualistic competitive drives at the cost of others. The citizen, who has a genuine concern for the welfare of all replaces the private person, the individual subject.

Meszaros offers a fairly judicious opinion on Rousseau's contribution in these words: 'Rousseau's great dilemma was that while he pinpointed the social contradictions as the root of alienation, he could not suggest any realistic remedies to them. His great educational utopias -- put forward in the name and force of a categorical moral *ought* -- were meant as counter-examples to a reality whose contradictions he could not help retaining and idealising. For he was forced to admit that within the framework of his vision the sacredness of private property was the ultimate foundation of civilised life itself.... Thus in the end in the utopian counter-examples the remedy to alienation was restricted to pruning the "excesses" of the prevailing trends, in the name of an idealised "middle condition" which, set against the dynamic power of the unfolding capitalist development, had to remain a *moral postulate*' (Meszaros 1986, 255).

Hegel's philosophy was decisive for Marx's theory of alienation. The meaning given to the term 'alienation' by Marx in the sense of 'estrangement' or 'detachment' owes a great deal to its Hegelian source. It was Hegel who for the first time used *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung* as explicit philosophical terms systematically in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. But there is a theory of alienation (under the name of *Positivität*) already in Hegel's early writings that are collected as the *Theologische Jugendschriften*. This period extends from 1790 to 1800 when Hegel tried to

formulate his philosophy on religious basis. (As to different developmental stages in Hegel's philosophy, see Marcuse 1941, 28-29.)

In this period, Hegel regards the 'positive' faith of Christianity as a pillar of despotism and oppression, compared with the non-positive religions of antiquity, which were religions of freedom and human dignity. Hegel's concept of positivity is best described by Hegel himself: 'A positive faith is a system of religious propositions which are true for us because they have been presented to us by an authority which we cannot flout.... the concept implies a system of religious propositions or truths which must be held to be truths independently of our own opinions, and which even if no man has ever perceived them and even if no man has ever considered them to be truths, nevertheless remain truths. These truths are often said to be the objective truths and what is required of them is that they should now become objective truths, truths for us' (cited in Lukacs 1975, 18; see also Marcuse 1941, 35). Here positivity means the imposition of authority; where the moral choice of the subject is negated. It is largely due to this critique of positivity by Hegel in his early writings that his philosophy is seen as potentially radical, but his 'vaunting of a kind of scientific positivity later disposes him to conservatism' (Gouldner 1980, 178).

Positive religion, in Hegel's view, was the chief hurdle to the liberation of man. In his critique of religion, Hegel observed that 'the objectivity of the deity increased in direct proportion to the increase in the corruption and slavery of man, and this objectivity is in reality no more than a revelation, a manifestation of this spirit of the age ... The spirit of the age was revealed in the objectivity of its God when ... it was introduced into a world alien to us, in a realm in which we had no share, where we could not acquire a place through our activity, but at most by begging or conjuring our way in; it was an age when man was a Non-ego and his God was another Non-ego.... In such an age the Deity sheds all its subjectivity and becomes nothing but object; and the inversion of all moral precepts is easily and logically justified by theory.... This is the system of every Church' (cited in Lukacs 1975, 69). In the writings of Hegel's early period, we find a materialist critique of religion which was subsequently developed by Feuerbach, Strauss and Marx.

In his theological expositions in the early phase, Hegel was trying to find an answer as to why the relation between the individual and the state does not fulfil his capacities. He regarded

the state rather as an alienated and alienating institution. Marcuse observes: 'Hegel defined this state with the same categories as those of eighteenth century liberalism: the state rests on the consent of individuals ... The individual, as opposed to the state, possesses the inalienable rights of man, and with these the state power can under no circumstances interfere, not even if such interference may be in the individual's own interest.... Here is nothing of that moral and metaphysical exaltation of the state which we encounter in Hegel's later works' (Marcuse 1941, 32-33).

The concept of positivity, as Lukacs points out contains the seeds of a problem which 'will prove central to the later developments of the dialectic: viz. the problem he was later to designate by the term "*externalisation*" (*Entäusserung*) and which, in the context of his later, much more comprehensive and systematic ideas, contains the entire problem of the nature of objects (*Gegenständlichkeit*) in thought, nature and in history. We need remind ourselves that in his later philosophy the whole of nature is conceived as an externalisation of mind, of spirit' (Lukacs 1975, 74). In his later writings, Hegel begins to analyse work as a process of externalisation (*Entäusserung*). Out of his studies of classical economy, Hegel comes to conclude that 'work not only makes man human ... it not only causes the vast and complex array of social processes to come into being, it also makes the world of man into an "alienated", "externalised", world. The old concept of "positivity" had placed a one-sided emphasis on the dead, alien aspects of social institutions. In the concept of "externalisation", however, we find enshrined Hegel's conviction that the world of economics which dominates man and which utterly controls the life of the individual, is nevertheless the product of man himself. It is in this duality that the truly seminal nature of "externalisation" is to be found' (ibid., 333; see also Schacht 1971, 25-37; Israel 1971, 26-29; Marcuse 1941, 34-35).

Hegel's philosophy, like the philosophy of any other important thinker, can be understood in its cultural and historical settings. The specific concept of *Entäusserung* can be distinguished from *Entfremdung* in traditions of the church going back to Luther. Adam Schaff points out that 'the difference between these concepts is not very clear in Hegel, and in Marx, who in his later writings used the concepts interchangeably, it is lost completely'. Schaff continues: '*Kenosis* or *Entäusserung* is the consequence of the Divine Spirit going "out of itself", of an incarnation

which entails the abandonment of divine properties in favour of human ones. The Hegelian concept of the absolute idea going out of itself and constituting material reality which is the exteriorization and *Entäusserung* of this idea, vividly reminds us of the theological doctrine of *Kenosis* transplanted to a historical-cosmic level' (Schaff 1980, 25).

The main thrust of Hegel's theological writings, as mentioned above, was against Christianity. It stands in sharp contrast to his later views on the role of religion. Lukacs in his classic study *The Young Hegel* writes: 'We may ... give our conclusion which is that in his youth Hegel conceives of Christianity as the religion of the "private individual", of the bourgeois, as the religion of the loss of human liberty, of the millennia-long despotism and enslavement of mankind. Such ideas place Hegel firmly in the mainstream of Enlightenment thought.' Lukacs qualifies this conclusion with the remark that 'Hegel never took his attacks on Christianity as far as the great English and French thinkers. His critique of Christianity never reaches the point of materialist atheism. Quite the reverse, the core of his work here is religious. His aim is to discover the social prerequisites for a return from a religion of despotism and enslavement to a religion of freedom on the model of antiquity' (Lukacs 1975, 9). The notion that religion was instrumental in man's alienation from his true nature belongs to Ludwig Feuerbach. It was Feuerbach's transformation of theology into anthropology which started the secularisation of an originally theological concept. This process reaches its critical development in Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.*

1.2. Definitions and Distinctions: Alienation, *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung*

In this section, I intend to clarify the meanings of the terms used to denote the concept which can roughly be translated in English as 'alienation'. As the terms and words have a varied history of their usage and interpretations, I think it will be helpful to point out some possible distinctions at this stage in the present work.

I begin with the term 'alienation'. To define it has to be only a tentative effort at a very general level. Gajo Petrovich writes: 'The term 'alienation' (estrangement) has very many different meanings in everyday life, in science, and in philosophy; most of them can be regarded as modifications of one broad meaning which is suggested by the etymology and morphology of the word -- the meaning in which alienation (or estrangement) is the act, through which something or somebody, becomes (or has become) alien (or strange) to something or somebody, else' (in Edwards 1967, vol. 1, 76). It makes it rather difficult for the social theorists to proceed with any commonly accepted criterion in the use of the term 'alienation'. Peter C. Ludz, in view of the problem, suggests: 'The popularity, the immediate accessibility and the generality of the term must always be limited if the demands of scientific rigour are not to be sacrificed. This dilemma is increased by the fact that, within the social sciences, the term and the concept do not convey one specific meaning. Indeed, one can question whether "alienation" is a concept at all' (in Geyer and Schweitzer 1976, 4). But the vast array of opinions around the concept, according to Ludz, is not the plausible ground to eliminate the concept from the humanities as advocated by some researchers, like W. Kaufmann and P. Naville, among others.

Etymologically, the term 'alienation' is derived from the Latin noun *alienatio*; its verb is *alienere* (to make something into another's, to remove, to take away). The Latin term *alienatio* has a threefold meaning which has come to be represented in English by 'alienation'. First, in the legal sphere, it shows connection with legal property or rights by transfer or sale to another. Seneca used the term in this legal sense (see Lobkowicz 1967, 299). Secondly, in the medico-psychological sphere it meant mental derangement or insanity (*alienatio mentis*), etc.,. Thirdly, in the interpersonal sphere it meant a personal separation or estrangement from other men, or from his country or God. (For a brief summary of these three spheres, see Schacht 1971, 10-13).

The German term *Entfremdung* corresponds to the Latin noun '*alienatio*' and the English 'alienation'. The term has been in use since the Middle Ages. In Grimms' *Wörterbuch* of 1862, the meaning of the *entfremden* is given as: *fremd machen, berauben, nehmen, entledigen*', etc., which can be translated as 'to make alien, to rob, to take, to strip of'. The literal meanings of the German *Entfremdung* and the English 'alienation' are also similar. But unlike the English term, *Entfremdung* did not have a standard usage in connection with the deliberate and legal transfer of

property to another; but it did refer to a change of ownership in the sense of robing or taking a thing from its owner. By the end of the last century the term no longer appeared in German dictionaries. Its reappearance, later in recent times, is primarily in connection with interpersonal estrangement. Instead of *Entfremdung*, another term *Veräusserung* was used in legal transactions regarding transfer of property to another. Hegel uses it in his *Philosophy of Right* in the legal meaning of transfer.

An another term used by Hegel is *Entäusserung*, which is variously translated as 'alienation', 'surrender' (of property), or 'renunciation', and 'abdication', etc., (Lobkowicz 1967, 299). It was used earlier by Fichte and Hegel's use of it owes much to the Fichtean influence.

However, in Hegel the terms *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung* have different meanings. Since Marx has used them interchangeably, it is essential to pay attention to their difference in Hegel. Marcella D'Abbeiro writes:

'After Marx (and in Marx himself) the concepts of "*Entäusserung*" and "*Entfremdung*" were considered as perfectly equivalent. The Italian translation generally adopted is "*alienazione*". In Hegel, on the other hand, these two concepts are different. We should not equate them, as many translators have done.... "*Entäusserung*" ("*Veräusserrung*") and "*Entfremdung*", and especially the first two, were not employed by Hegel in an unequivocal sense, to denote a well-defined and precise concept... "*Entfremdung*" and "*entfremden*" always had the negative meaning of "secession", "estrangement": "*Entäusserung*", "*entäussern*" and the rarer "*Veräusserung*" had the meaning of "renunciation", which could acquire either a negative or a positive sense' (cited in Schaff 1980, 29).

Richard Schacht has also emphasised the difference in the meaning of the term 'alienation' in Hegel, although he uses a different typology of these meanings. He writes: 'One cannot meaningfully speak of "Hegel's concept of alienation", *simpliciter*, because he uses the term in two different ways. At times he uses it to refer to a separation or discordant relation, such as might obtain between the individual and the social substance, or (as "self-alienation") between one's actual condition and essential nature.... He also uses it to refer to a surrender or sacrifice of particularity and wilfulness, in connection with the overcoming of alienation, and the reattainment of unity' (Schacht 1980, 43-44).

Despite these differences of interpretation, as Schaff observes, both Hegel and Marx have 'distinguished *Entäusserung* ("making something alien" by renunciation or transfer of rights) from *Entfremdung* ("becoming alien") both in the sense that the Spirit (*Geist*) alienates itself when "going out of itself" to constitute the material world and in the sense that man becomes alien in relation to his own nature or being -- self-alienation. The emphasis on the objective character of alienation in Hegel's concept is particularly important from the point of view of Marxist analysis: what matters is not that man subjectively experiences his relation to reality as alienness, but that this reality, in effect, becomes alien in respect to man. This is an important conclusion which counterposes the subjective concept of alienation appearing in existentialism not only to Marx's but also to Hegel's theory of alienation' (Schaff 1980, 29-30).

When speaking of alienation, Marx employs, as mentioned above, the terms *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung* interchangeably. Chris Arthur argues that some problems associated with these terms in Marx and his translators 'flow from a certain condensation in the employment of the expressions themselves' (Arthur 1980, 13). There are three key terms:

(1) *Entfremdung*: estrangement; alienation.

(2) *Entäusserung*: alienation (of property); parting with; relinquishment, externalisation.

(3) *Vergegenständlichung*: objectification.

Regarding the first two terms which can be translated as 'alienation', we have three concepts: (a) estrangement; (b) alienation of property to another; and (c) externalisation. The translators have adopted different solutions to the terminological complexity. For instance, Milligan (1974) and Benton (1974) render *Entfremdung*: estrangement and *Entäusserung*: alienation (or externalisation) whereas Easton and Guddat (1967) and McLellan (1974) translate *Entfremdung:* alienation, and *Entäusserung*: externalisation. Bottomore renders both terms as alienation (or estrangement) 'since Marx (unlike Hegel) does not make a systematic distinction between them' (Bottomore 1963, xix). We can also mention her Miller (translator of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*) and Livingstone (translator of Lukacs's *The Young Hegel*) who have translated *Entfemdung*: alienation and *Entäusserung:* externalisation. And it is despite the fact that Lukacs says in the last chapter of *The Young Hegel*:

'In themselves there is nothing novel about the terms *Entäusserung* and *Entfremdung*. They are simply German translations of the English word "alienation". This was used in works of economic theory to betoken the sale of a commodity, and in works on natural law to refer to the loss of an aboriginal freedom, the handing-over or alienation of freedom to the society which came into being as a result of social contract. Philosophically, the term *Entäusserung* was first used, to the best of my knowledge, by Fichte for whom it meant both that the positing of an object implied an externalisation or alienation of the subject and that the object was to be thought of as an "externalised" act of reason' (Lukacs 1975, 538).

The important point is that Marx does make a distinction between objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*) and alienation (*Entäusserung*). Marx's philosophical anthropology stresses man's activity and work. Peter Ludz writes: 'According to Marx, human activity ideally includes both an externalisation into an object (*Entäusserung*) and a reappropriation of that object, i.e. an objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*). This unity is broken. Objectification becomes alienation; man is no longer able to re-appropriate the object of his work. The world of objects stands alien to him, although he himself has created it. Work is no longer activity but has become forced labour' (in Geyer and Schweitzer 1976, 9). Marx's theory of alienation (*Entfremdung*) occupying a central place in his thought addresses itself to this phenomenon and its supersession.

CHAPTER 2

RELIGIOUS ALIENATION: FEUERBACH AND MARX

In this chapter, after a brief introduction to Marx's early works as an essential background to the discussion on Feuerbach and his influence on Marx, I present the main tenets of Feuerbach's philosophy in 2.2. While crediting Feuerbach for his great achievements, Marx, on a number of issues held adverse judgements and critical reservations from early on about Feuerbach's work. In 2.3. and 2.4. I set out Feuerbach's concept of human nature, man as species-being and man as a communal being. These ideas have a direct influence on Marx's theory of man as enunciated in the *EPM*. In 2.5. I discuss the impact of Feuerbachian philosophy, especially his transformational criticism of Hegelian philosophy which Marx inherited from Feuerbach. A gradual shift in Marx's position regarding Feuerbach is shown by his growing awareness that Feuerbachian 'contemplative' philosophy does not provide any solution in concrete terms to overcome alienation in the specific conditions of the capitalist social order. To seek the cause of human alienation only in religion is not enough. Marx moves on to the study of concrete factors of social life, in the sphere of politics and economics, to find the causes of alienation. I conclude this chapter with Marx's critique of Feuerbach in his famous *Theses on Feuerbach.*

2.1. The concept of alienation in the Young Hegelian movement

Although the notion of alienation received an extended elaboration in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (published in 1807), it attracted no special attention and the term gained hardly any currency. After Hegel's death in 1831, however, his philosophy for a decade saw an immense rise in its influence in Germany. 'Few figures in modern history,' writes William Brazill, 'have exercised an influence as pervasive and as puzzlingly complex as Hegel's, few have exercised so profound an ascendancy over the minds of generations of intellectuals.... For those who chose to consider themselves his disciples in Germany in the 1830s and 1840s, Hegel's influence was a

direct and specific experience. They accepted the master's views totally and were content to develop their own ideas within the framework provided by his philosophy' (Brazill 1970, 29). Hegel's remarks that 'a party shows itself to be victorious when it splits in two parties.... What appears to be an unfortunate dissension within a party is really a proof of its success' (cited in Brazill 1970, 27). This also proved true in the case of the Hegelian movement. The Hegelians split in conservative and radical groups. The radicals were called the Left Hegelians or the Young Hegelians that included in their members David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Arnold Ruge, Edgar Bauer, Max Stirner, Freidrich Theodor Vischer as well as young Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Among the most prominent figures were Ludwig Feuerbach, David Strauss and Bruno Bauer who were often grouped together as a Left-Hegelian trio. However, Feuerbach did not identify his views with those of the other two (for details, see Toews 1985, 327).

Although the main thrust of the atheistic humanism of the Young Hegelians was the criticism of religion, there was more at stake than merely the questions of religious dogma. In the nineteenth-century Germany the question of religious belief had taken on an inherently social and political dimension that became increasingly important during the social and political unrest of the 1830s and 1840s. Hegel had tried to reconcile Christianity with his philosophic system. The conservative Hegelians argued that Christianity formed a vital part of the Hegelian system. The Left Hegelians fiercely contested this claim and held that Christianity could not be reconciled with philosophic truth.

Under the Young Hegelians the Hebraic-Christian traditional duality of God and man became the immediate target of the attack. The latent monism of God and man implicit in Hegelian philosophy was used to buttress the tool of criticism. Robert Tucker writes: 'The fundamental theme around which the movement of thought revolved was formulated by Strauss as the unity of the divine and human natures. This idea was, of course, Hegelian in inspiration. It was implicit in Hegel's dynamic monism of God and man. Even the Young Hegelian watchword "criticism" of which Bruno Bauer was the principal author, derived easily from Hegel's picture of knowledge as a progressive puncturing of illusions. Bauer interpreted this to mean the evolution of critical consciousness via the progressive exposure of dogma, and saw it as the principal task of the critical consciousness to express the God-illusion and show man to be the real Deity'

(Tucker 1972, 73-74). One of the important ideas in this connection related to the self-alienation and self-estrangement of man.

In 1835, David Strauss's *Life of Jesus* was published. Strauss explained that Christianity recognised that God is Man. The significance of the historical Jesus is that he introduced this idea, and then this idea in the gospels was changed into myths and spurious miracles. Bruno Bauer held that the gospels reflected the experience of the early Church in the Roman Empire where individual's self-consciousness faced indomitable powers before which he felt helpless, so that eventually he sought refuge in his inwardness and thus his being was alienated from the world (see also, Engels, 'Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity' in Marx and Engels 1972, 173-82). Accordingly, alienation arises from a split in man's consciousness and the illusion that not only is there something existing apart from and independent of man's consciousness, but that he himself is dependent on his creation. Religion, for Bauer, is a division in consciousness where religious beliefs become opposed to consciousness as a separate power, and they perpetuate this alienation in mythological and miraculous form. It was within this intellectual climate that Feuerbach appears on the scene.

In 1841 Ludwig Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*, unravelling religion as the alienation of human traits was published. So far the use of the term 'alienation' in the writings of the Young Hegelians had been closely associated with the theological sphere.

The elaboration of the concept of alienation reached a climax in the *Manuscripts* of 1844 which Karl Marx had jotted down during his sojourn in France. These were discovered and published for the first time in full by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in 1932 as *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (*EPM*). The present-day wide use of the term in social sciences is closely related to the publication of the *EPM*. Now the concept 'alienation', as Lichtheim puts it, 'shed the metaphysical aura that it had still retained in Feuerbach and assumed a historical character. Alienation was no longer held to be inherent in man's "being in the world", but rather in his being in a particular historical world, that of "alienated labour" ' (Lichtheim 1968, 264).

Apart from Marxian tradition, the theme of alienation is found in the works of other sociologists as well. However, the concept of alienation in Max Weber and Georg Simmel is different from that of Marx's. (For details, see Israel 1971, chapter 5; Sartre 1982, 153-220.)

Even though the concept 'alienation' appeared under different names in Marx's mature writings, it was forgotten after Marx. Consequently, we do not find any significance of the concept in the works of Engels, Plekhanov, Kautsky, Labriola, Lenin, Trotsky or Luxemburg. The only exception is Lukacs who in his *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) was able to make alienation and the related concept of reification important categories in Marxism without knowing about the existence of the *EPM* at that time. His concept of reification is to a large extent similar to Marx's account of alienation in the *EPM*. There is good reason to believe that his views on reification owe a great deal to Georg Simmel's discussion of the effects of division of labour on the workers (see Parkinson 1977, 56-57).

The importance of the *EPM* in the formation of Marx's social theory, the critique of society which subjected workers to dehumanising process of exploitation is generally agreed upon. We see Marx using the categories of Hegelian dialectical philosophy and those of the classical political economy to offer his first analysis of capitalism and the place of worker in it. The concept of alienation was an important part of this analysis. Even though there were limitations in the conceptual structure and language of political economy, Hegel's philosophy provided Marx with the concept in its idealist form which he transformed into a materialist and critical one. It is worth emphasising that Marx's concept of alienation should not be viewed within a strictly philosophical framework because Marx advocated a break with the philosophical tradition which had hitherto only explained alienation.

After the publication of the *EPM*, Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, among others, gave a sympathetic interpretation to the concept of alienation in Marx. Besides, the concept found its exponents in the existentialist philosophy -- although in a different sense -- of Heidegger and Sartre. In addition to popularising the term 'alienation', the *EPM* drew attention to Hegel's discussion of alienation in the *Phenomenology* to which Marx had attached great importance.

The place of *EPM* in the totality of Marx's thought, both in relation to his early development and the later works as well as his relation both to Hegel and Feuerbach raises a number of complex questions. The young and mature Marx debate in the last few decades leading to the notion of 'Two Marxs' is one of them. A number of critics have argued that the original and humanist Marx is found only in his early writings, and that especially the theory of

alienation in the *EPM* is the cornerstone of his early philosophy. On the other side of the scale, Althusser offered his thesis of an 'epistemological break' when Marx ushered in his mature and scientific theories of *Capital*, and that alienation in his later works 'appears very rarely, and where it does it is either used ironically, or with a different conceptual content' (Althusser 1979, 249). There are also the upholders of continuity thesis in Marx. However, the advocacy of continuity aspect should not be used to blur the distinction between the early and later works of Marx. A lot of academic literature has grown up round these issues. However, as my present study deals with the concept of alienation in Marx's thought between the years 1843 and 1844, the above questions which are not of direct concern, will not detain us.

In the remainder of this chapter, I set out the philosophy of Feuerbach. His materialist and anthropological perspective on how different systems of belief can come to oppress human beings has left its trace in the thought of diverse nineteenth- and twentieth century thinkers such as Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Buber, Heidegger and Sartre. Marx's concept of human nature, man as *Gattungswesen*, alienation and the inversion of Hegelian philosophy can only be understood within the context of Feuerbach's leading philosophical ideas.

2.2. Feuerbach's impact on the Young Hegelian movement

Feuerbach's influence on the development of the Young Hegelian movement started with the publication in 1839 of a long essay *Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy*. It dealt for the first time with the themes that formed the core of his thought in the coming years. The task that Feuerbach set for himself was to show that the entire history of religious and speculative philosophic thought was a history of the development of alienated form of human self-consciousness. He demonstrated the 'rational mysticism' of Hegelian philosophy, and the contradictory and tautological nature of his system and method. In this systematic rejection of Hegelianism, observes Zawar Hanfi in his Introduction to *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach* that Feuerbach shows 'the two most characteristic qualities of Hegelianism are also two of its most questionable aspects -- its reliance on speculation and its drive towards

system' (Feuerbach 1972, 10; for more on Hegel's conception of speculation and system, see ibid., 10-13). Feuerbach expressed his ideas relating to naturalism, humanism and sensualism for the first time which he elaborated in his subsequent works.

In 1841 Marx obtained his doctoral degree. In the same year, Feuerbach's most influential book *The Essence of Christianity* was published. (In his accompanying letter to the publisher, he had suggested a more provocative title '*Critique of Unreason*'.) It was followed by his *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy* (1842) and the *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1843). These works had an immense impact on the philosophical scene in Germany. Feuerbach appeared a Prometheus who had dared to challenge and rob the Gods of their treasured secrets. David Strauss, who himself had caused a furore with his radical book on Jesus, wrote: 'Today, and perhaps for some time to come, the field belongs to him. His theory is the truth of the age' (cited in Kamenka 1970, 15). The great popularity enjoyed by Feuerbach was due to the fact that in the eyes of his contemporaries he 'had put materialist anthropology in place of religious idealism, who had shown that God was made in the image of man, that thought was a function of being, that man had feelings and strivings as well as consciousness and that nature confronted man as an independent force, as an objective challenge' (Kamenka 1970, 16).

In his early writings Marx was very enthusiastic about Feuerbach. He wrote in 1842: 'To you, speculative theologians and philosophers, I give this advice: free yourselves from the concepts and prejudices of previous speculative philosophy if you wish really to discover things as they really are, that is if you wish to discover the truth. And there is no other way to truth than through the "river of fire" (*Feuer-bac*h). Feuerbach is the purgatory of the present time' (*MEGA* I, 1, 175, cited in McLellan 1980a, 97). The great impact of *The Essence of Christianity* is graphically described by Engels: 'With one blow it pulverised the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy.... Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the "system" was exploded and cast aside; and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians' (Engels 1975,

20). The influence of the book on other Young Hegelians was quite considerable (see McLellan 1980, 95-96). Even though the book was repetitious and its literary style sometimes even high-flown, it attracted the attention of a large public. Toews observes: 'With the revolutionary simplicity of a new philosophical Copernicus, Feuerbach exploded "the old metaphysical standpoint of the absolute" by unveiling the "secret" of religion, theology, and speculative philosophy as the self-alienation, reification, and mystification of the essential powers of the concrete human subject, man in nature. The ultimate identity of spirit and nature was to be found not in the actualisation of "the self-consciousness of God" in nature and humanity, but in the self-actualisation and self-comprehension of man as both a natural and spiritual being' (Toews 1985, 340).

In spite of his critical reservations and strictures in his later works, Marx in his early writings was enthusiastic about Feuerbachian ideas. For instance, he wrote in *The Holy Family*: '*Feuerbach*, who completed and criticised *Hegel from Hegel's point of view* by resolving the metaphysical *Absolute* Spirit into "*real man on the basis of nature*", was the first to complete the *criticism of religion* by sketching in a grand and masterly manner the *basic features* of the *criticism of Hegel's speculation* and hence *of all metaphysics*' (CW4, 139). In the *EPM*, he acclaimed Feuerbach's work as 'the only writings since Hegel's *Phenomenology* and *Logic* which contain a real theoretical revolution' (EPM, 18). But there was a considerable shift in Marx's opinion about Feuerbach in his later years. For instance, in a letter to Engels in 1868, he wrote: 'The gentlemen in Germany (with the exception of theological reactionaries) believe Hegel's dialectic to be a "dead dog". Feuerbach has much on his conscience in this respect' (CW42, 520). [The expression 'treat like a dead dog' was first used by Gotthold E. Lessing to describe the attitude of some of his contemporaries like Moses Mendelssohn to Spinoza's philosophy. Marx mentions this again in the Afterward to the second German edition of *Capital* I, 29.]

2.3. Religious anthropology

Feuerbach in *The Essence of Christianity* aimed at revealing the Christian theology and religious consciousness as the psychological and historical culmination of self-alienation. According to him the conception of the nature of God had been given a rational-conceptual form in speculative philosophy as the *res cogitans* of Descartes, the substance of Spinoza, the Ego of Fichte and the Absolute of Hegel. In the fourth proposition of his *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, Feuerbach says: 'The *essence* of the speculative philosophy is nothing other than the *rationalised, realised, actualised essence of God*. The speculative philosophy is the *true, consistent, rational* theology' (1972, 178). It was nothing other than the conception of the essential nature of man hypostatised by theology as the Divine Being. As Zawar Hanfi construes, Feuerbach is not interested in resolving the question as to the existence or non-existence of God; he is 'concerned with the content which religious consciousness throughout its history had put into the category of God.... Feuerbach's criticism addresses itself to the historical forms in which the religious consciousness has articulated its conceptions of the Divine Being. The cornerstone of his philosophy is that the Divine being thus conceived has its genesis in the being of man: It is the hypostatisation of man understood as a species being' (Feuerbach 1972, 34). In fact, the question of the existence or non-existence of God is resolved when Feuerbach explains that God is the creation of man; it is an illusion or -- in Freudian terms -- God is the projection of man's inner and outermost desires, dreams and values. As this is the total reality of God, no other explanation could have produced a more 'real', 'personal', 'transcendent' or 'immanent' God. Feuerbach time and again emphasises that the religious discussion of the nature of God is a mystified way of thinking about man. All the religious claims about the nature and attributes of God are, in an obscure form, only the truths about human beings.

Feuerbach proclaimed in the opening proposition of his *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*: 'The task of the modern era was the realisation and humanisation of God -- the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology' (ibid., 177). In the Preface to the *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,* he wrote that the task of the present booklet was 'of leading philosophy from the realm of "detached souls" back in the realm of embodied, living souls; of compelling philosophy to come down from its divine and self-sufficient blissfulness in thought and open its eyes to human misery. To this end, it needs nothing more than human

understanding and human speech. But to think, speak, and act in a genuinely human way is to be the privilege only of future generations. At present, the task is not to invent a theory of man, but to pull man out of the mire in which he is bogged down,' (ibid., 175-6).

The mire in which man was sunk was primarily that of alienation. The human predicament of alienation in the sphere of religion was that man had severed his own powers and capacities and projected them into an imaginary being, God, whom Feuerbach defined as 'man's relinquished [*entäussertes*] self'. 'God,' explains Feuerbach, 'is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself ... The more subjective God is, the more completely does man divest himself [*sick entäussern*] of his subjectivity' (Feuerbach 1957, 31). By creating God after his own image, as Schacht points out, man has, to use Fichtean language, posited an object with his own essential qualities in opposition to himself, and in doing so has 'relinquished' what is essential to him (see Schacht 1971, 76). In Feuerbach's words: 'The personality of God is thus the means by which man converts the qualities of his own nature into the qualities of another being -- of a being external to himself. The personality of God is nothing else than the projected personality of man' (Feuerbach 1957, 226).

This projection of human qualities on a divine being, constituted an alienation of man from his own essential nature: 'To enrich God, man must become poor, that God may be all, man must become nothing' (ibid., 26). According to Feuerbach, the essence of God is nothing but the consciousness of the human species. So far as the question of these imaginings is concerned, men recognise in God what they are missing in themselves: 'It is only human misery that affords God his birthplace' (cited in McLellan 1880a, 90).

Religion in its essentials is an extreme form of human alienation. What religion celebrates in man is at the same time taken away from him to give to an artificial subject. Man worships these human qualities by subordinating himself to his self-created super-ego, God. Since the qualities of man and God are alike, it can enrich God only by impoverishing man. Thus 'man denies as to himself only what he attributes to God' (Feuerbach 1957, 27). The Virgin represents the love that the monk denies to himself and the nun becomes the bride of Christ, i.e. they substitute an unearthly love for real earthly love. 'The heavenly virgin is only a sensible presentation of a general truth, having relation to the essence of religion' (ibid., 27). Religion

alienates man from his human reality: 'Religion abstracts from man, from the world; but it can only abstract from the limitations, from the phenomena; in short from the negative, not from the essence, the positive, of the world and humanity: hence in the very abstraction and negation it must recover that from which it abstracts, or believes itself to abstract. And thus, in reality, whatever religion consciously denies ... it unconsciously restores in God' (ibid., 27). Instead of caring, loving our fellow human beings directly in his distinct human capacity, man makes God the eternal repository of love and care in the first place, and only thereafter, indirectly, cares or loves his neighbour because the Lord commands him to do so.

Feuerbach holds Spinoza in high esteem for making God one with nature, as a material being who was not squatting outside space and time. He writes: 'Spinoza hit the nail on the head with his paradoxical proposition: God is an extended, that is, material being. He found, at least, for his time, the true philosophical expression for the materialistic tendency of the modern era; he legitimated and sanctioned it: God himself is a materialist. Spinoza's philosophy was religion; he himself was an amazing man. Unlike so many others, Spinoza's materialism did not stand in contradiction to the notion of a non-material and anti-materialist God who also quite consistently imposes on man the duty to give himself up only to *anti-materialistic, heavenly tendencies* and *concerns*; for God is nothing other than the archetypal and ideal image of man; *what* God is and *how* he is, is what man *ought* to be or wants to be, or at least hopes to be in the future. But only where theory does not belie practice, and practice theory, is there character, truth and religion. Spinoza is the Moses of modern free-thinkers and materialists' (Feuerbach 1972, 196).

Feuerbach incorporates Spinoza's pantheism in his religious anthropology. 'Pantheism is *theological atheism or theological materialism;*' says Feuerbach, 'it is *the negation of theology* while itself confined to the *standpoint of theology*.... The *deification of the real*, of *that which exists materially* -- materialism, empiricism, realism and humanism -- or the *negation* of theology is the essence of the modern era' (ibid., 194-5). But Feuerbach's conception of God as man's creation had its origin in Hegel. The spirit of the Master brooded over Feuerbach's work, as Brazill comments: 'Hegel had insisted that man's original comprehension of the divine occurred in human terms, that the divine was really man's production, his creation.' Brazill cites Hegel: "The natural as it is explained by man -- i.e. in its inner and essential nature -- is, in general, the

beginning of the divine." And, regarding the representation of the divine in the form of gods, Hegel said: "... the human being is the womb that conceived them, the breast that suckled them, and the spiritual that gave them grandeur and purity.... Thus the honour of the human is swallowed up in the honour of the divine. Men honour the divine in and for itself, but, at the same time, they honour it as *their* deed, their product, and their existence." Feuerbach owed much to Hegel in affirming that man created God from his own spirit' (Brazill 1970, 149).

The essential difference between Hegel and Feuerbach is the underlying unity of man and God in Hegel who represents man as God in his state of self-alienation. Feuerbach holds this position to represent religion in a mystified form. The truth of the matter is rather reverse, as Tucker comments: 'God is man in his state of self-alienation, i.e. man in his religious life is alienated from himself. The Hegelian God who experiences alienation in the consciousness of himself as finite man is a representation in reverse of the actual fact that Christian or, more generally, religious man experiences alienation in the consciousness of himself as almighty God' (Tucker 1972, 85). By the process of inversion, which Feuerbach calls 'transformational criticism' Hegel's key propositions are turned right way up. Despite his reservations about Hegel's speculative philosophy, he also recognises it as the logical culmination of the metaphysical tradition. Thus, writes Tucker further: 'instead of saying with Hegel that man is God in self-alienation, one must turn the proposition on its head and say: God is man in his self-realisation. The Hegelian idea of God or the Absolute reflects the actuality of man' (ibid., 85).

Christianity, the most subjective religion carries to an extreme the contradiction of love and faith; it qualifies love as 'Christian' and restricts it to those who share faith in the incarnation of God as Christ. Thus Christians 'in the certainty of the divine nature of their emotions, the truth and unassailableness of their subjective feelings, converted that which to the ancients was a theoretic problem into an immediate fact -- converted a theoretic, and in itself an open question, into a matter of conscience, the denial of which was equivalent to the high treason of atheism. He who denies the resurrection denies the resurrection of Christ, but he who denies the resurrection of Christ denies Christ himself, and who denies Christ denies God. Thus did "spiritual" Christianity unspiritualise what was spiritual' (Feuerbach 1957, 136)! By making belief in its God a law, 'faith produces in man an inward disunion, a disunion with himself, and by consequence an

outward disunion also ... faith has God out of itself; it estranges God from man, it makes him an external object' (ibid., 247-48). Man's estranged essence usurps the place of the human essence which should unite man with man.

With his elaborate explication of religious fetishism, it is no wonder that Feuerbach came to regard religion as the chief source of alienation and of human bondage. An attack on man's pious self-delusion in itself was not enough. It has further implications. Michael Gagern aptly remarks: 'But all the different religious justifications of a benign divine order, according to Feuerbach, in the end served as justifications of the man-made order that are both reason for and source of the continuation of the misery. Theodicy thus becomes sociodicy. It not only keeps man from finding his own value and respecting the dignity of his fellow man, but it bars human progress by paralysing the incentive to work for change within the limited range of natural possibilities. Theodicy, like sociodicy, is the systematisation and centralisation of unrealistic hopes at the expense of constant and consistent work for a better world' (Gagern 1979, 42).

However, the main defect in Feuerbach's theory of alienation was to leave out the socio-political aspects of the problem in his humanist philosophy. The way to overcome the human predicament, insisted Feuerbach, was the categorical imperative for man to take into himself all the richness of the content which he had put into God or into his speculative metamorphoses. The God-illusion must disappear. The awakening of man from the religious dream will deliver him from 'the hellish torments of contradiction' (cited in Tucker 1972, 90). Both religion and speculative philosophy throughout history have been the major expression of alienated form of human consciousness. For Feuerbach, the task of the 'new' philosophy is to demystify the speculative philosophy and lay bare the truth-claims of religion. The completion of this task will lead to supersession of man's self-alienation which would unshackle the capacities of man, elevating him into a fully free and dignified being.

Even though Marx in his early writings credits Feuerbach with 'great achievement' for having shown 'that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e. another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned' (EPM, 126), yet Marx is not quite satisfied and feels that the task has not yet been accomplished.

2.4. Feuerbach's conception of the human essence

Feuerbach in the Preface to *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* viewed the task of the modern era to be 'to derive the necessity of a philosophy of man, that is, anthropology, from the Philosophy of the Absolute, that is, theology, in order thus to establish a critique of human philosophy through a critique of divine philosophy' (Feuerbach 1972, 176). The reason for making man the subject of philosophy was first and foremost to serve the cause of humanity: 'The task of the modern era was the realisation and humanisation of God -- the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology' (ibid., 177). The word 'anthropology' was used by Feuerbach as substitute for psychology.

Accordingly, the essential task was 'to pull man out of the mire', primarily that of alienation, in which he was bogged down (ibid., 176). The human predicament of alienation in the realm of religion where man had relinquished his powers into a fetish is well described by Kamenka: 'Man had severed from himself those powers and capacities which were at least potentially his; he had projected them into a God or fetish. He had thus made himself a slave to one of his creations. This is why Feuerbach saw the critique of religion as the *sine qua non* of human emancipation, for in religion, he believed, he had found the "secret" or paradigm of the process of alienation. Alienation, for Feuerbach, was a form of intellectual error, a fantasy which could be cured by showing how it arose and what its real content was' (Kamenka 1970, 114). By depriving himself of all the ideal attributes that belong to him into an imaginary being, man has nothing of value left in him. In this man's self-alienation is an 'unhappy consciousness'. Religious man is an alienated man; he is a suffering man. Religion not only was the main instrument in creating the dominant illusions, but it also provided justification for the consequent human bondage and social oppression.

Feuerbach's views were in opposition to Hegel's views whose philosophy of the absolute spirit was the last realisation of pure philosophy. Hegel did not hold that man in his determinations embodies his universal essence. In his *Philosophy of Right* Hegel, for instance,

makes the following distinction: 'In [abstract] right, what we have before us was the person: in the sphere of morality, the subject; in the family, the family member; in civil society as a whole, the burgher or *bourgeois*. Here at the standpoint of needs what we have before us is the composite idea which we call man. Thus, this is the first time, and indeed properly the only time, to speak of *man* in this sense' (Hegel 1967, 127). This particularised determination of man in Hegel was criticised by Feuerbach. Karl Löwith writes: 'The fact that man can be discussed in so many different ways -- as a legal "person", as a moral "subject", and so on -- implies that the whole human being is referred to, although each time in a different sense. It belongs to the very character of man that he can be defined as this one and as that one, as a private person, as a public person, as a citizen, by his social role and by his economic relations. Feuerbach thus guards himself against Hegel's idea of particularity, though he does not show us how to reintegrate the particularised humanity of the modern bourgeois into the whole humanity of man. This indeed could not be achieved by the humanitarian communism of Feuerbach, by the love of "I and thou", but only through social criticism of the division of labour in general and of its class-character in particular, as undertaken by Marx ' (Löwith 1954, 207-8).

Feuerbach uses the word 'man' in a generic or collective sense. The human essence consists in his membership in the species as a whole, for the human species represents man's 'essential nature' which 'has its adequate existence only in the sum total of mankind' (Feuerbach 1957, 157). The individual is only a particular instance of the life of the species.

The defining characteristic of man is his ability to possess self-conscious knowledge of his own essence, to know himself as a 'species-being'. Due to consciousness man makes his species, his essential nature, an object of his thought. There is a dialectical relation between consciousness and its object. Wartofsky interprets Feuerbach's view thus: 'Man *creates* his essence infinitely in the process of developing a self-consciousness with respect to his existence. But without existence, there is no consciousness; without this "real" consciousness of his existence, no self-consciousness. On the other hand, without self-consciousness, no man. In the dialectic as an evolutionary process, man creates himself as man, in the very process of coming to self-consciousness. And this self-consciousness entails the consciousness of himself as species, that is, the consciousness of himself as identical in essence with other selves, *insofar as*

they are self-conscious selves. Self-consciousness, in its *species* sense, is the essence of humanity, the mark of man's separation from brutes' (Wartofsky 1977, 224).

It was man's essence which transcended all individuality, all individual men, and attained to universality. It was this element of self-consciousness which made man capable of *Wissenschaft* (science). 'Where there is this higher consciousness there is a capability of science. Science is the cognisance of species. In practical life we have to deal with individuals; in science, with species. But only a being to whom his own species, his own nature, is an object of thought, can make the essential nature of other things or beings an object of thought' (Feuerbach 1957, 2).

In contrast to the animal, which has limited consciousness of itself, its inner life being one with its outer life, man has both an inner and an outer life: 'The inner life of man is the life which has relation to his species, to his general, as distinguished from individual, nature' (ibid., 2). In so far as man was conscious of his own essential nature as a human being, the separation and limitations of individual finitude were overcome. 'Man is himself at once I and thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this reason, that to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is an object of thought' (ibid., 2).

Feuerbach defined human nature as Reason, Will and Affection: 'What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will and Affection.... To will, to love, to think are the highest powers, are the absolute nature of man as man, and the basis of his existence. Man exists to think, to love, to will' (ibid., 3). As far as the dichotomy of universal and particular, infinite and finite is concerned, 'it is our task to show that the antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory, that it is nothing else than the antithesis between the human nature in general and the human individual' (ibid., 14). At another place he refers to Reason, Will and Love as the constitutive elements of man's nature: 'Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is nothing without them; they are the constitutive elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers -- divine, absolute powers -- to which he can oppose no resistance' (ibid., 3). What was the power of understanding in relation to species? Feuerbach says: 'Only by and in the understanding has man the power of abstraction from himself, from his subjective being -- of exalting himself to general ideas and relations, of

distinguishing the object from the impressions which it produces on his feelings ... Religious anthropomorphisms, therefore, are in contradiction with the understanding; it repudiates their application to God; it denies them' (ibid., 35).

No doubt, the problem of religious alienation is one of the most important themes in Feuerbach. How did the human essence become alienated? Feuerbach's answer in *The Essence of Christianity* related to man's projection of God, as we have seen above, was to account for this fetish. But in his *Preliminary Theses of the Reform of Philosophy* (1843) he extended the concept of alienation to German speculative philosophy also. In the *Theses* he argues that since Hegel's philosophy starts and ends with the infinite, the finite -- Man -- is presented as a phase in the evolution of the Spirit: 'Speculative philosophy has turned into a form, or into an attribute of the Absolute, the *development* which it has *detached from time*. This detachment of development from time is, however, truly a masterpiece of *speculative arbitrariness* and the conclusive proof of the fact that the speculative philosophers have done with their Absolute exactly what theologians have done with their God who possesses all emotions of man *without having emotion*, loves *without love*, and is angry *without anger*. Development without time amounts to development without development. The proposition that the Absolute Being unfolds itself is, moreover, true and rational only *other way round*. It must, therefore, be formulated thus: Only a being that develops and unfolds itself in time is an absolute; i.e. a *true* and *actual* being' (Feuerbach 1972, 162-3). The speculative philosophy conceals the real source of ideas in man, and thus it itself is an expression of alienation. In the new philosophy finite replaces infinite: 'The task of the true philosophy is not to cognize the infinite as the finite, but as the *non*-finite; i.e. as the infinite. In other words, not to posit the finite in the infinite, but to posit the infinite in the finite' (ibid., 159)

The complete and *true* man, according to Feuerbach, was a universal being. His universality lay in the fact that he was not an isolated and egoistic individual as portrayed by Stirner. Man's universality extended beyond his individual self. The point of departure of the new philosophy is man in his relationship with the external world through the senses, and towards other men through love and reason: 'The new philosophy makes *man, together with nature* as the basis of man, the *exclusive, universal*, and *highest object* of philosophy; it makes *anthropology,*

together with physiology, the *universal science*. *Art*, *religion*, *philosophy*, and *science* are only expressions or manifestations of the *true being of man ... Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto* -- this sentence, taken in its *universal* and *highest* meaning, is the *motto* of the *new philosophy*' (Feuerbach 1972, 243).

As men are self-conscious individuals, with individual differences, they can also lose sight of the species as the only standard of human perfection. Their conception of the human essence may become an abstract idealisation of all that they lack individually: 'Where instead of the consciousness of the species has been substituted the exclusive self-consciousness of the individual ... Where therefore the species is not an object to him as a species, it will become object to him as God. He supplies the absence of the idea of species by the idea of God ... But this perfect being, free from the limits of the individual is nothing else than the species, which reveals the infinitude of its nature in this, that it is realised in infinitely numerous and various individuals' (Feuerbach 1957, 157). The resulting externalisation and alienation is aptly described by John Torrance : 'Thus the human essence becomes externalised, alienated, and set over against men as an extraneous personification of the essential powers that belong to the species, and which could belong to the individual too in so far as he is capable of living as a true "species-being". Religion only allows him to reappropriate these powers in a distorted way, mediated through faith in the alien will of a divine creator and judge. Sexuality and mortality, man's natural limitations are denied by religion' (Torrance 1972, 50). The role of man in this artificially divided world becomes all the more emaciated. Torrance continues : 'But cut off from nature, man can only fulfil his potential for love and community in an exclusive, divisive fashion amongst his fellow believers in a world artificially sundered into sacred and profane, the saved and damned. Religion thus redefines as a religious need, as need for God's love, the isolated individual's need for completion by the variety and fullness of the species; and in satisfying this it provides compensation for his stunted life -- which thereby becomes, however, even more stunted than before' (ibid., 50). Thus religion disunites man from himself. The image of God which he sets before him appears as the antithesis of man and his potentialities. Whereas God is projected as the sum of realities, the absolutely positive, man is seen as negative, degraded and abject entity.

2.4.1. Man as a communal being

In declaring a new philosophy of 'humanism' or 'realised Christianity', which is to take the place of historic religion, Feuerbach makes man the object of adoration instead of the illusory God. As a consequence, it will lead to a true unity of head and heart: 'The *true unity of head and heart* does not consist in wiping out or covering up their differences, but rather in the recognition that the *essential object* of the *heart* is also the *essential object of head*, or in the identity of the object, The new philosophy, which makes the essential and highest object of the heart -- man -- also the essential and highest object of the intellect, lays the foundations of a rational unity of head and heart, of thought and life' (Feuerbach 1972, 243).

Feuerbach saw the task of the new *Bildung* (roughly equivalent to 'culture', 'cultivation', 'education', and 'character-formation') in the exaltation of the individual above his subjectivity to objective universal ideas, to the contemplation of the world. For Feuerbach, *Bildung* was the expression of a vision of a future society, where the cultural liberation of man will be realised. In the spiritual context, man will achieve knowledge without religious illusions. From the standpoint of the human *Bildung* the ethical incompleteness of individual could be transcended by the 'species consciousness' in the community of men, through friendship and love. The essential human properties, love, reason and will could not be understood or accounted for in terms of a single individual; they required at least an I and a Thou. This essential unity is expressed by Feuerbach in these words: 'The single man in *isolation* possesses in himself the essence of man neither as a *moral* nor a *thinking* being. The *essence* of man is contained only in the community, the *unity of man with man* -- a unity, however, that rests on the *reality* of the *distinction* between "I" and "You" ' (ibid., 244). For Feuerbach, the 'reality' or 'existential' duality of the other, and not merely the otherness of the *I*, constitutes a necessary condition for consciousness. As Wartofsky says: 'It must be an ontologically or existentially independent *Thou*. This existential duality is the real, not the merely apparent or confused, condition of consciousness. And because it is sense perception that "gives" us the knowledge of existent "others", it is not merely the conditional but the essential prerequisite and basis for consciousness itself, and therefore also the basis for the development of self-consciousness' (Wartofsky 1977, 207; see also ibid., 34-36). Man shapes himself and understands himself only through his relation

to other men. 'The *true* dialectic,' Feuerbach says, '*is not a monologue of the solitary thinker* with himself; it is a *dialogue between "I" and "You"* (Feuerbach 1972, 244). In this connection, Robert Tucker is right to suggest that 'Feuerbach's underlying idea here is that the religious man, and his spokesmen the theologian and speculative philosopher, are fundamentally self-centred, concerned with the self in the form of divine *alter ego*, whereas what man should have before him is not an illusory "other" in God but a real and living "other" in the other human being.... Self-divided religious man, once awakened from the dream, would recover his lost humanity in the "communism" of the I-Thou relation, in the unity of man with man' (Tucker 1972, 90-91).

'Only community constitutes humanity,' Feuerbach insists, and the individual becomes a participant in the community through 'the consciousness that the *thou* belongs to the perfection of *I*, that men are required to constitute humanity' (Feuerbach 1957, 158, 155). The process of human self-actualisation and self-knowledge was possible as a collective act of an 'we' rather than 'I'. The actualisation of human essence was not possible in a single historical individual. In his *Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy* Feuerbach had quoted approvingly from Goethe's correspondence with Schiller: 'Only all men taken together cognize nature, and only all men taken together live human nature' (Feuerbach 1972, 56).

Feuerbach's insistence on man being a species-being, a communal being, was an important corrective to the epistemological individualism of Cartesian tradition. It led directly to Marx's conception of man as a social being. I discuss Marx's conception of man as social being in chapter 5.

2.5. Human activity and alienation

The idea of human creativity and activity adumbrated by Feuerbach, despite its cumbersome theological trappings, has been seen by some commentators to be of some conceptual significance in the rise of Marxism. Feuerbach viewed labour as self-realising activity of man which makes him a free individual. Man basically a creative being enjoys his creativity in his productive activity. 'The idea of activity, of making, of creation, is in itself a divine idea; it is therefore unhesitatingly applied to God. In activity man feels himself free, unlimited, happy; in

passivity, limited, oppressed, unhappy. Activity is the positive sense of one's personality. And the happiest, the most blissful activity is that which is productive. To read is delightful, reading is passive activity; but to produce what is worthy to be read is more delightful still. Hence this attribute of the species -- productive activity -- is assigned to God; that is, realised and made objective as divine activity' (Feuerbach 1957, 217-18). But man's creativity and 'making [which] is a genuine human idea' (ibid., 220), are projected into omnipotent creative being which consequently deprives human beings of their realisation and fulfilment in their human capacity. Theologians, the custodians of religious consciousness, assert that all emanates from God. 'The question how did God create? is an indirect doubt that he will create the world. It was this question which brought man to atheism, materialism, naturalism'. But 'to theology, which looks with one eye at heaven and with the other at earth' it is 'highly unsatisfactory' to reflect on the actual things (ibid., 219, 220). 'Religion has no physical conception of the world; it has no interest in a natural explanation' (ibid., 219). Notwithstanding the religious explanation of the origin of 'all things' it is an empirical fact that 'every particular thing arises in a natural way; it is something determinate, and as such it has a ... determinate cause. It was not God, but carbon that produced the diamond; a given salt owes its origin, not to God, but to the combination of a particular acid with a particular base' (ibid., 218).

In this state of man's alienation characterised by the projections of his essence and creativity into God, according to Feuerbach's argument, man's human potentialities remain unfulfilled and emaciated. The necessary step in man's self-actualisation is to break the shackles of God-illusion as well as of the speculative philosophy, 'the last rational mainstay of theology' (Feuerbach 1972, 168). But only a theoretical destruction of these illusions is not enough. Feuerbach looks at the present as 'the necessary turning-point of history' in which man had eventually come to the realisation that 'the consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the species; that man can and should raise himself above the limits of his individuality, ... that there is no other essence which man can think, dream of, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for, love and adore as the *absolute*, than the essence of human nature itself [including external nature ... Nature belongs to the essence of man]' (Feuerbach 1957, 270). Philosophy was no longer a rationalised version of Christian consciousness, but rather it had

become a destroyer of the illusions which alienated man from himself. The return of man to himself, and the reappropriation of human nature meant that by establishing the new cultural order, man would affirm his human essence, and his will.

In the new cultural order, the relationship of the individual to universal will be transformed by creative labour. Toews elucidates: 'The notion that salvation was a free gift of grace passively received was a part of the old Christian order. "Culture overcomes the limits of sensuous consciousness and life by real activity," Feuerbach stated. The successful creation of an earthly heaven required that the relationship of the individual to the universal be transformed from the passive relationship of prayer to the active one of creative labour. Commitment to the fulfilment of one's humanity through creative labour was based on the destruction of the wish-fulfilling illusions of Christianity, on an acceptance of the limited "conditionality" of a world in which every effect had a natural cause and every aim required a corresponding operation for its fulfilment. The undeluded man of the post-Christian era would transform his "attainable wishes" into "objects of real activity" ' (Towes 1985, 353; see also Wartofsky 1977, 321-40).

It was left to Marx to show that a change in consciousness alone is not sufficient to bring about the realisation of 'positive humanism'. For Feuerbach the 'reform of consciousness' by exposure of the religious illusions was the main task of the new philosophy. Marx acknowledging the Feuerbachian contribution wrote in the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction*: 'The immediate *task of philosophy*, which is at the service of history, once the *holy form* of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its *unholy forms*. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the *criticism of religion* into the *criticism of law* and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*' (CW3, 176). This brings us to the Marxian critique of Feuerbach in the development of his critical social theory and the place of the concept of alienation in Marx's early works.

2.6. Marx's Feuerbachian metaphysics

So far in this chapter I have concentrated mainly upon Feuerbach's conception of human essence and religious self-alienation. In 2.6. I present Marx's critique of Feuerbach which we find in his early writings. This critique and the evaluation of Feuerbach by Marx has a direct bearing on the evolution of Marxian concept of alienation. In 2.7. I discuss the divergence of views between Marx and Feuerbach, and the gradual shift in Marx's position regarding Feuerbachian philosophy which becomes evident in his *Theses on Feuerbach*.

During the years 1843-45, Marx was strongly influenced by Feuerbach. In his writings from this period, especially the *EPM* the influence of Feuerbach is conspicuous. H.B. Acton finds that 'the Marxist rejection of religion, theology and metaphysics, and the Marxist account of what they are, arose from Feuerbach's treatment of the same theme' (Acton 1955, 115). No doubt, Feuerbach's *Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy* and *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* were of great significance for Marx; these had, in his words, 'in principle overthrown the old dialectic and philosophy' (EPM, 125)

During this period, Marx credited Feuerbach with being the liberator from the bondage of the Hegelian system. 'Feuerbach's great achievement,' Marx says 'is: (1) the proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e. another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned; (2) the establishment of *true materialism* and of *real science*, by making the social relationship of "man to man" the basic principle of the theory; (3) his opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself' (EPM, 126).

One of the earliest writings which shows a strong influence of Feuerbach is Marx's unfinished manuscript of *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1843). It is a paragraph by paragraph commentary on Hegel's text. Here the immediate influence of Feuerbach's *Theses* is obvious. For instance, Hegel's paragraph 262 reads: 'The actual Idea is mind, which, sundering itself into the two ideal spheres of its concept, family and civil society, enters upon its finite phase, but it does so only in order to raise above its ideality and become explicit as infinite actual mind. It is therefore to these ideal spheres that the actual Idea assigns the material of this, its finite actuality, viz. human beings as a mass, in such a way that the

function assigned to any given individual is visibly mediated by circumstances, his caprice and personal choice of his station in life' (Hegel 1967, 162). Marx views it as Hegel's 'pantheistic mysticism' where family and civil society are conceived as the spheres of the concept of the state. He comments in terminology taken over from Feuerbach's *Theses*: 'The idea is made the subject and the *actual* relation of family and civil society to the state is conceived as its *internal imaginary* activity. Family and civil society are the premises of the state; they are the genuinely active elements, but in speculative philosophy things are inverted. When the idea is made the subject, however, the real subjects, namely, civil society, family, "circumstances, caprice, etc.", become *unreal* objective elements of the idea with a changed significance' (CW3, 7, 8). In this quotation Hegel has been criticised for reversing the proper relation of subject and object, by making the idea or the state the cause instead of the effect. This makes specific use of Feuerbach's critique of speculative philosophy in the *Theses*: 'We need only turn the *predicate* into *subject* and thus as *subject* into *object* and *principle* -- that is, only *reverse* speculative philosophy. In this way, we have the unconcealed, pure, and untarnished truth' (Feuerbach 1972, 154).

One result of the liberating effect of Feuerbachian critique of Hegelian system upon Marx was that instead of looking at Hegel and Hegelianism in enchanted veneration, Marx was able to look back upon Hegel's philosophy critically, as well as recognising it as a definite stage in the development of human thought. In *The German Ideology*, he and Engels brushed aside Hegel's *Weltgeist* as a metaphysical spectre and described the intellectual climate of Germany at the 'decomposition of the Hegelian system' as the time of 'putrescence of the absolute spirit' (Marx & Engels 1976, 33). The role of Feuerbach in breaking the spell of Hegelian influence on the mind of the young Marx was crucial.

But it is important to bear in mind that Feuerbach's overthrow of the Hegelian system was no more than the inversion of the key propositions of Hegel by what Feuerbach calls 'transformational criticism'. This can be explained by a quotation from the *Theses* where Feuerbach, regarding the essence of man, says: 'The direct, crystal-clear, and undeceptive identification of the essence of man ... *with* man cannot be effected through a positive approach; it can only be derived from the Hegelian philosophy as its *negation*; it can only be *apprehended*

at all if it is apprehended *as the total negation* of speculative philosophy, although it is the *truth* of this philosophy. It is true that everything is contained in Hegel's philosophy, but always together with its *negation*, its *opposite*' (Feuerbach 1972, 157).

That Feuerbach had shown the truth-value of Hegelianism to Marx, although it was concealed in its mystified and inverted form, has succinctly been described by Robert Tucker: 'In one sense he overthrew Hegelianism, in another he enthroned it. He grounded it in the human psyche. This was the implication of his contention that "Metaphysics is esoteric psychology". What Hegel represents as taking place in the imaginary realm of *Geist*, it said in effect, is actually taking place in the real world of *Mensch*. Hegel's self-alienated God is the mystified portrait of a religious man -- real man suffering estrangement from himself on the foundation of nature' (Tucker 1972, 96). The 'real theoretical revolution' which Marx (EPM, 18) imputed to Feuerbach consisted in his separating the earthly reality of man from the fantasies of the subjective thought -- world of Hegelian philosophy. There were not two worlds, but only one, the real material world. 'The world of Hegelian philosophical consciousness,' summarises Tucker, 'in which spirit is alienated from itself and striving to transcend its alienation, is nothing but a fantasy-reflection, a mystical representation of the condition of man in the real world. The fantasy corresponds to something quite real. The hard empirical, objective fact of life in earthly reality is the fact of man's estrangement from himself. Hegelianism, if you only invert it and substitute "man" for "God" or spirit gives you the truth. It is a revelation of truth by way of a code that the method of transformational criticism enables us to decipher' (Tucker 1972, 96-97).

Marx's idea of the humanisation and the naturalisation of man in the *EPM* is based on an argument of Feuerbach in *The Essence of Christianity*, where he says: 'In the object which he contemplates, therefore, man becomes acquainted with himself; consciousness of the objective is the self-consciousness of man. We know the man by the object, by his conception of what is external to himself; in it his nature becomes evident; this object is his manifested nature, his true objective *ego*.... Even the objects which are the most remote from man, because they are objects to him and to the extent to which they are so, are revelations of human nature' (Feuerbach 1957, 5). He writes further in the same context: 'The absolute to man is his own nature. The power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own nature. Thus the power of the object of

feeling is the power of feeling itself; the power of the object of intellect is the power of the intellect itself; the power of the object of the will is the power of the will itself' (ibid. 5).

2.7. Divergent views of Marx and Feuerbach

For a short period Marx seems to have agreed with Feuerbachian view that a change in consciousness was sufficient to ensure the realisation of positive humanism. 'Our whole object,' Marx wrote to Ruge in 1843, 'can only be -- as is also the case in Feuerbach's criticism of religion -- to give religious and philosophical questions the form corresponding to man who has become conscious of himself. Hence, our motto must be: reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but by analysing the mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself, whether it manifests itself in a religious or a political form' (CW3, 144).

But in the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction*, written within a few months of the letter cited above, Marx comes to reject Feuerbach's view, for its assuming that reform of consciousness is all that is needed: 'The basis of irreligious criticism is: *Man makes religion*, religion does not make man.... But man is no abstract being encamped outside the world. Man is the world of man, the state, society. This state, this society, produce religion, an *inverted world consciousness*, because they are an *inverted world'* (CW3, 175).

As the source of religious alienation lies in an 'inverted world', it requires more than a change of attitude to overcome this form of alienation. 'The immediate *task of philosophy,* which is at the service of history, once the *holy form* of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its *unholy forms*. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the *criticism* of *religion* into the *criticism of law* and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*' (ibid., 176). The existence of religious illusions was warranted by the existing state of affairs. Can we do away with the religious illusions by a changed mental attitude or the consciousness of their unreality? Marx writes: 'To abolish religion as the illusory happiness of the people is to demand their real happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the *demand to give up a state of affairs which needs*

illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore *in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears*, the *halo* of which is religion' (ibid., 176).

Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (not to be mixed with his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction*), is Marx's own personal dialogue with Hegel. In this, Marx applies clearly the Feuerbachian transformational criticism. Marx became convinced of the topicality of Hegel as Feuerbach had demonstrated. Hegelianism for him now represented a real configuration of man's existence which had been expressed in a confused way. The truth-value of Hegel's philosophy had to be explored further. Feuerbach had definitely provided the necessary method to that end.

Between 1843 and 1846 Feuerbach consistently held that only sensuous being, that is, concrete, individual, existing being, was 'real'. '*Man* alone is the *reality*,' exclaims Feuerbach, 'the *subject* of *reason*. It is man who thinks, not the ego, not reason.... If the motto of the old philosophy was: "The rational alone is the true and real", the motto of the new philosophy is: "The *human* alone is the *true* and *real*", for the human alone is the rational; *man is the measure of reason*' (Feuerbach 1972, 239-40). The Feuerbachian premise that only the concrete and sensuous was real was reconstructed by Marx after 1843: he defined productive activity as 'making' rather than 'feeling' and 'desiring'. Toews distinguishes Marx's approach to the Hegelian concrete universal from that of Feuerbach's thus: 'He was able to reconstruct the Hegelian concrete universal in social and historical terms, a goal that always eluded Feuerbach. Feuerbach was well aware that the complete actualisation of human potentialities in the totality of sensuous relationships required a transformation of objective social and political conditions, but he remained vague and abstract in his analysis of the practical transformations that will bring an end to sensual poverty and sensual repression' (Towes 1985, 366).

On several occasions Marx reproaches Feuerbach for being purely 'contemplative', concerned with interpretation and giving no guide to action. After absorbing Feuerbach's 'demystification' of Hegelianism, Marx draws his own conclusions. The solution to the world of human alienation did not lie, as he saw it, in adding another philosophical interpretation but a practical programme of action to change the world. It was the revolutionary imperative of changing the world: 'The world of phenomena having been shown to be a world of human

alienation, the Marxian revolutionary imperative took shape as a call to end human alienation by changing the world. It now said that the world in which man is everywhere estranged from himself and exists only as "non-man" ought to be transformed into a new world of humanism in which alienation would be overcome and man would realise his nature as man' (Tucker 1972, 100).

The criticism of religion by Feuerbach as the main-spring of human alienation was acknowledged by Marx in his early writings. For example, in the opening sentence of *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction*, he declares: 'For Germany the *criticism of religion* is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism' (CW3, 175). Having assimilated Feuerbachian criticism of religion, Marx embarked upon the criticism of Feuerbach, especially his version of materialism. But the atheistic criticism of religion by Feuerbach was not the most important one. Eric Thier is one of the few scholars who has pointed out that Feuerbach's influence upon Marx did not rest upon his atheism, because Marx was well acquainted both with the thought of the French Enlightenment and of the Left Hegelians' criticism of religion, but rather on his own emotional feelings for nature and man (see Schmidt 1971, 22). Marx's solution to the human alienation was different from Feuerbachian solution of the criticism of religion by means of thinking and even advocacy of a new religion to fight against the old religion. For Marx the phenomenon of alienation was not confined to religious consciousness; it extended to virtually all spheres of human existence under the present socio-political order.

In 1845 Marx jotted down his most frequently quoted (and often misunderstood) *Theses on Feuerbach* which were published by Engels after Marx's death. Written in an epigrammatic form, they largely recapitulate points Marx had made in his earlier writings. Feuerbach and earlier materialists come under a sharp attack in the first *Thesis* for taking a passive, contemplative view of nature and not comprehending sensuous, practical, human activity: 'Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. In *Das Wesen des Christenthums*, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude ... Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary", of "practical-critical", activity' (CW5, 3).

Marx's criticism is correct so far as there is no coherent theory of activity in Feuerbach. But, as David McLellan remarks, it 'is not quite just to Feuerbach, for it blames him for not doing what he never set out to do' (McLellan 1980a, 114). The central motif in Feuerbach's philosophical development throughout his life had been the religious problem. He was not a revolutionary figure. But he was not averse to the idea of practical activity when the situation was ripe for it. The following quotation from his *Das Wesen der Religion*, written in the year of revolutionary upheavals of 1848 testifies to it: 'If we not only "believe" in a better life, but also "will" it, and will it not in an isolated way, but with our united strength, then we will also "create" a better life and at least remove the gross, heart-rending injustices and evils that cry to heaven from which mankind has up till now suffered. [And this can only happen, according to Feuerbach] where an oppressed mass or majority opposes their justified egoism to that of an exclusive, nation or caste, where classes or whole nations out of the despised darkness of the proletariat step forward through their victory over the increasing obscurity of a patrician minority into the light of historical celebrity' (cited in McLellan 1980a, 115).

Marx repeats his criticism of Feuerbach's theory of religious alienation in the fourth *Thesis* and its inability to resolve the human dilemma: 'Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. But that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must, therefore, itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice' (CW5, 4).

This thesis, together with the sixth and seventh, contains the cardinal points of Marx's criticism of Feuerbach's theory of religion. Comparing the respective views of Marx and Feuerbach, Sidney Hook comments: 'Feuerbach had found the essence of religion in the human feelings of dependence upon the external forces of the natural and social world, and had declared the chief agencies of the processes of compensatory expression for emotional frustration to be ritual, mythology and theology ... But as an explanation of religious thought and behaviour,

Feuerbach's theory is inadequate because it is too abstract. It leaves totally unexplained the historical diversity in religious phenomena' (Hook 1962, 291). For Marx religion is not born of a natural, tragic split within the human heart, but, rather due to objective social factors. 'The real forces impelling men to find satisfaction in some dreamy empire where they enjoy the uncontested power denied them in this life are not merely psychological but social. The source of religion is to be sought in the antagonisms between the way men actually produce and the traditional, social, legal and moral forms under which that production is carried on -- or between the new needs generated in the course of their social Praxis and the old needs which give rise to, and yet oppose, the new needs.... Religion, according to Marx, is to be construed from the real conditions of man's empirical life and not from his essence. And if these conditions are such that they generate certain kind of emotional conflicts and theoretical illusions, then these illusions and conflicts must be removed by removing that which gives rise to them' (ibid., 292).

In his essay *On the Jewish Question* (1843), Marx comes to emphasise the economic conditions, and not religion, as the chief factor in human alienation. It is the period when Marx is viewed by some writers to be a Feuerbachian, a view disputed, among others, by Avineri. I think, Avineri is right to point out that 'the methodological weaknesses of Feuerbachian philosophy arose from its mechanistic materialistic conception. Marx, who perceived this flaw from the very beginning, was never a Feuerbachian who later turned against his master. He had acknowledged Feuerbach's achievements as well as his limitations from the outset' (Avineri 1970, 68).

Theses on Feuerbach form the principal source of the Marxist doctrine of 'the unity of theory and practice'. 'For Marx,' Peter Singer aptly remarks, 'the unity of theory and practice meant the resolution of theoretical problems by practical activity. It is an idea which makes little sense outside the context of a materialist transformation of Hegel's philosophy of world history' (Singer 1980, 31-32). 'All social life,' in Marx's words, 'is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice' (CW5, 5). As most of the problems of social life are the problems of alienation; the alienation phenomenon dominates the life-situation of man in the world, the key to a total solution is to change this situation by practical action. The inhuman condition which surrounds man can only be overthrown by revolutionary praxis.

In the eleventh *Thesis*, Marx says: 'The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it (CW5, 8). To understand by this statement that Marx is advocating the rejection of philosophical and sociological analysis in favour of only the revolutionary activity is to miss the whole point. In this oft-quoted remark, Marx, in fact, was criticising the Young Hegelians whose 'world shattering phrases' did nothing more than 'rebaptising the world as they found it with a new set of distinctions' (Hook 1962, 303). Feuerbach's radical phraseology also in the like vein, sought the social changes in personal attitudes and in his cult of love. 'For all his talk,' as Sidney Hook remarks, 'about man, humanity and communism, Feuerbach never investigated what the social conditions of men were, to what extent the qualities of humanity which he regarded "essential to the species" were historical, and what programme of action his communism laid upon him' (ibid., 304). In a short epigram Marx expressed the viewpoint of his philosophy of action in opposition to the 'contemplative' attitude of Hegel or Feuerbach. For Marx, philosophy was not mere theory but, rather, a practical activity. Philosophising does not bring about any active change in society. Philosophy must necessarily be linked with practice as a guide to action. Philosophy can lead to action; it is not action *per se*. In this connection, C.J. McFadden observes: 'When Marxism speaks of the "unity of thought and action", it does not intend to imply that thought and action are one and the same thing. It does mean, however, that thought and action are inseparably united' (McFadden 1939, 69). The new outlook based upon the unity of theory and practice formed the nucleus of Marxism. 'To understand the world does not mean,' observes Kolakowski, 'considering it from outside, judging it morally or explaining it scientifically; it means society understanding itself , an act in which the subject changes the object by the very fact of understanding it. This can only come about when the subject and object coincide, when the difference between educator and educated disappears, and when thought itself becomes a revolutionary act, the self-recognition of human existence' (Kolakowski 1981, 144).

Marx in a letter to Johann Baptist Schweitzer in 1865 commenting on Proudhon's *What is Property*? says: 'Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is certainly poor. Nevertheless, he was epoch-making *after* Hegel because he laid *stress* on certain points which were disagreeable to the Christian consciousness but important for the progress of criticism, points which Hegel had left

in mystic semi-obscurity' (SC, 142). This short comment of Marx is a fairly comprehensive judgement on Feuerbach. The 'certain points' refer to Feuerbach's presentation of religion as self-alienation. In comparison to the colossal figure of Hegel, Feuerbach is a small thinker who, nonetheless contributed a great deal to clarify Hegel's latent meaning. In other words, it means that Feuerbach had rightly grasped the significance of Hegelian philosophy, when, for example, he wrote: 'The *culmination* of modern philosophy is the Hegelian philosophy. The *historical necessity* and *justification* of the new philosophy must therefore be derived from a *critique of Hegel's*' (Feuerbach 1972, 203). Frederick Engels in his *Ludwig Feuerbach* regards Feuerbach compared with the other Young Hegelians like Strauss, Bauer, Stirner to be alone of significance as a philosopher. 'But,' writes Engels, 'not only did philosophy ... remain to him an impassable barrier, an inviolable holy thing, but as a philosopher, too, he stopped half-way, was a materialist below and an idealist above. He was incapable of disposing of Hegel through criticism: he simply threw him aside as useless, while he himself, compared with the encyclopaedic wealth of the Hegelian system, achieved nothing positive beyond a turgid religion of love and a meagre, impotent morality' (Engels 1975, 42). In conclusion, we can say that despite his serious limitations, Feuerbach did raise important questions regarding the development of human beliefs and thought. In view of his theological background and concerns, surely, it was no mean achievement.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL ALIENATION: HEGEL AND MARX

3.1. The early writings of Marx and the problem of alienation

In chapters 3 and 4, I trace the evolution of the theory of alienation in Marx's early writings between 1843 and 1844. As Marx's ideas take shape in his critical assimilation and transformation of the Hegelian political philosophy, I think it necessary to present Hegel's political philosophy first, followed by Marx's political theory. The first part of this chapter outlines Hegel's ideas on the state and civil society. In the second part of this chapter and chapter 4, I undertake a detailed critique of Marx's writings of the period. These consist of three critical essays prior to his famous *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (*EPM*). First, the main reason as to my selective choice from the early writings of Marx is to explore comprehensively the early phase of Marx's intellectual development, by concentrating on the evolution of the concept of alienation therein. Secondly, the concept of political alienation evinced in these essays seems to have been overshadowed by the overwhelming impact of the *EPM*. I intend to underline the importance and the relevance of these essays.

The trajectory of Marx's thinking 'from criticism of religion to criticism of philosophy, from criticism of philosophy to criticism of the state; from criticism of the state to criticism of society -- that is, from criticism of politics to criticism of political economy, which led to criticism of private property' (Mandel 1971, 10-11) can best be seen unfolding itself in Marx's conception of alienation at each stage of his theoretical development.

In the phase under review Marx's study of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* in 1842 and 1843 resulted in his two essays. The first one bearing the title 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' (referred to hereafter as *Critique*) was written in the spring and summer of 1843; however, Oizerman maintains that the essay was written partly in 1842 and partly in 1843 (see Oizerman 1981, 167). The *Critique* is Marx's commentary on Section Three of Part Three of

Hegel's work that deals with the question of the state. The first few pages of the manuscript are missing. These apparently must have been Marx's crucial comments on extremely important Paragraphs 257-260 of Hegel's work on the theoretical question of the state.The second essay 'Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' (hereafter *Introduction*) was written at the end of 1843-January 1844. Only the *Introduction* was published in Marx's lifetime in the *French-German Yearbooks.*

The striking feature of the *Critique* is that Marx while accepting the Hegelian political philosophy as a whole subjects it to Feuerbachian transformational criticism. Hegel was deemed to have revealed the reality of the state and society in all its essentials although in a mystified way; the task of philosophy propounded by Feuerbach, as mentioned earlier, was to present reality by inverting Hegel. Robert Tucker writes in this connection. 'Since man's estrangement in the religious life was expressed theoretically in theology, to which Hegel's speculative philosophy had provided Feuerbach with an interpretative key, it seemed to Marx that man's estrangement in the political life must be reflected, albeit in a mystified form, in Hegel's philosophy of the state' (Tucker 1972, 103).

Up to this point, when he wrote the *Critique*, Marx's theoretical and political position was attached to what he called the 'reform of consciousness'. For instance, in September 1843, in a letter to Ruge he wrote his view of the policy of the new journal, the *French-German Yearbooks* as the unwavering criticism of the existing order in the name of humanity; that it should lend its support to the political struggle for a democratic system which should encompass more than the machinery of a political state; that it would strive to reform the individual's consciousness not dogmatically including the various system of communism but 'wish to discover the new world by criticism of the old' (Marx 1971b, 80). Marx emphasised the rejection of dogmatism as part of the new line: 'We must try and help dogmatists to understand their own principles. Thus communism in particular is a dogmatic abstraction, though by this I do not mean any imaginable and possible communism but the really existing communism, that Cabet, Dezamy, etc. teach. This communism is itself only a peculiar presentation of the humanist principle infected by its opposite private individualism. The abolition of private property and communism are therefore by no means identical, and it is no chance that communism has seen other socialist doctrines like

those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc. necessarily arise opposite, since it is itself only a particular one-sided realisation of the socialist principle' (ibid., 80-81).

The second article of relevance to the questions relating to political alienation and the concept of social emancipation to replace political emancipation is 'On the Jewish Question' (mentioned hereafter as *OJQ*), which Marx wrote during the Kreuznach period in the autumn of 1843. The background to his knowledge regarding Judaism can be seen in his notebooks which show that he had been reading Spinoza in 1841. 'His knowledge of Judaism,' write Rubel and Manale, 'later criticised in his essay *OJQ*, probably stemmed from Spinoza's *Tractatus*, apart from which Marx made two notebooks of extracts from Spinoza's correspondence' (Rubel & Manale 1975, 22-23). This essay reviews Bruno Bauer's two articles on the question of civil and political rights for Jews which were published earlier that year. Arguing against Bauer's view that the social emancipation of Jews was conditional on their religious emancipation, Marx used the occasion for a broader materialistic examination of the problem of mankind's emancipation not only from national, religious and political, but also from economic and social oppression (see Preface to CW3, xiv). This essay for the first time shows the signs of a growing realisation on Marx's part of the importance of material and economic conditions of human life. Marx sees the economic life in civil society and not religion as the extreme practical expression of human alienation. He links money with private property as the source of human alienation. It is worthwhile to note that Marx, at this juncture, had hardly begun the study of political economy.

At the time of writing the *Introduction* Marx's transition to the standpoint of communism had taken place. In this essay Marx continued his analysis of the problem of human emancipation. We find Marx for the first time formulating his ideas on the historical significance of the role of proletariat as a social force which was capable of emancipating itself from an alienated existence as a social class and thereby becoming the emancipator of mankind as a whole. In this essay Marx reaches the conclusion which is of decisive importance in the Marxist concept of the unity of theory and practice: 'The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon it has gripped the masses' (CW3, 182)

The imprint of Hegelian philosophy in the development of Marx's earliest political ideas, and especially the conception of political alienation is clear. The *Critique* shows that Marx takes great pains to analyse Hegel to arrive at a correct analysis of existing political situation. Marx's political philosophy can only be meaningfully analysed and understood within the Hegelian system, which provides Marx not only with conceptual framework but also the conceptual tools. In the following part, I present a brief account of Hegel's political theory as it appears in his *Philosophy of Right* (1821) whose Paragraphs 261-311 formed the basis of Marx's *Critique*. It is intended to be an essential background to the second part of this chapter where I discuss Marx's political philosophy and the issue of political alienation on the basis of his *Critique* and *OJQ*.

Part I HEGEL

3.2. The state and civil society in the Philosophy of Right

In part 1 of this chapter I present an overall view of Hegel's theory of the state and civil society as developed by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* (referred to hereafter as the *PR*). The role of the civil service, 'the universal class', is discussed in 3.2.5. The problem of dualism between the individual and the citizen is explained in 3.2.6. The *PR* is no doubt Hegel's most systematic work on political philosophy. It contains a theory of ethical community of modern times and the various 'moments' of it. Before we analyse his political theory, I should mention some of the difficulties which one meets in Hegel. His terminology causes great difficulty to a beginner, and there is no easy way to overcome it except than to familiarise oneself with this terminology, his conception of philosophy and logic as contained in his works prior to the *PR*. Hegel has often been called an 'obscure' philosopher, and there is some justification for that. But 'the problem lies in the fact that Hegel's philosophy is obscure not only to the dilettantes but to professional philosophers. Also significant is the fact that what is unclear in the philosophy of Hegel proves to be not only excruciatingly subtle speculative distinctions, but also his socio-political postulates,

and those that relate to the history of philosophy, which are presented in comparatively popular style and are free of dialectical "paradoxes" ' (Oizerman 1970, 300).

The obscurity we meet in Hegel cannot be merely reduced to the shortcomings of his style. It is true that this language is complex; but, in Oizerman's words, 'it must be studied and one must become accustomed to it in order to understand Hegel's philosophy. Nonetheless, this distinctive language is very expressive. It presents well all the nuances of Hegel's thought ... [but] the obscurity in Hegel's thought is not something external in character. It is, if one may be permitted to express oneself thus, something essential, significant and, if you will, attractive' (1970, 299-300; see also Findlay 1984, 320).

Another aspect of the problem is that the complexity, abstractness and speculative character of Hegel's social and political philosophy is due to its being a part of a general philosophical system that is elaborate and abstruse. His philosophy does not offer causal explanations as to how things occur in the world, but rather as to why the world is necessarily as it is (see Plamenatz 1980, 129). In our modern age, political and social theory is, as Pelczynski observes, 'committed to logical and empirical thinking, while Hegel, at least at first sight, appears to have nothing but contempt for empiricism and non-dialectical logic' (Pelczynski 1971, 1-2).

Some of the complexities and problems as well as the gravest misunderstandings in Hegel's concept of the state in the *PR* are 'the result of his conception of the true philosophical method, which ought to conceptualise various forms of human experience and relate them to each other as necessarily connected. A concept (*Begriff*) is necessarily complex because it is a dialectical synthesis of contrary forms of experience. His concept of the state ... contains, in a highly condensed way , diverse experiences, observations, intellectual influences and so on' (ibid., 9-10). One way to remove some of the misunderstandings is by showing the place of the *PR* in Hegel's system. The *PR* does not treat with the whole complex of the cultural phenomenon of the existing society because for Hegel, as Herbert Marcuse points out, 'the realm of right is but a part of the realm of mind, namely, that part which Hegel denotes as objective mind. It does not, in short, deal with the cultural realities of art, religion and philosophy, which embody the ultimate truth for Hegel. The place that the *PR* occupies in the Hegelian system makes it impossible to regard the state, the highest reality within the realm of right, as the highest reality

within the whole system. Even Hegel's most emphatic deification of the state cannot conceal his definite subordination of the objective to the absolute mind, of the political to the philosophical truth' (Marcuse 1941, 178).

After these preliminary comments, we can turn to Hegel's concept of ethical life -- the family, civil society and the state being its 'moments'.

3.2.1. Ethical life (Sittlichkeit)

An important feature of Hegel's social philosophy is his concept of *Sittlichke*it which has been variously translated as 'ethical life', 'objective ethics' or 'concrete ethics', etc. but no English word is able to compensate for the original term. It is this concept which underlies Hegel's discussion about 'ethical substance' and 'substantial ties'. Its etymological roots are in the term *Sitten*, 'customs'. One of the best summaries of the theory is by Taylor, who writes: ' "*Sittlichkeit*" refers to the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am part. These obligations are based on established norms and uses, and that is why the etymological root in 'Sitten' is important for Hegel's use. The crucial characteristic of *Sittlichkeit* is that it enjoins us to bring about what already is. This is a paradoxical way of putting it, but in fact the common life which is the basis of my *sittlich* obligation is already there in existence. It is in virtue of its being an ongoing affair that I have these obligations; and my fulfilment of these obligations is what sustains it and keeps it in being. Hence in *Sittlichkeit*, there is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between *Sollen* and *Sein.* With *Moralität*, the opposite holds. Here we have an obligation to realise something that does not exist. What ought to be contrasts with what is' (Taylor 1987, 376).

The vital point in Hegel's espousal of his social philosophy is that the norms of a society's public life constitute the content of *Sittlichkeit*. It is *Sittlichkeit* along with other cultural factors and historical traditions, which creates the spiritual bondage between the people of a state and makes it an ethical community. The ancient Greek polis and its culture contributed to forming the genuine or ethical communities of men. This could only come about when the people identified themselves fully with the cultural values, moral ideals and the social institutions of the city-states. Greek political institutions were not seen as something external, superimposed from

outside but rather as an essential part of the harmonious Greek life in polis. For Hegel the Greek polis was the paradigm from which he derived his concept of *Sittlichkeit*. Taylor underlines deftly the importance of *sittlich* dimension of men's ethical obligations to a larger life where they have a profound identification with their society and its institutions. But 'where they do not, where what is of central importance to them lies elsewhere, we have what Hegel characterises as alienation. Hegel, following in this Montesquieu and a long tradition does not believe that a free society can be sustained without this kind of identification which sustains a vital *Sittlichkeit*' (Taylor 1988, 125).

In fact, Hegel had become increasingly disenchanted with the individualistic conceptions of law and morality during his teaching period at Jena. He began to form his own philosophical views in opposition to the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. He found the treatment of some important aspects of ethical, social and political life in their philosophies lacking in a proper synthesis of the ancient and modern thought. Hegel's studies of the ancient Greek history, literature and philosophy led him to view the Greek polis and its culture as a genuine expression of *Sittlichkeit*. The ancient Greeks are seen as the ethical people *par excellence*. Inwood elaborates the idealised view of Hegel about the Greek society thus: 'In contrast to earlier societies, Greek society was a humanised society, in which natural forces were felt to have been tamed and subdued. Their gods, for example, were of a human form; their sculpture portrayed human and not animal figures. The world of the Greeks was familiar and friendly to its inhabitants. The chaos of nature was held at bay by social norms and institutions which were recognisably the product of men and in which men felt at home. In contrast to the later peoples, then, the Greeks had not yet come to regard their social norms and institutions as alien and oppressive or to distance themselves from them. They acted out their appointed roles without question. Such, according to Hegel, was the character of the Greek society when it was at its height, and it is in this which is meant by the "Greek *Sittlichkeit*" ' (Inwood 1984, 40)

The primary source of inspiration for Hegel's concept of *Sittlichkeit* and the model of political community is to be found in Plato's *Republic*. Hegel regarded it as the work of a true genius, expounding the essence of Greek society and culture. The *Republic*, which, in Hegel's words 'passes proverbially as an empty ideal, is in essence but an interpretation of the nature of

Greek ethical life' (Preface to the PR, 10). 'In his *Republic* Plato displays the substance of ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth' (PR, 124, §185).

Plato's *Republic* served the purpose of a diagrammatic representation of a state, which, to the modern readers, may appear a community reduced to bare essentials. A true community, according to Plato's views, must be above all things a single spiritual system. As against the individual souls which have some elements of spiritual sparks, it is only in the community as a working system that various organs, institutions, the 'classes' that several souls combine according to the predominant gift of each to render their specific service to the whole. 'And as action springs from the mind, while the mind becomes a definite system only in action, it follows that every soul or self in the community is a microcosm of which the state or community is the macrocosm, or that the whole visible community is the body of which a whole connected system of spiritual qualities is the soul. Thus the organisation and harmony of the state at once expresses, and guarantees by expressing, the organisation and harmony of the soul, for unfulfilled or undisciplined capacities in the latter imply waste and friction in the former. And, therefore, the order of the state may be portrayed as a system of moral excellences, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice' (cited in Baldwin 1902, 596).

Hegel had used about thirty years in observing and studying the contemporary relevance of the ethical life. It appeared in his mature work the *PR* (1820), where he offered a detailed philosophical construction of the ethical life which expressed the totality of ideas, practices, sentiments and relations of contemporary man. A lot of empirical data and historical raw material were used by Hegel in developing his theory of *Sittlichkeit*. The importance of the *PR* lies not in the formal structure of the philosophical arguments but rather with the political realities. The *PR*, in Karl Löwith's words, 'is the concrete realisation of the abstract tendency to reconcile philosophy with reality in all areas: political philosophy with politics, religious philosophy with Christendom. In both areas Hegel achieved a reconciliation not only with reality, but also within it, albeit "through comprehension". At this high point of his effectiveness, he saw the real world as a world "conformed to" the spirit. In return, the Prussian Protestant State appropriated philosophy in the person of Hegel' (Löwith 1991, 45-46).

The three key areas and concepts in the *PR* deal with right, ethical life and the state. All three are closely connected. By '*Recht*' (right) Hegel means the whole range of norms which regulate social life. For instance, he says that by *Recht* he means 'not merely what is generally understood by the word, namely civil law, but also morality, ethical life, and world history; these belong just as much to our topic, because the concept brings thoughts together into a true system' (PR, 233, Addition to § 33). Ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), as Pelczynski explains, 'includes the actual conduct of men guided by those norms, and is the result of a social process of character-training and habit-forming fostered by institutions but also (in the modern world) of critical reflection and intellectual grasp' (Pelczynski 1984, 8).

In the character-training of man, where man becomes a vehicle of Spirit or Reason, there lies the process of a long *Bildung* (roughly: 'education' or 'cultivation'), which, according to Hegel, plays a vital role. This view of *Bildung* is in opposition to Rousseau's romantic notions about education. For Hegel, *Bildung* is the true self-realisation of man of himself through his interaction with the objective world as it really is. It makes man free: 'The final purpose of *Bildung*, therefore, is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation still; *Bildung* is the absolute transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to the one which is intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form' (PR, 125, § 187). It 'rubs the edges off particular characteristics until a man conducts himself in accordance with the nature of the thing. Genuine originality, which produces the real thing, demands genuine *Bildung*, while bastard originality adopts eccentricities which only enter the heads of the uneducated' (PR, 268, Addition to § 187; see also Taylor 1987, 366; Avineri 1972, 132).

It is through this mediation of *Bildung* that man begins to distinguish within ethical life of two subordinate spheres, that of 'absolute or formal right' and of 'subjective morality'. In the *PR* Hegel divides the ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) in three forms of common life. These, in an ascending order, are: the family, civil society and the state. In the ethical order, these 'moments are the ethical powers which regulate the life of the individuals' (PR, 105, § 145). When viewed from the perspective of inter-human relationships, the three moments of the ethical order have their own modes. In the family, the place of the individual is determined not as an independent person but

as a member in a transcendent unity. The family life is characterised by particular altruism, love and concern. But in civil society, the 'natural and immediate phase' in the ethical order of the family is replaced by individuals coming together in pursuit of their individual and private needs and their satisfactions. Universal egoism is its distinctive mark. In the economic sphere, production and exchange of goods and services between men are carried out in one's own self-interest. The legal system protects the interests of the individuals. Finally, the state, the embodiment of universal altruism, stands at the apex of the ethical order.

3.2.2. The State

The discussion of the state in the *PR* falls into three parts. The first part deals with its immediate actuality or structure as an individual state -- the constitution. The second concerns its relation as a particular state to other states -- the international law. And the third deals with the wider development of the spirit of which every individual state is only a special phase in the world history.

According to Hegel, the state is the highest realisation of human community on earth; the highest form of human life if we take into account life-forms as a whole. The state in its fully realised form reconciles the fully developed individual subjectivity and the universal. It is the highest form of the objectification of Spirit which is essentially free. Since man as a rational being has the capability of making the deliberate choice, he values freedom very highly which he can realise only in the state. 'The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they ever recognise it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit' (PR, 160, § 260).

According to Hegel, it is only as members of a political and social order in a community that men come to conceive and desire freedom. In the state, and its various institutions the individual is universalised. The state accords protection and security to the individuals. Man

achieves his social purposes and objectives within the state. This extension of the personal into universal does not mean that individual loses his individual identity. It gives him freedom. Reyburn expounds it well: 'Everything that builds up a man's self and provides a field for the powers thus constituted is a means to freedom; and it is only in the state that man can find and fulfil his practical ends. Necessity ... is hard and sad only when it is external; when that which contains the individual and into which he passes is seen not to be an other but his own substance, necessity becomes freedom -- and this is the only freedom that counts. The restraints of public life are the articulations which the state requires in order to attain its proper unity and organisation, and the citizen who is conscious of his identity with the state is made free by them' (Reyburn 1921, 234-35).

Though Hegel speaks of the Spirit who to actualise and to perfect himself creates the world, because 'without the world God is not God' (cited in Cohen 1982, 9); he also speaks of world as existing only in and through finite minds, the human beings. Society seen in this light is thus the product of human activity. Without human activity there could be no society and without society there would not have been any realisation of human potentialities.

For Hegel the family and civil society are elements in a concrete and objective ethical system, the partial variants of the whole order. Only the state is the full realisation of the idea of *Sittlichkeit*; the last development in a series of rational social orders the state transcends the partial and particular interests, and in it the common good of the community is realised. 'The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is ethical mind *qua* the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself' (PR, 155, § 257). The state is 'the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that consciousness had been raised to the consciousness of its universality' (PR, 155-56). Against the view that particular wills are real and responsible for the state, this fundamental conception must be kept in mind that 'the objective will is rationality implicit or in conception, whether it be recognised or not by individuals, whether their whims are deliberately for it or not' (PR, 157, § 258). The state is, as Taylor elucidates, 'the manifestation of substantial will. It is the community in which the full rational will is manifest in public life. The fully realised state reconciles the individual subjectivity and the universal. It is concrete freedom' (Taylor 1987, 438).

Hegel's elaboration of the conception of freedom in the *PR* is related to man as a moral agent who makes a rational and moral choice and who is not swayed only by his impulses and appetites, which Hegel calls an arbitrary will (PR, 28, § 17). The idea of freedom operates in the ethical sphere of rational and moral will. Hegel says that 'if we hear it said that the definition of freedom is the ability to do what we please, such an idea can only be taken to mean an utter immaturity of thought, for it contains not an inkling of right, ethical life, and so forth' (PR, 27, § 15) and that 'it is only as thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free' (PR, 30, § 21). The ability to do what we choose to do rationally is possible only under an ethical order which the state comes to embody. This rational will, as John Plamenatz mentions, does not emerge in the privacy of an individual mind unconnected with other minds: 'It is the product of life lived in society. There is therefore for Hegel (as there was for Plato and Rousseau) always a close connection between the rationality of the individual will and the rationality of the social and political order' (Plamenatz 1980, 219).

There is no doubt that Hegel's characterisation of the state as the supreme articulation of society has a touch of the divine in Hegel's eyes. Taylor elaborates on this point thus: 'In order to realise God's (Spirit's) fulfilment, man has to come to a vision of himself as part of a larger life. And that requires that as a living being he be in fact integrated into a larger life. The state is the real expression of that universal life which is the necessary embodiment ... for the vision of the Absolute. In other words, it is essential to God's progress through the world that the state be' (Taylor 1987, 366).

The Addition to § 258 of *PR* has caused a misconception that Hegel by the deification of the state advocated an authoritarian form of government. In the original German the sentence is as follows: 'Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, dass der Staat ist.' It has been variously translated and interpreted into English as 'The existence of the state is the process of God upon earth' (see Kaufmann 1970, 36), whereas Knox in his translation renders it thus: 'The march of God in the world, that is what the state is' (PR, 279). To put the matter right, we can point out that the sentence concerned was added by the posthumous editor, Eduard Gans, from the notebooks of Hegel's students, in the 'Addition' of the PR; Hegel's own edition of the *Rechtsphilosophie* does not mention it. As Walter Kaufmann shows, a correct translation of the sentence is: 'It is the way

of God with [literally: in] the world that there should be [literally: is] the state' (Kaufmann 1970, 4). What Hegel meant to convey was that the existence of the state is in no way a matter of coincidence but, metaphorically speaking, rather a part of the divine plane, not a merely human arbitrary artefact, and it is the philosopher's task to discover its reason, its *raison d'être*. John Plamenatz mentions approvingly of an essay on the divinity of the state by M. Gregoire. According to Gregoire, Hegel was apt to call anything divine which he regarded as the manifestation of the high level of rational spirit. That Hegel's calling the state divine was in his repudiation of the views of the social contract theorists who made the state a human device. Hegel did not view the state as a contract, terminable at will. 'We are already citizens of the state by birth. The rational end of man is life in the state, and if there is no state there, reason at once demands that one be founded' (PR, 242, Addition to § 75; see also Plamenatz 1980, 243).

Whether Hegel can be accused of advocating an authoritarian, if not an outright totalitarian, view of the state may be questionable but there is ample evidence of his minimising the role of the individual *vis-a-vis* the state. 'Though Hegel is not as illiberal as he is sometimes presented as being, he is illiberal; he does play down the individual. He does sometimes come very close to suggesting that, because society makes us rational and moral, we ought not to challenge established laws and conventions. He also sometimes speaks as if the state stood to the citizen as God the creator stands to His creature man. He insists so much that man owes everything to the communities he belongs to, and above all to the state, that he seems to be suggesting, without wishing to put it into crude words, that he also owes absolute obedience' (Plamenatz 1980, 243).

Meanwhile we must keep in view the fact that Hegel throughout this discussion is speaking of the Idea of the state, the ideal essence of it and not any particular state. So far any historical state is concerned Hegel does not hold it to be above criticism: 'The state is no work of art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many respects. But the ugliest of men, or a criminal, or an invalid, or a cripple, is still always a living man. The affirmative, life, subsists despite his defects, and it is this affirmative factor which is our theme here' (PR, 279, Addition to § 258). It should also be kept in mind that Hegel's theory of the state is not to be construed, as indicated above, as referring to any

existing state. Hegel's model or ideal construction of the state can best be located in his *idea* of the state and any existing state cannot be anything but a mere approximation to the idea. But, as Walter Kaufmann says, 'Hegel would distinguish between the Idea of the State, which he means when he speaks of "the State", and the many states round us. But the idea, he claims, does not reside in a Platonic heaven, but is present, more or less distorted, in these states. The philosopher should neither immerse himself in the description and detailed analysis of various historical states, nor turn his back on history to behold some inner vision: he should disentangle the rational core from the web of history' (Kaufmann 1970, 152-53).

So far as the historical origin of the state in general or any particular state is concerned, to Hegel 'all these questions are no concern of the Idea of the state. We are here dealing exclusively with the philosophic science of the state, and from that point of view all these things are mere appearance and therefore matters for the history' (PR, 156, § 258).

The state in its fully realised form reconciles the fully developed individual subjectivity and the universal. The state is the concrete freedom; 'not that freedom from all restraints which, at its worst, culminates in anarchy, license, and bestiality, but, rather, man's freedom to develop his humanity and to cultivate art, religion, and philosophy. He considers the state supreme among human institutions because he would subordinate all such institutions to the highest spiritual pursuits and because he believes that these are possible only in "the State" ' (Kaufmann 1970, 155).

Hegel's theory of the state, as Sabine observes, depends upon the peculiar nature of relationship, as Hegel surmised between the state and civil society: 'The relation is at once one of contrast and mutual dependence. The state as Hegel conceived it is no utilitarian institution, engaged in the commonplace business of providing public services, administering the law, performing police duties and adjusting industrial and economic interests. All these functions belong to civil society. The state may indeed direct and regulate them as need arises, but it does not itself perform them' (Sabine 1981, 598). Whereas the civil society depends upon the state for supervision and moral leadership, the state itself depends upon the civil society for accomplishing the moral purposes it embodies.

3.2.3. The state as an organic whole

The state, in Hegel's view, is the realisation of rational necessity, of the Idea, which gives unity and harmony to family and civil society. It does so by virtue of its being an organism. 'This organism is the development of the Idea to its differences and their objective actuality. Hence these different members are the various powers of the state with their functions and spheres of action ... Throughout this process the universal maintains its identity, since it is itself the presupposition of its own production. This organism is the constitution of the state' (PR, 164, § 269).

In the *PR*, Hegel clearly distinguishes between 'civil society' and 'the state'. The former which I discuss in 3.2.4., is, according to Hegel, also a kind of state, and not merely as an aspect of the state. It is, as Pelczynski sums up, 'the modern state conceived as a system of public authorities and autonomous public bodies existing to further the private interests of individuals, or their more or less organised groups, to protect their legal rights of person, property, contract, and so on, and to enforce their mutual obligations. But it is also a network of spontaneous, private relations established within the framework of the law by individuals pursuing their particular ("the system of needs"), which Hegel considers to be an essential aspect of "civil society" ' (Pelczynski 1971, 10). All the activities and institutions which transcend 'civil society' come within the ambit of 'the state' that is 'the strictly political state and its constitution' (PR, 163, § 267).

The state in its 'political' sense (not as the Idea of the state) is composed of interdependent parts. An essential function of the state is to maintain the internal relations among its various parts. Hegel views these parts of the political organism as harmonious elements of a totality. In the constitutional structure of the state Hegel assigns monarchy the central place. The monarch 'as the will with the ultimate decision' holds the unique position: 'In the crown, the different powers are bound into an individual unity which is thus at once the apex and basis of the whole, i.e. of constitutional monarchy' (PR, 176, § 273; for a critique of Hegelian position, see Reyburn l921, 242-44). Hegel's concept of constitutional monarchy is far removed from the absolutist and the despotic tradition. 'The development of the state to constitutional monarchy is the achievement of the modern world' (PR, 176, § 273). This system is necessarily an historical

evolution of a given society. The constitution of the state cannot be imposed from without; nor is it ever 'made'. It grows or evolves. Hegel says that 'the constitution of any given nation depends in general on the character and development of its self-consciousness'; he says further that 'the proposal to give a constitution -- even more or less rational in content -- to a nation *a priori* would be a happy thought overlooking precisely that factor in a constitution which makes it more than an *ens rationis*. Hence every nation has the constitution appropriate to it and suitable for it, (PR, 179, § 274). As regards the system of constitutional monarchy, it cannot be 'imposed *a priori* on any given society; rather it is an outgrowth of a whole sub-structure of institutions and mores and any attempt to impose the form of a constitutional monarchy on a society as yet unripe for it is doomed to failure' (Avineri 1972, 185). Hegel emphasises the necessity of historical change or more appropriately the historical evolution as a pre-requisite for political development. 'The advance from one state of affairs to another is tranquil in appearance and unnoticed. In this way a constitution changes over a long period of time into something quite different from what it was originally' (PR, 291, Addition to § 298).

Various component parts of the state are brought into focus through its constitution, showing the government as a complex whole. Hugh Reyburn clarifies this point: 'The constitution is realised in the government. It is through the government that the natural differences which arise in the community are brought back in unity, and "those general aims of the whole which rise above the function of the family and of civil society" are carried out in the lower spheres. To this end the government must be a complex whole, with various aspects depending on the main functions which it has to perform, but not divided into parts entirely independent of one another' (Reyburn 1921, 239). Accordingly, Hegel rejects the traditional theory of the separation of powers. Though he insists on the element of truth which it contains as 'the guarantee of public freedom' and the development of 'the essential moments of difference, of rationality *realised*' (PR, 175, § 272), but he points that it side-steps the essential unity of the state. 'In one way or the other we must be able to regard the parts as articulations of whole in them. They do not merely comprise a mechanical system; each speaks with the authority of the whole. The legislature enacts laws for and in the name of the whole state; the judiciary defines them by the same authority; and the executive acts on behalf of the same common will. These

powers do not act each for itself; they stand for the whole, and run back into it' (Reyburn 1921, 240).

Hegel's concept of the organic unity of the state ensures that powers used by different institutions do not conflict with one another; and they do not interfere with the function of integration in the whole: 'The powers of the state, then, must certainly be distinguished, but each of them must build itself inwardly into a whole and contain in itself the other moments. When we speak of the distinct activities of these powers, we must not slip into the monstrous error of so interpreting their distinction as to suppose that each power should subsist independently in abstraction from the others' (PR, 286, Addition to § 272). Therefore, when Hegel speaks of the state as articulated like an organism into its different members (PR, 164, § 269) he does not have any division of powers in view which could operate as checks and balances upon one another. Hegel says: 'The constitution is rational in so far as the state inwardly differentiates and determines its activity in accordance with the nature of the concept. The result of this is that each of these powers is in itself the totality of the constitution, because each contains the other moments and has been effective in itself, and because the moments, being expressions of the differentiation of the concept, simply abide in their ideality and constitute nothing but a single individual whole' (PR, 174, § 272). This means that different powers within the state are not self-subsistent and that they do not vie with each other. To hold a contrary view would imply an infringement of the basic principle of the organic unity of the state. 'This view implies,' explains Hegel, 'that the attitude adopted by each power to the others is hostile and apprehensive, as if the others were evils, and that their function is to oppose one another and as a result of this counterpoise to effect an equilibrium on the whole, but never a living unity' (PR, 175). The result of the powers becoming self-subsistent within the state is that 'the destruction of the state is forthwith a *fait accompli*' (PR, 175, § 72).

The principle of the organic unity as being central in Hegelian theory of state has been emphasised by Charles Taylor: 'The state as a community embodying reason has to be lived as an organic whole; it cannot be seen simply as an aggregation of its elements, be these groups or individuals. For in this case it cannot be lived by its citizens as the locus of a large life with

which they identify. Hegel argues strenuously against the type of constitution or constitutional provision which is based on the atomistic or composite view of the state' (Taylor 1987, 439).

The place of individuals in this political state as an organic unity can be mentioned here. Hegel was able to see the role of the individuals in relation to the guilds, corporations, the estates and classes; without these larger associational structures individuals were small atoms. According to Hegel the individual citizens were not the primary constituents of the state. As individual citizens they should participate in the affairs of the state through their membership of corporations and estates. 'The individual must be "mediated" through a long series of corporations and associations before he arrives at the final dignity of citizenship in the state' (Sabine 1981, 599). The relationship of individual to his corporation, church or community, according to the Hegelian view, provides the basis for a full realisation of his individuality. The individual who joins a corporation or is co-opted by one, gains a measure of economic security, because the corporation protects its members against 'particular contingencies'. It also provides him with vocational training and education necessary in conducting the affairs of the corporation (see PR, 153, § 252). Heiman elaborates well: 'Hegel's individual, in his capacity as a corporation member has learned to assess his interests both economically and, gradually, politically.... According to Hegel, once the individual has recognised the full extent of his own interests he becomes aware of the fact that the protection is best afforded in the actions taken by the public authority of the state which had legitimised his corporation. The hostility to and alienation from the state which the individual may have harboured is alleviated by his corporate existence. Ultimately the immediacy of the group, the contact with his "fellows" and the sharing in the management of his corporation provides the foundation of patriotism and political loyalty' (Heiman 1971, 128).

Hegel has no reservations that the whole is prior to its parts; that the parts can exist so that the whole may posit as such. The French Hegelian philosopher Jean Hyppolite puts it thus: 'The truly political state is an emergent over and above the everyday life of the individuals; it is their unity, their rationale; within this unity alone are they what they ought to be, namely, conscious of themselves as the general will which had precedence in law over all particular

desires, just as the principle of unity in an organism is prior to the organs in which it is embodied and through which it maintains itself' (Hyppolite 1969, 109; see also Russell 1961, 711-12).

3.2.4. Civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft)

Hegel's discussion of civil society in the *PR* and the distinction he made between civil society and the state greatly influenced the theoretical activity of young Marx. In the subsequent history of political thought, Hegel's contribution has proved to be a source of inspiration to many theorists.

In 1962, Manfred Riedel argued that Hegel's separation of civil society from the state effected a conceptual revolution. It had made an abrupt break with traditional political thought: 'What Hegel, with the term civil society, raised to the consciousness of his time was nothing less than the result of the modern revolution, the rise of a depoliticized society through the centralisation of politics in the princely or the revolutionary state, and the shift of its point of gravity to the economy, a change which this society experienced simultaneously in the industrial Revolution and which found an expression in "political" or "national economy". It was in this process within the European society that its "political" and "social" conditions were first separated, conditions which before then, in the classical world of old politics, meant one and the same thing -- "communitas civilis sive politica", as Thomas Aquinas or "civil or political society", as John Locke put it' (cited in Pelczynski 1984, 3-4).

Riedel points out that the phrase *koinonia politike* first used by Aristotle, was translated as *societas civilis* which became along with its synonyms *civitas* and *res publica*, a general term for an independent political entity or the state. It was in explicit contrast to the family or household (*societas domestica*). In classical political theory some sections of the population were excluded from being members of the *res publica* or *societas civilis*. These have included at different times slaves, serfs, artisans, domestic servants, women and children. Slaves, for instance, were excluded from the membership of polis, but they could be members of the household (*oikos*). Aristotle wrote: 'But a state is something more than investment; its purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is worth living otherwise a state might be

made up of slaves or animals, and that is impossible, because slaves and animals are not free agents and do not participate in the well-being' (Aristotle 1974, 119).

The terms 'political' and 'civil' were used as being synonymous by late philosophers and writers like Aquinas, Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Kant. But Hegel's division of ethical life in family, civil society and the state put an end to the traditional dichotomy.

Hegel develops his theory of civil society when community is seen from the point of view of classical political economy. He takes into account the historical developments within the sphere of private interests in a complex modern world. The works of the British political economists like Adam Smith and James Steuart and other eighteenth-century thinkers who had visualised society as a universe of 'economic man', where everyone pursued his own self-interest, formed the basis of Hegelian theory. The political economists' model of the free market is evident in Hegel's definition of civil society: 'Civil society -- an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system -- the means to security of person and property -- and by an external organisation for attaining their particular and common interests' (PR, 110, § 157).

Hegel was well aware of the economic structure of the industrial society and the role of labour in the production. 'Alone among the German philosophers of his age,' writes Avineri, 'Hegel realised the prime importance of the economic sphere in political, religious and cultural life and tried to unravel the connection between what he later would call "civil society" and political life' (Avineri 1972, 5).

Hegel had experienced three major political events in his life. First, in his early life, it was the French Revolution. As a grown-up man, he saw the ascendancy of Napoleon and the extension of his empire, and finally, there were the Prussian wars of liberation. These events, as Löwith remarks, also determined the changes in his political thought: from a radical criticism of the existing order, through a recognition of Napoleon, to the justification of the Prussian bureaucratic state (see Löwith 1991, 241). With the collapse of the Napoleonic empire, the youthful illusions of Hegel had given way to a more sombre view of bourgeois society. Recalling the later period of Hegel's life, Lukacs comments that 'it is characteristic of Hegel that his

philosophical justification of the "estates" (i.e. of the class structure of civil society) becomes less ideological, and much closer to a grasp of society's material foundations' (Lukacs 1975, 234).

In civil society relations between individuals, in pursuance of their economic interests are not as members of family, nor as member of any ethical community but exclusively as men. It is a sphere where men are related to each other as bearers of rights. Hegel says: 'A man counts as a man in virtue of his humanity alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.' (PR, 134, § 209). Civil society appears to be an iniquitous system governed by the rule of nature, the predominance of the strong, and the rule of force. 'Civil society is the battlefield where everyone's individual private interest meets everyone else's' (PR, 189, § 289). The dominant concern in relationship with others is expressed thus: 'In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to him. But except in contact with others he cannot attain the whole compass of his ends, and therefore these others are the means to the end of the particular member' (PR, 267, Addition to § 182).

Within the economic sphere, civil society stands for universal egoism. Hegel calls it the positive creation of individualism, the 'achievement of the modern world' (PR, 266, Addition to § 182). Drawing a distinction between the principle of civil society as a sphere of universal egoism which exists in every society and its fully developed institutionalisation into a distinct and differentiated social sphere, Avineri observes that 'it is the latter which is typical of modern societies, where individual self-interest receives legitimization and is emancipated from the religious and ethico-political considerations which until then had hampered the free play of individual interests to their full extent' (Avineri 1972, 142).

But in the economic exchange which takes place in civil society to meet the needs of individuals a system of interdependence is created. Individuals can meet their needs by co-operation with others. They indirectly satisfy the needs and promote the interests of others. It leads to a system of interdependence and the creation of a large framework of rules and institutions defining and protecting the legal rights of person, property, contract and so on. 'In the course of actual attainment of selfish ends ... there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all. On this system, individual happiness, etc.,

depend, and only in this connected system are they actualised and secured. This system may be *prima facie* regarded as external state, the state based on need, the state as the Understanding envisages it' (PR, 123, § 183). To characterise civil society in the passage as 'the external state', 'the state based on need' and 'the state as the Understanding envisages it', etc., Hegel in fact means that, while civil society is a state, but it is one of inferior types when seen in relation to and contrasted with the state. Hegel's description of civil society in this way, as Pelczynski observes, is that 'there is another, more adequate mode of conceiving the state. The complex of activities, attitudes, rules and institutions which make up "civil society" is only one aspect of the political and social life "abstracted" from a wider, richer or more "concrete" system of a process of formal, abstract thinking which Hegel calls the understanding' (Pelczynski 1971, 10). Thus it is apparent that even though civil society precedes the state, it is in fact dependent upon the state for its existence and preservation (see PR, 266, Addition to §182).

The basis of civil society is the system of needs. These needs are mediated through human work and effort. Reyburn writes: 'Natural objects are seldom found in a condition fit to fulfil our needs, and must be transformed by human agency. Work is a spiritualizing of nature, the infusion of purpose into a soulless material, and the adaptation of it to rational needs. But labour is more than a means ... man is not a being created with a fixed number of impulses and desires, a definite empty space to be filled, his whole life is organic; and the satisfaction of one need itself creates others. Labour itself becomes a need in his life, and by it he not only satisfies original wants but also finds a mode of expression, an activity, which is essential to his character and freedom' (Reyburn 1921, 217-18; see also PR, 128-29, § 196).

Human needs multiply through the mediation of human labour and effort. In this process of interaction, to satisfy their own needs, men also need the work and co-operation of others. In this way, they enter into exchange. We can distinguish human needs from those of the animal. In the case of the latter, the ways and means of satisfying needs are restricted in scope. But man, on the contrary, despite his limitations and restrictions, evinces his transcendence and universality by multiplying his needs and the means of satisfying them. This multiplication in civil society goes on *ad infinitum*.

Hegel regards the increasing multiplication and social determination of needs to reflect the increasing liberation of mankind from 'the strict natural necessity of need' (PR, 128, § 194). This view is opposed to the idealisation of the 'state of nature' by Rousseau as a model of an equilibrium between man and his needs and between human consciousness and nature. The decadence and evil involved in human civilisation in Rousseau's eyes is seen by Hegel as an essential part of the development of spirit. Hegel argues against Rousseau's view: 'This view takes no account of the moment of liberation intrinsic to work ... Apart from this, it is false, because to be confined to mere physical needs as such and their direct satisfaction would simply be the condition in which the mental is plunged in the natural and so would be one of savagery and unfreedom, while freedom itself is to be found only in the reflection of mind into itself, in mind's distinction from nature, and in the reflex of mind in nature' (PR, 128, § 194; for a comparative account of Hegel's and Marx's views on human need and egoism, see Berry 1989).

There are no limits to human needs. The satisfaction of a need leads to the creation of a new need. At the same time, it is the creation of new need which pushes human society to the endless pursuit of commodities. One noticeable consequence of it in civil society is that 'particularised needs and all the various ways of satisfying these are themselves divided and multiplied and so in turn become proximate ends and abstract needs' (PR, 127, § 191).

In capitalist economy the demand of 'abstract needs' or profit is consciously furthered by producers. Everything is subordinated to the pursuit of profit-making; and since the key to profit lies in commodity production, the production for profit becomes an end itself: 'What the English call "comfort" is something inexhaustible and illimitable. [Others can discover to you that what you take to be] comfort at any stage is discomfort, and these discoveries never come to an end. Hence the need for greater comfort does not exactly arise within you directly; it is suggested to you by those who hope to make a profit from its creation' (PR, 269, Addition to § 191). Our present-day society is a witness to the stark reality of ever-growing consumption of commodities and the creation of new needs pushed by the forces of market economy.

When civil society is seen only in its economic sphere, the natural inequalities between individuals, according to Hegel, find their full scope. In a state of unimpeded activity, civil society expands in industry and in population. Hegel explains how this leads to accumulation of

wealth in the hands of a few and poverty for the workers: 'The amassing of wealth is intensified by generalising (a) the linkage of men by their needs, and (b) the methods of preparing and distributing the means to satisfy these needs, because it is from this double process of generalisation that the largest profits are derived. This is one side of the picture. The other side is the subdivision and restriction of particular jobs. This results in the dependence and distress of the class tied to work of that sort, and these again entail inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially the intellectual benefits of civil society' (PR, 149-50, § 243). This is a clear statement of the effects of an intensification of the division of labour and increasing subdivision of jobs on the working people. They are both materially and spiritually impoverished. When reduced to this condition, these human beings utterly atomised and alienated from society, lose their sense of self-respect, the sense of right and wrong. They can no longer identify themselves with the whole community and thus they become a rabble of paupers.

Hegel provides one of the most perceptive insights in the dialectical nature of the emergence of poverty. He stresses many times that the growth of poverty in bourgeois society goes along with the concentration of wealth in a few hands. Avineri expounds the dilemma of the poor in civil society: 'The main problem of the poor is that while they cannot attain that which is considered as the minimum in their particular society, they nevertheless have the felt need to achieve this level. Civil society thus succeeds in internalising its norms about consumption into the consciousness of its members even while it is unable to satisfy these norms. This is exacerbated because civil society continuously overproduces goods which the masses cannot buy because of their lack of purchasing power. Thus poverty becomes a dialectical concept; it is the expression of tension between the needs created by civil society and its inability to satisfy them' (Avineri 1972, 149).

In outlining the main characteristics of civil society (PR, §§ 201-207), Hegel argues for the articulation of civil society into classes or more appropriately, estates (*Stände*), an older term which he uses. In their work relations and the satisfaction of needs men are dependent upon others. It leads to the division of labour. Hegel traces the origin of social differentiation, to the social division of labour: 'The infinitely complex, criss-cross, movements of reciprocal production and exchange, and the equally infinite multiplicity of means employed, become

crystallised, owing to the universality inherent in their content, and distinguished into general groups. As a result, the entire complex is built up into particular systems of needs, means, and types of work relative to these needs, modes of satisfaction and of theoretical and practical education, i.e. into systems, to one or other of which individuals are assigned -- in other words, into class-divisions' (PR, 130-31, § 201).

For Hegel the integration of every individual within civil society to a social class is necessary. It is through this mediation that a man's purely individual existence becomes part of a larger whole. 'When we say that a man must be a "somebody", we mean that he should belong to some specific social class, since to be somebody means to have substantive being. A man with no class is a mere private individual and his universality is not actualised' (PR, 271, Addition to § 207). Class membership defines the way in which a man actualises himself, becoming 'something definite, i.e. something specifically particularised'. According to Hegel, this represents 'the disposition to make oneself a member of one of the moments of civil society by one's own act, through one's energy, industry, and skill, to maintain oneself in this position, and to fend for oneself only through this process of mediating oneself with the universal, while in this way gaining recognition both in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others' (PR, 132, § 207).

Hegel's analysis of the role of social classes in civil society and Marx's critique of some aspects of it needs to be differentiated. Avineri observes in this connection: 'For Marx, classes are aggregates formed by types of social labour, linked together by the common relationship of their members to the means of production, seeking a political articulation for their socio-economic interests. The class nature of political power is a sin against the state's presumed claim to express the universal as against the particularism and egoism of civil society. For Hegel, the institutionalisation of class relationships into the political structure is the way through which the atomism of civil society becomes integrated into a comprehensive totality. The different classes represent to Hegel not only modes of production, but modes of consciousness which are relevant to a society differentiated in its structure according to the criteria of Hegel's general system. While for Marx classes represent a division of labour that has to be overcome, for Hegel they stand for the integration of this regrettable division into a meaningful whole' (Avineri 1972, 104).

Hegel (PR, 131, § 202) singles out three classes: (a) the *substantial* or immediate [agricultural] class; (b) the *reflecting* or formal [or business] class; and finally, (c) the *universal* class [the class of civil servants]. The class of civil servants, whom Hegel calls the 'universal class' identifies itself with the interests of the whole community. Marx, while rejecting this description of civil servants, retains the concept of a universal class. He suggests for the first time in the *Introduction* that it is the proletariat which has the attributes of a universal class (see 4.3. below). Hegel uses the concept of the class of civil servants in a wider sense than Marx's use of it in a more restricted sense of bureaucracy (higher grade civil servants). For instance, Hegel regards the university teachers in the Prussian state as civil servants who could hardly be called bureaucrats. In the following discussion, this vital distinction in the respective views of Hegel and Marx should be kept in mind.

3.2.5. The universal class

In the exposition of his theory of social classes in the *PR*, Hegel attaches great importance to the official governing class, the class of civil servants. Within the constitutional framework of the state or more appropriately 'the state of estates', the role of monarch and the estates in the legislative process is actualised through the universal will and the universal insight of civil servants. Hegel looks at professional civil service as an absolutely necessary institution. This class is a near bond between the particularism of civil society and the universality of the state. Within the political integration of the state and the maintenance of the internal relations among its various parts, this class, in Hegel's view, transcends the sphere of the private interests; it has solely the interests of the community as its sphere.

In the present structure of society, according to Hegel, only the class of civil servants fulfils the conditions of universality as a class: 'The universal class [the class of civil servants] has for its task the universal interests of the community. It must therefore be relieved from direct labour to supply its needs, either by having private means or by receiving an allowance from the state which claims its industry, with the result that public interest finds its satisfaction in its work for the universal' (PR, 132, § 205).

When Hegel wrote the *PR*, many public offices were still venal. There was no proper civil service in England in existence. The situation of civil service in Prussia was relatively better than in England where corruption was quite common. 'The business of the state is in the hands of individuals. But their authority to conduct its affairs is based not on their birth but on their objective qualities. Ability, skill, character, all belong to a man in his particular capacity.... Hence an office may not be saleable or hereditary. In France, seats in parliament were formerly saleable, and in the English army commissions up to a certain rank are saleable to this day. This saleability of office, however, was and is still connected with the medieval constitution of certain states, and such constitutions are nowadays gradually disappearing' (PR, 287-88, Addition to § 277).

The aim of making the civil service a career is to increase the chances of maximum independence from the private interests and full dedication to the profession. Only the civil service unlike any other class or group in the state, identifies itself totally with the life of the state and public affairs. The 'civil servants and the members of the executive constitute the greater part of the middle class' (PR, 193, § 297). And the middle class prominent in educational attainment and politically conscious 'is also the pillar of the state in so far as honesty and intelligence are concerned' (PR, 291, Addition to § 297). Even though civil servants belong to the middle class, Hegel argues that their qualification to join the civil service should be by merit alone. Hegel emphasises this point: 'Between an individual and his office there is no immediate natural link. Hence individuals are not appointed to office on account of their birth or native personal gifts. The *objective* factor in their appointment is knowledge and proof of ability. Such proof guarantees that the state will get what it requires; and since it is the sole condition of appointment, it also guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants' (PR, 190, § 291).

The civil servants come to represent the insight and will of the universal interest. These characteristics, however, are not the property of the individual civil servants; these are because of the organisation and the hierarchical structure of the system. For Hegel, the civil servants are impartial towards the private and social interests which they regulate. According to Sabine, the civil service in a special sense in Hegel's view 'represents the general will and the "reason" of society, in contrast with acquisitive self-interest or special and partial interests, and is the

guardian of the whole public interest' (Sabine 1981, 601). The universalistic character of the civil service being an essential part of the modern state is not due to the property-oriented criteria of civil society. The particular activities and agencies of the state, according to Hegel, are its essential moments: 'The individual functionaries and agents are attached to their office not on the strength of their immediate personality, but only on the strength of their universal and objective qualities. Hence it is in an external and contingent way that these offices are linked with particular persons, and therefore the functions and powers of the state cannot be private property' (PR, 179, § 277).

Victor Perez-Diaz aptly comments on Hegel's notion of the universality of the bureaucrats: 'They are universal, not because of the "negative" universality of their wants, as was the case of the slave in the *Phenomenology* ... but because of the "positive" universality of what they already have, the state itself. They are not the "unhappy consciousness" which feels estranged from its own product and the totality of the world, and which looks for realisation either in the realm of beyond or in the revolution.... On the contrary, they are a self-satisfied consciousness which understands and accepts the world as *its* world' (Perez-Diaz 1978, 11). The organisation of the civil service is grounded in a strict hierarchy which defines the system of relations and specialisation. 'Hierarchical subordination, specialisation and co-ordination make possible the overcoming of the particular wills and interests of the political actors which are, nevertheless, still there' (ibid., 12).

A total identification with the state and the immersion in the public affairs can create the feeling among the members of the civil service that they themselves are 'owning' the state. Hegel was aware of this danger: 'The opposite extreme to a knight errant, so far as the services of the state goes, would be an official who clung to his office purely and simply to make a living without any real sense of duty and so without any real right to go on holding it' (PR, 191, § 294). But Hegel suggested that by developing the middle class to which the civil service belongs, the state can develop other independent organisations and corporations to operate as effective brakes on the excessive power of the civil servants: 'It can be done only by giving authority to spheres of particular interests, which are relatively independent, and by appointing an army of officials

whose personal arbitrariness is broken against such authorised bodies' (PR, 291, Addition to § 298).

In the functioning of the modern state and civil society Hegel's theory of the official governing class fulfils the integrative role as an organ in a larger organism of the whole state. It embodies, in Avineri's words, 'not only a reflection of the functional needs of a complex and differentiated society, but also represents a critique of the claims of civil society to absolute and paramount power' (Avineri 1972, 160-61).

3.2.6. The duality of man

This problem in political philosophy is related to the relation between civil society and the state, which creates the division of man into private individual (*bürger, bourgeois*) as distinct from citizen (*citoyen*). The first clear statement of the duality of man in civil society is contained in the writings of Rousseau. According to him, a man in civil society is not a whole man. He is a private individual in civil society but a citizen in the state. The problematic relationship of civil society to the state is the cause of this bifurcation.

For Hegel, this division of man into a private person and a citizen was in a sense unavoidable. Man is both a member of civil society and a citizen of the state. As it was not feasible to overcome this duality, the solution was to create a balance between these two aspects of his existence: 'Both individualities are the same. This man cares for himself and for his family, works, signs contracts, etc., and at the same time he also labours for the universal and has it as an end. From the first viewpoint, he is called a *bourgeois*, from the second *citoyen'* (*Realphilosophie II*, 249).

The classical model of a harmonious life in Hegel's eyes was, no doubt, the Greek polis. The dilemma of Hegel's generation was 'how to combine the fullness of moral autonomy, with the recovery of that community, whose public life was expressive of its members and whose paradigm realisation in history was the Greek polis' (Taylor 1987, 365). But it would not be true to postulate as some observers have done that Hegel was looking to the polis as a paradigm for resurrection. Avineri rightly rejects this. He writes: 'Yet for all of Hegel's praise for the polis, he always remained fully conscious of the reasons for its decline and there is never any intimation in

his writings that he might consider a renascence of ancient republicanism possible.... Nevertheless, the dream of a kind of political structure that would cater not only to man as an individual but as a social being always remained with Hegel. The problem for him was how to reach such a synthesis within the conditions of the modern world' (Avineri 1972, 33; see also Pelczynski 1971, 6).

We can mention two tendencies which have shaped individualism in European culture as against communal and collectivist thinking and the mode of living. First of all, the modern European culture with its particular emphasis on the private rights of individuals *vis-a-vis* the state had evolved under the influence of Roman law and the doctrines of natural law. Unlike the individual's identification with the community as in the Greek polis, the legitimate private rights of individuals and group interests have been the salient feature of the European culture. Secondly, there is the social role of Christianity. According to Hegel, Christianity had also deep effect on European culture, especially 'after it had been developed by the Reformation and secularised by the Enlightenment. Under its influence men came to regard themselves as moral agents, acknowledging no higher authority than their own conscience or reason. Hegel calls the first tendency "particularity" and the second "subjectivity"; the two together constitute the peculiarly modern and European phenomenon of individualism' (Pelczynski 1971, 7).

Unlike individualism, a dominant cultural force in modern age, the Greek polis presented a different set of values and priorities in the body-politic for its citizens. There the citizens had the will of the general or universal in an immediate and substantial way. The distinction of private and public did not exist. As Hegel says: 'This is the beautiful happy liberty of the Greeks, which has been and is admired so much. The people is at the same time split up into citizens as well as constituting the *one* individual, the government. It inter-relates with itself alone. The same will is the individual and the universal. The alienation of the particularity of the will is its immediate preservation ... There is no protest here: everyone knows himself immediately as universal, i.e. he gives up his particularity without knowing it as such, as a self, an essence' (*Realphilosophie II*, 250). In the contemporary world any such identification is unknown. According to Hegel, the French revolution failed because it could not suppress the citizen and the private individual or to absorb them completely in a truly political state.

In contrast to the Greek polity, we have the model of society which is not an ethical community. It was the Roman world in its last days. It was the expression of the 'unhappy consciousness' because of the frustrated attempts of the individual to attain harmony and a complete consciousness of self. Here we have a civil society of self-seeking individuals, of masters and slaves who have no moral bonds towards each other. The separation of private and civic life, of 'concern for the particular and concern for what is general' is complete. 'The individual,' writes Hyppolite, 'separated himself from the city and withdrew into himself, to his private property, his private labour, his own finite and limited domain. He came to consider the state as an external force -- *a form of alienation*, as Hegel and Marx later expressed it. The counterpart to this experience of political alienation was one of religious alienation because the private individual, having lost the meaning of life in the polis, could only flee from his own limited conception of life to take refuge in an eternal nature protected beyond himself' (Hyppolite 1969, 110).

The modern civil society, however, is not quite so atomistic as the Roman world. The political mechanism of the state as the apex of the ethical order and the controlled mechanism of civil society accomplishes the synthesis, under which, according to Hegel, the 'abstract' freedom of individuals as envisaged by Rousseau is made 'concrete'. The rights of the individuals in regard to their personal interests and the subjective choices, on the one hand, and the altruistic service for the common good, on the other hand, are achieved in the ethical order. How the differing roles as an individual bourgeois and the citizen find in a rational synthesis in modern state is aptly described by Pelczynski. 'The *raison d'être* of civil society and the justification of civil freedom is the private interest and subjective choice of the individual *bourgeois* which, mediated through a system of economic and social relations as well as laws, institutions and authorities, promotes the interest of the ethical community only indirectly and in the last resort. The *raison d'être* of political community and the justification of political liberty is the good of the ethical community itself, the common good or the public interest, which the fully self-conscious and self-determined citizen promotes for its own sake. In so doing he actualises his own deepest freedom and realises his nature not simply as a particular but as a universal, communal being' (Pelczynski 1984, 76).

Since Hegel wrote the *PR* there have been momentous developments in the transformation of the 'civil society' into a mature capitalist economic system. The functioning of modern capitalist system has self-regulatory mechanisms for adjustment and change in the sphere of market economy. This social order in Hegel's opinion produces much better results than the regulations of the ancient regime. The modern state, according to Hegel, has 'prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principles of subjectivity itself' (PR, 161, § 260). In Part 2, we will look at Marx's critique of Hegelian political philosophy.

Part 2 MARX

3.3. The premises of political alienation in the Critique

In his first major theoretical work, the *Critique*, Marx's point of departure is Hegel's *PR*. Marx uses the concepts of 'civil society' (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) or 'property' like Hegel did to begin with but giving these a significantly new content in his commentary. Marx's use of the term '*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*' in his early writings, for instance, as the editors of the *EPM* point out, means two things: '(1) in a broader sense, the economic system of society independent of the historical stage of its development, the sum-total of material relations which determine political institutions and ideology, and (2) in the narrow sense, the material relations of bourgeois society (later on, that society as a whole), of capitalism' (EPM l90, note 39).

In the *Critique*, Marx undertakes a searching and critical analysis, possibly with a view to his own self-clarification, of the philosophical premises of the Hegelian philosophy. But 'it is from Hegel's political philosophy that Marx works towards the root of the Hegelian system -- and not the other way round. Marx starts with the socio-political implications of Hegel's philosophy and only then proceeds to a review of the Hegelian system as a whole' (Avineri 1970, 13; cf.

Barbalet 1983, 116-18). In the *Critique* Marx while remaining within the Hegelian system makes an extensive use of the Feuerbachian transformative method. 'In this extraordinary text,' the French philosopher Michel Henry writes, 'of unlimited philosophical import ... [there is] the initial working out of a thought which simultaneously succumbs to Hegelianism and makes a radical break with it and with the principles which, since ancient Greece, have dominated Western philosophy' (Henry 1983, 17). However, we see that Marx's arguments advanced in the *Critique* come to be superseded in his later works (see Berki 1971, 215, 216). One of the chief concerns of Marx was to expose the state as one of the 'unholy forms' of human alienation. Hegel's speculative philosophy had been used by Feuerbach to expose man's estrangement in the religious life; Marx's textual analysis of the *PR* was the exploration of the state as a sphere of alienated human life. Here, for the first time, Marx deals adequately with the phenomenon of alienation and offers a political solution to overcome it.

As Marx's formulations of the state, civil society and property are essentially within the orbit of Hegelian philosophical presuppositions, it is necessary to analyse these within the particular context of their original usage. Avineri reminds us about this: 'It can be shown that all the main achievements, as well as dilemmas, of Marx's later theory (like the abolition of private property, of alienation, and of the state) originate in this work [i.e. the *Critique*]. Marx's use of these terms is meaningless if divorced from the specific context in which he employs them, as well as from the manner and method of their application' (Avineri 1970, 3). Hegel had written in the Preface to the *PR*: 'Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thought. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes' (PR, 11). Marx's working within the Hegelian system is understandable in view of the impact of Hegel on the philosophical movement after his death. The *Critique* shows that 'the distinctive patterns in Marx's later thought had already taken shape when he attacked Hegel in this work' (Avineri 1970, 13).

By inverting Hegel in the manner of Feuerbach, Marx set out to turn Hegel's speculative philosophy 'upside down'. Whereas Feuerbach had seen the task in putting the predicate in place of the subject and vice versa, in unconcealing the truth of the Hegelian philosophy, Marx goes

farther than that. He, unlike Feuerbach, 'finds in Hegel's mystification of actual reality, notably of the state, not only a speculative-theological but also a political conception. Marx did not specifically consider the question of the theological premises of Hegel's idealism apparently because this had been done by Feuerbach. It is much more important therefore to show that Hegel's speculative constructions reflect a definite social reality and a very definite attitude towards it' (Oizerman 1981, 169; see also Berki 1971, 201-202). In Hegel's philosophy, the individual, the real object, appeared as a mere predicate of an abstraction: 'Hegel transforms the predicates, the objects, into independent entities, but divorced from their actual independence, their subject. Subsequently the actual subject appears as a result, whereas one must start from the actual subject and look at its objectification' (CW3, 23). Marx points the way to re-identify the true subject, the acting individual, living in the 'real', 'material' world.

Within the political sphere, Hegel regarded civil society as a manifestation of the state. But Marx rejects this and shows that the truth lies in the reverse order: the state being a manifestation, an outgrowth, of civil society. He inverts the Hegelian concept of 'monarchy' with 'democracy', where, according to Marx, 'each is in actual fact only an element of the whole demos [people]'. Marx writes further: 'Hegel starts from the state and makes man the subjectified state; democracy starts from man and makes the state objectified man. Just as it is not religion which creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constitution which creates the people but the people which creates the constitution' (CW3, 29).

The dualism of the private individual and the citizen, of the civil society and the state in Hegelian political philosophy, needed to be resolved. The essential point in this respect which Marx made was that political state was not an emanation of the Idea but rather the product of the concrete subject, the man in society. The real world is not to be inferred from the study of the ideal; it is the ideal which has to be understood as the historical outcome of the real. 'The truly concrete subject, the bearer of predicates, is *man as social being,* who belongs to what Hegel called bourgeois society, and the state, which Hegel mistakenly took for the subject, as Idea, is in fact a predicate of man's social nature. The Idea -- in reality, the product of man's social activity -- appears in Hegel as the authentic subject which results in "a mystery which degenerates into mystification" as Marx puts it' (Hyppolite 1969, 112). In Hegel's account, the state is not only

presented as severed from the life of the individuals in civil society, but as logically prior to individual. Only as a moment in the march of universal freedom, embodied in the state, does the individual come to have any significance. The state or cultural complex, rather than the individual, is the bearer of history.

The mystery of the Idea, an outright mystification in Hegel whereby the state becomes the phenomenon of the Idea within the civil society, in the constitutional monarchy, the bureaucracy and the two chambers is substituted for the activity of man in making history (see Hyppolite 1969, 112). The role of the actual subject is substituted for the predicate: 'Hegel everywhere makes the idea the subject and turns the proper, the actual subject ... into a predicate. It is always on the side of the predicate that the development takes place' (CW3, 11). We can illustrate this point from the *PR*: 'The patriotic sentiment acquires its specifically determined content from the various members of the organism of the state. This organism is the development of the Idea to its differences and their objective actuality. Hence these different members are the various powers of the state with their functions and spheres of action, by means of which the universal continually engenders itself, and engenders itself in a necessary way because their specific character is fixed by the nature of the concept. Throughout this process the universal maintains its identity, since it is itself the presupposition of its own production. This organism is the constitution of the state' (PR, 164, § 269). To hold the view which ascribes organic features to the state by analogy may be accepted. But when Hegel 'proceeds to show what sort of organism it is or what specific form the state should have, he introduces a content foreign to its concept; he then fails to conceptualise it adequately' (Hyppolite 1969, 112).

In his comments on 'this organism in the development of the Idea to its differences' (PR, 164, § 269), Marx explains that Hegel does not say that the organism of the state is the development of the state into distinct aspects and their objective actuality: 'The genuine thought is this: the development of the state or the political constitution into distinct aspects and their actuality is an *organic* development. The *actual distinct aspects* or *various facets of the political* constitution are the premise, the subject. The predicate is their characterisation as *organic*. Instead of this, the idea is made the subject, and the distinct aspects and their actuality are conceived as the idea's development and product; whereas, on the contrary, the idea has to be

developed from the actual distinct aspects. The organic is just the *idea of the distinct aspects*, their ideal definition. Here, however, the idea is spoken of as a subject, which develops itself into its distinct aspects' (CW3, 12).

Marx has shown in detail the logico-pantheistic mystification consisting of reducing the real, empirical facts to the Idea which is declared to be the substance and cause. Hegel 'does not develop his thinking from the object, but expounds the object in accordance with a thinking that is cut and dried -- already formed and fixed in the abstract sphere of logic' (CW3, 14). Hegel's use of empirical facts is to support the categories of his logic. 'Not the logic of the matter,' Marx says pithily, 'but the matter of logic is the philosophical element. The logic does not serve to prove the state, but the state to prove the logic' (CW3, 18).

Thus, Hegel, according to Marx, had committed himself to the view that the phenomenal world always had the idea hidden behind it: 'The perversion of the subjective into the objective and of the objective into the subjective is a consequence of Hegel's wanting to write the biography of abstract substance, of the Idea, man's activity, etc. thus having to appear as the activity and result of something else, and of his wanting to make the human essence operate on its own, as an imaginary individuality, instead of in its *actual human* existence' (CW3, 39). According to Marx, Hegel had invested empirical reality with a philosophical halo and the impression of it as 'something *mystical* and *profound*' (CW3, 39). By appealing to the Idea, Hegel avoids the real issues. Consequently, 'the Idea, which should have been a criterion for judging reality, turns out to be a mere rationalisation. This hypostasis leads to a quietistic acceptance of socio-political situation as it is, and elevates a contemporary phase of history arbitrarily into a philosophical criterion' (Avineri 1970, 14). Marx is very critical of Hegel's lack of concern for empirical material for the deductions he arrives at in the *PR*. Hyppolite remarks: 'Even though Hegel brings an empirical material, and a rich one at that, to the "idea mill", one has to admit that he finds in it what suits his deductions, constricting empirical events in the formulas of the dialectic' (Hyppolite 1969, 113-14). The Hegelian mystification of reality, especially of the state, according to Marx, couched in speculative constructions, reflects a very definite social reality. For Marx, the transformative method, to use Avineri's rich expression, is 'the cipher which would enable him to decode the hidden truth in Hegel's thought' (Avineri 1970, 14). Marx makes

extensive use of this method in the *Critique* of the Hegelian ideas regarding monarchy, sovereignty and general consciousness.

3.4. The state and alienation

There is a gradual development in the concept of alienation in Marx's early writings, especially in his analysis of the nature of the modern state. The influence of Hegelian political philosophy has a clear imprint on his writings. At this point, he regards the state as the guardian of the general interest of society, and law as the personification of reason and freedom. In his 'Leading Article in No. 179 of *Kölnische Zeitung*' (July 1842), Marx says that modern philosophy 'looks on the state as the great organism, in which legal, moral, and political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason' (CWl, 202). But Marx does not ignore the fact that in holding the concept of the state as the realisation of rational freedom, the actual functioning of the sate is the standard, because 'a state that is not the realisation of rational freedom is a bad state' (CWl, 200). The emergence of modern state's 'centre of gravity' was discovered by modern philosophy. 'Immediately before and after the time of Copernicus' great discovery of the true solar system, the law of the gravitation of state was discovered, its own gravity was found in the state itself. The various European governments tried, in the superficial way of first practical attempts, to apply this result in order to establish a system of equilibrium of states. Earlier, however, Machiavelli and Campanella and later Hobbes and Spinoza, Hugo Grotius, right down to Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel, began to regard the state through human eyes and to deduce its natural laws from reason and experience, and not from theology. In so doing, they were as little deterred as Copernicus was by the fact that Joshua bade the sun stand still over Gideon and the moon in the valley of Ajalon' (CWl, 201).

At this stage the problem of the state is a matter of great concern to Marx. He criticises the views that decline of the Graeco-Roman states was due to the decline of the old religions. Marx holds that the facts were in reverse order where the downfall of these states resulted in the

demise of their respective religions. The classical Rome provides an example of this: 'The Epicurean, Stoic or Sceptic philosophies were the religions of cultured Romans when Rome had reached the zenith of its development. That with the downfall of the ancient states their religions also disappeared requires no further explanation, for the "true religion" of the ancients was the cult of "their nationality", of their "state". It was not the downfall of the ancient religions that caused the downfall of the ancient states, but the downfall of the ancient states that caused the downfall of the old religions' (CWl, 189).

However, Marx begins to emphasise increasingly the external pressures upon the actions of the state. In his article 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' written in January 1843, Marx remarks: 'In investigating the situation concerning the state one is all too easily tempted to overlook the objective nature of the circumstances and to explain everything by the will of the persons concerned. However, there are circumstances which determine the actions of private persons and individual authorities' (CWl, 337). Compared to his articles in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, the *Critique* shows Marx's wide new horizons in setting forth the agenda for his political analysis. This is well summarised by Lucio Colletti: 'At this point in his evolution, what strikes us most forcibly is that while Marx has not yet outlined his later materialist conception of history he already possesses a very mature theory of politics and the state. The *Critique*, after all, contains a clear statement of the dependence of the state upon society, a critical analysis of parliamentarism accompanied by a counter theory of popular delegation, and a perspective showing the need for ultimate supersession of the state itself. Politically speaking, mature Marxism would have little to add to this' (cited in Levin 1989, 39).

Hegel's state appeared as an emanation of the Idea rather than of the social and historical forces which create and condition its existence. Marx, on the contrary, declares: 'Family and civil society are the premises of the state; they are the genuinely active elements, but in speculative philosophy things are inverted' (CW3, 8). According to Hegel, family and civil society as well as the state representing the universal interests, ultimately constitute a dialectical unity, the vehicle of concrete freedom (see PR, 160, § 260). But within this identity, Hegel keeps a sharp distinction: 'family and civil society are conceived as *spheres of the concept* of the state, namely, as the spheres of *its finite phase*, as its *finiteness*. It is the state which *divides* itself into them,

which *presupposes* them' (CW3, 7). Thus we see that the difference between the state and its finite sphere is expressed as an alienation within the unity, as a contradiction between the outward necessity and immanent goals (see Oizerman 1981, 171-72).

Hegel kept the state outside the sphere of alienation, because he saw the alienated spheres of the state (family and civil society) as the untrue state. It was the break up of the medieval estates (*Stände*) that the civil society in its modern form emerges. In this industrial world, which, as Jean Hyppolite says, is 'characterised by the conflict of private interests, the struggle of all against all, and at the same time there appears the modern state as the formal principle of unity in this society of private men. It is in this formal unity that the real essence of man is self-alienated' (Hyppolite 1969, 118). Commenting on Paragraph 277 of the *PR*, Marx writes that Hegel's 'nonsense comes in because Hegel takes state functions and activities in abstract isolation, and the particular individual in antithesis to them. He forgets ... that the functions and activities of the state are human functions ... that state functions, etc. are nothing but modes of being and modes of action of the social qualities of men' (CW3, 21-22).

According to Marx, Hegel was right to acknowledge the separation of civil society from the state, but his assertion of their reconciliation in the state is untenable. 'In Hegel's system,' writes Ralph Miliband, 'the "contradiction" between the state and society is resolved in the supposed representation in the state of society's true meaning and reality; the alienation of the individual from the state, the contradiction between man as a private member of civil society, concerned with his own private interests, and as a citizen of the state finds resolution in the state as the expression of society's ultimate reality' (in Bottomore 1979, 131). Marx rejects this as only a mystification and explains that the contradictions of civil society and the state are not imaginary but real. 'Indeed, the political alienation which it entails is the central fact of modern, bourgeois society, since man's political significance is detached from his real private condition, while it is in fact this condition which determines him as a social being, all other determinations appear to him as external and inessential' (ibid. 131). Marx says that 'the *real human being* is the *private individual* of the present-day state constitution' (CW3, 81).

The suggested resolution of the contradiction in Hegel by the mediation of the monarch, the civil service, and the legislature, in the internal side of the constitution is mere illusory.

According to Marx, the Hegelian state is not above private interests. It is in fact subordinate to the interests of private property. Marx writes about the landed property as private property *par excellence* where 'primogeniture is merely the *external* appearance of the *inner* nature of landed property' (CW3, 98). Hegel had represented primogeniture as the power of political state over private property; the state determining the private property. Marx questions this formulation and asks instead: What is the power of political state over private property? His answer is: 'The *power of private property* itself, its essence brought into existence. What remains for the political state in contrast with this essence? The *illusion* that the state determines, when it is being determined' (CW3, l00).

Marx, in contrast to Hegel, conceptualises the state as a product of the self-alienation of family and civil society, as a result of the development of their inherent contradiction. He demystifies the concept of state. But, at this stage, Marx takes an abstract view of the substance of the modern state and its predecessor, the feudal state, which he describes as 'completed estrangement', because its basis is the serf, the unfree man. The Middle Ages were the democracy of unfreedom. Marx assumes that in the feudal state there was a unity of the people and the state: 'In the Middle Ages the life of the nation and the life of the state are identical. Man is the actual principle of the state -- but *unfree* man. It is thus the *democracy of unfreedom* -- estrangement carried to completion. The abstract reflected antithesis belongs only to the modern world. The Middle Ages are the period of *actual* dualism; modern times, one of *abstract* dualism' (CW3, 32). In the recent period, Marx says, the state system has developed to the point of *particular* actuality alongside the actual life of the people (see CW3, 33).

The creation of a genuinely political state belongs to the modern era: 'The abstraction of the *state as such* belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the *political state* is a modern product' (CW3, 32). This is an explanation of the development of the abstract political state, which had little effect on the life of its citizens. Marx shows this from the property and legal relations that were virtually the same in North America and Prussia even though their constitutional *forms* were different. The actual content of the state does not reside in the constitution. Marx comments that Hegel is right

to say that the political state is the constitution, i.e. the material state is not political: 'What obtains here is merely an external identity, a determination of changing forms' (CW3, 31).

No doubt, one of the most difficult problems in the national life has been the evolution of the political state, the constitution. It developed, according to Marx, as universal reason over against the other spheres, as ulterior to them. But the particular spheres have not reconciled themselves to this historical task of new accommodation. The essential task is to put an end to the separation of particular spheres from the political states: 'Up till now the *political constitution* has been the *religious sphere*, the *religion* of national life, the heaven of its generality over against the *earthly existence* of its actuality. The political sphere has been the only state sphere in the state, the only sphere in which the content as well as the form has been species-content, the truly general; but in such a way that at the same time, because this sphere has confronted the others, its content has also become formal and particular' (CW3, 31). In the present state, the state power confronts the people as an alien and transcendental force. While the 'democracy of unfreedom' (CW3, 32) of the Middle Ages is no longer there, the phenomenon of alienation stays, and assumes new forms. The institution of monarchy and the bureaucratisation of the state are two obvious examples of the alienation. The following sub-section is devoted to Marx's critique of bureaucracy.

3.4.1. Bureaucracy as the theological spirit of the state

Hegel had put a high value on the role of the civil service in the functioning of the modern state. It was the real 'governing power' within the modern state. According to Marx, Hegel has given 'an empirical description of the bureaucracy, partly as it is in actual fact, and partly as it is on its own estimation' (CW3, 45; for later references to bureaucracy in Marx's writings, see Avineri 1970, 48-52). Marx's discussion of bureaucracy presents his first attempt to provide a sociological definition of state power (see McLellan 1970, 152; Avineri 1970, 48; cf. Perez-Diaz 1978, 2-5). Under the impact of the Napoleonic rule and later of the Prussian reformism, Hegel assigned the role of the ancient feudal nobility to the present-day bureaucracy, the soul of the present state. Marx subjects the Hegelian notions to a penetrating and forceful criticism. He regards the bureaucracy as the institutionalised embodiment of political alienation, based on the

illusion that the state realises human universality. 'Statism, centralism, and bureaucratism simply organise, centralise, and institutionalise social and political alienation. Administration and the civil service exercise no communal or universal function but, rather, express particular and determined reality and interests. Those who administer the affairs of state administer the affairs of a dominant class that has "confused" its business with the total social interest' (Axelos 1976, 97). Hegel in his attempt 'to construct a formal state unity, had created a further alienation: man's being, which was alienated in monarchy, was now even more alienated in the growing power of the executive, the bureaucracy' (McLellan 1970, 153).

Marx views bureaucracy as distorting the nature of the state which is determined by society's division into groups or corporations, having their own specific private interests. Marx says: 'Hegel starts from the *separation* of the "state" and "civil" society, from particular interests and the "intrinsically and explicitly general"; and indeed bureaucracy is based on this *separation* ... Hegel expounds no content for the bureaucracy, but only some general features of its "formal" organisation; and indeed the bureaucracy is only the *formalism* of a content which lies outside itself. The *corporations* are the materialism of the bureaucracy, and bureaucracy is the *spiritualism* of the corporation' (CW3, 45). It is true that in the past bureaucracy took the side of the monarchy in the fight against the corporations and the estates. But once the state emerges victorious and the civil society is freed from the corporations, the bureaucracy tries to restore them for its own perpetuation, thus creating what it had helped to destroy (see Hyppolite 1969, 119). The bureaucratic centralisation has not in any way done away with the antithesis between the interests of various social groups: 'The same spirit which creates the corporation in society creates the bureaucracy in the state. Hence, the attack on the spirit of the corporation is an attack on the spirit of the bureaucracy; and if earlier the bureaucracy combated the existence of the corporations in order to make room for its own existence, so now it tries forcibly to keep them in existence in order to preserve the spirit of the corporations, which is its own spirit' (CW3, 45).

The development of administration and the bureaucracy in the modern state is indicative of the exacerbated political alienation. The bureaucracy allocates to itself a particular, closed society within the state. The bureaucracy as 'state formalism' transforms the 'state as formalism', intending to be the 'state consciousness', the 'state will' and the 'state power'. 'Since this "state

formalism" constitutes itself as an actual power and itself becomes its own material content, it goes without saying that the "bureaucracy" is a web of practical illusions, or the "illusions of the state". The bureaucratic spirit is a Jesuitical, theological spirit through and through. The bureaucrats are the Jesuits and theologians of the state. The bureaucracy is *la r'epublique prêtre*' (CW3, 46). Like the theologians who have the 'knowledge' to decode the secrets of god or religions, the bureaucrats become the jealous theologians of statecraft, by creating special myths and symbols which sanctify and mystify their position. In a bureaucracy, 'the affairs of the state are made into a private patrimony and presented to the outsiders as a mystique. The apparent idealism of bureaucracy's dedication to the general well-being of society is nothing but a mask for its own coarse, materialistic ends' (Avineri 1970, 23). The bureaucracy arrogates to itself 'the ultimate purpose of the state' (CW3, 47), thus identifying its own ends with those of the state.

Marx is one of the first thinkers to see the problems of modern bureaucracy. The sociological significance of his analysis of bureaucracy, as Avineri says, lies in his insistence that bureaucratic structures do not automatically reflect prevailing social power relations but pervert and disfigure them: 'Bureaucracy is the image of the prevailing social order distorted by its claim to universality' (Avineri 1970, 51). Marx says: 'The bureaucracy is the imaginary state alongside the real state -- the spiritualism of the state.... [It] has the state, the spiritual essence of society, in its possession, as its *private property*. The general spirit of the bureaucracy is the *secret*, the mystery, preserved within itself, by the hierarchy and against the outside world by being a closed corporation. Avowed political spirit, as also political-mindedness, therefore appear to the bureaucracy as *treason* against its mystery. Hence, *authority* is the basis of its knowledge, and the deification of authority is its *conviction*. Within the bureaucracy itself, however, *spiritualism* becomes *crass materialism*, the materialism of passive obedience, of faith in authority, of the *mechanism* of fixed and formalistic behaviour, and of fixed principles, views and traditions. In the case of the individual bureaucrat, the state objective turns into his private objective, into a *chasing after higher posts*, the *making of a career*.... The bureaucrat must, therefore, deal with the actual state jesuistically, whether this jesuistry is conscious or unconscious' (CW3, 47).

Although the bureaucracy seemingly serves the basic purposes of the state, in reality it is hostile to it: 'The actual purpose of the state therefore appears to the bureaucracy as an objective

hostile to the state. The spirit of the bureaucracy is the "formal state spirit" [Hegel's expression: N.K.]. The bureaucracy therefore turns the "formal state spirit" or the *actual* spiritlessness of the state into a categorical imperative. The bureaucracy takes itself to be the ultimate purpose of the state.... State objectives are transformed into objectives of the department, and department objectives into objectives of the state' (CW3, 46).

By converting itself from a means to an end, the goals of state, as far as bureaucracy is concerned, become opposed to any definite content. The purposes of bureaucracy become the purposes of the state in the hands of bureaucrats. 'In the bureaucracy,' says Marx, 'the identity of state interest and particular private aim is established in such a way that the *state interest* becomes a *particular* private aim over against other private aims.... For the bureaucrat the world is a mere object to be manipulated by him' (CW3, 48).

The alienation involved in the functioning of the modern state is epitomised by the functioning of the civil service. Marx observes: 'The state only continues to exist as various fixed bureaucratic minds, bound together in subordination and passive obedience. *Actual* knowledge seems devoid of content, just as actual life seems dead; for this imaginary knowledge and this imaginary life are taken for the real thing' (CW3, 47). Here in this situation the bureaucracy is shown to be autonomous, separate and alienated from the actual life of the individuals in the society. Marx's condemnation of the modern politics, devoid of content applies to 'all institutions as oppressive realities empty of life and meaning. Anything which is in essence universal becomes, when it is particularised, alienated and alienating' (Axelos 1976, 105). Marx in his extremely perceptive criticism in the *Critique* of what exists has the main objective of preparing for the future society. He concludes that the way to abolishing the bureaucracy lies in whereby the general interest actually becomes the particular interest (see CW3, 48-49). According to Marx, the antithesis between power and the people, which is characteristic of the oppressive state, is inseparable from the bureaucratic system. Within the oppressive state the interests of private property, constitute the actual basis of the system.

3.4.2. Democracy versus monarchy

Marx views Hegel's idea of the state as an organism as a valid formulation in its essentials. It underlines the state as an integrated unity. But this in itself is not enough. The idea of organism can equally be applied to every form of organism; it cannot be confined only to the political sphere. Marx says: 'No bridge has been built *whereby one could pass from the general idea of organism to the specific idea of the organism of the state or the political constitution*, and no such bridge can ever be built' (CW3, 14).

Hegel deduces from the idea of the state as organism the state sovereignty, which he identifies with a single individual, the monarch (see PR, 181, § 279). Marx criticises Hegel's propositions as arbitrary. He comments on the two propositions of Hegel thus: 'Sovereignty, the ideality of the state, exists as person, as "subject" -- obviously, as many persons, many subjects, since no single person absorbs in himself the sphere of personality, nor any single subject the subjectivity. What sort of state idealism would that be which, instead of being the actual self-consciousness of the citizens, the collective soul of the state, were to be *one* person, *one* subject? ... Hegel is concerned to present the monarch as the true "god-man", as the *actual incarnation* of the Idea' (CW3, 24). Hegel's deductions are aptly summarised by Hyppolite, who writes: 'Certainly, he sees that to some extent sovereignty belongs to the nation as a whole -- to the people -- but having made the people merely a mediated appearance of the Idea, he is obliged to introduce the Idea in its own right as the negation of this first appearance; thus he comes to a strange conclusion, namely, that the Idea should be present as an individual, hence the *monarch*. The Idea should be realised without mediation as a fact of nature, for in the mass of individuals it has only a mediated presence, hence *hereditary* monarchy' (Hyppolite 1969, 114). In other words, the hereditary monarchy follows of necessity from the concept of the state; the sovereignty identified in the person of the monarch. Marx rejects this sophistry and formulates the real alternative thus: 'Sovereignty of the monarch or sovereignty of the people -- that is the question' (CW3, 172). However, despite the mystical reverence which Hegel accords to the monarchy, it plays a minor role as compared with the part played by the civil service in his theory of constitutionalism (see Sabine 1981, 602).

Marx explains that Hegel could have avoided the reduction of state to one person if he had started from the concrete and the real subject: 'As if the actual state were not the people. The

state is an abstraction. The people alone is what is concrete' (CW3, 28). In this criticism the Feuerbachian influence is also obvious: 'If Hegel had set out from real as the basis of the state he would not have found it necessary to transform the state in a mystical fashion into a subject.... Subjectivity is a characteristic of the subject, personality a characteristic of the person. Instead of conceiving them as predicates of their subjects, Hegel gives the predicates an independent existence and subsequently transforms them in a mystical fashion into their subjects.... So in this case sovereignty, the essential feature of the state, is treated to begin with as an independent entity, is objectified (*vergegenständlicht*). Then, of course, this objective entity has to become a subject again. This subject then appears, however, as a self-incarnation of sovereignty; whereas sovereignty is nothing but the objectified mind of the subjects of the state' (CW3, 23, 24).

Hegel's rational monarchy is viewed by Marx as the reverse of rational or truly free, because 'in monarchy one part determines the character of the whole' (CW3, 29). Monarchy represents a state divided against itself just as the class represents man divided against himself. Marx rejects Hegel's view that in the constitutional monarchy the state interests coincide with the interests of the people and explains that people must carry out the universal endeavour of the state. It is not enough to substitute a republic for a constitutional monarchy; there have to be changes not merely in the form but also in the content. The real issue is the need for a state 'where the nation itself is a matter of general concern; in this case it is a question of the will, which finds its true presence as species-will only in the self-conscious will of the nation' (CW3, 65). According to Marx, the sovereignty for Hegel exists in the monarch, and as such it excludes any possibility of the sovereignty which can repose in the people, 'for it is implied in the concept of sovereignty that sovereignty cannot have a double existence, still less one which is contradictory' (CW3, 28). Therefore when Hegel mentions the sovereignty of the people as opposed to the sovereignty of the monarch he does not have identical meanings of the concept. To Hegel the sovereignty of the people essentially signifies 'one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the "people". Taken without its monarch and the articulation of the whole which is the indispensable and direct concomitant of monarchy, the people is a formless mass and no longer a state' (PR, 182-83, Remarks to § 279). This is a clear manifestation of the idealistic mystification of the political realities, an expression of the political alienation which comes under

a sharp criticism of Marx. As the sovereignty of the monarch is nothing more than a constitutional fiction, an illusion, the real question according to Marx is whether the sovereignty of the monarch or the sovereignty of the people. As the alternative is clear, we may ask if both of these can co-exist.

Marx says that Hegel admits a sovereignty of the people as antithetical to that of the monarch, but this is not a question of one and the same sovereignty, as mentioned above, but 'two *entirely contradictory concepts of sovereignty*, the one a sovereignty such as can come to exist in a *monarch*, the other such as can come to exist only in a *people.* It is the same with the question: "Is God sovereign, or is man?" one of the two is an untruth, even if an existing untruth' (CW3, 28). A state in which the sovereignty does not reside in the people is not a true, rational state, but an abstraction. It is on this principle that Marx holds democracy and not monarchy, as the people's state self-determination: 'Democracy is the genus Constitution. Monarchy is one species and a poor one at that. Democracy is content and form. Monarchy is *supposed* to be only a form, but it falsifies the content' (CW3, 29).

Marx's initial treatment of democracy derives from his critique of Hegel's advocacy of monarchy, a consummate expression of man's political alienation. For Marx the question of democracy in the rational state is not of peripheral significance; it is rather the actual constituent of its rational form. This can be seen, to begin with Hegel's view in the *PR* where he says: 'To hold that every single person should share in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern on the ground that all individuals are members of the state, that its concerns are their concerns, and that it is their right that what is done should be done with their knowledge and volition, is tantamount to a proposal to put the democratic element without any rational form into the organism of the state, although it is in virtue of possession of such a form that the state is an organism at all' (PR, 200, Remarks to § 308). Marx while accepting Hegel's notion of the state as a rational organism, holds a diametrically different view with regard to the state's democratic element. Marx says: 'According to Hegel the direct participation of all in deliberating and deciding on the general affairs of the state includes "the *democratic* element *without any rational form* into the state organism which is a state organism solely by virtue of such a form", i.e. the democratic element can be embodied only as a *formal* element in a state organism which is

merely the formalism of the state. The democratic element must rather be the actual element which gives to itself its *rational form* in the state organism *as a whole*. But if on the other hand it enters the organism or formalism of the state as a "*particular*" element, then what is meant by the "rational form" of its being is a drill, an accommodation, a form in which the democratic element does not display the specific features of its nature; or what is meant is that it only enters as a *formal* principle' (CW3, 115-16).

A comparison of the respective views of Hegel and Marx on the democratic element in the state leads to important conclusions. In Marx, the democratic element in the state, has in fact been made a criterion, a definite principle of the 'reality' of the state. It entails by implication that while the reality of the rational state lies in its democratic element, a non-democratic state even though not without physical existence is 'unreal'.

A state which lacks the democratic element, whether it takes the monarchical or the republican form, according to Marx, is an incomplete state. Marx puts together both the monarchy and the republic 'as a merely particular form of state' (CW3, 30). Marx repeatedly stresses the pre-requisite principle of democracy. For him, democracy is the corner-stone and 'the *essence of all state constitutions*', because 'it goes without saying that all forms of state have democracy *for* their truth and that they are therefore untrue as they are not democracy' (CW3, 30, 31). At this stage Marx's concept of the state does not signify a break with idealism; he still views the state as the realm of freedom (see Oizerman 1981, 173-74). Therefore he views only the democracy in contrast to other forms as representing the self-determination of the people: 'In democracy the constitution, the law, the state itself, insofar as it is a political constitution, is only the self-determination of the people, and a particular content of the people' (CW3, 31).

Hegel had assigned to the political sphere the task of putting the idea of the universal into practice but as Marx says, 'political life in the modern sense is the scholasticism of the national life' (CW3, 31); this task was not possible to accomplish. To contrast a monarchy with a republic may only obscure the fact that both these forms of government have failed to overcome the alienation between the general and the universal: '*Monarchy* is the perfect expression of this alienation. The *republic* is the negation of this alienation within its own sphere' (CW3, 31). Thus, for example, within the republican system the cleavage between various economic interests

increases (see Avineri 1970, 19). The way to overcome this alienation within the modern political state was through 'true democracy' which I discuss in 3.4.4. Of course, the conception of democracy in the *Critique* is by no means a clear one. Nevertheless, we can summarise the main features of Marx's sketchy and transitional ideas.

First, in the creation of a truly human society, Marx's conception of man who is the sole subject of political process, is humanistic: 'Democracy is the solved *riddle* of all constitutions. Here, not merely *implicitly* and in essence but *existing* in reality, the constitution is constantly brought back to its actual basis, the *actual human being*, the actual *people*, and established as the people's own work' (CW3, 29). In a democracy 'man does not exist for the law but the law for man -- it is a *human manifestation*; whereas in other forms of state man is a *legal manifestation*. That is the fundamental distinction of democracy' (CW3, 30).

Secondly, for the young Marx the goal of human history is the free society -- the universal kingdom of ends. Hegel had reduced man to the status of a predicate who was to be the subject of history. Marx reverses these roles; man becomes the free subject with society as his predicate.

Thirdly, Marx's conception, as McLellan points out, is in some sense socialistic: 'It is plain that, like Hegel, he considered the aim to be the realisation of an essence. But instead of the realisation of the Idea, Marx envisaged the realisation of man's species-being' (McLellan 1970, 150-51).

For the creation of the social conditions which would produce a free society Marx was to struggle for the next forty years. 'In the intensity of the struggle,' comments Eugene Kamenka (1972, 30-31), 'he never again turned to ask what the "realm of freedom" might mean. That problem, he thought, he had solved before the struggle began. From 1844 onward Marx's primary interest was not in the nature of freedom, but in the developments by which it would come about.'

3.4.3. Individual's alienation

The *Critique*, as an internal discussion of Hegelian philosophy, contains Marx's critical insights on political alienation. These insights are mainly philosophical, where Marx attempts to refute philosophy with philosophy, and when seen in this light, they are also an attempt to understand

social and political reality. The criticism of Hegel in this work also leads Marx to his subsequent criticism of bourgeois economists and their pre-suppositions. However, it is fairly correct to postulate that in Marx's later writings the 'main question is not how to understand reality, but how to bring it to its own perfection' (Dupre 1966, 93). In the *Critique* Marx achieves his aim of self-clarification on issues which appear in more concrete form in his writings which follow the *Critique*. In a way the *Critique* prepares the theoretical ground for his systematic study of alienation in the *EPM*. The phenomenon of alienation in the political sphere, as discussed above, is pivotal in the whole exposition. Marx offers here his earliest solutions to overcome the alienation.

The *Critique* follows the Feuerbachian model in a number of ways in exposing man's alienation. We can recall from our earlier discussion of Feuerbach's view, according to which the alienated man is a divided man living two lives: one in the fantasy world of religion and the other in the real world. Marx finds the predicament of the citizen of a modern state in his divided self as a 'communal being' (*Gemeinwesen*) where he participates in the communal life of the species and as a private person in the civil society where the human existence is the *sphere of egoism*, or economic *war of all against all*. In the modern world, man finds himself pursuing his egoistic ends, his communal being having little scope of activity. Man's 'self-realisation as a member of the political community is a spurious, empty, purely formal self-realisation, just as in the religious fantasy he obtains at most a pseudo-realisation of himself' (Tucker 1972, 104).

Marx portrays the characteristics of the human individual in the present society in a passage, which is striking for its incisiveness and clarity. He writes: 'The present-day estate of society (*Stand der Sozietät*) already shows its difference from the earlier estate of civil society in that it does not hold the individual as it formerly did as something communal, as a community, but that is partly accident, partly the work, and so on of the individual which does, or does not, keep him in his estate, an *estate* which is itself only an *external* quality (*äusserliche Bestimmung*) of the individual, being neither inherent in his labour nor standing to him in fixed relationships as an objective community organised according to rigid laws.... For just as civil society is separated from political society, so civil society has within itself become divided into *estate* and *social* position, however, many relations may occur between them. The principle of the civil estate or of

civil society is *enjoyment* and the *capacity to enjoy*. In his political significance the member of civil society frees himself from his estate, his true civil position; it is only here that he acquires importance as a *human being*, or that his quality as member of the state, as social being, appears as his human quality. For all his other qualities in the civil society *appear inessential* to the human being, the individual, as *external* qualities which indeed are necessary for his existence in the whole, i.e. as a link with the whole, but link that he can just as well throw away again.[Present-day civil society is the realised principle of *individualism*; the individual existence is the final goal; activity, work, content, etc. are mere means.'] Comparing the position of human individual in the Middle Ages with that of the modern age, Marx adds further: 'Not only is the *estate* based on the *separation* of society as the prevailing law; it separates the human being from his general essence, it turns him into an animal that is directly identical with its function. The Middle Ages are the animal history of human society, its zoology. The modern era, *civilisation*, makes the opposite mistake. It separates the *objective* essence of the human being from him as something merely *external*, material. It does not accept the content of the human being as his true reality' (CW3, 80-81).

In the passage Marx does not use the terms '*Entäusserung*', and '*Veräusserung*'; but, as Meszaros points out, Marx's 'insistence on the "division of society" ("*Trennung der Sozietät*") and on the merely "external determination of the individual" ("*äusserliche Bestimmung des Individuums*"), with their direct reference to the "divorce of man from his objective being" ("*Sie trennt das gegenständliche Wesen des Menschen von ihm*") in the age of "civilisation" -- i.e. in modern capitalist society -- take him near to the basic concept of his later analysis' (Meszaros 1970, 69). In the passage the reference to the 'externality of labour' as regards the individual ('activity, labour and content') becomes the central point of focus in Marx's elaboration of the theory of alienation in the *EPM*. In the *Critique*, 'this phenomenon is considered basically from a legal-institutional standpoint. Accordingly, capitalism is characterised as "the consistent realisation of the principle of *individualism*" ("*das durchgeführte Prinzip des Individualismus*"), whereas in Marx's later works this "principle of individualism" is put in its proper perspective: it is analysed as a manifestation *determined* by the *alienation of labour*, as one of the principal aspects of labour's self-alienation' (ibid. 70).

In the *Critique* man's alienation is seen as a consequence of the division between the state and the civil society: 'Civil society and state are separated. Hence the citizen of the state is also separated from the citizen as the member of civil society. He must therefore effect a *fundamental division* with himself.... The separation of civil society and political state necessarily appears as a separation of the *political* citizen, the citizen of the state, from civil society, from his own, actual, empirical reality, for as an idealist of the state he is *quite another being*, a *different*, distinct, opposed being' (CW3, 77-78). Marx refutes Hegel's view that there is no tension between the private sphere of civil society and the public or social sphere of the state. Marx maintains that man is estranged from the state in his individual life. The alienation of the individual expressed in the system of political representation, where the representation of the legislative function is carried on by particular bodies, because it is precisely the participation of civil society in the political state through *delegates* that is the *expression* of their separation and of their merely dualistic unity' (CW3, 119) .

3.4.4. Political disalienation through 'true democracy'

In the *Critique* Marx resolves the contradiction between the state and civil society and the individual's alienation as a consequence of it in the framework of direct or 'true democracy'. In its essentials it is a political programme to realise human freedom from political alienation. The concept of 'true democracy' is not presented as a positive alternative to the existing political arrangements of the modern political state, because in a critical commentary like the *Critique*, a systematic working out of a positive solution was beyond the scope of the essay.

Michael Levin suggests that in the *Critique* we have a 'criticism of idealism from the standpoint of a materialism that still remained unexplained. The negative groundwork for Marx's theory of the state has now been completed. The question of positive designations still remained unanswered' (Levin 1989, 38).

In the *Critique*, the meaning which Marx attributes to the word democracy are to be found in the Enlightenment tradition, and also as used by some leaders of the French Revolution. The problem of political alienation, in the *Critique* is resolved through the institution of the direct democracy: 'The state exists only as the *political state*. The totality of the political state is the

legislature. To take part in the legislature is therefore to take part in the political state ... Hence, that civil society should penetrate the *legislative* power *in the mass*, if possible *in its entirety*, that actual civil society wishes to substitute itself for the *fictitious* civil society of the legislative power, that is merely the striving of civil society to give itself *political* being or to make *political being* its actual being' (CW3, 118). Direct participation in the legislative function of individuals removes the alienation which exists by virtue of the representation of the legislative functions of particular bodies, because the participation of civil society in the political state through the delegates is, as cited above, the expression of their separation and dualistic unity.

Marx regards the sphere of political state as distinctly different from that of the democratic state; in the former man is alienated while in the latter he is not. This distinction is a crucial one in understanding Marx's views in overcoming alienation in the *Critique*. This is well exemplified in Marx's discussion of democracy and monarchy, where Marx argues for the establishment of *true democracy*. Marx writes: 'In democracy the political state, which stands alongside this content and distinguishes itself from it, is itself merely a particular content and a particular *form of existence* of the people. In monarchy, for example, this particular, the political constitution, has the significance of the *general* that dominates and determines everything particular. In democracy the state as particular is *merely* particular; as general, it is the truly general, i.e. not something determinate in distinction from the other content. The French have recently interpreted this as meaning that in true democracy the *political state is annihilated*. This is correct insofar as the political state *qua* political state, as constitution, no longer passes for the whole' (CW3, 30).

The main problem of the political state in contrast with the democratic state, is related to its inability to allow a full development of man. Under the political state, individual is relegated to an insignificant position and left to an atomistic existence in civil society. 'The atomism into which civil society plunges in its political act follows necessarily from the fact that the community, the communal being in which the individual exists, is civil society separated from the state' (CW3, 79). But this situation is remedied in the democratic state, where, according to Marx, the condition of man's full human existence is met. Democracy, according to Marx, is founded on real human beings and real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in

existence and in reality (see CW3, 29). Instead of a divided life and divided essence, in a condition of alienation in the political state, man realises his essential unity within the democratic state; the democratic state embracing all spheres of life. So far as the republican state is concerned, democracy is merely formal in it but in a democratic state form and content are unified. 'In democracy the *abstract* state has ceased to be the dominant factor. The struggle between monarchy and republic is itself still a struggle within the abstract state. The *political* republic is democracy within the abstract state form. The abstract state form of democracy is therefore republic' (CW3, 31).

How can the alienation of man be overcome? It is possible, according to Marx's views, to attain full human freedom within a fully developed state, as a rational organism which overcomes the alienating division between the political state and civil society, and where the alienating division in man's own essence is overcome by a full integration in the new democratic society. The suppressed human subject reduced to a mere predicate in Hegelian political philosophy can attain his full stature by reclaiming his status. Marx envisages the method of revolution which effects a change in the mode of social consciousness, and that in turns has bearing on the nature of social relations and the social structure. The social content of this revolution, as Avineri mentions, lies in the premise that human society is not merely a given datum but an outcome of human agency: 'As society is a predicate, it calls for the activity of the human subject; what was formally within the realm of necessity will become the province of freedom. This revolution assumes that man and his social activity are one and the same. Man, according to Marx, is the totality of his social connections, hence emancipated society is identical with the emancipated self. This self is called by Marx "man's communal being" (*das kommunistische Wesen des Menschen*) or "socialised man" (*sozialisierte Mensch*)' (Avineri 1970, 33).

Thus, it is obvious that the notion of 'communal being' for Marx provides a standard to gauge the present political institutions as well as a criterion for the coming new society. The modern society characterised by individualism nullifies the concept of man as a social being. Under individualism the social relations of man and his activity are subordinated to the private ends which dominate his existence. 'Contemporary civil sociality is the realised principle of individualism; the individual existence is the goal; activity, work, content, etc. are mere means'

(CW3, 81). There is no possibility of the emergence of a socialised 'model' of man in the present-day society, dominated by individualism. To effect the radical democratisation of society as a solution to overcome alienation in the *Critique* is deemed feasible only through a political mechanism: the electoral reform. 'Elections are the chief political interest,' writes Marx 'of actual civil society. Civil society has *really* raised itself to abstraction from itself, to *political* being, as its true, general, essential mode of being only in e*lections unlimited* both in respect of the franchise and the right to be elected. But the completion of this abstraction is at the same time the transcendence of this abstraction. In actually positing its *political existence* as its *true* existence, civil society has simultaneously posited its civil existence, in distinction from its political existence, as *inessential*, and the fall of one side of the division carries with it the fall of the other, its opposite. *Electoral reform* within the abstract political state is therefore the demand of its *dissolution*, but also for the *dissolution of civil society*' (CW3, 121).

Thus, according to Marx's view in the *Critique*, the politicisation of the civil society through electoral reform breaks down the dichotomy of political and civil life. In this process both the political state and civil society are transcended (*aufhob*) and the democratic state takes shape. In other words, the *Aufhebung* of political state is reached in Marx's concept of 'true' or 'real democracy' through the universal suffrage. True democracy is for Marx, as Avineri says, the 'state of society in which the individual is no longer juxtaposed against society' (Avineri 1970, 34). The alienation between the individual and the political community or the political structure is overcome by resolving the dichotomy between the egoistic interests of individuals in the civil society and the social character of the political life. Marx uses the term 'communal being' for the first time here: 'The atomism into which civil society plunges in its *political act* follows necessarily from the fact that the community (*Gemeinwesen*), the communal being (*das kommunistische Wesen*) in which the individual exists, is civil society separated from the state, or that *political state* is an *abstraction* from it' (CW3, 79). Marx's choice of the word *Gemeinwesen*, as Avineri says, has significant connotations: it 'means both commonwealth in the dual sense of *res publica* and republic in the narrow meaning, as well as man's common, universalistic nature and "commune". The word can be predicated on both the body politic and the individual, and as such it suggests forcefully Marx's idea of an integrated human being who has overcome the

dichotomy between the public and the private self' (Avineri 1970, 34-35; for Ferdinand Tönnies's well-known distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, see Coser 1980, 169-71).

From our discussion it is obvious that Marx at this stage considers alienation primarily as political and not the economic one. Accordingly, the resolution of the political alienation is seen in the political sphere whereby the universal .suffrage ushers in the true democracy. Marx's argument for de-alienation here, has certain resemblance to Hegel's view, even though they cannot be regarded identical. Both Marx and Hegel view the state as an agency of human emancipation. For Hegel the state is subject to the moving force of the universality of the Idea, while Marx regards the democratic state accomplishing the true social nature of man. As mentioned earlier, in the *Critique* Marx argues for the development of the democratic state, the abolition of the non-democratic state being a necessary step in this process. David McLellan commenting on Marx's idea on the universal suffrage writes: 'Thus Marx arrives here at the same conclusion as in his discussion of "true democracy". Democracy implied universal suffrage, and universal suffrage would lead to the dissolution of the state' (McLellan 1970, 163). Possibly, McLellan has in mind the non-democratic state, and not the state as such. Any claim that Marx's call for democracy and universal suffrage amounted to his demand for the abolition of state (see O'Malley 1970, ixiii) is not correct. In the *Critique* Marx's concept of the state, like Hegel's, is that of an organic state; the state in this sense is politically organised society. Unlike his later writings, Marx in the *Critique* does not argue for the abolition of the state as such but only for the abolition of the non-democratic state. 'True democracy' in this way does not mean the abolition of the state but the universalization of it. In this connection, political state has to be distinguished from the organic state. 'The political state,' in Barbalet's words, 'although claiming universality for itself exists as a particular institution separate from civil society. Man's existence in the political state is divided from his existence in civil society, and his essence is therefore similarly divided. This is the basis of man's alienation, according to the *Critique*' (Barbalet 1983, 123). On the other hand, democracy represents, according to Marx, 'the true unity of the general and the particular' (CW3, 123). In true democracy the state is really universal, embracing all of society: 'In democracy the state as particular is merely particular; as general, it is truly general, i.e. not something determinate in distinction from the other contents' (CW3, 30).

The political solution to alienation in the *Critique* is seen in the universal suffrage in the democratic state which gives all the members of civil society a political existence, and thereby eliminating the 'political' as a separate category (see Giddens 1971, 6). Soon after writing this in the *Critique*, Marx rejects this notion in the *Introduction*, where he describes it as a 'utopian dream ... the partial, the merely political revolution which leaves the pillars of the house standing' (CW3, 184). As the very existence of state is an expression of man's alienation, there is no possibility of overcoming this alienation within the state. 'The solution Marx found lies, dialectically, beyond the state. The effort to realise the state's universal postulates makes the state itself superfluous; hence it will be *aufgehoben*. Republicanism is just an imperfect, formal way of overcoming alienation. Since it abolishes alienation within the sphere of alienation, it cannot be Marx's ultimate goal' (Avineri 1970, 38). Marx's rejection of the position of the *Critique* is pronounced in his polemical article of 1844 'Critical Marginal Notes on the article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform by a Prussian" '. Marx describes the organic conception of the state: 'From the political point of view, the *state* and the *system of society* are not two different things. The state is the system of society' (CW3, 197). The basis of the state, according to Marx, is 'on the contradiction between public and private life, on the contradiction between general interests and private interests' (CW3, 198). He points out the practical limitations of political understanding to overcome the source of social needs (see CW3, 203-204). There is a decided shift in Marx's notion of overcoming alienation in his writings after 1843. For instance, he analyses the phenomenon of worker's alienation, in the article mentioned above, which is not confined only to the political sphere: 'But the *community* from which the worker is *isolated* is a community the character and scope of which is quite different from that of the *political* community. The community from which the worker is isolated by *his own labour* is *life* itself, physical and mental life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature. *Human nature* is the *true community* of men. The disastrous isolation from this essential nature is incomparably more universal, more intolerable, more dreadful, and more contradictory, than isolation from the political community. Hence, too, the *abolition* of this isolation -- and even a partial reaction to it, an *uprising* against it -- is just as much more infinite as *man* is more infinite than the *citizen*, and *human life* more infinite than *political life*' (CW3, 204-205).

In 1843, Marx arrives at the important conclusion, whose details are not fully worked out, that the solution to human alienation lay in the *Aufhebung* of the state. In the *Critique*, his search for a revolutionary theory leads him to his economic and historical studies. There are differing views whether Marx in his intellectual development at this point when he wrote the *Critique* moves from radical democracy to socialism. George Lichtheim is of the opinion that Marx's 'standpoint is that of a typical radical democrat of the period: not a socialist, let alone a communist. The socialist critique of bourgeois society entered his horizon only after he had removed to Paris in 1843' (Lichtheim 1982, 38). But Avineri holds a different opinion. He writes: 'A close inspection of what Marx really said in the *Critique* about the nature of "true democracy" makes it extremely difficult to sustain this notion. It can be shown clearly that what Marx terms "democracy" is not fundamentally different from what he will later call "communism", and that in any case this "democracy" is based on "man's communist essence". It also follows that the decisive transition in Marx's intellectual development was not from radical democracy to communism, any more than it was from idealism to materialism.... The *Critique* contains ample material to show that Marx envisages in 1843 a society based on the abolition of private property and the disappearance of the state. Briefly, the *Communist Manifesto* is immanent in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*' (Avineri 1970, 34).

Avineri's argument is in line with his general thesis which emphasises the continuity aspect of Marx's thought both in his early and mature writings, but this position cannot be defended on the point under discussion. The *Critique* despite its prefatory analysis of the state is not complete. In fact in all his early writings we discover a great deal of discrepancy between the objective content of the philosophical conceptions Marx was formulating and their form which he borrowed from Hegel and Feuerbach. For instance, Marx and Engels in their joint work *The German Ideology*, written between 1845 and 1846, formulated the materialist conception of history and the theory of surplus value, parted company with the old materialism to settle scores with their erstwhile philosophical conscience. I think, Anthony Giddens offers a differentiated and balanced view when he says: 'It cannot be doubted that the *Critique* embodies notions which Marx did not subsequently relinquish. Indeed, it supplies the key to the understanding of the theory of the state, and of the possibility of its abolition, and thus the conceptions contained

within it underlie the whole of Marx's mature writings' (Giddens 1971, 7). The next important article *OJQ* restates the dichotomy between the state and civil society but the solution towards human emancipation from alienation is no longer sought in the democratic state.

3.5. Political emancipation and the question of alienation

In *OJQ* Marx reviews Bruno Bauer's two articles on the Jewish question. Bruno Bauer was his former philosophy teacher and mentor from Berlin. The general theme of Marx's essay is to contrast political emancipation as distinct from human emancipation, and show that political emancipation is not sufficient to overcome alienation. Marx deals with the problem within the structure of the modern capitalistic society where Judaism plays a definite historical role in the development and growth of capitalism. The solution to the question of Jewish emancipation is tackled at both social and political planes. The article is of great importance in the development of Marx's notion of alienation; Marx begins to look at the economic life, and not religion, as the principal form of human alienation. Berki stresses the importance of the article in these words: 'Marx's exposure of the world of the fragmented human being culminates in his classic criticism of capitalism, which is castigated for its political shortcomings in *OJQ* (in many ways the most incisive *political* tract ever written by Marx), for its psychological effects in the *Manuscripts* and for its exploitative character in the whole subsequent Marxian literary output' (Berki 1971, 216).

The question of Jewish emancipation in the writings of eminent Jewish philosophers is characterised by two main trends, some emphasising the universalistic dimension of the question within the universal, human emancipation and historical developments, others seeing the problem within its particularistic perspective. Meszaros elucidates the point rather well when he says: 'Only those Jewish philosophers could achieve the comprehensiveness and degree of universality that characterise the systems of both Spinoza and Marx who were able to grasp the issue of the Jewish emancipation in its paradoxical duality, as inextricably intertwined with the historical development of mankind. Many others, from Moses Hess to Martin Buber, because of the particularistic character of their perspectives -- or, in other words, because of their inability to

emancipate themselves from "Jewish narrowness" -- formulated their views in terms of second rate, provincialistic Utopias' (Meszaros 1970, 71-72).

The discussion of alienation in *OJQ* assumes a central place merely due to the fact that the concept provides a converging point of various socio-economic and political problems and only the notion of alienation could be assigned such a role within Marx's conceptual framework. As in the *Critique*, the starting point in Marx's argument is the principle of *bellum omnium contra omnes* operative in civil society, the separation of state and civil society, and the consequent bifurcation of a man into the 'citizen' (*citoyen*) and the 'bourgeois', the terms already popularised by Hegel in his *PR*. Man is expected to live up to universal criteria in the state, but within civil society his existence is dominated by his egoistic needs and interests. This duality separates man from the community, from himself and other men. According to Marx, these considerations extend to every aspect of civil society. Marx uses a number of terms to explicate various aspects of alienation in specific contexts in civil society, such as '*Trennung*,' '*Spaltung*,' '*Absconderung*,' '*verderben*,' '*sich selbt verlieren, veräussern*,' '*sich isolleren und auf sich zurückziehen*,' '*äusserlich Machen*,' '*alle Gattungsbände des Menschen zerreissen*,' and '*die Menschenwelt in eine Welt atomistischer Individuen auflösen*,' etc. (see *Werke 1*, 374-77).

Bruno Bauer had argued in response to the Jews who wanted religious emancipation that this was not possible without political emancipation. Historically, the Jews had been outsiders in European Christian society for centuries. They were victims of political discrimination. The only exceptions in the European history where they had been accorded full rights are to be found, first, in Spain under the Muslim rule and later on in the Ottoman Empire. In France they were granted full citizenship rights by Napoleon but Germany was slow in following this process. With the industrial expansion and the growth of commerce in the early forties, in which the Jews played a significant part, the demand for the political rights of the Jews was again resumed. The juridical status of Jews prior to the establishment of the *Kaiserreich* varied from one German state to the other. It was the legislation of the North German Federation in 1869, which abolished all restrictions and disqualifications based on religious affiliation. It was later extended to the whole empire. Thus the Jews became full and equal citizens in Germany.

In 1840s Bruno Bauer took a stand against the campaign for religious freedom for the Jews. He argued that the Jews by their religious exclusiveness had deliberately cut themselves off from the mainstream of society in which they lived. Their religion, according to Bauer's view, was instrumental in preventing them for full participation in the affairs of the state. If the Jews were interested in full citizenship of a modern rational state, then they must first get rid of their antiquated religion and join in the common struggle for the establishing of a free and rational state. Any appeal to the Germans to help secure the rights for the Jews while the German themselves were politically unfree, was a bad strategy. This situation of different or conflicting interests is expressed by Sidney Hook in these words: 'The Christians to whom the Jews appealed for support were either religious or not. If they were not religious, their interest was in liberalising the entire state in the name of humanity, not in the name of a few chosen people. Why should these free-minded Christians aid the Jews in retaining their own religious movement when the Jews refused to aid them in their radical struggles against the state which was the *source of all* discrimination? But if the Christians to whom the Jews appealed were themselves religious, then the Jews were asking them to surrender their religious prejudices while clinging all the more tenaciously to their own. As genuine Christians they *must* believe that their religion is the true religion. Else why should they be Christians? But if they must believe this, then they are consistent in excluding from Christian social life those who have a different religion. In asking them to grant the Jews the same rights Christians enjoyed, the Jews were asking them to cease being Christians. But the Jews were not willing to cease being Jews. This was a peculiar asymmetrical logic and ethics' (Hook 1962, 101-102).

The solution to the Jewish problem lay, according to Bauer, in solving the religious problem. It meant first of all renouncing the Judaism as a religion in the doctrinal sphere and the destruction of the Christian state in its political sphere. This will create the necessary pre-requisites for the emancipation of the Jews along with the rest of the society.

Marx criticises Bauer's ideas on the Jewish question by pointing out that Bauer's solution is the abolition of religion; the critique of the Jewish question is the answer to the Jewish question: 'The most rigid form of opposition between the Jew and the Christian is the *religious* opposition. How is an opposition resolved? By making it impossible. How is religious *opposition*

made impossible? By *abolishing religion*' (CW3, 147). This incumbent civic, political emancipation of the Jews, as of any other people, could be realised above all by the abolition of religion. Marx admirably sums up Bauer's position: 'Bauer therefore demands, on the one hand, that the Jew should renounce Judaism, and that mankind in general should renounce religion, in order to achieve civic emancipation. On the other hand, he quite consistently regards the political abolition of religion as the abolition of religion as such. The state which presupposes religion is not yet a true, real state' (CW3, 149). Marx showed that Bauer's formulations and solutions did not go far enough; and that Bauer had converted the problem of the emancipation of the Jews into a purely religious issue, as if the oppression to which they were being subjected was rooted in Judaism. Religion was not the cause but the effect of social oppression.

Marx, however, does not defend the validity of religious ideas. He, unlike Bauer, rejects the notion that the secularisation of the state is sufficient to free man from social oppression and servitude. The root of this servitude is not religious alienation but political alienation: 'We no longer regard religion as the *cause,* but only as the *manifestation* of secular narrowness. Therefore we explain the religious limitations of the free citizens by their secular limitations. We do not assert that they must overcome their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions, we assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their secular restrictions. We do not turn secular questions into theological questions. We turn theological questions into secular ones.... The question of the r*elation of political emancipation to religion* becomes for us the question of the *relation of political emancipation to human emancipation'* (CW3, 151).

Marx and Bauer, however, do not offer two opposite or mutually exclusive explanations on all points on the Jewish question. Marx in fact credits Bauer for offering a new form to the problematic of religious emancipation of the Jews 'after giving a critical analysis of the previous formulations and solutions of the question' and that when Bauer 'analyses the religious opposition between Judaism and Christianity, he elucidates the essence of the Christian state ... in a style of writing that is as precise as it is pithy and vigorous' (CW3, 147).

Bauer had criticised only the Christian state which stood in the way of the political emancipation of the Jews. In other words, his criticism did not extend to the state as such; only to

the Christian state. In view of this, he was not able to see the connection between political emancipation and human emancipation. In advocating only the political emancipation, Bauer had not realised that political emancipation embodied an alienation similar to the religious alienation which he had criticised. Marx in this context shows that the abolition of religion from political sphere, as in the United States of America and France, does not do away with the religiosity.

The limitations of political emancipation, according to Marx, are evident from the fact that the state can free itself from a restriction, like religion, without its citizens being really free (see CW3, 152). In fact, the existence of religion was presupposed, as was the existence of private property by its abolition as a property qualification for the right to elect. 'The state abolishes, in its way, distinctions of *birth, social rank, education, occupation,* when it declares that ... [these] are *non-political* distinctions ... Far from abolishing these *real* distinctions, the state only exists on the presupposition of their existence' (CW3, 153). The state 'feels itself to be a *political state* and asserts its *universality* only in opposition to these elements of its being' (CW3, 153).

The inevitable result of this was that man's social being was profoundly divided. In this situation, man's social being was fulfilled in the abstract sphere of the state, whereas his material conditions of life remain unchanged: 'The perfect political state is, by its nature, man's *species-life,* as *opposed* to his material life. All the preconditions of this egoistic life continue to exist in *civil society outside* the sphere of the state, but as qualities of civil life. Where the political state has attained its true development, man -- not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life -- leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the *political community,* in which he considers himself a *communal being,* and life in *civil society,* in which he acts as *private individual,* regards other men as means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers' (CW3, 153-54).

Marx does not reject or denigrate political emancipation, which is valuable and important: 'Political emancipation is, of course, a big step forward. True, it is not the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto existing world order' (CW3, 155). Political democracy could be called Christian because in it it is man who is regarded sovereign and supreme, but unfortunately it also meant 'man in his uncivilised, unsocial form, man in his

fortuitous experience, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted by the whole organisation of our society, who has lost himself, been alienated, and handed over to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements -- in short, man who is not yet a *real* species-being. That which is a creation of fantasy, a dream, a postulate of Christianity, i.e. the sovereignty of man -- but man as an alien being different from the real man -- becomes in democracy tangible reality, present existence, and secular principle' (CW3, 159).

Coming to the question of religious alienation in civil society, Marx points out that the separation of the state from religion and economics liberated the state from religion, but that did not liberate the man. Religion was not the cause of the duality of man in civil society but rather it was the dichotomy of man in civil society which helped the flourishing of religion. Instead of being the spirit of the state, religion became the spirit of civil society, the spirit of egoism and division: 'Religion is no longer the spirit of the *state*, in which man behaves ... as a species being, in community with other men. Religion has become the essence of *civil society*, of the sphere of egoism, *bellum omnium contra omnes*. It is no longer the essence of the *community* but of its *difference*. It has become the expression of man's *separation* from his community, from himself and from other men -- as it was *originally*' (CW3, 155). [In German: 'Sie ist nicht mehr das Wesen der *Gemeinschaft*, sondern das Wesen des *Unterschieds*. Sie ist zum Ausdruck der *Trennung* des Menschen von seinem *Gemeinwesen*, von sick und den anderen Menschen geworden -- was sie *ursprünglich* war' MEGA I, 1, 586.]

Marx investigates the abstract nature of the political state and the consequent dualism which it creates in the life of its citizens. The modern political state which came into existence as a result of the political revolution, dissolving feudalism, an organisation of national life, did not raise 'property or labour to the level of social elements; on the contrary, it completed their separation from the state as a whole and constituted them as discrete societies within society' (CW3, 165). Thus the political state was to create a unity lacking in feudalism, by setting free 'the political spirit, which had been, as it were, split up, partitioned and dispersed in the various blind alleys of feudal society. It gathered the dispersed parts of the political spirit ... and established it as the sphere of the community, the *general* concern of the nation, ideally independent of those *particular* elements of civil life' (CW3, 166). But the transition from feudalism to bourgeois

society did not bring about human emancipation: 'Hence man was not freed from religion, he received religious freedom. He was not freed from property, he received freedom to own property. He was not freed from the egoism of business, he received freedom to engage in business' (CW3, 167).

Marx does not give any detailed account of his notion of human emancipation in place of political emancipation. Political emancipation is defined thus: 'Die politische Emanzipation ist die Reduktion des Menschen, einerseits auf das Midtglied der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, auf das *egoistische unabhängige* Individuum, andererseits auf den *Staatsbürger*, auf die moralische Person' (MEGA I, 1, 599). It shows that political emancipation confirms the dichotomy of man. 'The purpose of human emancipation,' Kolakowski writes, 'is to bring it about that the collective, generic character of human life is real life, so that society itself takes on a collective character and coincides with the life of the state' (Kolakowski 1981, 126). The solution to political alienation lies in the transcendence of the state, which means that man has to repossess the social power that has been externalised in political institutions. Marx's notion of human emancipation which is quite utopian and abstract at this stage is postulated thus: 'Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as individual human being has become a *species-being* in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognised and organised his "*forces propres"* [own powers] as *social* forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of *political* power, only then will the human emancipation have been accomplished' (CW3, 168). Marx in this exposition of man's actual dichotomous existence has found a solution in an imaginary unity, described in very abstract terms. The liberation of man from alienation in the state, unlike his liberation from religion, will require a real social religion.

The separation of the modern state from religion and economics is, no doubt, a great achievement but, according to Marx, this also shows the severe limitation of the modern state when we distinguish between political and human emancipation: 'The *decomposition* of man into Jew and citizen, Protestant and citizen, religious man and citizen, is neither a deception directed *against* citizenhood, nor it is a circumvention of political emancipation, it is *political emancipation itself,* the *political* method of emancipating oneself from religion' (CW3, 155). The

contradictions in which any follower of any particular religion meets 'in relation to his citizenship is only one aspect of the universal secular contradiction between the political state and civil society' (CW3, 159-60). The emancipation of the modern state from religion does not emancipate man from religion.

3.6. Money, the alienated essence of man's life

The second part of *OJQ* deals with Bauer's essay '*Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen. freit zu werden*'. The question of Jewish emancipation, according to Bauer, was to be resolved by freeing of the Jews from the Jewish religion. Whereas the Christians had to emancipate themselves from their religion as an alienating power, the Jews had to go farther than that. Beside making a break with their religion, the Jews had to break with the task of completing their religion, that is Christianity, a development which had remained alien to them. Bauer's suggested solution was in the complete secularisation of the German state which would not recognise any religious denomination.

Marx does regard political emancipation resulting from the negation of the role of religion in the state to be the solution. He criticises Bauer once again for transforming the question of Jewish emancipation into a purely religious question: 'The theological problem as to whether the Jew or the Christian has the better prospect of salvation is repeated here in the enlightened form: which of them is *more capable of emancipation*. No longer is the question asked: Is it Judaism or Christianity that makes a man free? On the contrary, the question is now: Which makes man freer, the negation of Judaism or the negation of Christianity' (CW3, 168)?

The political question of emancipation, according to Marx, could not be reduced to the problem of religion. Here Marx takes a different approach which places religion within its specific sociological role in the society, a theme which Marx had touched on earlier in the first part of the *OJQ*.

In contrast to Bauer, Marx breaks with the theological formulation of the question. 'For us, the question of the Jew's capacity for emancipation becomes the question: What particular

social element has to be overcome in order to abolish Judaism? For us the present-day Jew's capacity for emancipation is the relation of Judaism to the emancipation of the modern world. This relation necessarily results from the special position of Judaism in the contemporary enslaved world' (CW3, 169). In fact, this 'special position' of Judaism in the contemporary European society, with its mighty financial power, is not a result of the activities of the Sabbath Jew, as Bauer surmises, but rather of the 'actual, worldly Jew', the '*everyday Jew*' (ibid., 169).

Marx makes it clear that the problem of human alienation can be overcome only when a fundamental re-organisation of civil society is accomplished, and when the *Aufhebung* of the state in this process becomes an essential part. In calling for an organisation of society which would abolish the preconditions upon which money and commerce exists, Marx calls for the abolition of the preconditions of egoistic man, dominated by needs and private interests. The 'Jewish spirit' (that is, commerce) merely reflects the life of civil society. To be engaged in huckstering and self-interest is realising the essence of civil society. 'An organisation of society which would abolish the preconditions for huckstering, and therefore the possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible. His religious consciousness would be dissipated like a thin haze in the real, vital air of society. On the other hand, if the Jew recognises that this *practical* nature of his is futile and works to abolish it, he extricates himself from the previous development and works for *human emancipation* as such and turns against the supreme practical expression of human self-estrangement' (CW3, 170).

Turning to the religious aspect of the Jewish question, Marx argues that it is nothing more than a facade of selfish interests. Marx defines the secular basis of Judaism as 'practical need, self-interest' (CW3, 169). 'What is the worldly religion of the Jew? *Huckstering*. What is his worldly God? *Money*.... Emancipation from *huckstering* and *money*, consequently from practical, real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time' (CW3, 170).

According to Marx, the monotheism of the Jew, is in reality the polytheism of many needs: '*Practical need, egoism*, is the principle of civil society, and as such appears in a pure form as soon as civil society has given birth to the political state. The god of *practical need and self-interest* is *money* (CW3, 172).

For the first time Marx comes to emphasise the social role of money as the alienated essence of man's life, and thus he rejects the position of the Young Hegelians, including that of Feuerbach and Bauer, who see religion as the alienated human essence. It is Marx's hypothesis that the modern commercial world has enslaved mankind and the supreme practical expression of this self-alienation is money. In this essay Marx clearly extends the notion of alienation to the economic sphere, even though Marx's understanding of economics is not deep or extensive. We should also mention here the influence of an essay by Moses Hess entitled 'On the Essence of Money' which he had written for the *German-French Yearbooks*. But, owing to the financial difficulties, the publication of the journal came to an end after its first number. As a consequence, the essay by Hess remained unpublished. It is very likely that Marx as editor of the *German-French Yearbooks* had read the article before writing the *OJQ*. There are many similarities between Hess's article and Marx's *OJQ* which cannot be merely coincidental. For example, Hess wrote of the influence of his article upon others: 'The best recent writings on the essence of money have ideas that I developed, that is, that money is for the practical world what God is for the theoretical world, that it constitutes the alienation of the idea of social value, in silver or alloy from the Catholic point of view, or in paper money from the Protestant point of view. In other words, money is simply the inorganic symbol of our present social production that has broken free from our rational control and therefore dominates us' (cited in McLellan l980a, 154). Hess in his essay extends Feuerbach's idea of religious alienation to the sphere of economic and social life. (For more on this article, see McLellan l980a, 155; for details on the relationship of Hess and Marx, see Kaegi 1965.) Marx follows closely Hess's arguments on money as an alienating power and the question of the Jewish-Christian relationship. The philosophical categories 'particular' and 'universal' are not so prominent in *OJQ* as they are in the *Critique*; they are replaced by concrete category of 'money' in the exegesis of alienation. In the civil society ('*Judaism*'), dominated by practical needs and egoism, money is the secularised god: 'Money is the jealous god of Israel, in face of which no other god may exist. Money degrades all the gods of man -- and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal self-established *value* of all things. It has therefore robbed the whole world -- both the world of man and nature -- of its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man's work and man's existence, and this alien

essence dominates him, and he worships it' (CW3, 172). [In German: 'Das Geld ist das derm Menschen entfremdete Wesen seiner Arbeit und seinen Daseins, und dies fremde Wesen beherrscht ihn, und er betet es an' MEGA I, 1, 603.]

Marx in this article uses the words Jew and Judaism in their figurative sense of commerce, usury and huckstering, etc., which, in no way, are anti-semetic. David McLellan is right to point out that ' "*Judentum*", the German word for Judaism, had the derivative meaning of "commerce", and it is this meaning which is uppermost in Marx's mind throughout the article. "Judaism" has very little religious, and still less racial, content for Marx and it would be little exaggeration to say that this latter part of Marx's review is an extended pun at Bauer's expense' (McLellan 1972, 184).

The Jew had already emancipated himself in a practical, Jewish way, 'not only because he has acquired financial power, but also because, through him and also apart from him, *money* has become a world power and the practical Jewish spirit has become the practical spirit of the Christian nations' (CW3, 170). The divine god undergoes a metamorphosis, appearing in his secular form: 'The god of the Jews has become secularised and has become the god of the world. The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange' (CW3, 172). Marx approvingly cites Bauer from *Die Judenfrage* who had written: 'The Jew, who in Vienna, for example, is only tolerated, determines the fate of the whole Empire by his financial power. The Jew, who may have no rights in the smallest German state, decides the fate of Europe. While corporations and guilds refuse to admit Jews, or have not yet adopted a favourable attitude towards them, the audacity of industry mocks at the obstinacy of the medieval institutions' and also that 'a fictitious state of affairs when in theory the Jew is deprived of political rights, whereas in practice he has immense power and exerts his political power *en gros*, although it is curtailed *en détail'* (Bauer). Marx comments that 'the contradiction that exists between the practical political power of the Jew and his political rights is the contradiction between politics and the power of money in general. Although theoretically the former is superior to the latter, in actual fact politics has become the serf of financial power' (CW3, 170, 171).

Marx explains the tenacity of the Jew not by his religion but 'by the human basis of his religion', which is, practical need and egoism. Marx in his conclusion underlines the idea of

alienated labour, whose details he was to develop soon in the *EPM*. He proclaims: 'Selling is the practical aspect of alienation' [Die Veräusserung ist die Praxis der Entäusserung.] (CW3, 174). As under the restraining influence of religion, man could objectify his essential nature only by turning it into an alien and fantastic being, so under the sway of egoistic need he could act practically and produce objects by making his activity and his products subservient to an alien substance -- money.

CHAPTER 4

SACRED AND NON-SACRED FORMS OF ALIENATION

In this chapter I shall discuss the problem of religious alienation and the emergence of proletariat as an emancipating class which appear in *Introduction*, an important study of the period in Marx's intellectual development. This essay written at the end of 1843-January 1844 is one of the most piquant pieces which Marx ever wrote. As the name indicates, the *Introduction* was part of Marx's plan to rewrite the *Critique*. *OJQ* had already elaborated some of the themes. The *Introduction* is the first writing where Marx arrived at the idea of communism as that form of communal organisation which truly fulfilled the human nature as a species-being. His conversion to communism 'took place only after he became convinced that the economic life in civil society is the prime locus of human self-alienation' (Tucker 1972, 107). Now, Marx rejects the political solution to alienation which he had proposed in the *Critique*. The proletariat as a class that is to effect the revolutionary transformations, is mentioned for its historical role. The task of philosophy Marx defines as a radical criticism of 'non-sacred' forms and manifestations of self-alienation.

The *Introduction* can be seen as a summary of the previous positions held by Marx on the religious, philosophical, political and revolutionary themes. McLellan is of the opinion that 'all the elements of the article are contained in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", though there is quite a new emphasis on the proletariat as future emancipator of society' (McLellan 1972, 185). But Louis Dupre (1966) views the evolution of Marx's ideas in demonstrably new directions. There is, no doubt, that many features of the *Introduction* are traceable in the *Critique*, but the new emphasis on the proletariat is of a fundamentally new dimension in Marx's political theory. The essay begins with a critique of religion and goes on to the critique of German politics and the prospects of a proletarian revolution. This summary arrangement of the themes is a veritable reflection of the developmental phases in Marx himself, as mentioned before, 'from

criticism of religion to criticism of philosophy; from criticism of philosophy to criticism of the state; from criticism of the state to criticism of society -- that is, from criticism of politics to criticism of political economy, which led to criticism of private property' (Mandel l971, 10-11; see also McLellan I972, 184-85). Now, we can turn to his critique of religion.

4.1. Religion as an extreme form of alienation

For Marx religion is primordially an active form of ideological alienation, where inverted world-consciousness and mystification become the essential elements of the alienative process. Marx's writings show that he hardly ever thought it worthwhile to discuss theological formulations or religious dogmas. The question of religious consciousness for Marx was a matter of little interest. Karl Löwith writes: 'By advancing towards the criticism of man's material conditions, Marx does not simply leave behind the criticism of religion but rather assumes it on a new level; for though, on the basis of the social-political world, religion is but a false consciousness, the question has still to be answered: Why did this real world at all develop an inadequate consciousness? If we assume with Feuerbach that the religious world is only a self-projection of the human world, one has to ask: Why does the latter project the first and create a religious superstructure?... It is not enough to state with Feuerbach that religion is a creation of man, this statement has to be qualified by the further insight that religion is the consciousness of *that* man who has not yet returned from his self-lienation and found himself at home in his worldly conditions' (Löwith 1949, 48, 49).

Marx's approach to religion in his early thinking can be seen in his letter of November 1842 to Arnold Ruge, where he says that 'religion should be criticised in the framework of criticism of political conditions rather than that political conditions should be criticised in the framework of religion ... for religion in itself is without content, it owes its being not to heaven but to the earth, and with the abolition of distorted reality, of which it is the *theory*, it will collapse of itself' (CW1, 394-95). If religion is without any content then the whole problematic of religion can be reduced to a particular mode of products and as such it is always a reflection of

the material historical developments. In *Anti-Dühring,* Engels writes: 'All religion, however, is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces. In the beginnings of history it was the forces of nature which were so reflected and which in the course of further evolution underwent the most manifold and varied personifications among the various peoples.... But it is not long before, side by side with the forces of nature, social forces begin to be active -- forces which confront man as equally alien and at first equally inexplicable, dominating him with the same apparent natural necessity as the forces of nature themselves' (Engels 1978, 382-83). In this lucid exposition, Engels points to the roots of religion in the early phase of historical development of mankind. At this stage the primitive man comes to the realisation of his helplessness when he is face to face with the gigantic and mighty forces of nature. His effort to appease these, leads to primitive nature worship. But at a later stage under the antagonistic class society, the exploited classes of society face to face with the social oppression, and in their helplessness give birth to and foster religion, the belief in a better life hereafter, the alleged reward for suffering on earth (see Foreword to Marx & Engels 1972, 8).

In this connection, Kostas Axelos, the French Marxist of *Arguments* group, sums up the Marxian position: 'Being the expression of impotence and alienation, religion in turn, in its own modality, alienates man from his life and from his essential forces. Far from being some kind of index of the strength of human being, religion comes about only owing to man's weakness, his frustrations, his dissatisfactions, his alienation. An abstraction from concrete conditions, religion is a product of the alienation of man on the level of both practice and theory. Mystery, far from implying a truth of its own, veils the truth of reality and masks its own mystification' (Axelos 1976, 160). Within the sphere of developed productive forces under the institutionalized private ownership, 'religion begins to express the alienation of man in relation to the products of his labour as the imaginary satisfaction of unsatisfied real drives. The nondevelopment of productive forces determines the genesis of religion, and this later development determines its subsequent "evolution" ' (ibid., 159-160).

At the time of writing the *Introduction* Marx's conversion to the stand-point of theoretical communism takes place. In the beginning of the essay, he excellently summarises his views on

religion. Marx is referring to the philosophical critique of religion and the religious alienation accomplished by the Young Hegelians from Strauss to Feuerbach when he says: 'For Germany, the criticism of religion is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism' (CW3, 175). There are possibly two main reasons for Marx's viewing of religious criticism as the premise of all criticism. First, religion stood in the way of any political change in Germany by its adamant support of the Prussian state. It meant that any change in the political sphere was possible when the powerful support of religion to the *status quo* was removed. Secondly, religion *per se* represented the most extreme form of alienation, and it was at this point that secularisation had to start; religion was the pivotal point for the criticism of other forms of alienation (see McLellan 1972, 185).

Marx succinctly summarises the accomplishment of Feuerbach's religious philosophy: 'The profane existence of error is discredited after its *heavenly oratio pro aris et focis* [speech for the altars and hearths] has been disproved. Man, who looked for a superhuman being in the fantastic reality of heaven and found nothing there but the *reflection* of himself, will no longer be disposed to find out but the *semblance* of himself, only an inhuman being, where he seeks and must seek his true reality' (CW3, 175). Religion, in Marx's view, was 'the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again' (CW3, 175). The intellectual climate in which the young Marx lived was dominated by the Young Hegelians' atheistic critique of religion. In the beginning, he shared their view-point, but 'he became disenchanted with their war of words. What eventually turned Marx against philosophical forms of atheism, as he understood them, was their failure to grasp the fact that religion has a justificatory function which resists philosophical critique' (Myers 1981, 317).

A recurrent theme in Marx's criticism is the transformational characteristic of religion. The social structure in the first place provides the basis for the inverted world of religion because it is in itself an inverted world. In this he differs from Feuerbach. Marx does not simply reduce religious elements to any more fundamental elements: 'The basis of irreligious criticism is: *Man makes religion*, religion does not make man.... But *man* is no abstract being encamped outside the world. Man is *the world of man*, the state, society. This state, this society, produce religion, an *inverted world-consciousness*, because they are an *inverted world*' (CW3, 175).

Marx in his evaluation of religion uses a series of illuminating metaphors to show the place of religion in an inverted world: 'Religion is the general theory of that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its spiritualistic *point d'honneur*, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn compliment, its universal source of consolation and justification. It is the *fantastic realisation* of the *human essence* because the human essence has no true reality' (CW3, 175). Religion, on the one hand, expresses the real social distress, and on the other, it seeks to justify the social oppression. 'The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly a fight against *the world* of which religion is the spiritual *aroma*. *Religious* distress is at the same time the e*xpression* of real distress and also the *protest* against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the *opium* of the people' (CW3, 175). Presumably, Marx thought that taking drugs like opium helped to bring about a condition of illusions and hallucinations, it also proved as a palliative, a consolatory refuge from the heartlessness and hardships of the real world. Religion for Marx is a medium of social illusions. An alienated and alienating human existence calls for these illusions. The need for these illusions is not illusory; it is real. Marx in his much later work, *Capital*, describes religious world as 'a reflex of the real world' (Marx 1977, 83).

Marx's description of religion in the *Introduction* has sometimes been seen to contain a positive evaluation of religion. However, this view can be attributed to a perfunctory understanding of Marx's ideas. McLellan in his book, *Marxism and Religion*, rightly says that if it was so, then it was an extremely backhanded compliment: 'Religion may well represent humanity's feeble aspirations under adverse circumstances, but the whole tenor of the passage is that religion is metaphysically and sociologically misguided and that its disappearance is the pre-condition for any radical amelioration of social conditions' (McLellan 1987, 13).

The way to overcome religious consciousness is therefore through the changing of the conditions which provide a material base to inverted consciousness in society. 'A strictly materialistic critique of religion consists neither in pure and simple rejection (Bauer) nor in mere humanisation (Feuerbach) but in the positive postulate to create conditions which deprive religion of all its source and motivation. The practical criticism of the existing society can alone

supersede religious criticism' (Löwith 1949, 49). Religious persecution and coercion as a political tool only serve to strengthen the chains of religion. The critique of religion, accordingly, addresses itself to the issues in the world which produce and keep religion. The editors of *Marx and Engels: On Religion* point out that 'Marx and Engels most resolutely denounced the attempts of the anarchists and Blanquists, Dühring and others to use coercive methods against religion.... They proved that the prohibition and persecution of religion can only intensify religious feeling. On the other hand, Marxism, contrary to bourgeois atheism with its abstract ideological propaganda and its narrow culturalism, shows that religion cannot be eliminated until the social and political conditions which foster it are abolished' (Marx & Engels 1972, 9). The illusory consolation of religion cannot be remedied by the removal of religion: 'To abolish religion as the *illusory* happiness of the people is to demand their *real* happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the *demand to give up a state of affairs which needs illusions*. The criticism of religion is therefore *in embryo the criticism of vale of tears*, the *halo* of which is religion' (CW3, 176).

Marx in the *Introduction* makes it abundantly clear that the criticism of religion is not a goal in itself. The criticism of religion is only a premise for every other kind of criticism; it is not more than that. The real aim in the exposure of religion is not that it tears up the imaginary flowers camouflaging the alienated life of the people, but rather that the people 'shake off the chain and pluck the living flower' (CW3, 176). It is essential, therefore, that the criticism of religion becomes a criticism of politics: 'The task of history, therefore, once the *world beyond the truth* has disappeared, is to establish the *truth of this world*. The immediate *task of philosophy* which is at the service of history, once the *holy form* of human self-alienation has been unmasked, is to unmask self-alienation in its *unholy forms*. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the *criticism of religion* into the *criticism of law* and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*' (CW3, 176).

In these formulations, Marx went beyond the Young Hegelians like D.F. Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner, and Feuerbach, who criticised everything by making everything a matter of religious representation. 'The total domination,' writes Axelos, 'was presupposed, and religious concepts dominated all realities and all ideas; so that, after first interpreting everything in a

religious and theological way, these critical critics would attack that very domination as a usurpation of the true and natural life of man. They wanted to free man from their religious bonds. And yet, since they are the ones who viewed everything through religion, their negation of what held man in chains remained ideologically critical, abstract, theological in an antitheological form, and simply long-winded' (Axelos 1976, 161).

Marx's critique of religion, on the other hand, focuses on the world from which it takes shape, and it is this malaise of alienation which needs to be extirpated. He gives a materialist explanation to the religious consciousness. 'Marx undertakes a critique of reality as it is and of the ideology that corresponds to it, a critique that would end by compelling the practical and revolutionary transformation of everything in existence. The battle is engaged not in the name of "philosophic truth" but in order to supersede alienation on a practical level and free both productive forces and men' (ibid., 161).

Marx, in his early theory of alienation, views religion as a fantasy of the alienated man. 'Religion rests on a want, a defect, a limitation. Its truth resides in practice, though religion itself, as religion, possesses no practice, just as it does not have a history of its own. Since practice, of which religion is always the sublimation, did not contain real truth, religion has been only the alienated expression of a real alienation and, of course, has contributed to the continuance of that alienation. Marx does not recognise any formative and basic role for religion.... There is not even any question of the "divine" or the "sacred"; these are but products of the alienation of religious imagination, which is itself a by-product of alienated material production' (ibid., 165). In Marx's estimation, religion being a phenomenon of secondary importance merited no independent criticism. In his later works, the element of class ideology becomes his major concern.

Some writers have characterised Marxism as a religion, and also have questioned Marx's atheism. Robert Tucker, for instance, writes: 'The religious essence of Marxism is superficially obscured by Marx's rejection of the traditional religions. This took the form of a repudiation of "religion" as such and espousal of "atheism". Marx's atheism, however, meant only a negation of the transmundane God of traditional Western religion. It did not mean the denial of a supreme being.... Thus his atheism was a positive religious proposition. It rules out considerations of Marxism as a religious system of thought only if, with Marx, we equate the traditional religions

with religion as such' (Tucker 1972, 22; see also Reding 1961, 160). According to this approach Marxism is to be analysed as a religious system within the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and as such it can be assimilated in theology. Eberhard Jüngel in his book *God as the Mystery of the World* advocates this: 'The Marxist critique of religion could much more easily be accepted by theology than that of Feuerbach, if the latter were not presupposed by the former. Certainly one can integrate critically the specific interest of Marx's critique of religion into theology -- and in some ways it must be done. But that is the current fashion anyway, so that there is scarcely too little being done along these lines theologically' (Jüngel 1983, 341, footnote 43).

The positions taken by Tucker and Jüngel concerning Marx's atheism in fact confuse the issue. Our point of departure in this matter is that Marx viewed religion, without any reservations, as a medium of social illusions, and that all the religious belief claims were false. Marx was a thoroughgoing atheist. In his writings from the earliest to the latest, there is no indication, explicit or implicit, admitting the existence of God. Marx absolutely rejects any idea of a transcendent God or a personal God (i.e. God in the human form); therefore any religious belief claims like God becoming a human being or a human being becoming God, etc. are false and nonsensical linguistic aberrations and they are nothing more than that. Marx's atheism cannot be reconciled with religious and theological presuppositions. The loud exclamations about God from the authoritarian pulpits cannot bring into being which is a *non-being*. Turner rightly suggests: 'It simply will not do, as some Christian apologists maintain, that Marx was only a relative atheist, that he rejected only the God espoused by the Christians of his day, that this God (primarily the God of the nineteenth-century orthodox Lutheran establishments) is not the God of contemporary Christianity, or that as others suggest, his hostility to theism may have no purchase on that contemporary Christianity. Marx rejected not only particular forms of theism but also any reference whatever to a transcendent reality' (Turner 1991, 322; see also Lobkowicz 1967, 303-35).

According to Marx, the history of the world is the creation of man through his labour, which is explicable solely with reference to man without the mediation of a divine being. In the *EPM*, for instance, Marx writes: 'But since for the socialist man the *entire so-called history of the world* is nothing but the creation of man through human labour, nothing but the emergence of

nature for man, so he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his *birth* through himself, of his *genesis*. Since the *real existence* of man and nature -- since man has become for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man has become practical, sensuous, perceptible -- the question about an *alien* being, about a being above nature and man -- a question which implies the admission of the unreality of nature and of man -- has become impossible in practice' (EPM 100). This pronouncement leaves little room for any other interpretation of Marx except that there is no room for God in this world or anywhere else outside it.

Marx's discussion of religion in the *Introduction*, shows that he was well acquainted with the Western religions and their various traditions. In *OJQ* and the *Introduction*, Marx, no doubt, has the contemporary dogmatic Lutheranism in Germany in his view, but he writes about religion in general and therein his rejection of it is absolute. For him atheism, as a *negation of God* was inseparable from humanism which postulates the *existence of man* through this negation.

4.2. The emergence of the proletariat and human emancipation

In the history of ideas, Marx is not the first thinker to use the term 'proletariat' or the notion of it in the sense of a class. In the *Critique* the discussion of proletariat takes place in connection with Hegel's class analysis. Marx does not use the term 'proletariat' here. Hegel in the *PR* sees a harmonious bond between civil society and the state through the mediating function of the estates. Marx rejects this view forcefully: 'In describing civil society as civil estate, Hegel has declared the distinctions of estate in civil society to be *non*-political distinctions, and civil and political life to be heterogeneous' (CW3, 76). Marx rejects this view of the separation of political and civil society. He reinforces his argument by explaining the role played by the French revolution which 'completed the transformation of the *political* into *social* estates, or changed the *differences of estate* of civil society into mere *social* differences, into differences of civil life which are without significance in political life' (ibid. 80). According to Marx, the medieval estate which Hegel uses in his class analysis is an anachronism. Historically the change of political estates into estates of civil society had taken place. Apart from bureaucracy, where the estate in

the medieval sense continues, and 'where civil and political positions are directly identical' (CW3, 80), no such identity of civil and political position of a person exists in the present society.

Marx enunciates his nascent views on 'the estate of direct labour' which anticipates his discussion of 'proletariat' in the *Introduction* a few months later. Marx writes: 'Only one thing is characteristic, namely, that *lack of property* and the *estate of direct* labour, of concrete labour, form not so much an estate of civil society as the ground upon which its circles rest and move' (ibid., 80).

In fact, Hegel in Paragraph 243 of the *PR* mentions that when civil society is unimpeded in its activity, it leads to internal expansion in population and industry. This paves the way for the accumulation of wealth by some, but it also necessitates the subdivisions and restrictions of particular jobs; 'this results in the dependence and distress of the class tied to work of that sort, and these again entail inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially the intellectual benefits of civil society' (PR, 149-50, § 243). In the next paragraph Hegel expresses his views as to how the fall of standard of living of a large mass of people below the subsistence level results in 'the creation of a rabble of paupers' (PR, 150, § 245). Marx's discussion of the class of direct labour follows Paragraph 243 of the *PR*. Avineri emphasises the immense importance of the concept in Marx thus: 'The "class of concrete labour" is not just a marginal phenomenon of modern society. Its existence is the condition for the functioning of civil society; hence an understanding of modern society presupposes an analysis of the condition of the working class. Here, in 1843, the nucleus for Marx's life work is already clearly visible' (Avineri 1970, 26).

It is most likely that Marx's 'class of direct labour' refers to the large number of dispossessed agricultural labourers. The main occupation of the Germans at this time was agriculture. Agricultural products were the main export followed by craftsmen's products. Germany divided in thirty-six states presented a class structure which was as uncomplicated as its economic life. The German historian Golo Mann describes the classes of German society as follows: 'There were the "nobility", the "middle class", and the "people". Nobles were landowners and held privileged positions in the army or the civil service. The middle class was

composed of members of the academic and liberal professions middle-rank civil servants, merchants, successful promoters of home industries and townsmen who had bought land. The rest were "the people" -- peasants, artisans and tradesmen, soldiers and journeymen, who began but only in the forties -- to be called "proletarians" ' (Mann 1974, 92-93). The most significant changes in the traditional way of life of the Germans were taking place with the advent of the railway (for the effect of railways on the German states, see Thomson 1973, 181-82). The large number of dispossessed peasants and landless agricultural labourers were on the increase. Being 'unincorporated' in an estate, they did not comprise a class in the established order of the society. They were vital to the function of civil society, but they themselves remained outside the integrating structure of civil society. In his articles on 'Debate on the Law on Thefts of Wood' in October 1842, Marx discusses the situation of the rural poor against the privileged classes. At this stage Marx thinks in traditional terms of 'the poor'. He writes: 'We ... demand for the poor, politically and socially propertyless many what the learned and would-be learned servility of so-called historians has discovered to be the true philosopher's stone for turning every sordid claim into the pure gold of right. We demand for the poor a *customary right*, and indeed one which is not of a local character but is a customary right of the poor of all countries. We go still further and maintain that a customary right by its very nature can *only* be a right of this lowest, propertyless and elemental mass' (CWl, 230).

After the preliminary paragraphs on religion, Marx in the *Introduction*, discusses the contemporary German politics and the possibilities of a revolution arising from the inherent contradictions of the situation. Here Marx for the first time in his writings assigns a specific historic mission to the proletariat -- to carry out the social revolution which will emancipate humanity from the self-alienation of the present existence. This idea of proletariat is a milestone in Marx's intellectual development. In the theoretical framework of his social criticism, the dialectics of social revolution becomes easy to explain through the vehicle of this change, the proletariat. Marx sees the proletariat as the visible manifestation of the self-alienation of man in the present world. 'The image of self-alienated humanity turned into an image of the proletariat as the living, breathing, suffering expression of self-alienated humanity, and also its *rebellious* expression -- alienated man in rebellion against his condition' (Tucker 1972, 113). In the same

context Avineri suggests that 'the proletariat, for Marx, is not just an historical phenomenon: its suffering and dehumanisation are, according to Marx, a paradigm for the human condition at large. It is not the proletarians' concrete conditions of life but their relation to an anthropological determination of man which primarily interests Marx' (Avineri 1970, 52).

Marx makes a special case of the backwardness of Germany as compared to England and France. Germany is said to have achieved in thought, in philosophy, what others did in practice. Even the big past revolutionary event, the Reformation, which influenced the later developments in the Europe, was theoretical, the brain-child of a monk. What is the significance of Luther's theoretical revolution? What is the contribution of the Protestantism in freeing man from the shackles of blind faith? Luther 'shattered faith in authority because he restored the authority of faith', and 'turned priests into laymen because he turned laymen into priests' and who freed body from the chains of outer religiosity to enchain man's heart in the inner religiosity (CW3, 182). Marx exposes the anachronistic nature of Germany's present condition thus: 'If one wanted to proceed from the *status quo* itself in Germany, even in the only appropriate way, i.e. negatively, the result will still be an *anachronism*. Even the negation of our political present is a reality already covered with dust in the historical lumber-room of modern nations.... If I negate the German state of affairs in 1843, then according to the French computation of time, I am hardly in the year 1789, and still less in the focus of the present' (CW3, 176). The internal political situation in Germany needs radical measures. It is no longer enough to criticise the situation, but rather to make criticism an instrument of change. Marx fervently advances his ideas on the role of social criticism. He writes: 'In the struggle against those conditions criticism is no passion of the head, it is the head of passion. It is not a lancet, it is a weapon. Its object is its *enemy*, which it wants not to refute but to *exterminate*. For the spirit of those conditions is refuted.... Criticism does not need to make things clear to itself as regards this subject-matter, for it has already dealt with it. Criticism appears no longer as an *end in itself*, but only as a *means*' (CW3, 177).

In Germany the theoretical aspect of the radical criticism, for instance, having been accomplished in the sphere of religion demanded a resolute positive abolition of religion. This criticism of religion ends with the evident truth that it is man who is the highest being for man, hence the categorical imperative to overthrow those conditions which degrade and enslave man

in the fantasy world of religion, pushing him in the abyss of human alienation. Marx advances the view that social criticism becomes a dynamic material force in its radical theoretical form when it meets the aspirations of the masses: 'The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates *ad hominem* and it demonstrates *ad hominem* as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter' (CW3, 182).

How can Germany achieve a revolution which while eliminating the backwardness of Germany will accomplish emancipation which is not merely political? This is the crux of the matter and Marx deals with it in his usual optimistic and candid manner. Marx asks: 'Can Germany attain a practice *à la hauteur des principes*, i.e. a *revolution* which will raise it not only to the *official level* of the modern nations but to the *height of humanity* which will be the near future of those nations' (CW3, 182)? Why only the Germans will raise to the height of humanity, Marx does not explain. Perhaps the only credentials to this end, in Marx's mind, are their philosophical achievements in the contemporary age. The way forward, according to Marx, will be through the social revolution brought about by a class whose particular interests coincide with the universal interests of the whole society. Marx introduces the question in the denouement of the article thus: 'Where, then, is the positive possibility of a German emancipation'? This is his answer: 'In the formation of a class with *radical chains*, a class of civil society, which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no *particular right* because no *particular wrong* but *wrong generally* is perpetrated against it; which can no longer invoke a *historical* but only a *human* title; which does not stand in any one-sided antithesis to the consequences but in an all-round antithesis to the premises of the German state; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other sphere of society and thereby emancipating all other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the *complete loss* of man and hence can win itself only through the *complete rewinning of man*. This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the *proletariat*' (CW3, 186).

In the *Introduction* the idea of proletarian revolution is introduced for the first time as a means to human emancipation in distinction from merely political emancipation as in the *Critique*. Political emancipation is only partial whereas human emancipation implies the existence of a class which dissolves the old world order. A partial and merely a political revolution's inability to overcome the social alienation is due to the fact that it leaves the pillars of the house standing (see CW3, 184). In other words, a political revolution which turns the scales of power in favour of a new class within the existing social framework, does not end the alienation of the proletariat. Marx remarks in his article 'Critical Marginal Notes on the Article by a Prussian' (published in August 1844) that the state and the system of society are not two different things in dealing with the problem of pauperism as asserted by 'a Prussian'. Marx says: 'The state -- contrary to what the Prussian demands of his King -- will *never* see in "*the state* and the *system of society*" the source of *social maladies*. Where political parties exist, each party seeks the root of *every* evil in the fact that instead of itself an opposing party stands at the *helm of the state*. Even radical and revolutionary politicians seek the root of the evil not in the *essential nature* of the state, but in a definite *state form*, which they wish to replace by a *different* state form' (CW3, 197). Consequently, there is no wonder if the causes of pauperism are seen differently. Marx says further: 'On the other hand, England explains *pauperism* as due to the *bad will of the poor*, just as the King of Prussia explains it by the *un-Christian feelings of the rich*, and just as the Convention explained it by the *suspect counter-revolutionary mentality of the property-owners.* Therefore England punishes the poor, the King of Prussia admonishes the rich, and the Convention cuts off the heads of the property owners' (CW3, l97-98).

Basically 'a partial revolution means that a class emancipates itself but only by establishing its domination over other classes. In so doing it makes the others believe that it struggles not for itself but for society as a whole, that its goals are universal goals' (Henry 1983, 67). This illusory universality, however, disappears with the victory of the proletariat. Only the proletariat fulfils this historic, and universalistic role as a class which ends the class rule and class domination. 'By proclaiming the *dissolution of the hitherto existing world order* the proletariat merely states the *secret of its own existence*, for it *is in fact* the dissolution of that world order. By demanding the *negation of private property*, the proletariat merely raises to the

rank of a *principle of society* what society has made the principle of the *proletariat*, what, without its own co-operation, is already incorporated in *it* as a negative result of society' (CW3, 187).

In this way, human emancipation is realised when the proletariat achieves its social emancipation by the *Aufhebung* of private property as the basis of social life, and the dissolution of the existing capitalist order. In the proletariat's socialist revolution the status and task of philosophy undergoes a radical change, and it realises itself: 'As philosophy finds its *material* weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its *spiritual* weapons in philosophy. And once the lightning of thought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil of the people the emancipation of the *Germans* into *human beings* will take place' (CW3, 187). The negation of philosophy in the old sense of the term becomes the start of a fundamentally new philosophical outlook: 'Philosophy cannot be made a reality without the abolition of the proletariat, the proletariat cannot be abolished without philosophy being made a reality' (CW3, 187). Thus Marx reformulates his concept of the unity of theory and practice, of head and heart. The proletariat, being the heart accomplishes the historic task of human emancipation which had hitherto been confined to the realm of philosophy, the head, and thereby it abolishes philosophy as a separate sphere.

4.3. The proletariat as the universal class

In the *Introduction*, Marx associates the Hegelian notion of the universality of a class with the proletariat. He finds in the proletariat the 'universal character' which Hegel identifies, as we have seen, with the civil sevice. In the *Critique* Marx shows that bureaucracy as Hegel asserts does not represent universality, but rather a usurpation of it under the pretext of serving the general interests of the community. (For a discussion of general and particular interests in Marx, see Elster 1985, 482-86.)

We can trace a decisive shift in Marx's position in the *Introduction* from that of in the *Critique* where he regards the whole of civil society as the class of citizens able to become

universal in the democratic state. He arrives at this conclusion in refuting Hegel's assumptions regarding the class of civil servants. He shows that Hegel's identity of the bureaucracy with universality is unrealistic: 'Hegel starts from an unreal antithesis and therefore achieves only an imaginary identity which is in truth again a contradictory identity. The bureaucracy is just such an identity' (CW3, 48). The civil society and state being distinctly separate, the civil and political positions of the individual are also separate and distinct. What is his option, then? Marx replies: 'Hence, in order to behave as an *actual citizen of the state*, and to attain political significance and effectiveness, he must step out of his civil reality, disregard it, and withdraw from his whole organisation into his individuality ... the citizen must discard his estate, civil society, the *civil estate* ... for it is this *estate* which stands between the *individual* and the *political state*' (CW3, 77, 78). The claim for the civil service as the universal class being untenable, Marx in the *Critique* identifies the democratic state with universality due to universalization of franchise in it: 'Civil society has *really* raised itself to abstraction from itself, to *political* being as its true, general, essential mode of being only in *elections unlimited* both in respect of the franchise and the right to be elected' (CW3, 121). The democratisation of civil society eventually results in its ultimate dissolution, because the completion of this abstraction is at the same time the transcendence of this abstraction. In fact, Marx through the election as 'the *actual relation* of actual civil society to the *civil society* of the l*egislature*, to the r*epresentative element* (CW3, 121), envisaged 'that any future development was going to involve a recovery by man of the social dimension that had been lost ever since the French Revolution levelled all citizens in the political state and thus accentuated the individualism of bourgeois society' (McLellan 1972, 164).

But, in the *Introduction* this theoretical position is no longer upheld by Marx. However, he does retain the concept of universality which he attributes to the proletariat. There is emphasis on proletariat's revolutionary nature as a class which is not a class of civil society but a class which is destined to dissolve all classes. The universality of the proletariat cannot be a consequence of the universalization of civil society or the democratisation of the state. Both the state and civil society are viewed as the instruments of human alienation now. The alienation suffered by the proletariat cannot be explained by an account of alienation in terms of the division between state and civil society, between citizen and bourgeois (*Bürger*), because the

proletariat stands outside this division. The social revolution can only be carried out by a class whose particular interests come to represent and epitomise the general interests of society as a whole.

The proletariat has a universal character, because of its universal suffering and alienation. 'Marx was now deeply convinced,' writes Tucker, 'that alienation was no mere figment of Hegel's philosophical imagination, but a massive fact of real life throughout modern society. There were, in particular, masses of alienated men in every centre of industry where wretched proletarians slaved themselves on the altar of the worldly god. The visible signs of their unrest, of the proletariat's incipient rebellion against its conditions, were merely the surface symptoms of dehumanised man's revolt against his dehumanisation' (Tucker 1972, 118). This state of alienation could be overcome by overthrowing the social order which had made man alienated human being. In this the proletariat accomplishes by the socialist revolution not merely the particular interests of its class but the universal spiritual needs of man to overcome his self-alienation. Marx posits the proletariat with universality because proletariat is, as cited earlier, 'a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no *particular right* because no *particular wrong* but *wrong generally* is perpetrated against it' (CW3, 186). The true emancipation from oppression means when both the oppressed and the oppressors, both victims of the systemic role in different ways, are liberated. This can be brought about by a class which can liberate itself through liberating all the classes of society. The dissolution of an alienated society is the secret and historic mission of this class.

It is important to bear in mind that for Marx the universality of the proletariat does not involve any *a priori* absoluteness as such. Avineri elucidates it concisely: 'If Hegel's "universal class" hypostatizes a given historical phenomenon into a self-fulfilling trans-historical norm, Marx uses it differently. For Marx the term will always be open to the dialectical dynamics of the historical process. He does not invest any one class with the attributes of universality: for him every generation, every historical situation gives rise to a class which aspires to be the subject of society's general consciousness. Historical developments actually allow this class for a time to represent the *res publica*, society at large, but after a while, with changes in the distribution of

social forces and in general conditions, this claim for universality no longer accords with the interests of society as a whole' (Avineri 1970, 57-58).

Marx formulates his views on the 'universality of a class' in its historical setting for the first time in the *Introduction*: 'No class of civil society can play this role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm in itself and in the masses, a moment in which it fraternises and merges with society in general, becomes confused with it and is perceived and acknowledged as its *general representative*; a moment in which its demands and rights are truly the rights and demands of society itself; a moment in which it is truly the social head and the social heart. Only in the name of the general rights of society can a particular class lay claim to general domination. For the storming of this emancipatory position, and hence for the political exploitation of all spheres of society in the interests of its own sphere, revolutionary energy and intellectual self-confidence are not sufficient.... No more has any estate the breadth of soul that identifies itself, even for a moment, with the soul of the nation, the genius that inspires material force to political violence, or that revolutionary audacity which flings at the adversary the defiant words: *I am nothing and I should be everything*' (CW3, 184-85, 185). In *The German Ideology* also Marx and Engels explain further: 'For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aims, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality. The class making a revolution comes forward from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a *class*, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society, as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class' (Marx & Engels 1976, 68-69).

The dichotomy between the general and the particular appears in its acute form, according to Marx, with the emergence of the proletariat. The tension between the two 'can be overcome only by the simultaneous abolition of the proletariat as a separate class and the disappearance of class differences in general. Marx does not postulate the abolition of class antagonisms because any economic mechanism points in that direction. No economic analysis precedes his dictum about the abolition of classes; they will be abolished (*aufgehoben*) because historical development has brought the tension between the general and the particular to a point of no return' (Avineri 1970, 59).

In the *Introduction* Marx is still under the influence of Feuerbachian anthropologism. For Marx the task of the socialist revolution primarily is to put an end to alienation and to implement humanism. The task of the emancipation of Germany is seen to proceed from the standpoint of the theory which proclaims man to be the highest being for man. For instance, in a letter to Feuerbach from Paris on August 11, commenting on Feuerbach's important philosophical works, he writes: 'In these writings you have provided -- I don't know whether intentionally -- a philosophical basis for socialism and the Communists have immediately understood them in this way. The unity of man with man, which is based on the real differences between men, the concept of the human species brought down from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this but the concept of *society*' (CW3, 354)! For Feuerbach, the humanistic tasks are in abstract form. In the *Introduction*, Marx advocates the revolutionary path which the proletariat, both as subject and the protagonist of imminent revolution in Germany is to take in fulfilling the humanistic tasks. Even though Marx has not yet worked out the materialist conception of history, he clearly has a developed political theory -- theory of proletarian revolution and the historic role of the proletariat.

The location for the proletarian revolution, according to Marx, is destined to be Germany. The reason for this belief is that Germany presents 'a concentration of all the contradictions of the modern world together with those of feudalism. To abolish a particular form of oppression in Germany will mean the abolition of all oppression and the general emancipation of mankind' (Kolakowski 1981, 130) from alienation and human degradation. 'It is not the *radical* revolution, not the *general human* emancipation which is a utopian dream for Germany, but rather the partial, a *merely* political revolution which leaves the pillars of the house standing' (CW3, 184), and that 'in Germany universal emancipation is the *conditio sine qua non* of any partial emancipation' (CW3, 186). According to Marx, the emancipation of Germany is only possible from its existing Middle Ages in the political sphere when emancipation is achieved 'from the *partial* victories over the Middle Ages as well' (CW3, 187).

The proletariat in Germany which Marx describes, is 'as a result of the rising industrial development' (CW3, 186). The overall impact of industrial development on the 'modern politico-social reality' is briefly mentioned (see CW3, 179). The growing poverty in the proletariat is not

attributable to the growth in its numbers. The economic mechanism of the modern industrial society reveals its all-embracing alienative impact. Due to this, the proletarized producer is himself a product of alienating economic process. Marx does not characterise the proletariat's poverty as natural to it but rather artificially produced: 'For it is not the *naturally arising* poor but the *artificially impoverished*, not the human masses mechanically oppressed by the gravity of society but the masses resulting from the *drastic dissolution* of society, mainly of the middle estate, that form the proletariat, although it is obvious that gradually the naturally arising poor and the Christian-Germanic serfs also join its ranks' (CW3, 186-87). The need for human emancipation is determined by the development of material requirements, because 'revolutions require a *passive* element, a *material* basis', and if theory can be realised in the people then it can only do so 'insofar as it is the realisation of the needs of the people' (CW3, 183). This forms the nucleus of the class which will effect the socialist revolution and put an end to human alienation. Marx emphatically adheres to his humanist approach in the coming socialist revolution that proceeds from the standpoint of the theory which proclaims man to be the highest being for man.

The great originality shown by Marx in his articles in the *German-French Yearbooks* is of enormous importance. Marx has clearly come to see that supersession of alienation cannot be sought in partial politics alone because politics in itself is a partial aspect of the social reality. But the articles show certain limitations as well. Meszaros writes: 'The opposition between "partiality" and "universality" is grasped in its rather abstract generality and only one of its aspects is concretised, negatively, in Marx's rejection of "*political* partiality" as a possible candidate for bringing about the supersession of alienation. Its positive counterpart remains unspecified as a general *postulate of "universality*" and thus assumes the character of a "Sollen" [ought]' (Meszaros 1970, 75).

Marx at this juncture does not explore the fundamental sphere of economics, and his references to political economy are general and unspecific, despite his intuitive insight that 'the relation of the industry, of the world of wealth in general, to the political world is a major problem of modern times' (CW3, 179). Marx's unrealistic assessment of the contradictions of capitalism is evident here when he says: 'Whereas the problem in France and England is: *Political economy* or the *rule of society over wealth*, in Germany it is: *National economy* or the

mastery of the private property over nationality. In France and England, then, it is a case of abolishing monopoly that has proceeded to its last consequences; in Germany it is a case of proceeding to the last consequences of monopoly' (CW3, 179). However, within a few months, Marx in his *EPM* makes a definite theoretical advance on his previous position, by 'radically superseding the "political partiality" of his own orientation and the limitations of a conceptual framework that characterised his development in its phase of "revolutionary democratism" ' (Meszaros 1970, 75-76).

From our discussion it clearly emerges that Marx's advance from revolutionary democracy to communism and his ideas on proletariat and the proletarian revolution as he presents these in the *Introduction* are not merely an elaboration on his previously held views. His ideas can be seen as gaining new ground and that this theoretical development of Marx does not happen due to any 'epistemological break' ushering in new problematic as maintained by Louis Althusser (see Althusser 1976, 151-61). His idea of proletarian revolution in the *Introduction*, for instance, is formulated in general terms which undergoes substantial modification in form and content in his later writings. But the basic principles he formulated about the socialist revolution and the leading role of the proletariat as the social catalyst in creating the new world, free from alienation remain the corner-stone of his social philosophy throughout his life. Regarding this period in Marx's intellectual development, Boris Nicolaievsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen rightly observe: 'Philosophy had emerged into economics. At the end of the road taken by political radicalism in its criticism of the irrational Prussian state lay communism, the abolition of private property, the proletarian revolution' (1976, 75). The hitherto philosophical conception of alienation is given a thorough socio-economic content in the *EPM*.

CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC ALIENATION

5.1. Introduction: Marx's encounter with political economy

The importance of the *EPM* was briefly mentioned before. In this chapter I discuss the central theme of Marx's critique of political economy and the elaboration of his theory of alienation in the *EPM*. Frederick Engels's article 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy' (1843), which was published in the *German-French Yearbooks*, drew Marx's attention to the study of political economy. This article was highly praised by Marx, calling it later in 1859 in his 'Preface to The Critique of Political Economy' as the 'brilliant sketch on the criticism of the economic categories' (SW1, 364). Marx took notes from it. Maximilien Rubel explains the main purpose of Marx's studies of political economy: 'Reading Engels's *Outlines* had made him see that it was not enough to criticise Hegel's political philosophy in order to work out, with mere negation of the state as one's point of departure, that radical theory of society which might "grip" the working-masses and make them aware of the need for a social revolution that would put an end to their alienation.... It was therefore with the well-defined purpose of finding an answer to these questions that Marx set himself to study the "anatomy of bourgeois society" as this was to be found in the writings of the great economists' (cited in Mandel 1971, 27). In addition to German philosophers and socialist writers Marx concentrated intensively at the end of 1843 and during the early part of 1844 on the study of the classics of political economy. He made copious reading notes from de Boisguillbert, Eugene Buret, Lord Lauderdale, John Law, Friedrich List, MacCulloch, James Mill, Oslander, Ricardo, Say, Schulz, Skarbek and Adam Smith.

The first result of his studies were the *EPM*. 'In them, Marx sought to show the dialectical break within economic life itself, the inescapable contradictions which made its continuance or free development within the same "form" impossible. He sought to do so by submitting the entire structure of contemporary political economy, its categories and its fundamental laws, to the most

searching philosophical criticism' (Kamenka 1972, 70). It involved the development of a new approach in the analysis of the skeletal structure of the bourgeois-capitalist world. It was decidedly more than just a mere change of emphasis from 'bourgeois society' in Hegel's sense to the 'system of needs'. While depicting the material relations of production as the skeletal structure of the present society, this approach, suggests Karl Löwith, 'also includes the much broader and more questionable thesis of the fundamental importance of the material conditions of life as the determinant of all other aspects which eventually crystallises in the vulgar Marxist thesis of the so-called "real base" as the foundation on which there arises a superstructure that is to be interpreted as purely ideological' (Löwith 1982, 68). Obviously, Karl Löwith's remarks in this regard are directed against the dogmatic economic historical materialism in the history of the development of Marxism. (For an overview of this theme, see Anderson 1976, 1-23, see also Lukacs 1982b, 24-25 for the suppression of the legacies of Marx and Lenin under Stalin.)

The *EPM* are more than an economic study. Marx analyses the capitalist economy and arrives at philosophical conclusions which relate to the role of labour and of material production in the development of the individual and society as a whole. Karl Korsch contrasts Marx's present position against the views he had held earlier: 'A radical critique of bourgeois society can no longer start from "any" form of theoretical or practical consciousness whatever, as Marx thought as late as 1843. It must start from the particular forms of consciousness which have found their scientific expression in the political economy of the bourgeois society. Consequently the critique of political economy is theoretically and practically the first priority. Yet even this deeper and more radical version of Marx's revolutionary critique of society never ceases to be a critique of the *whole* of bourgeois society and so *all* of its forms of consciousness' (Korsch 1970, 74-75).

Much has been written about the place of the *EPM* in Marx, and the reinterpretation of Marxism since their publication in 1932. The young and old Marx controversy is due to the *EPM*. In the never-ending polemics between the young and mature Marx's respective disputants, Karl Löwith's remarks are germane when he says that the 'vital impulse' in the result of economic critique is the critique of self-alienation in Marx's early writings. He writes: '[It] does not imply that the young Marx can be completely separated from the mature Marx, and the latter handed

over to the "Marxists" while the former is assigned to the bourgeois philosophy. On the contrary, Marx's early writings are and remain fundamental even to *Capital*, and if the first chapter of Volume I of *Capital* is a "result", the vital impulse that produced it can still be found in a discussion in the *Rheinische Zeitung* of l842' (Löwith 1982, 69).

In his economic ideas, Marx's concern continues to be the social questions, especially the question of human freedom. In the *EPM* Marx identifies alienation as a radical loss of freedom in capitalism, because it negates the basic postulates of genuine human productivity. The basic theme and 'the original form of Marx's critical analysis of the capitalist process of production is a critique of the bourgeois world as a whole in terms of its human self-alienation. This bourgeois-capitalist world represents for Marx, as a Hegelian, "ir-rational" reality, a human world which is inhuman, a perverted human world' (ibid., 69).

The importance of the *EPM* can be assessed for a number of reasons. These are regarded by some as a rough draft of Karl Marx's first investigation of political economy and its theoretical presuppositions whose final version is *Capital*. Kolakowski says: 'It would, of course, be quite wrong to imagine that the Paris Manuscripts contain the entire gist of *Capital*; yet they are in effect the first draft of the book that Marx went on writing all his life, and of which *Capital* is the final version. There are, moreover, sound reasons for maintaining that the final version is a development of its predecessor and not a departure from it. The Manuscripts, it is true, do not mention the theory of value and surplus value, which is regarded as the corner-stone of "mature" Marxism. But the specifically Marxist theory of value, with the distinction between abstract and concrete labour and the recognition of the labour force as a commodity, is nothing but the definitive version of the theory of alienated labour' (Kolakowski 1981, 132-33).

The preface to the *EPM* reveals the plans of an ambitious project covering a broad critique of capitalist society. Marx intended to 'publish the criticism of law, ethics, politics, etc., in a series of distinct, independent pamphlets, and afterwards try in a special work to present them again as a connected whole showing the interrelationship of the separate parts, and lastly attempt a critique of the speculative elaboration of that material' (EPM, 17). As we know, Marx never got beyond one aspect of his plan, the critique of political economy for the rest of his life.

To have accomplished all his intended work, as meticulously as he was wont to, he needed a Noah's life.

The *EPM* show that Marx first approached the economic problems as a philosopher steeped in Feuerbach and Hegel. Ernest Mandel is correct in his remarks that Marx while broadly accepting Feuerbach's materialist criticism of Hegel, started 'to criticise Feuerbach on the basis of Hegel, because Hegel's contribution added a historico-social dimension to anthropology that was lacking in Feuerbach. Thus the *EPM* presents us with a fascinating "encounter" between philosophy and political economy, a source both of a new awareness and of a contradiction for Marx, and a source of problems and disputes for those who study his work today' (Mandel 1971, 154). Marx gives to the philosophical concept of alienation a complete socio-economic content. Marx had taken from Feuerbach the concept of alienated and dehumanised man. But Marx had already in the *Introduction* begun to identify the problem of alienation in its political connections, and held it to be the glory of the French Revolution that it had raised man to the level of a free man. 'In doing this, however, we find ourselves gliding into a quite new context,' writes Paul Kaegi, 'one in which the problems are political, or at least social. Alienated man is suddenly no longer the individual attached to a religious or speculative dream world but the member of an imperfect society who is lacking in all his human dignity. Man in a dehumanised world has now become man in a dehumanised society' (Kaegi 1965, 194-95, cited in Mandel 1971, 29). This dehumanised society becomes the primary focus of attention for Marx in the *EPM*. He arrives at the conclusion that this society in which man is dehumanised is due to the fact that labour in this society is alienated labour. The focal point in which labour is held both by Hegel and the economists and Marx's synthesising their respective views is aptly described by Mandel: 'Marx found it all the easier to reduce society and social man to labour because Hegel had already described labour as the essential core of human praxis. When he then studies the classical economists, Marx found that they made labour the ultimate source of value. The synthesis occurred in a flash, the two ideas were combined, and we have the impression of really being present at this discovery when we examine Marx's reading notes' (Mandel 1971, 29).

The *EPM* are mainly an economic study, but they also contain a fundamental critique of Hegel's *Phenomenology.* Marx's analysis of political economy, the role of labour, the problem of

alienated labour are connected with matters of general philosophical import. Avineri also highlights this point: 'Marx formed his ideas on alienation through confrontation with Hegel's views on *Entfremdung* in the *Phenomenology*. Marx's discussion is thus related to issues of general philosophical significance, and the more limited idea of alienated labour is meaningful only within this wider context. Marx's critique of the way in which Hegel handled the question of alienation restates Marx's general critique of philosophical idealism, and the Marxian version of materialism emerges from this discussion of alienation. Marx's views on alienation and his materialism are thus inseparable' (Avineri 1970, 96). Marcuse characterises the *EPM* as 'a philosophical critique and foundation for political economy in the sense of a theory of a revolution'. Marx's critique of political economy is philosophical in that its fundamental categories 'develop out of a critical confrontation with the categories of Hegelian philosophy (i.e. labour, objectification, alienation, sublation, property' (Marcuse 1973, 3, 4).

Marx's principal aim in the study of political economy was not directed towards finding the mechanisms regulating supply or demand, the determining of prices or the allocation of resources, but 'to analyse how the working activity of people is regulated in a capitalist economy. The subject of the analysis is a determined social structure, a particular culture, namely commodity-capitalism, a social form of economy in which the relations among people are not regulated directly, but through things' (Perlman 1972, 'Introduction' xi). The Russian economist Professor Issak Illich Rubin (who fell a victim to the Stalinist purges) explains that all the basic concepts of political economy (value, money, capital, profit, rent, wages, etc.) have a material character: 'Marx showed that under each of them is hidden a definite social production relation which in the commodity economy is realised only through things and gives things a determined, objectively-social character, a "determination of form" (more precisely: a social form), as Marx often put it.' Consequently, 'the specific character of economic theory as a science which deals with the commodity capitalist economy lies precisely in the fact that it deals with production relations which acquire material forms' (Rubin 1972, 45, 47). But it should be kept in mind that the pivotal point in Marx's analysis of political economy's key concepts is *man*. 'His whole *tour de force* in the *Paris Manuscripts*,' as Kamenka says, 'is to proclaim that political economy cannot be an ethically neutral study of so-called "objective" relations between non-human beings

or laws.... The fundamental categories of political economy, Marx insists, are not labour, capital, profits, rents, land. The fundamental category is man, man and his human activities. These activities cannot be abstracted from man; they must be seen as integral expressions of his humanity' (Kamenka 1972, 71). This concern with man and his creative activity is not merely the prime concern of Marx in his early works but it remains central to Marx in all his theoretical and historical works throughout his life. In section 5.2. I examine Marx's view on human nature as developed in the *EPM*.

5.2. The concept of human nature in the EPM

The whole argument of economic alienation and its supersession in the *EPM* is conceptualised within the framework of a general theory of man as a species being (*Gattungswesen*). Alienation here is 'presented as a form of unfreedom that can only befall those who possess consciousness. No animal is liable to alienation -- because no animal is capable of rationally choosing its mode of existence. The theory of alienation, in short, is rooted in humanist assumptions regarding the potential freedom and constitutive role of human beings in the creation and control of social processes' (Soper 1986, 37-38). Marx's concept of man as a teleological being capable of actualising his distinctly human potentialities through his activity forms the core of his world-view. The Marxian approach to man is presented well by Kamenka: 'The presupposition and the true *end* of ethics, of philosophy, of all human activities, is the free human being. Man is potentially the only subject in a world of objects, and anything that turns him into an object, subordinates him to powers outside himself, is inhuman. To Marx, as to so many other eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European radicals, there was something especially monstrous about an alleged type of self-abasement, about the situation in which man fell slave to things or institutions that he had himself created, to human forces severed from humanity, the situation in which man humiliated himself before an idol of his own making' (Kamenka 1970, 11-12).

Marx's critique of the account of human nature given by the political economists, therefore, is a necessary follow-up of his concept of man. According to Marx, political economy

starts with the visible appearance, the actual movement of property is expressed in general, abstract formulas which it later takes for laws. But it does not explain how they arise from the very nature of private property, thus it in fact only takes for granted what it is supposed to explain (EPM 62; hereafter the references from EPM are indicated by the page number only).

In the *EPM* Marx for the first time laid out his premises regarding man which formed the basis of his emerging critical social and economic theory. 'Moving from man in general to man as modified in particular historical periods, he developed detailed socio-scientific concepts and theories which allowed him to engage in very specific explanations and predictions. Yet it is only Marx's grasp of the special characteristics of man in general that allow him to avoid the problem of relativism that are raised by his studies of specific historical formations' (Walton and Gamble 1979, 1). It is quite true, as Iring Fetscher says that Marx was mainly concerned with the conditions and possibilities for the transformation of capitalist society, and not with anthropology or the philosophy of man: 'Nevertheless, both in his earlier writings (before 1848) and in his mature works (such as *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomi*, 1857-58, and *Capital*, 1867), he time and again indicated that his was a specific concept of man, distinct from that of his "teachers" Hegel and Feuerbach although containing elements of both.... His "critique of political economy" developed his theory of systematic structure of the capitalistic mode of production, but the underlying concept of man remained essentially the same' (Fetscher 1973, 443).

In fact, we can see in Marx's concept of man an attempt to integrate the radical humanism of Fichte and Hegel and the naturalism of Feuerbach. Fichte and Hegel had taken the right standpoint by making man the centre of universe and history as a process of man's self-creation. What Marx found objectionable in this was the identification of man with his consciousness and the movement of history in terms of its independent dialectical movement. Consciousness, according to Marx, is a quality of human nature and not the other way round. The human history was not the work of the absolute spirit but of the actual, sensuous human being.

In comparison with the 'idealistic' and 'speculative' views of Fichte and Hegel regarding man and his history, Feuerbach's naturalism, according to Marx, avoided the idealist mistake and was more satisfactory. Feuerbach emphasised man's essentially sensuous nature, recognised man

as a part of the natural world, and asserted the empirical basis of all human knowledge. But, as Marx says later in his *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845) that Feuerbach starting from the fact of religious self-alienation (which duplicates the world into an imaginary and a real one), 'resolves the religious essence into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations' (*Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach*, (CW5, 4). The contemplative materialism, 'that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society' (*Ninth Thesis on Feuerbach*, CW5, 5). This contemplative and static view of man and nature in Feuerbach is aptly described by Bhiku Parekh: 'Feuerbach's naturalism was static and unhistorical, and did not recognise that both nature and man were constantly evolving. It took a passive and "contemplative" view of man and did not stress man's power to create both himself and nature. A view of man was therefore needed, Marx seems to have thought, that satisfied two conditions. First, it must combine the valid humanistic insights of Fichte and Hegel and the naturalistic and empirical orientation of Feuerbach. Secondly, it must combine them not mechanically but dialectically ... What Marx meant was that it must be a view of man in which humanism and naturalism interpenetrate, so that it is not merely humanistic *and* naturalistic but humanistic in its naturalism and naturalistic in its humanism' (Parekh 1975, 38).

In view of this task, Marx discusses his concept of man in the *EPM* within the broader context of alienation. Alienation comes to represent the phenomenon alienating man's activity, depriving and disappropriating him of his essential being. For Marx, labour is the source of human historical life, man's self-genesis but labour through its material production, its objectification, is not the realisation of man but rather the loss of that realisation. The development of the means of production and the productivity of labour, observes Shinkoruk, led to accumulation of material goods and resources in human society throughout history as social wealth grew as a means of man's social development: 'But this process was realised through alienation of material goods from the direct producers through the exploitation of man by man in conditions of private property and class antagonism. With the rise and consolidation of private property, the human mode of life activity, i.e. labour, took on an inhuman form for the majority of mankind, and became an alienated form of activity.... In labour, as it has figured in working

people's life activity for thousand of years, the human individual has not, in many cases, affirmed his human essence, the essence of a creator, but on the contrary had alienated it' (Shinkoruk 1988, 154). This process of alienation sees the abject degradation of human being in the capitalist society which reduces him into a commodity himself while imposing the product of his labour as an external, alien power over him. In this situation, the conditions of man's existence clearly separate him from his essential function of self-creativity.

In his *Human Nature: the Marxian View*, Vernon Venable writes: 'Marx and Engels were reluctant, on the whole, to do much talking about "man". They were happier speaking of "men". Man, human nature in general, was too little of anything in particular to satisfy their predilection for the actual, the concrete, the living, the real' (Venable 1966, 3). There is no mention, however, of the *EPM* in Venable's otherwise outstanding book completed in 1944, even though the *EPM*, with an unmistakable imprint of Feuerbach's anthropological view of man, were available to him in the *Gesamtausgabe.*

In the *EPM* man's present existence is described as a violation of man as a species-being. Marx uses criteria which seem to be normative. (For the ethical dimension of Marx's thought, see Stojanovic 1973, 137-55; Kamenka 1970b and 1972). But as the Norwegian writer Lars Roar Langslet suggests, Marx's view of man can be divided in two aspects: the descriptive or empirical, which describes the distinctive character of man as it manifests itself in all phases of the history; and the normative or utopian aspect which describes 'the total man' who will emerge in the coming society. But these two aspects cannot be clearly set apart from each other as the 'total man' is equivalent to the total realisation of the potentialities found in the 'empirical' man (see Langslet 1963, 110). It is, however, essential to keep in mind that man's history is not only the history of the transformation of nature by his creative activity; it also is the history of his self-creation. In the words of Gajo Petrovic, if man 'does not want to cease being man, he can never interrupt the process of self-creation. This means that man can never be completely finished, that he is not man when he lives only in the present and in the contemplation of the past, but only in so far as he in the present realises his future. Man is man if he realises his historically created human possibilities' (in Bottomore 1981, 27). Therefore, it is for this reason that 'Marx's turn to praxis follows from this in the sense that his conception of man cannot remain a mere

conception, but is also a criticism of alienated man who does not realise his human possibilities and a humanistic programme of struggle for humanness. Marx's conception of man can thus not be separated from his humanistic theory of alienation and de-alienation' (ibid., 28).

Marx's basic proposition regarding man is that man is a part of nature. It is only the viewing of man in this specific perspective that we can analyse Marx's characterisation of man in his general and specific human attributes, i.e. man as a natural being and man as a human natural being. This makes it easy for us to appreciate Marx's perceptive discussion of the alienation of human powers. This means that we have no other measure to decide what is human and what is alienated human activity than having man as being the measure of himself. In 5.2.1. and 5.2.2. I examine Marx's views in the *EPM* on man as a natural being and as a species being.

5.2.1. Man as a natural being

Man, according to Marx, is 'directly a *natural being*'. In his capacity as a natural being and a living natural being, he has 'natural powers, vital powers' which make him distinctly as an '*active* natural being' (135). Marx's description will be easy to understand if we keep in mind his classification of natural beings in three classes. First, there are the inanimate natural beings, which have neither life nor consciousness. Second, there are the living natural beings without consciousness, like plants, etc. Third, there are natural beings having both life and consciousness; animals and humans comprise this class. But 'Marx's use of the term "natural being" is not consistent. Sometimes he refers to all three kinds of being as natural beings; sometimes he confines the term to the last two. Sometimes again, he call the last two "living natural beings" and by implication the first, non-living natural beings' (Parekh 1975, 40).

In the characterisation of a natural being, Marx uses two key terms 'power' (*Kraft*) and 'need' (*Bedürfnis*). In the case of man, as a biological, natural being, these terms can be used primarily in Marx's conception of human nature in general. However, the needs and powers of men at any particular stage in history primarily reflect the prevalent mode of production in the social and economic spheres. It is due to this fact that there is no immutable human nature for Marx. We can distinguish man's natural powers and wants from his species powers and wants. Man shares the former ones with other living beings but the latter are exclusively possessed by

man. The species powers or potentialities that human beings possess are unique to the human species. 'Different forms of society facilitate the actualisation of these potentialities in varying degrees. Those human potentialities whose fullest actualisation Marx thought most desirable were those that he considered unique to the human beings' (Conway 1987, 30). Only the species-powers make man distinctly human as compared with the rest of the animal world. Bertell Ollman emphasises the importance of the distinction between these powers: 'This distinction between natural and species man is the generally unrecognised foundation on which Marx erects his entire conception of human nature' (Ollman 1971, 76).

What does Marx mean by 'natural powers'? He obviously does not draw up a list of these powers, but he gives a general indication of these. What he calls 'natural power' in one place is also called an 'animal function' or 'physical need' in other places. Even though these terms, as Ollman explains, are not exact equivalents, they are closely related: ‘Animal functions are the processes that living creatures undergo and the actions they undertake in order to stay alive, while physical needs are the desires they feel for the objects and actions required to keep them alive and functioning. With certain qualifications ... we could say that natural powers are similar to animal functions and the relation between both of them and physical needs is similar to the relation between power and need’ (ibid., 79).

According to Marx, man as a living natural being is endowed with natural powers, vital powers, which make him an active natural being: 'These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities -- as *instincts* (*Triebe*). On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a *suffering*, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the *objects* of his instincts exist outside of him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are *objects* that he *needs* -- essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers' (135). What Marx means is that man as a natural, sensuous being expresses himself through his activity, his labour. It is 'through labour that man reproduces the world of nature such that it appears as his work and his reality. Man realises his essence in nature and nature realises its essence in man. Both occur through the objectification of labour' (Kain 1983, 268). It amounts to say that 'consistent naturalism or humanism' as being 'distinct from both idealism and materialism', in reality constitutes 'the unifying truth of both' (135). This can be

described as Marx's conception of his 'positive humanism'. Kate Soper explains it succinctly: 'According to this "humanism", human beings are *natural beings* -- actively or "subjectively" natural in so far as they possess vital forces or powers, and "objectively" natural in so far, like plants or animals, they depend on a nature outside themselves for the expression of their essential powers. It is not, therefore, the *act of positing* their essential powers as is the subject of alienation ... the subjectivity of the process resides in these essential powers in their objective existence, in the objective production that is "man's" nature "outside of himself", his existence as an objective, natural being' (Soper 1986, 35).

In a literal sense, the term 'power' as used by Marx, can be substituted for other ordinary equivalents like 'faculty', 'ability', and capacity', etc. But in that case one misses the real meaning of Marx's use of the term. Power also means the potentiality and the possibility of becoming more, in changed circumstances, from what it already is: 'As elements in Marx's conception of reality, powers are related to their own future forms as well as to other entities in the present. As with everything else, Marx sees them in the process of change and, through a study of their organic law, knows in a general way what they are changing into. At each stage their progress can be charted by the evidence of the individual's skills and achievements. The standard from which judgements are made in Marx's conception of what constitutes proper fulfilment for these powers, which is that state when the ends he takes to be inherent in them have been attained' (Ollman 1971, 77). Marx in his explication of powers and needs, contends that every natural being endeavours to realise its powers. For Marx, 'powers' are not only the capacities but also the 'impulses', which are the inherent dynamism of a natural being. Every natural being aspires to realise its powers and it suffers when it is frustrated in its struggle.

The philosophical concept of need which Marx develops in the *EPM* and in *The German Ideology* (co-author Engels) lies at the root of most of the original contributions made by Marx in the realm of economic theories. Even though 'some of the problems are not taken up again in the later works, at least not in a systematic manner. Others are presented in his mature writings with various modified interpretations' (Heller 1976, 40). According to Marx's view, man endowed with natural powers and faculties has definite and identifiable needs. 'For Marx, "need" refers to the desire one feels for something, usually something which is not immediately available.... For

Marx, man not only has needs but he also feels them. They exist in him as felt drives, as wants. The link between objective state and the subjective recognition of it, which is fixed in Marx's use of "need", makes "drive" and "want" practically synonyms for "need" in Marxism' (Ollman 1971, 77-78; for more on this, see Heller 1976, chap. 1; Elster 1985, 68-74).

Man needs specific objects appropriate to his natural powers and drives. Historically speaking, for men to engage in any activity, the first conditions which had to be met to sustain their living were to meet their vital, human needs. To satisfy these, men created means of producing their material life, as self-creative beings, the makers of their own history. The process of satisfying needs by means of appropriate tools and instruments of production leads to the rise of new needs. The creation and satisfaction of one human need leads to the creation of another need and this process is endless. When man creates new tools to satisfy his needs, the need for new tools is itself a new human need, as well as the act of creating new needs. The term 'history' means the record of man's activity in actual life. Thus 'history is not only the story of the satisfaction of human needs but also the story of their emergence and development' (Avineri 1970, 79). Man's history is an incessant struggle of man with his material environment, a struggle which shapes and re-shapes his nature.

Man needs specific objects appropriate to his natural powers and needs. As Heller says: 'The orientation of needs towards objects also points to the *active* character of needs. Needs are simultaneously passions and capacities (the passion and capacity to appropriate the object) and thus *capacities are themselves needs*' (Heller 1976, 41-42). Due to the fact that 'the objects that satisfy his needs lie outside him, he is by his very nature an outgoing, active and striving being, driven by his impulses and needs to explore and manipulate the external world' (Parekh 1975, 43). Objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] is the process of making an object, through activity. Men can only actualise their powers and their ideas by 'realising through them a concrete object that embodies and expresses these powers and ideas. Only in this way is it possible for raw material to be constituted into an object satisfying specific needs. Because the object is an embodiment, realisation, and expression of powers and ideas and because it satisfies needs, mirrors, the human essence' (Kain 1983, 269). Specifically human senses come about in the process of objectification. Man's growing consciousness of his needs is not a 'mechanistic,

automatic response of the human consciousness to merely material stimuli. Man's consciousness of his needs is a product of his historical development and attests to the cultural values of preceding generations' (Avineri 1970, 79).

Since 'passion is the essential force of man energetically bent on its object [*Die Leidenschaft, die passion ist die nach seinem Gegenstand energisch strebende Wesenskraft des Menschen*], man therefore by nature is 'a passionate being' [*ein leidenschaftsliches Wesen*] because he suffers and feels that he does so (136). Being a striving being, he tries to obtain objects for his needs, running the risk of failure which brings him face to face with pain and remorse; he is a suffering being. 'To be *sensuous*, that is, to be really existing, means to be an object of sense, to be a *sensuous* object, and thus to have sensuous objects outside oneself -- objects of one's sensuousness. To be sensuous is to *suffer*' (136).

Marx says that the concept of an *objective being* necessarily implies *another being* which is the *object* of that objective being. This relationship is expressed as need, e.g. 'hunger is a natural *need*; it therefore needs a *nature* outside itself, an *object* outside itself, in order to satisfy itself, to be stilled' (135). However, reciprocally, the *object* has the objective being for *its object*. 'As soon as I have an object, this object has me for an object' (136). It amounts to say that the relation between an object and human objective being creates a bond of mutual dependence or subjection *per se*; thus the object of need and need itself are interconnected. Agnes Heller writes: 'The objects "bring about" the needs, and the needs bring about the objects. The need and its objects are "moments", "sides" of one and the same complex.... Naturally, the "object" of need is not restricted in its meaning [to] the objectivity of material things. The world in its totality is an objective world; every social relation, every social product is the objectivation [*Objektivation*] of man' (Heller 1976, 40). When seen in this light, objective relations are not restricted to the human realm only; they extend to non-human objects as well, which, obviously preclude consciousness. Marx explains this by the existing objective relation between the sun and the plant: 'The sun is the *object* of the plant -- an indispensable object to it, confirming its life -- just as the plant is an object of the sun, being an *expression* of the life-awakening power of the sun, of the sun's *objective* essential power' (135). The plant needs the sun for its growth and its realisation; thus the sun is the object of the plant. In return, the plant is also sun's object.

Marx emphasises that every sensuous or natural being has its nature outside itself. If it did not, it would not be a natural being; hence it would be only a non-being. Sensuousness is the relationship between a natural being and an object. To Marx, to be sensuous means to be conditioned by and to be dependent upon objects. Plants are also sensuous and sensuousness also includes activities like 'feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving', in short, almost any essential relation to an independent object (93). 'A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a *natural* being, and plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has no being for its *object*; i.e. it is not objectively related. Its being is not objective. A non-objective being is a *non-being*' ['Ein ungegenständliches Wesen ist ein *Unwesen*'] (135). It evidently means that only objective beings really exist; a non-objective being, that is not an object of sense, is a non-being (*Unwesen*), 'a product of mere thought (i.e. of mere imagination), an abstraction' (136). For instance, God, angels and other mysterious 'essences' are by definition non-natural beings, therefore they do not exist; these are merely the creatures of human fantasy. Allen Wood explains: 'Marx's foremost aim is to show that Hegel's favoured attitude toward external, sensible objects, the attitude which treats them as phenomenal manifestations of the knowing mind, is an alienated attitude, a symptom of an alienated mode of life.' To show the falsity of this view 'Marx must also attack the Hegelian idea that ultimate reality is an all-embracing divine mind or spirit, which recognises every finite object as the appearance of its own creative power and by this recognition cancels or supersedes the "externality" or "otherness" of its objects.... If Marx shows that everything which exists is an "objective being", that a "non-objective" being is a non-being", then he has shown that there is no such thing as Hegel's cosmic spirit' (Wood 1981, 165).

Secondly, as Meszaros explains that having one's nature outside itself, expresses the mode of existence of every natural being; it is by no means specific about man: 'Thus if someone wants to identify *externalisation* with *human alienation* (as Hegel did, for instance) he can only do this by confounding the whole with one specific part of it. Consequently "objectification" and "externalisation" are relevant to alienation only insofar as they take place in an *inhuman* form' (Meszaros 1970, 169).

The distinction between animals and man in the *EPM* is meant to show the human qualities of man which distinguish him from all other natural beings, above all the animals, which come closest to him. Marx's discussion of man by distinguishing man from animal, as Hegel and Feuerbach had done before, was to trace the differences and highlight the species character of man. (For more on this theme, see Elster 1985, 62-68; see also Fetscher 1973, 443-47; Oizerman 1988, 39-55).

According to Marx the essence of a being is discoverable by looking at its life activity. Drawing the distinction between the activity and production in man and animal, Marx writes: 'The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is *its life activity*. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity' (68). In the sphere of production man is a 'conscious species being', he produces intentionally. 'Admittedly, animals also produce.... But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the domination of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom' (68-69). However, these distinctive characteristics of man are peculiar to man in his capacity as 'a conscious species-being, i.e. as a being that treats the species as its own essential being, or that he treats itself as a species-being' (68). But as a natural being, who has not reached the human level yet, he is like an animal, whose labour is his species-character; he is not a self-aware natural being. As a natural being, man is like an animal 'one with its life activity' (68). He produces only to secure his immediate physical needs. Without self-consciousness and intellectual abilities, he forms objects without any standard of beauty. Man's labour in this context is a constrained and restrictive activity; it is mere energy used to satisfy human needs, having very little in common with human productive activity. Only the human beings in pursuing their 'genuinely human functions' (66) are capable of creative work in accordance with the laws of beauty.

5.2.2. Man as a species being

In 5.2.1. I have presented a general outline of Marx's concept of man as a natural being. But, according to Marx, man is not merely a natural being: he at the same time is a *human* natural being. This means that basically man has the ability to live with and for himself, made possible by the fact of his social life. In 5.2.2. we will look closely at Marx's notion of man as a species being.

Marx expresses his idea of man by speaking of man as a species-being who has unique and distinctly human qualities. In Marx's words, man 'is a being for himself [*für sich selbst seiendes Wesen*]. Therefore he is a *species being* (*Gattungswesen*), and has to confirm and manifest himself as such both in his being and in his knowing' (136). According to Marx the essence of a living natural being is ascertainable by looking at its life activity, the way it lives: 'The whole character of a species -- its species character -- is contained in the character of its life activity' (68). The distinctive character of human being is therefore found in his productive activity. 'It is in his work,' writes Marx, 'upon the objective world, therefore that man really proves himself to be a *species-being*. This production is his active species-life. Through this production nature appears as *his* work and reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the *objectification of man's species-life*; for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created' (69). Man self-conscious of himself as an individual, conscious of others manifests himself through his activity and his goal-setting. According to Marx, man in his nature and his activity is social. Man's consciousness itself is a social product and it remains so as long as men will continue to exist. The notion that man is social by nature, and that man can live a human life only by realising his social nature is of cardinal importance in understanding Marx. As man is social by nature, he can develop his true nature only in society.

Marx uses the term *Gattungswesen* in the *EPM* to describe human nature in the broader context of alienation. The term has been translated as 'species-being' or 'species essence'. The place of the concept of species-being in Marx is one of extreme complexity. There is also a considerable divergence of opinion among various writers about the place of the concept in Marx's thought as a whole. In this connection, we can examine two opinions. Bertell Ollman regards the distinction between natural powers, which I have cited before, to be 'the generally unrecognised foundation on which Marx erects his entire conception of human nature' (Ollman 1971, 76). Richard J. Bernstein while accepting the central place of the concept of species-being in Marx's early thought, suggests that Marx rejected it in his later works. He writes: 'Marx's early use of the concept of "species-being" and his subsequent criticism of this concept is a typical

instance of his own progressive dialectical development in which he negates, affirms and passes beyond an early stage in his thinking. Marx relies heavily on this concept in his writings during the early 1840s. Species being is man's true or ideal nature and it becomes fully manifest only when human alienation is overcome. Already in 1845, in his sixth thesis of Feuerbach, Marx is critical of this concept.... Marx is not only criticising Feuerbach, he is also criticising himself' (Bernstein 1972, 66).

The term itself is derived from Hegel, and the concept of man as a species-being, as described in chapter 2, was developed by Feuerbach. However, it needs to be added that Marx's use of the term 'species-being' is comprehensible only after having grasped the meanings of the notion 'species' in Feuerbach. In fact, the term 'species-being' was the current philosophical phraseology of the age. Adam Schaff views this phraseology as one of the notable influences in the study of Marx's thought in these words: 'This is particularly true of the "phraseology" (as Marx called it) that he took from the current philosophical vocabulary -- not necessarily lock, stock, and barrel but at any rate with much of its semantic paraphernalia: without appreciating these liabilities, much, and sometimes all, of the sense of the problem is lost. To Feuerbach -- as to Marx after him -- the question of human essence was inseparable from man's relationship with other men, his membership of the species *Homo sapiens* -- and consequently inseparable from the fact that man is, as the jargon of the time put it, a species being' (Schaff 1970, 79). Feuerbach, as mentioned before, saw the essential characteristic of man in the unity of man with other man, in the I-Thou relationship in the sphere of love and friendship. This was to emphasise the social aspect of man, despite the formal limitations of the doctrine and its linguistic peculiarity.

In addition, we can say that for Feuerbach, 'species-being' is man's true or ideal nature, which man has as an essential characteristic, and also the intrinsic potential, once he finds his way out of the labyrinth of alienation into which religion has thrown him. From this we can surmise that the very concept of alienation presupposes a vision or ideal of man and that is what he can become when he is able to develop and actualise his potentialities freely and creatively. Feuerbach employs the term to designate a consciousness peculiar only to man, whereby man is also cognisant of being a member of the same species. In fact these views, which Feuerbach articulates, are based upon the commonly held belief in the eighteenth century that self-consciousness is man's distinctive characteristic. The term used by Feuerbach can be shown to have the double meaning of essential characteristic as well as the basic potentiality. In the *EPM* Marx 'apparently adopts both meanings of the Feuerbachian term in uncritical fashion' (Rockmore 1980, 37).

The question whether Marx abandons the use of the concept in his later writings can best be explained by disentangling the term 'species-being' from the concept. How far can we accept that the *Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach* provides us sufficient evidence to conclude that Marx comes to reject the concept of human nature in his later thought? As a first step in our attempt to clarify the concept, we should look at the full text of the *Sixth Thesis* which reads: 'Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of *man* (*das menschliche Wesen*). But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is hence obliged:

1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment by itself, and to presuppose an abstract -- *isolated* -- human individual.

2. Essence, therefore, can be regarded only as "species", as an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals *in a natural way*' (CW5, 4). The German expression Marx uses to describe what has been translated as 'the essence of man' or 'human nature' is '*das menschliche Wesen*'.

Marx criticises Feuerbach for failing to grasp that the essence of man in the concrete historical terms of man's 'sensuous practice', and that his use of 'species existence' is only as an abstract term. Wartofsky argues that this criticism is correct in the sense that Feuerbach did not grasp the historical praxis in the politico-historical terms of Marx's conception of praxis: 'Nonetheless, it is clear that Feuerbach did think of "species existence" in terms of a historical process, at the level of the historical phenomenology of human consciousness. That is to say, he dealt in detail with the modes of reflection *in consciousness* of characteristic human experiences. It may be said that where Marx and Engels were concrete (i.e. in historical political-economic terms), Feuerbach was abstract; but that where Feuerbach was concrete (i.e. in the psychology and phenomenology of conscious experience), Marx and Engels remained abstract' (Wartofsky 1977, 225).

The Australian writer Wal Suchting in his commentary on the *Sixth Thesis* argues that Marx at this juncture arrives at a new theoretical point in his description of the human essence. The second and third 'sentences state a view on the subject of human "essence", first negatively, and then positively. Negatively Marx rejects all essentialist theories, that is, all theories about human beings, society, history which begin from characterisations of the intrinsic nature of the individuals, whether such natures are conceived of in transcendental (for example Christian) or in naturalistic (for example Hobbesian) terms: whether conceived of as subject to change, the question concerns the fixing on the individuals as the theoretically primary element... [In the third sentence the view of man as ensemble of human relations is put positively by Marx.] In

such a conception, which was to be given clear development and made the basis of his later work, individuals are to be regarded not as the origin or constituting basis of their relations but rather as the "bearers" of those relations' (Suchting 1979, 19).

The line of thought such as that of Suchting's, was first advanced by the French philosopher Louis Althusser which had a big impact on a whole range of issues within Marxism. Althusser regards 1845 to be the year of Marx's epistemological rupture, when, according to Althusser, 'Marx broke radically with every theory that based history and politics on an essence of man'... [The rupture with every philosophical anthropology and humanism] 'means that Marx rejected the problematic of the earlier philosophy and adopted a new problematic in one and the same act. The earlier idealist ("bourgeois") philosophy depended in all its domains and arguments ... on a problematic of *human nature* (or the essence of man) ... By rejecting the essence of man as his theoretical basis, Marx rejected the whole of this organic system of postulates. He drove the philosophical categories of the *subject*, of *empiricism*, of the *ideal essence,* etc., from all the domains in which they had been supreme' (Althusser 1979, 227, 228; for a comprehensive review of Althusser's views in their political context, see Elliott 1987, especially Chapter 2 and Callinicos 1978; as to why Althusser reacted against 'Marxist humanism', see Althusser's comments to the English edition of *For Marx*, 1979, 9-15). I can only very briefly mention that there has much been written on Althusserian formulations in Marxist philosophy, and Althusser's struggle against the reduction of Marxism only to 'humanism' at the hands of revisionists of France. Althusser saw the danger of Catholic influence, represented by Calvez, Bigo, Rubel and Cornu growing within French Marxists. Roger Garaudy, the eminent philosopher of the French Communist Party in his *Perspectives de 1'homme* (1959) had made friendly overtures towards existentialists, phenomenologists and Christians, offering a 'humanistic' interpretation of Marxism. (For the technical meanings of the terms 'humanism' and 'anti-humanism' in recent French philosophy, see Soper 1986, 11-12.) One should take note of the fact that Althusser's, what has come to be called 'anti-humanism', was in fact a political and ideological struggle emphasising the scientific character of Marxism against the 'Hegelian Marxism', 'historicism', and 'empiricism'. It is within this position that Althusser's rejection of the postulates of the human nature in Marxism should be evaluated.

In this study, there is little space for a detailed discussion on the conflicting claims for and against the concept of human nature in Marx's thought as a whole. However, we should mention that one of the recent exponents of the continued existence of the concept of human nature in Marx's later writings is Norman Geras, who in his *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend* rigorously scrutinises the *Sixth Thesis*. While dealing with the views of a wide

variety of writers who have come to argue against the presence of the concept of human nature in Marx's post-1845 writings, Geras writes: 'Most, though not all, of these arguments obviously go beyond a concern with the meaning of the sixth thesis, using the latter in support of a more far-reaching claim about the development of Marx's thought. In so far as this is so, one should note that it is the claim's generality, emphasised in the quoted passages [of these writers], that gives it its point. No one could be startled if the arguments were only that Marx disputed or forsook some conceptions of a universal human nature. There might be room even then for controversy over particulars, but it would be a quite different kind of contention, consistent with the recognition that a concept of human nature still finds its place in his mature theory of history' (Geras 1983, 51).

After a fairly comprehensive analysis, Geras arrives at the conclusion that the views which reject the concept of human nature in Marx after 1845 are not correct. He argues that the terms '*das menschliche Wesen*' and 'human nature' can be interchanged with 'the essence of man'. Of course, there is the possibility of other interpretations of the *Sixth Thesis*, 'but further proposals will not affect the main contours of the argument. It is enough if it has been shown that there are ... plausible ways of reading the thesis in which no denial of human nature is involved' (ibid., 54). There is certainly a justified criticism of Marx's use of the term especially in the *EPM*, where, according to Richard Bernstein, Marx makes no special attempt to analyse and justify this crucial concept. But Bernstein's drastic postulation that 'by the time Marx wrote *Capital*, he was quite explicit about the abandonment of species-being and its replacement by the concept of class' (Bernstein 1972, 68-69) cannot be defended. Tom Rockmore, in fact, makes it a point to emphasise that in the *Sixth Thesis* where Marx objects that the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each individual; it is in reality the ensemble of social relations; and that the absence of the term 'species-being' in later writings is not sufficient to substantiate the claim that Marx rejects the concept after 1845. Tom Rockmore writes: 'Although Marx did in fact abandon the term "species-being", it seems questionable that he could relinquish the concept for which it stands. To be sure, Marx quickly unburdens himself of the idea that consciousness is in itself a distinguishing human trait. This should not be surprising, since it would have been inconsistent to champion a theory of false consciousness, as Marx does in *The German Ideology*, and put such faith in individual awareness. Indeed, in the same work Marx notes that it is not in fact consciousness which distinguishes man from animals, but the production of the means of subsistence. But it is important to emphasise that it does not therefore follow that Marx rejects the idea that there is a distinguishing human characteristic. Rather, in effect, it is to substitute one such criterion for another' (Rockmore 1980, 37-38).

Now to return to our discussion in the early works, we see that Marx uses the idea of it in 1843 in the *Critique* as 'man's communal being' against individualism. In the *EPM* Marx emphasises the social aspect of man by the concept of species-being. The social 'mode of human existence cannot be derived from man's existence as an atomistic or individualistic creature, but presupposes his reciprocal trans-subjective activity and orientation' (Avineri 1970, 87). Marx uses the term to define man, and distinguish him from the animal. 'Marx was struck by the fact,' writes Parekh, 'that unlike the animal, man has generic consciousness, the consciousness of being a man like other men, a member of a species, and he felt that this difference could be best conceptualised in terms of the Feuerbachian notion of species-being. Evidently he found the term very useful, and he used it on every conceivable occasion during his Feuerbachian period, and derived a number of terms from it that are not to be found in Feuerbach' (Parekh 1975, 47). The new terms which Marx uses are species-life, species-activity, species-powers, species-consciousness, species-objectivity, species-act and species-spirit, etc. In his later writings, Marx gives up the use of the term but he retains the concept by using the new term 'social being' instead.

In the *EPM*, Marx alludes to the species-character of human existence in these words: 'Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other beings) as his object, but -- and this is only another way of expressing it -- also because he treats himself as a *universal* and therefore a free being' (67). This is one of the clearest definitions of species-being. It means that man has the capacity to make his species as well as that of other beings an object of his consciousness, will and practical concern. Man 'combines in himself both the subjective and objective aspects of activity, so the historical enrichment of his specific singular nature is expressed in the extent to which he is capable, through his endeavours, of humanising the rest of the environment. Man as such becomes specific inasmuch that his activity becomes *universal* ... the *universal* in man is exactly what is *specific* in him and in his attitude to the world, because it is only in the crucible of activity that things of nature interact at human level' (Ivanov 1984, 82-83).

Man's species-powers establish his relationship with nature, including other human beings as part of nature. In developing this theme of the type of social relationships, and a standard to gauge the level at which human society has reached, Marx mentions the direct species-relationship of man to woman (but in this age, we should also include the species-relationship of woman to man): 'The direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the *relation of man to woman*. In this *natural* species-relationship man's relationship to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relationship to

nature -- his own *natural* destination. In this relationship, therefore, is *sensuously manifested*, reduced to an observable *fact*, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man, or to which nature to him has become the human essence of man. From this relationship, one can therefore judge man's whole level of development. From the character of this relationship follows how much *man* as a *species-being*, as *man*, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most *natural relation* of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man's *natural* behaviour has become *human*, or the extent to which the *human* essence in him has become a *natural* essence ... the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being' (89). Even though man and woman relationship is a natural power, it also typifies most truly the species-being of his nature. *Gattungswesen* is also the ideal fulfilment of man as man. By ascending the narrow egoistic limitations of individual, man becomes more and more human. This process of humanisation is aptly described by Parekh: 'Humanised sense is in other words a "cultivated", "refined", or "cultured" sense, a sense that has incorporated within itself all the relevant achievements of the human species and that relates to its object not merely because of its ability to serve a raw human need but "for its own sake", that is, because of the kind of object it is. A cultured man, a man of humanised sense, is for Marx a free man, a man who has emancipated his senses from the tyranny of nature and turned them into organs freely expressing his human powers' (Parekh 1975, 56).

For the unfolding of the senses to their human level where they appropriate the object adequately, it is essential that the object must have been humanised. It means that the relation between the subject and the object is one of dialectical interaction, where the subject develops his senses with the humanising of objects. This reciprocal interaction taking place through the medium of human labour is excellently expressed by Philip J. Kain: '[Object] must have been transformed by human labour such that man has objectified himself in it. At the same time, the significance of the object can go no further than man's subjective capacity to perceive it -- Marx says there is no music for a non-musical ear. The senses too must have been developed. They are developed in part by the development of the object, by the response with a new object (e.g. an original development in art or technology) can stimulate in the subject, and in part the senses are developed by being exercises in the process of production and perception of objects.... The subject is developed by employing and objectifying its powers and ideas. The object comes into being through the subject's productive activity and through his capacity to perceive the object' (Kain 1983, 270).

In the context of man's humanising of nature through his labour, Marx sees industry in relation to the essence of man. For Marx, industry by which he means man's products as well as his tools used in the process of production, is 'the open book of *man's essential powers*, the perceptibly existing human *psychology*' (96). The whole complex of industry shows the materialised productive powers of human being. It is through the medium of industry that man humanises and harnesses external nature. The humanisation of external nature increases powers of man; it also develops his species-being. '*Industry* is the *actual*, historical relationship of nature ... to man. If, therefore, industry is conceived as the *exoteric* revelation of man's *essential powers*, we also gain an understanding of the *human* essence of nature or the *natural* essence of man' (97). The relation of industry with man had hitherto been viewed, 'only in an external relation of utility' and not seen 'in its conception with man's *essential being*' (97). The dependence of man's social developments, according to this view, is largely determined by the advance of productive forces. Marx says: 'Only through developed industry ... does the ontological essence of human passion come into being, in its totality as well as in its humanity; the science of man is therefore itself a product of man's own practical activity' (119). All history is the history of the extension of man's species-powers through his productive activity along with pervasive alienation, and at the same time it is also the history of the preparation of universal reconciliation and reappropriation of man's essential powers: 'We have before us the *objectified essential powers* of man in the form of *sensuous, alien, useful objects*, in the form of estrangement, displayed in *ordinary material industry* [which can be conceived either as a part of that general movement, or that movement can be conceived as a *particular* part of industry, since all human activity hitherto been labour -- that is, industry -- activity estranged from itself]' (97). The labour objectifies the species-life of man. Through man's efforts over the ages, a man-made environment appears before man. The history in this perspective is only the world of objects, the creation of man: 'All history is the history of preparing and developing "*man*" to become the object of *sensuous* consciousness and turning the requirements of "man as man" into his needs. History itself is a *real* part of *natural history* -- of nature developing into man' (98). Man, a concrete sensuous being, is a part of nature. 'The human nature of man,' elaborates Axelos, 'expresses the action by which nature becomes man, and this nature is the source of those essential, objective forces that push him toward his own externalisation; man is from the beginning a natural and socially active being that seeks to satisfy the totality of its needs through labour. The origin of man is nature, his nature is human; the Nature with which he is always involved is always social, and its becoming is historical. (Cosmic) Nature and (human) nature, (social) technique and (historical) becoming are therefore inseparably bound and manifest themselves from the very beginning' (Axelos 1976, 219).

In the *EPM*, the term 'nature' is used in three senses. First, external nature is the sensuous world external to man, nature as opposed to man. In this sense, according to Marx, 'nature is man's *inorganic body* -- nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body' (67). Second, nature in the sense of human nature, as man's *Gattungswesen*. Marx says: 'The nature that develops in human history -- the genesis of human society -- is man's *real* nature; hence nature as it develops through industry, even though in an *estranged* form, is true *anthropological* nature' (98). Third, here nature is as general, external nature; the human nature forming a part of it. Marx describes the relation between man and nature thus: 'Man *lives* on nature -- means that nature is his *body*, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature' (67-68).

This notion of the unity of man and nature in Marx is different from that of Feuerbach. In his natural philosophy Marx went beyond Feuerbach and 'took up a clear position against the traditional separation of nature and society that Feuerbach had not overcome, and always considered the problem of nature predominantly from the standpoint of its interaction with society' (Lukacs 1982b, 5; see also Levine 1975, 1-11). In Feuerbach the idea of the unity of man and nature 'related only to the romantically transfigured fact that man arose out of nature, and not to man's socio-historically mediated unity with nature in industry.... Feuerbach's man does not emerge as an independent productive force but remains bound to pre-human nature.... Feuerbach's anthropological accentuation of man as opposed to the rest of nature was always abstract. Nature as a whole was for Feuerbach an unhistorical, homogeneous substratum, while the essence of the Marxist critique was the dissolution of this homogeneity into a dialectic of Subject and Object' (Schmidt 1971, 27). In Marx, the Hegelian 'world spirit' in his world-creating activity when shorn of its idealistic trappings, appears to be the human being. 'Marx accepted the idealist view that the world is mediated through the subject. He considered however that he could bring home the full significance of this idea by showing what was the true pathos of "creation" as presented by philosophers from Kant to Hegel: the creator of the objective world is the socio-historical life-process of human beings' (ibid., 27-28, see also Tucker 1972, 130-32).

In the *EPM*, Marx views nature not only as the totality of all that exists but also as a constituent part of human practice. It is for this reason that he puts special stress on man and nature connection. 'But *nature* too, taken abstractly, for itself -- nature fixed in isolation from man -- is *nothing* for man' (145). Marx's view of nature, as Jean Hyppolite argues is 'that nature insofar as it is *for man* cannot be detached from its *human significance*. There does not exist *a nature*, without human significance, and *then* man. There is only nature *at the human level*,

neither objective nor subjective -- nature produced by man, that is to say, seen, touched, tasted, worked upon, and transformed by a living being' (Hyppolite 1969, 98). This view anyhow does not deny the existence or minimise the importance of nature's development before or independently of man. Marx argues for example, that geognosy (the scientific study of the development of the earth) shows that the earth's development has been a result of the process of self-generation. This dissolves the mythical explanations of the 'Creation' which as 'an idea [is] very difficult to dislodge from popular consciousness' (99). It also means that untransformed nature for man is not a nullity, it is definitely something for man. But in Marx's concept of nature, the primary focus continues to be on man and his labour. Alfred Schmidt points to this: 'The sensuous world and finite men in their existing social setting (the essence and appearance at the same time) are the only qualities taken into account by Marxist theory. At bottom, there existed for Marx only "man and his labour on the one side, nature and its materials on the other".... As long as nature remains unworked it is economically valueless, or rather, to be more precise, has a purely potential value which awaits its realisation' (Schmidt 1971, 29-30). In the *EPM*, we find Marx holding the view that, 'as far as ordinary experience goes, immediate untransformed nature for the most part disappeared long ago in history. Guided by developing needs, industry has transformed nature and constituted it into objects for-us. Our senses have been transformed in the same process' (Kain 1983, 273). The development of an object leads to a corresponding development of the subject. Both the object and the subject in their mutuality are constituted socially and historically as well as both are constitutive of each other. But where 'either the natural or the subjective side has not been developed, a meaningful object is not constituted' (ibid., 273).

The humanisation of nature in history has been a consequence of man's acting in co-operation with others of his species. Marx's use of the term 'species-being' in the *EPM*, in a significant way refers to man in that 'human beings have a capacity unique to the members of human species for empathising and co-operating with fellow members of the species. Like Feuerbach, Marx believed that the possession by human beings of this potential had important ethical implications. It implied that compassion for the suffering of others and conscious co-operation with others were more human attitudes than selfish indifference and hostility to others' (Conway 1987, 33; see also Mahowald 1972-3, 475-76). The essence of human nature is not egoism but sociality i.e. the ensemble of human relations. This, unlike egoism, is not abstract quality which is inherent in the single individual. It can only exist in the relations of individuals with each other and for each other. Thus society itself, is nothing else but man in his social relations. Egoism and Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*, according to Marx, are not

essentially human characteristics. Marx emphatically describes both the social character of man's species-being and the social character of his activity. Iring Fetscher finds the importance of co-operation and the socially transmitted traditions of human inventions in material production to be the condition of human existence: 'Society does not develop out of individual human beings coming together and concluding a social contract but is synchronous with human man. From his very first beginning man is a social being, and the kind of society he lives in determines the degree of humanisation he is capable of, his powers, wants, and satisfactions' (Fetscher 1973, 448). However, there are very many limitations on man's internal nature. Marx sums up man's dilemma pithily: 'Neither nature objectively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a form adequate to the *human* being' (136). But the development of countless powers and potentialities of individuals can take place only in conjunction with others. In a humanised way there is no clash between individual and social interests.

5.3. The theory of political economy and alienation

In the *EPM* Marx presents his analysis of the nature and functioning of the capitalistic economy for the first time. Before the *EPM*, the economic factor in Marx does not appear as a decisive one in the socio-political relations, even though we find that Marx had begun to realise the importance of economic relations when he was working in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. His articles in the *German-French Yearbooks* reveal his growing awareness that the abolition of private property was an essential condition to de-alienation and was also a positive content to human emancipation. Prior to the *EPM*, as Meszaros points out, Marx 'did not realise the fundamental ontological importance of the sphere of *production* which appeared in his writings in the form of rather generic references to "needs" (*Bedürfnisse*) in general. Consequently, Marx was unable to grasp in a comprehensive way the complex hierarchy of the various kinds and forms of human activity: their reciprocal *interrelations* within a *structured* whole' (Meszaros 1970, 80)

But at this stage in Marx's life, as Lukacs points out, there is 'a tendency towards the increasing concretization of forms and relationships, etc. of social existence, which reached a philosophical turning-point precisely in his economic writings. These tendencies find their first adequate expression in the *EPM*, since it is not the least aspect of the path-breaking originality of these texts that for the first time in the history of philosophy the categories of economics appear

as those of the production and reproduction of human life, and hence make it possible to depict social existence ontologically on a materialist basis. Yet the economic centre of Marx's ontology in no way means that his view of the world is "economist" ' (Lukacs 1982b, 4-5).

In the *EPM*, Marx's economic studies lead him to the critique of political economy within the ontological principles of social being. Marx criticises the main suppositions of political economy in terms of its own theory of value and its description of production and distribution of wealth. Beside this, Marx criticises its conception of man.

Marx in the Preface to the *EPM* claims that his results have been attained by means of a wholly empirical analysis based on a conscientious critical study of political economy. Marx here seems to have meant two things, as John Torrance outlines: 'First, he had used the works of the classical economists as a source of empirical generalisations and theoretical hypotheses, of an empirical kind, about economic life. He had "critically " separated these from mere speculation in order to get an account of how the capitalist system worked. But secondly, he had used the same sources as evidence for a generalized account of how "political economy" *interpreted* capitalism, and therefore also the type of human society in which it belonged. And here he critically isolated crucial limitations in the assumptions with which the economists had approached and classified their data. He did not necessarily regard these limitations as invalidating their findings or hypotheses. The assumptions built into the categories of political economy were, in Marx's view, also present in the meanings by which economic life was lived' (Torrance 1977, 67).

Marx finds the utter inadequacy of the 'abstracted formulas' of political economy which are presented as laws. The economic generalisations, and arbitrary assumptions remain less than laws. 'To abstract economic meanings alone and systematise them in isolation was an inevitably one-sided approach. It was rather like abstracting everything blue from nature in order to create a science of blueness. How important the economy might be in society, and however differentiated and specialised its roles and institutions might become, it remained part of a social system which affected it at every moment' (ibid., 67). This point can be explained by looking at political economy's view of the proletarians. Marx writes: 'It goes without saying that the *proletarian*, i.e. the man who being without capital and rent, lives purely by labour, and by a one-sided, abstract labour, is considered by political economy only as a *worker*. Political economy can therefore advance the proposition that the proletarian, the same as any horse, must get as much as will enable him to work. It does not consider him when he is not working, as a human being; but leaves such consideration to criminal law, to doctors, to religion, to the statistical tables, to politics and to the poor-house overseer' (28). It means that the questions which arise as a result of the assumptions of political economy cannot be answered with the help of the same assumptions.

To find an answer, it is imperative to 'rise above the level of political economy' (28), and place these assumptions in the broader social context. When seen in this light the question we have to ask becomes: 'What in the evolution of mankind is the meaning of this reduction of the greater part of mankind to abstract labour' (28)?

After quoting extensively from the classical economists, Marx criticises classical political economy for starting from the visible appearance, the actual movement of private property, without explaining the cause or the 'essence' of private property. Marx writes: 'Political economy starts with the fact of private property; it does not explain it to us. It expresses in general, abstract formulas the *material* process through which private property actually passes, and these formulas it then takes for *laws*. It does not *comprehend* these laws, i.e. it does not demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property. Political economy throws no light on the cause of the division between labour and capital, and between capital and land. When, for example, it defines the relationship of wages to profit, it takes the interest of the capitalists to be the ultimate cause, i.e. it takes for granted what it is supposed to explain' (62). Marx's own approach in the *EPM*, in Mandel's words, 'following the logic of a critique of private property and capitalism, and not of a general exposition of the laws of development of the capitalist mode of production ... [is] an analysis of the *poverty* caused by private property, rather than ... an analysis of the *wealth* caused by commodity production [which had been the starting point of all the classical works of political economy, and was the one which Marx was himself to adopt in *Capital*]' (Mandel 1971, 30-31).

Marx shows that the political economy's assumption that the conditions of the production of capitalism can be attributed to all forms of economy is incorrect. The political economists begin with the premise of the exchange economy and the existence of private property. The egoistic ends, profit-making, and competition are seen as the natural attributes of man; but, in fact, 'the only wheels which political economy sets in motion are *greed* and the *war amongst the greedy* -- *competition*' (62). Marx shows that the formation of an exchange economy, for instance, is the outcome of a historical process and capitalism is a historically determined system of production. Every economic phenomenon is simultaneously always a social phenomenon, and the prevalence of a particular type of economy presupposes a definite form of society. So far as the institution of private property is concerned, it is not the result of any operation of law of nature, in reality it is the essence of estranged labour (man's essence is labour and estranged labour is the essence of private property).

Another fallacious supposition of economists is to speak of 'capital', 'commodities', 'prices', and so on, as if these exist independent of human mediation. Consider the place of a

worker under capitalism. 'The worker exists as a worker only when he exists *for himself* as capital; and he exists as capital only when some *capital* exists *for him*. The existence of capital is *his* existence, his *life*; as it determines the tenor of his life in a manner indifferent to him' (75). In the concrete examples where political economy cannot reduce things to economic abstractions, these cease to have any significance: 'Political economy, therefore, does not recognise the unemployed worker, the working man so far as he happens to be outside his labour relationship. The rascal, swindler, beggar, the unemployed, the starving, wretched and criminal workingman -- these are *figures* that do not exist *for political economy* but only for other eyes, those of the doctor, the judge, the grave-digger, and bum-bailiff, etc.; such figures are spectres outside its domain' (76).

The workers are treated as objects by political economy. It is symptomatic of the suppositions of political economy that 'the economists treat workers as "costs" to the capitalists, and hence as equivalent to any other sort of capital expenditure. Political economy declares it to be irrelevant that the real "objects" of analysis are men in society. It is for this reason that the economists are able to obscure what is in fact intrinsic to their interpretation of the capitalist mode of production: that capitalism is founded upon a class division between proletariat, or working class, on the one hand, and bourgeoisie, or capitalist class, on the other. These classes are in endemic conflict as regards the distribution of the fruits of industrial production' (Giddens 1971, 10). At the start of his analysis of political economy, Marx points out the antagonistic struggle between the worker and the capitalist. This antagonism becomes apparent in the direct relation between the worker's wages and the capitalist's profit: '*Wages* are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capitalist and worker. Victory goes necessarily to the capitalist' (21).

The contradiction between profit and wages determines the trend in the latter's reduction to the level of minimum subsistence. The political economy asserts the harmony of labour and capital, but in fact it 'knows the worker only as a working animal -- as a beast reduced to the strictest bodily needs' (29). The division of labour increases the productive power of labour and it leads to the increase in wealth in the society, but it does not make the life of the worker easier for that reason: 'Whilst labour brings about the accumulation of capital and with this the increasing prosperity of society, it renders the worker even more dependent upon the capitalist, leads him into a competition of a new intensity, and drives him into the headlong rush of over-production, with its subsequent corresponding slump' (27).

Citing the economists (who use the phrases like: 'to hire out one's labour', 'to lend one's labour at interest', 'to work in other's place', 'to hire out the materials of labour', 'to lend the

materials of labour at interest', and 'to make others work in one's place' etc.), Marx says: 'Political economy considers labour in the abstract as a thing; labour is a commodity. If the price is high, then the commodity is in great demand, if the price is low, then the commodity is in great supply: the price of labour as a commodity must fall lower and lower' (32).

The worker has become a commodity, like any other commodity. When he is in excess of the market demand, his price sinks. 'The political economist tells us that everything is bought with labour and that capital is nothing but accumulated labour; but at the same time he tells us that the worker, far from being able to buy everything, must sell himself and his humanity' (26). As the worker in the capitalist mode of production with its ever-increasing division of labour finds himself reduced to a machine, his labour, i.e. his vital activity, with all its natural, spiritual and social diversity, increasingly confronts him as an alien property.

By means of the political economist's line of argument, Marx shows the paradoxical nature and results of the abstracted laws of political economy. According to the political economist, the interests of worker are never opposed to the interest of society, but 'society always and necessarily stands opposed to the interest of the worker' (27). The worker sinks to the level of a commodity, his misery standing in inverse relationship to the size and power of his production. On the side of capital, the necessary result of competition is the concentration of capital in a few hands and the growth in power of the capitalists, the workers experience their ruin, impoverishment and the overlordship of the capitalists. The political economist recognises that 'it is solely through labour that man enhances the value of the products of nature, whilst labour is man's active possession, according to the same political economy the landowner and the capitalist, who qua landowner and capitalist are merely privileged and idle gods, are everywhere superior to the worker and lay down the law to him' (26).

Marx's analysis of society based on private property in the stage of commodity-production, according to Kamenka, is 'the first version of what is undoubtedly Marx's best-known contribution to intellectual endeavour.... At the very beginning of his venture into political economy, Marx has thus satisfied the requirements of his dialectical critique of civil society: he has shown to his own satisfaction that civil society (i.e. political economy) is necessarily, by its very essence, self-contradictory, working by its own logic toward inevitable break-up and collapse. But Marx wants to go further than this. He wants to display the basic ground of the "contradictions" in political economy. This ground cannot be displayed, or even understood, if we remain within the abstracted laws of political economy' (Kamenka 1972, 73).

Marx's starting point in his critique of political economy and the phenomenon of alienated labour is in sharp contrast to the economist 'who assumes in the form of a fact, of an

event, what he is supposed to deduce -- namely, the necessary relationship between the two things -- between, for example, division of labour and exchange. Thus the theologian explains the origin of evil by the fall of man; that is, he assumes as a fact, in historical form, what has to be explained'; Marx starts 'from an *actual* economic fact' (63). The fact of contemporary political economy, according to Marx, is the impoverishment of the producers of wealth, on the one hand, and the assimilation of the worker to his product as a commodity, on the other hand. 'The separation between the worker and the product of his labour,' in the words of Giddens, 'is not, however, simply a matter of the expropriation of goods which rightfully belong to the worker. The main point of Marx's discussion is that, in capitalism, the material objects which are produced become treated on par with the worker himself -- just as they are, on a purely theoretical level, in the discipline of political economy' (Giddens 1971, 11). This process of production and alienation is described thus by Marx: 'The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The *devaluation* of the world of men is in direct proportion to the *increasing value* of the world of things. Labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a *commodity* -- and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general' (63). In the next section we turn to the central problem of private property in Marx's theory of alienation.

5.4. Private property and the alienated labour

In the *EPM*, Marx introduces labour for the first time as the central category of his social ontology which retains this eminence in his thought for the rest of his life. As a general concept, human labour is the activity that defines human life itself. It is through labour that man comes to realise his *Gattungswesen*. It is a distinctive human activity. Labour can be understood in its most restricted sense and rudimentary form as the metabolism between man and nature. Marx sketches the fundamental basis of man's production of himself through labour in the *Capital*: 'Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form

adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway' (Marx 1977, 173). It means that 'the transformation of the working subject -- the genuine humanisation of man -- is the necessary ontological consequence of this objective facticity of labour ... [It] is the mastery of consciousness over mere biological instinct. Labour ... signals a leap in this development. Not only does adaptation pass from the instinctual to the conscious, but it develops as an "adaptation" to circumstances that are not created by nature, but are self-selected, self-created' (Lukacs 1980c, 42, 43).

The development of labour is a historical process. Labour appears in different forms in different types of historical developments and in different socio-economic formations. Under the capitalist mode of production the products of labour can be bought and sold as commodities. This mode of production is distinguishable from the previous modes, and the primitive mode. Marx says: 'An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human' (Marx 1977, 173-74).

The fundamental ontological significance of human labour in Marx is not limited to the production of mere means of subsistence. The productive activity determines mode of life of the people: 'By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life.... This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production' (Marx & Engels 1976, 37).

But how is the human productive activity instead transformed in an alienated activity, the alienated labour? According to Marx, the answer has to be sought in the social structure of the existing society. In *Grundrisse*, writes Marx: 'Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always production at a definite stage of social development -- production by social individuals. It might seem, therefore, that in order to talk about production at all we must either pursue the process of historic development through its different phases, or declare beforehand that we are dealing with a specific historic epoch such as e.g. modern bourgeois production,

which is indeed our particular theme.... All production is appropriation of nature on the part of the individual within and through a specific form of society' (Marx 1973, 85, 87).

Marx specifically focuses on capitalist economy, and its basic premises in the *EPM*. Under the sub-title of 'Estranged Labour' (the title given by the editors of the *EPM*) in the first Manuscript, Marx basing his analysis on the works of other political economists, sums up the main points of his findings so far under the social structure of capitalism (as he witnesses it in the first half of the nineteenth century): 'We have proceeded from the premises of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws. We presupposed private property, the separation of labour, capital and land, and of wages, profit of capital and rent of land -- likewise division of labour, competition, the concept of exchange-value, etc. On the basis of political economy itself, in its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities; that the wretchedness of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and magnitude of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form; and that finally the distinction between capitalist and land rentier, like that between the tiller of the soil and the factory worker, disappears and that the whole of society must fall apart into the two classes -- the *property owners* and the propertyless *workers*' (61-62).

By analysing the facts of economic life on the basis of the uncriticised presuppositions of political economy, Marx shows the all-pervasive phenomenon of alienation. In his critique of alienated labour in the present society, his views seem to rest on a set of normative standards concerning a desirable, non-alienated, and creative labour. For Marx, the basic 'conception of labour is that man "objectifies" himself, which means that through creative activity man, by using his capacities in working up raw materials, transforms them into objects. Accordingly, these objects reflect his abilities' (Israel 1971, 37). But every objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*) is not an expression or actualisation of the distinctively human potentialities. Joachim Israel states this point clearly that, for Marx, 'work is creative, (1) if man makes "his activity itself an object of his will and consciousness", (2) if man through work can express his capabilities in a comprehensive way, (3) if through work he can express his social nature, (4) if work is not simply a means for maintaining man's subsistence, i.e. if it is not purely instrumental' (ibid., 39). In the capitalist mode of production, the social relations, especially the property relations and their consequences thereof, are matters of concern to Marx. He sees the productive activity of individuals under capitalism turned into an alienative process, separating the individual from his creative power, his 'life-activity'. The three conditions which Marx shows are instrumental in bringing about the alienation are 'first, the fact of private property and especially, of private

ownership of the means of production; second, the process of the division of labour, which in turn is a consequence of the development of "productive forces", particularly of technology and the use of machines. The third condition is that human labour is changed into a commodity on par with all other commodities. For that reason, labour is subordinated to the market-laws of capitalist society. The latter condition is part of the process which Marx in *Capital* subsequently calls "fetishism of commodities" ' (ibid., 40-41).

An analysis of private property should lead one to ask about the form of labour which creates it. According to the standpoint of political economy, any labour, labour in general, creates goods, capital and private property. Marx rejecting this view explains that private property and everything related to it is not created by labour in general but by alienated labour: 'Through *estranged, alienated labour* ('*entfremdete, entäusserte Arbeit*'), then, the worker produces the relationship to this labour of a man alien to labour and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labour creates the relation to it of the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call the master of labour). *Private property* is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of *alienated labour*, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself' (71-72).

What is the relation between private property and alienated labour? The answer to this question is of great importance to Marx's theory of alienated labour. Contrary to the notions of political economists, Marx regards private property, not as the product of labour but of alienated labour. Private property being a product of alienated labour also creates further alienation. It accelerates and deepens the alienative process within society. Marx says: 'True, it is as a result of the *movement of private property* that we have obtained the concept of *alienated labour* (*of alienated life*) in political economy. But on analysis of this concept it becomes clear that though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence, just as the gods are *originally* not the cause but the effect of man's intellectual confusion. Later this relationship becomes reciprocal' (72).

It is of vital importance to comprehend that while Marx views private property as the product of alienated labour, it is also 'the *means* by which labour alienates itself, the *realisation of this alienation*' (72). We find a clue to the direction of his thought when he writes soon afterwards: 'For when one speaks of private property, one thinks of dealing with something external to man. When one speaks of labour, one is directly dealing with man himself' (73). Applying this formulation to pre-capitalist society, we see property, e.g. landed property, in reality, as an external condition of labour's realisation, but in capitalist society, the main form of property, paradigmatically, is capital, as a store of value, internally related to the value-creating labour.

The relation of cause and effect between private property and alienated labour is elaborated well by Chris Arthur: 'The relation of cause and consequence is grasped here from the point of view of the being-in-process of the totality rather than as an external conjunction of antecedent and consequent. Abstract alienated labour, and self-expanding value, capital, stand in an internal relation which structures the whole of capitalist society in such a way that its reproduction depends on the constant reflection-in-process of these moments into each other. To prioritise labour is not to deny the reality of capital; but its effectivity as the proximate moment in the worker's self-estrangement does not prevent Marx from grasping it as the mediating moment in labour's self-alienation, posited by labour itself as its own otherness' (Arthur 1983, 11; see also Kamenka 1972, 82-83).

To assume that private property historically is prior to labour is 'to ignore the antagonistic character of this economic relation and to block the way to an analysis of its *origins.* But Marx's task was to clarify the origins of private property, a question which bourgeois economists ignored. Of course, he could not provide an exhaustive answer to the question in a short piece about alienated labour, but he does most definitely draw the main conclusion concerning the origination of private property from alienated labour' (Oizerman 1981, 235). However, Chris Arthur makes a valid point when he emphasises that by giving priority to labour over property Marx is not posing it as historically antecedent but rather as ontologically more fundamental in the social totality established by their dialectic: 'The elements of relationship may well exist separately before entering on this dialectic. Property may well have established itself originally in the manner projected by Rousseau in his second discourse (at least as plausible as anything in Locke, Smith, and company), imposing itself by force and fraud. It is essential then to bear in mind that when Marx speaks of labour as the basis of private property, this results from an analysis of *modern* private property, property held as capital, and, more particularly, means of production held as capital' (Arthur 1983, 11; see also Torrance 1977, 70). What the alienation of labour implies in its manifold aspects will be explored in the following section.

5.5. The alienation of labour

The theory of the alienation of labour stands central in the *EPM*. Marx addresses himself to the question as to why the phenomenon of alienation pervades the objective world which man creates. Alienation is conceived as a social process, occurring under certain social conditions.

Ollman writes: 'The theory of alienation is the mental construct in which Marx displays the devastating effect of capitalist production on human beings, on their physical and mental states and on the social processes of which they are a part. Centred on the acting individual, it is Marx's way of seeing his contemporaries and their conditions (a set of forms for comprehending their interaction) as well as what he sees there (the content poured into these forms). Brought under the same rubric are the links between one man, his activity and products, his fellows, inanimate nature and the species' (Ollman 1971, 131). Ollman emphasises the internal relations between various factors of Marx's subject matter of alienation as an organic whole; the factors being the facets of the composite whole. He writes further: 'Perhaps the most significant form into which the theory of alienation is cast ... is the internal relation it underscores between the present and the future. Alienation can only be understood as the absence of unalienation, each state serving as a point of reference for the other. And, for Marx, unalienation is the life man leads in communism' (ibid., 131-32; Marx's view of communism is given in chapter 6 below).

Alienation under the capitalist mode of production, according to Marx, does not manifest itself only in the case of the workers but also in the case of the owners of the means of production. All classes of modern society fall under the sway of this inhuman power. Individuals experience alienation in different ways depending on the class to which they belong. But in the case of the workers especially the abomination of alienation strikes in its acute form.

Starting with a discussion of political economy's assumptions, Marx lays bare the mechanism of private property in its present forms. This part of the *EPM* is, no doubt, the best organised treatment on the theory of alienation. The four broad relations under the alienation phenomenon, covering the human existence, are as under:

(i) man's relation to the product of his labour;

(ii) man's relation to his own productive activity;

(iii) man's alienation from his own species; and

(iv) the alienation of man from other fellow men. In the following sub-sections of 5.5. each of the above aspects of alienation will be examined.

5.5.1. Man's relation to the product of his labour

By subjecting the basic presuppositions of political economy, Marx, in fact, is searching for an answer as to why the worker who produces riches is impoverished, dehumanised and alienated in the capitalist society. The worker's production of more commodities at the same time involves the process whereby the worker becomes a cheap commodity himself. This discussion by Marx clearly relates to the conditions of worker under the capitalist mode of industrial production. 'The *devaluation* of the world of men is in direct proportion to the *increasing value* of the world of things' (63). The labour process, in addition to the production of commodities also 'produces itself, and the worker as a *commodity'* (63).

For Marx, production in itself cannot be said to constitute product's alienation. The mere fact that labour becomes an object, having an external existence does not amount to the alienation of worker in his product. The necessary condition in this regard, which creates alienated product is the fact that 'it exists *outside him*, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him' (64). The relation between productive activity and product here manifests itself clearly; the alienation of the worker from his product is due to the fact that productive activity in the first instance is alienated activity.

Under capitalism, according to Marx, productive activity is not one of human fulfilment and realisation, but as inherently unpleasant, monotonous, and soul-destroying, bound to the sole goal of the capitalist owners of the means of production -- the maximising of profit (with the minimum of the cost of production. Under capitalist mode of production, as Schacht comments, the 'product ceases to be the objective embodiment of the individual's own personality and the distinctive expression of his creative powers and interests. On the contrary, it is not all distinctive, and has no relation to his personality and interests. He does not choose to make it, but rather is directed to do so. He does not even choose *how* to make it; he is compelled to suppress all individuality in the course of its production. And when its production is finished, it is not his to do with [it] as he pleases. In reality, it never is *his* product at all; he is merely the instrument of its production. In a word, it is *alien* to him' (Schacht 1971, 93).

The alienated product in relation to the worker does not represent a passive relation; it is an active and independent power over the worker. Marx explicitly states: 'This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces, its product, confronts it as *something alien*, as a *power independent* of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the *objectification* of labour. ['Das Produkt der arbeit ist die Arbeit, die sich in einem Gegenstand fixirt, sachlich gemacht hat, es ist die *Vergegenständlichung* der Arbeit'.] Labour's realisation is its objectification. Under these

economic conditions, this realisation of labour appears as *loss of realisation* for the workers; objectification as *loss of the object and bondage to it;* appropriation as *estrangement*, as *alienation*' (63).

These formulations are the first detailed exposition of Marx's theory of alienation in economic sphere of human activity. It becomes easier for us to see the ramifications of alienated labour, if we have an overview of Marx's concept of labour. Labour, according to Marx, is a specific human, creative activity which shapes man and man's world. It is through labour that man realises his nature, his *Gattungswesen*. Man, as McLellan puts it 'forms and develops himself by working on and transforming the world outside him in co-operation with his fellow men. In this progressive interchange between man and the world, it is man's nature to be in control of this process, to be the initiator, the subject in which the process originates' (McLellan 1970, 218). Man creates a world of objects through his work. But this moulding and transforming of nature by man in Marx's theory also includes social institutions through which the process of production is regulated and controlled.

The process of objectification through which the worker realises his potential as a producer, is basically a question of labour and material production of things. The basic process in all societies continues to be objectification. It means that in order to satisfy his needs man makes conscious attempt to create objects. Carol C. Gould elucidates this clearly: 'According to Marx, objectification is a two-sided process in which an individual through labour forms objects in the image of his or her needs and in doing so, transforms him or herself. This model presupposes a distinction between the agent or subject of the activity and the object, but one in which the activity itself establishes an interrelation between the two terms. Thus the activity of objectification is one in which the subject's activity constitutes objects as what they are; that is to say, objects are not merely given to or discovered by the subject, but rather are made objects by the subject's activity. Objects are therefore constituted or given meaning by subjects' (Gould 1978, 41).

However, the labour of worker is objectified only when there is an external material for the application of labour. In this regard, writes Marx: 'The worker can create nothing without *nature,* without the *sensuous external world*. It is the material on which his labour is realised, in which it is active, from which and by means of which it produces' (64). Thus it is through the mediation of production that the unity of man and nature is established. 'It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a *species-being*. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as *his* and his reality. The object of labour is therefore the *objectification of man's species-life*: for he duplicates

himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created' (69).

Under the present conditions of capitalistic mode of production and exchange, the objectification of things is accomplished through alienation, and the product of labour appears as alien objects to the worker. The worker becomes a servant of the object. The world of things dominates the world of man. Drawing a parallel with religion, Marx says: 'It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the more the worker lacks objects.... The *alienation* of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an *external* existence, but that it exists *outside him*, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien' (64).

In the capitalistic market, according to Marx, social relations between persons become transformed into relations between commodities. The basis of commodity-structure 'is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a "phantom objectivity", an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people' (Lukacs 1971, 83). The difference between a product and commodity is well put by Joachim Israel: 'A product becomes a commodity only when it has been related to other products, e.g. when it can be exchanged against the other product. This exchange relationship is quantified in the exchange-value of a product' (Israel 1971, 41-42). Under the capitalistic system, the main characteristic of the product is its transformation into commodity. Karl Löwith points out that commodity form as alienation phenomenon, beside the products, also extends to human being: 'The economic expression of human alienation is the "commodity" as representative of the saleable character of all objects of the modern world. The commodity in Marx's sense does not signify one particular type of object among others; instead, for him the commodity embodies the basic ontological character of all our objects, their "commodity form". The commodity form or structure characterises the alienation both of things and of human individuality' (Löwith 1982, 76; see also Lukacs 1971, section 1 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', pp. 83-92).

The worker in modern society, according to Marx, is forced to sell his working capacity. Man, the creator of the world of objects himself becomes a servant of his objects. Under this inversion of roles, man stripped of his human powers, becomes, according to Marx, an abstraction, the 'abstract individual'. The man-shaped world becomes man's master, directing and

conditioning the mode of his being. His 'creative activity also appears to be merely a means of preservation of physical existence. The concept of alienation thus presupposes an essential image of man as object-creator and it is the attainment of this image that is being frustrated in existing society. This image of man is not created by material conditions *per se*. Rather it is the faculty which enables man to master his material conditions' (Avineri 1970, 106). Man's working capacity is no longer a part of his human powers which he can use to realise his personality or his human needs. 'His working capacity, being transformed into a thing, a commodity to be bought and sold, is no longer experienced as his life-power. The consequence is that the worker becomes alien to his own activity and alien to the products he produces' (Israel 1971, 43). According to Marx, 'the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes' (65). When Marx says that the worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size, he in fact expounds his views on the existing society as he observes and experiences, and the production relations in relation to the worker 'as an actual economic fact' (63). For Marx the meaning of the poverty of the worker, however, extends beyond its strictly economic sense. The wider implications of poverty cover the entirety of his life. The worker is also impoverished mentally and spiritually as a consequence of the production process.

Up to this point, we have discussed Marx's ideas about worker's relationship to the objects of his labour within alienation. Next, Marx analyses and defines the phenomenon of alienation inherent in the very activity of production itself, in the worker's labour itself.

5.5.2. Man's relation to his productive activity

The second characteristic of alienation under capitalism, according to Marx, is essentially that of worker's alienation in his productive activity. We should bear in mind that productive activity (labour) in Marx is pre-eminently a manifestation of human existence, of the human history. As man is a self-creative being, he while acting upon nature generates himself, he creates history. Marx writes emphatically that '*the entire so-called history of the world* is nothing but the creation of man through human labour, nothing but the emergence [*Werden*] of nature for man' (100; for more on the teleological category of labour in Marx, see Lukacs 1980c). But productive activity in the social relations of capitalist society is inherently alienated. It is described as 'active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation' (66), because if the product of labour is alienated then the productive activity must also be alienated. Marx asks: 'What, then,

constitutes the alienation of labour'? and then offers the reply as follows: 'First, the fact that the labour is *external* to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself ... His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is *forced labour*. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a *means* to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification' (66). In this formulation of labour as an activity which denies to man his essential being, Marx's point of reference is man as species being. Man's alienation from his essential being is his self-alienation. But a consciousness of alienation is not essential for the worker. Allen Wood states this precisely: 'Alienation, as Marx conceives of it, is not fundamentally a matter of consciousness or of how people in fact feel about themselves or their lives. Alienation is rather a state of objective unfulfilment, of the frustration of really existing human needs and potentialities.... Marx's real ground for believing that people in capitalist society are alienated is not that they are conscious of being alienated, but rather the objective existence of potentialities for human fulfilment that must be frustrated as long as the capitalist mode of production prevails' (Wood 1981, 55-56). In describing the productive activity under capitalism where labour only fulfils the external needs of man's essential being, Marx is describing an existing state of affairs where the nexus between productive activity and man's powers is at a very low level of achievement.

Marx occasionally refers to 'alienated labour' as 'slave labour'. The position of labour *vis-à-vis* capital is described superbly: '*The labour prices of the various kinds of workers show much wider differences than the profits in the various branches in which capital is applied*. In labour all the natural, spiritual, and social variety of individual activity is manifested and is variously rewarded, whilst dead capital always keeps the same pace and is indifferent to *real* individual activity. In general, we should observe that in those cases where worker and capitalist equally suffer, the worker suffers in his very existence, the capitalist in the profit on his dead mammon' (22-23). Within the sphere of production, the relation of alienation does not involve only the worker and his labour; it also includes the third person who is the master of worker and his activity. Here 'the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his

own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another'. Marx drawing a parallel with religion, where the human activity belongs to another, continues: 'Just as in religion, the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates on the individual independently of him -- that is, operates as an alien, divine or diabolical activity -- so is the worker's activity not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self' (66).

In this formulation, according to Richard Schacht, Marx's primary concern is the disassociation of labour from worker's interest and personality; 'but because his thinking is dominated by the model of the *Veräusserung* of labour, he tends to regard the submission of labour to the direction of another man as the necessary and sufficient condition of its alienation from the worker' (Schacht 1971, 99). Schacht criticises this position of Marx and regards the submission of labour to the direction of another which does not entail disassociation. He offers the examples of a cameraman in a film studio and the member of an orchestra, who have to work necessarily under the direction of another person, but in both cases the direction by another does not preclude self-realisation. These examples along with those of an independent farmer or shop owner, which Schacht offers do not negate the general principles of alienated labour in Marx. Schacht in his otherwise excellent exposition, takes a narrow and one-sided view of the vitiating impact of the third person's mediation. We cannot escape from the fact that in all these cases all the productive activities are conditioned and directed by the prevalent mode and relations of production.

It should be clear that for Marx there is a distinctive demarcation between productive activity as 'manifestation of life' (*Lebensäusserung)*) and as 'alienation of life' (*Lebensentäusserung*). In his 'Comments on James Mill' (written in the first half of the 1844), Marx discusses the mediating role of productive activity between the worker and his production both in the non-alienative and alienated forms. He writes: 'My work would be a *free manifestation of life*, hence an *enjoyment of life*. Presupposing private property, my work is an *alienation of life*, for I work *in order to live*, in order to obtain for myself the *means* of life. My work is *not* my life. Secondly, the *specific nature* of my individuality, therefore, would be affirmed in my labour, since the latter would be an affirmation of my *individual* life. Labour

therefore would be *true*, *active property*. Presupposing private property, my individuality is alienated to such a degree that this *activity* is instead *hateful* to me, a *torment*, and rather the *semblance* of an activity. Hence, too, it is only a *forced* activity and one imposed on me only through an *external* fortuitous need, *not* through an *inner*, *essential one*' (CW3, 228; see also Meszaros 1970, 91-92). The result is that man feels free only in his animal functions, like eating, drinking and procreating, etc. His human functions are reduced to the level of animal. But this reversal of man's human and animal functions does not mean that eating, drinking and procreating, etc. are not genuine human functions. These become animal functions when they are 'taken abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends' (66).

We have presented Marx's analysis of alienation in two of its major aspects. These can now be summarised. First, it is the relation of the worker to the products of his labour. Here the product is for the worker as an alien object exercising power over him. This power is at the same time, according to Marx, the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of nature, as an alien world inimically opposed to him. Secondly, it is the worker's alienation in relation to the productive activity within the labour process. Marx describes it concisely: 'This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker's *own* physical and mental energy, his personal life -- for what is life but activity? -- as an activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him' (67). This is worker's self-alienation (or self-estrangement as in Milligan's translation).

5.5.3. Man's alienation from his species

The third and fourth aspects of alienation, i.e. worker's alienation from his species being and from other fellow men are deduced from the two previous ones which we have seen above. In 5.5.3. I consider only the third aspect, followed by the fourth one in 5.5.4. Marx's discussion of man's alienation from his species or genus is closely related to Feuerbach's use of the term in *The Essence of Christianity* which we have discussed in chapter 2. Marx's concept of man as a species being has also been analysed above.

Even though the influence of Feuerbach, we may recall, in defining the term 'species' in the *EPM* is obvious, but in Marx there is substantially new content added to it. Anthony Giddens remarks in this context: 'But the import of what Marx says is quite different. Many secondary accounts of Marx's analysis of alienation in the 1844 *Manuscripts*, though assimilating Marx's position to that of Feuerbach, give Marx's position a more "utopian" connotation than in fact it has. Marx uses Feuerbachian terms in holding that man is a "universal producer", in contrast to the animals, who only produce "partially" and in limited contexts established by the instinctual components of their biological make-up: but his analysis is far more concrete and specific than this terminology suggests' (Giddens 1971, 13; see also Kamenka 1972, 76).

The two characteristics which Marx attributes to man as a species-being are self-consciousness and universality. He writes: 'Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but -- and this is only another way of expressing it -- also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a *universal* and therefore a free being' (67). Man's universality expresses itself through the fact that he can appropriate the whole of inorganic nature. As discussed earlier, in contrast to animal which cannot distinguish itself from its life activity, man 'makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity' (68). Man produces not under the immediate physical needs, but rather produces truly when his life activity is free and autonomous.

However, under capitalism, there is the negation of these human traits. As man's labour is estranged, he loses his relation to his species, his humanity. The alienation of man from himself, his species-being and nature means that man has lost his essential relation to his being and that his 'life-activity' in its estranged form becomes a mere means to his physical existence. Man's consciousness of his species is 'transformed by estrangement in such a way that species [-life] becomes for him a means' (69). This means that those specifically human potentialities which make an individual a member of the human species remain unrealised, and thereby 'the unique configuration of relations which distinguishes the individual as a human being has been transformed into something quite different by the performance of capitalist labour' (Ollman 1971, 151).

Marx's discussion of alienation of man from his species, in fact, presents a far deeper appraisal of the malaise of alienation than in man's alienation in relation to his product or productive activity. This relation, in fact, is qualitatively different from other relations which we have discussed. This aspect of 'alienation can be more clearly grasped if we consider it a reformulation of man's alienation in his work, product and other men, viewed now from the angle of the individual's membership in the species' (ibid. 151). Thus, alienated labour beside alienating man from the nature outside him also alienates him from his own species; 'in tearing away from man the object of his production [i.e. the objectification of man's species-life: N.K.], therefore, estranged labour tears from him his *species-life*, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him' (69). Labour, the 'life-activity' of man is his essence. For Marx, 'the productive activity is the life of the species' (68). But under the estranged labour, the human individual is deprived of the objects he produces, which results in his being deprived of his objective species-life (see also McLellan 1972, 222). There is a close relation between species alienation and social alienation. The proposition that man's species nature is estranged in fact means that one man is estranged from the other, and also that each of them is estranged from man's essential nature.

5 5.4. Man's relation to fellow men

This brings us to the fourth aspect of alienation: the alienation from the fellow human beings. It is an immediate consequence of man's alienation from the product of his labour, from his life-activity, and from his species being. Marx says: 'The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is realised and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men. Hence within the relationship of estranged labour each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker' (70). The alienation from other fellow men is an important form of alienation in Marx, but as Schacht points out Marx uses the term 'alienation from other men' in the present connection rather infrequently: 'To grasp his meaning, therefore, one must rely largely upon

passages he does not use it, but discusses the same sort of relation of men to each other' (Schacht 1971, 102; see also ibid., 103-104).

In the overall discussion of alienated labour, Marx starts with the concepts that are derived from the economic structure and the empirical facts of capitalist society. The whole complex of relationships under the alienated labour is scrutinised to show 'how the concept of estranged, alienated labour must express and present itself in real life' (70). The social alienation involved in the product and productive activity provides the point for Marx's elaboration. If the product of labour does not belong to the worker; and if this product confronts him as an alien power, then to whom does it belong? Likewise, if the worker's productive activity (labour) does not belong to the worker, and it is instead a coercive activity, to whom, then does it belong? It is apparent that it belongs to a being other than the worker, which cannot be the gods or nature. The magnificent buildings raised in the service of gods might appear as belonging to gods. 'However, the gods on their own were not the lords of labour. No more was *nature*. And what a contradiction it would be if, the more man subjugated nature by his labour, and more the miracles of the gods were rendered superfluous by the miracles of industry, the more man were to renounce the joy of production and the enjoyment of the product to please these powers' (70). It follows from this that this alien power is no other being except man 'in whose service labour is done and for whose benefit the product of labour is provided' (70).

In these formulations, Marx apparently envisages alienation as inherent in the social relations of capitalist society. In his *OJQ* Marx had declared the endemic egoism to be the distinctive feature of civil society. The civil society (capitalist society) is the sphere of egoism, of *bellum omnium contra omnes*. The society as such in sight of the political economist, according to Marx, 'is civil society in which every individual is a totality of needs and only exists for the other person, as the other exists for him, insofar as each becomes a means for the other (113). The chief concern of egoistic man is his self-interest. Self-interest 'makes every man see in other men not the *realisation* of his own freedom, but the barrier to it' (CW3, 163). Capitalism fosters egoism and rivalry towards the fellow human beings. The alienation from other men in Marx 'is to be understood as involving a complete absence of fellow feelings, an estimation of others as of no more positive significance than that of means to personal ends, and an antagonism based on a

feeling of rivalry and the anticipation of attempted counterexploitation. It is grounded in a self-centeredness which attends only to private advantage, and in a self-conception which excludes any idea of sociality' (Schacht 1971, 104).

Under the capitalist mode of production, the product of man's labour and the activity of production becoming alien and hostile to the worker means that 'someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him' (71). The alienation of man from himself and from nature also expresses itself in the relation with other people. It is in Marx's expression a 'practical' medium through which alienation takes place. Through alienated labour, man creates not only the estranged relation to his products or the productive activity as the alien and hostile powers over him; 'he also creates the relationship in which other men stand to his production and to his product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. Just as he creates his own production as the loss of his reality, as his punishment; his own product as a loss, as a product not belonging to him; so he creates the domination of the person who does not produce over production and over the product' (71). Thus worker's activity becomes estranged from himself; he also confers upon the stranger, the master of the product an activity which is not his own.

5.5.5. Alienation under capitalism

The relations under capital are the facets of capitalist's powers. The capitalist is the embodiment of capital and its power. In this society one class appropriates which another class produces, because wage-labour, a basic social relation of capitalist society, according to Marx, is a direct result of alienated labour, and alienated labour a direct cause of private property. As the social power of private property relationships increases and develops, so is there an inflection in egoistic, asocial and alienated existence of the worker. For Marx a man's labour is truly his own only when it is spontaneous and a free self-directed activity, reflecting his personality and free will. But the wag-labour, as imposed and forced labour stands opposed to the worker. In his 'Comments on Mill' (1844), Marx enumerates the following elements contained in wage-labour: '(1) estrangement and fortuitous connection between labour and the subject who labours; (2) estrangement and fortuitous connection between labour and the object of labour; (3) that the

worker's role is determined by social needs which, however, are alien to him and a compulsion to which he submits out of egoistic need and necessity, and which have for him only the significance of a means of satisfying his dire need, just as for them he exists only as a slave of their needs; (4) that to the worker the maintenance of his individual existence appears to be the *purpose* of his activity and what he actually does is regarded by him only as a means; that he carries on his life's activity in order to earn means of *subsistence*' (CW3, 220).

Marx explicitly locates alienation as being the very root of capitalist society. I quote again from his above-cited article, where Marx says: 'To say that *man* is estranged from himself, therefore, is the same thing as saying that the *society* of this estranged man is a caricature of his *real community*, of his true species-life, that his activity therefore appears to him as a torment, his own creation as an alien power, his wealth as poverty, the *essential bond* linking him with other men as an unessential bond, and separation from his fellow men, on the other hand, as his true mode of existence' (CW3, 217). From the ongoing description, it might appear that the whole discussion under capitalism revolves round the antagonistic economic structure. But the fourfold alienation in the means of production, as described above, is not confined only to the economic sphere. It includes all production because production in general involves all the spheres of man's life or is 'the reality of man' (91). It is for this reason that Marx regards religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc. only particular modes of production which fall under the general law of private property. Production, in *The German Ideology*, is explained not merely as the reproduction of the physical individuals, but 'rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part' (Marx & Engels 1976, 37; CW5, 31-32). In view of this, we can say that under capitalistic system all such expressions of life are various aspects of man's alienation by virtue of their internal relation to private property and the pervasive fetishism of commodities.

Marx firmly believed that capitalism thwarted the distinctively human potentialities. 'Capitalism is directed not towards satisfying human needs but towards reproducing value, increased by appropriated surplus-value' (Schlesinger 1950, 181; for details on Marx's general theory of the collapse of capitalism, see ibid., 178-87). The human predicament under capitalism is described well by Conway: 'Private ownership of the means of production, production for

profit, and wage-labourer all militate against human living. The condition to which human beings are reduced under capitalism as a result of its constitutive economic institutions preventing the actualisation of the distinctively human potentialities was called by Marx *alienation* or *self-estrangement*. In capitalism, human beings are estranged from their human essence' (Conway 1987, 34). For Marx, the phenomenon of alienation is not due to any intellectual error, whose remedy lay in correcting the error. Alienation, according to Marx, is an objective fact of individual's life. But it also has its subjective aspect. It lies in the consciousness of society, especially its ideology. It also has its 'subjective manifestations in the thoughts and feelings of those who suffer from it. A human being who is unable to live a human life is hardly going to be able to sustain either a sense that life has meaning or a sense of self-worth, unless by resorting to illusions about his or her condition that hide the truth from him- or herself. Pre-eminent among such illusions is religious faith' (ibid., 35).

Political economy is also a manifestation of ideological consciousness of society, an expression of the alienation of capitalist society. Avineri expresses the Marxian view thus: 'Political economy thus, according to Marx, ideologically reflects alienated life, as indicated by its insistence that its concepts have objective, ontological reality and attain a validity external to the specific human relations whose organisational principles it tries to express and systematise. Alienation is created in capitalist society not by the production of commodities but by the transformation of this production, according to political economy, from objectified human activity into "objective" laws which independently regulate human activity. The human subject becomes the object of his own products, and the laws of political economy are only an ultimate and radical expression of this inverted consciousness that makes man into a predicate of his own products and thus mystify human activity' (Avineri 1970, 107-108).

Within the capitalist society, according to Marx, the proletariat is the most alienated class by virtue of its economic function. The proletariat can only exist as a class where the means of production are in the hands of private ownership, the basis of alienation. 'The effects of alienation,' observes Giddens, 'are focused through the class structure, and are experienced in concentrated fashion by the proletariat. The transfer of the notion of the alienation from a general ontological category, which is how it is used both by Hegel and Feuerbach, to a specific social

and historical context, is the main theme of Marx's approach in the *Manuscripts.* Marx does not hold, however, that alienation is wholly confined to the position of wage-labourer. The capitalist is himself subservient to capital in the sense that the rule of private property and of money dominates his own existence' (Giddens 1971, 14-15). In other words, in capitalist society all are under the sway of alienation, 'from the capitalist whose life is dominated by the compulsive laws of capital accumulation and the necessity for seeking more and more profit, to the writers and artists who sell their creative talents to the highest commercial bidder.... The alienation of the working class is the alienation of the whole society: the exploitative relation between capital and labour seeps through the entire social structure and "an inhuman power" rules everything' (Swingewood 1975, 92-93). In the next section, I consider the division of labour under capitalistic mode of production which Marx regards as closely associated with the phenomenon of alienation.

5.6. Division of labour and alienation

The concept of 'division of labour' in the *EPM* is closely related to the problem of alienation. Unlike the common use of the term as at present, Marx's concept of it as with private property is rather at a high level of philosophical sophistication. I have analysed and elaborated Marx's views on man as a total being, with uniquely human potentialities whose realisation is essential for human flourishing. But this vision of man is negated in the productive process whereby the subject and object appear in their inverted relationship to each other: the product becomes man's master, and man, the producer of the object becomes an object-less being. 'These two aspects,' says Avineri 'are not self-contradictory, since their interdependence is established by the transformative method. Once the objects cease to be the objects of human activity and become independent beings, subjects unto themselves, man himself remains devoid of objects and realisation' (Avineri 1970, 117).

Marx's concept of division of labour has to be appreciated within the sphere of capitalistic mode of production. The individuals engaged in the productive activity are not geared to increase

each other's potentialities as communal beings. They are instead competitors whose personal interests through incentives like extra bonus for high productivity and other exploitative devices by the owners of the means of production are generally at variance with the growth of the potentialities of others. But the basic presupposition of Marx's views here is that labour essentially is a creative activity. Joachim Israel aptly remarks in this connection: 'In work man's potentialities for self-realisation exist in a latent form. However, Marx conceived of self-realisation not as an individualistic act alone. It is not only the question of an individual's giving expression to his own capacities. Self-realisation, to Marx's way of thinking, is just as much a social activity. Man participating in the social or total process of production, realises by his activities the potentialities of the whole species to create a world shaped according to principles which agree with normative concepts of self-realisation' (Israel 1971, 45-46). But when human activity becomes a coercive activity, it becomes an alienated form of activity. In the context of his vision of man as a communal being, the division of labour for Marx is partly instrumental in causing alienation of labour. It is 'the source of the history of man's alienated, isolated, desolated, and enslaved existence. It goes against everything which pertains to the meaning of man. Divided labour, labour "naturally and not voluntarily divided", disrupts the total content of human existence, by severing man from his natural universal inorganic body because he has no longer any control over the instruments of production; from his social body, because his own work does not belong to him, and thus he has no means to express his life to others and to himself, nor to satisfy the needs of another human life, and finally, with the growth of modern capitalism and modern monopolies and machineries, the division of labour cuts man off from the power to sustain the life of his organic body, because it is now the abstract demands and forces of production which regulate the manner in which his vital needs are or are not to be met' (Santilli l973, 82-83).

In the *EPM* and in the later works like *The German ideology*, and *Capital*, Marx pays a close attention to the problem of the division of labour, both in its progressive role, because it plays a vital role in the development of production, and its damaging role, which becomes a substantial factor in the alienation of labour. Besides being the source of the emergence of classes and class antagonisms, the division of labour on its positive side has also been a booster to

production. Marx says: 'As for the *essence of the division of labour* -- and of course the division of labour had to be conceived as a major driving force in the production of wealth as soon as *labour* was recognised as the *essence of private property* -- i.e. as for the *estranged and alienated form of human activity as an activity of the species* -- the political economists are very vague and self-contradictory about it' (113). In *The German Ideology* and Marx's later works the question of the division of labour in relation to historical development of various forms of property is expressed with greater precision than in the *EPM*. For instance, in *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels write. 'How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labour has been carried. Each new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension of productive forces already known ... causes a further development of the division of labour.' In addition: 'The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of property, i.e. the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument and product of labour' (Marx & Engels 1976, 38; for tribal, ancient and feudal forms of property, see ibid. 38-41; see also Acton 1955, 126).

Marx views man as a universal producer. Historically, all the major developments in technique and tools lead to a more complex mode of production. It leads to further division of labour, which reduces man to 'a one-sided being since it makes his occupation (e.g. farming, working for a wage) into his main characteristic (peasant, labourer). The emergence of this particularism sets one man against another, making the basic interhuman relationship one of antagonism instead of mutuality. This means that the division of labour negates man as a universal being, shuts him up within his own partial self' (Avineri 1970, 122). The division of labour in large scale manufacturing industry manifests the crippling effects on individual workers. Increased mechanical automation makes the worker an unconscious organ of the machine. 'Division of labour within the workshop implies the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men, that are but parts of a mechanism that belongs to him. The division of labour within the society brings into contact independent commodity-producers, who acknowledge no other authority but that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their mutual interests; just as in animal kingdom, the *bellum omnium contra omnes* more or less preserves the

conditions of existence of every species' (Marx 1977, 336). For Marx, the division of labour as an operative principle of economic production creates alienation. Since Marx wrote *Capital*, 'the division of labour within a factory and in society at large has reached new dimensions; and the alienating effects of this division have also become broader, to the point of transforming the worker into a *supplement* to the machine, completely subordinated to it. Charlie Chaplain in one of his socially most profound films, presented work on the assembly line in caricature form. Not only is man frustrated when he becomes a cog in a great production machine, but also in time he begins to manifest the signs of illness, psychic deformation' (Schaff 1980, 103-104; for a sociological study on the effects of mechanisation of production and specialisation of labour on workers, see Blauner 1964). The damaging effect of division of labour on worker under the modern conditions is well expressed by Kolakowski: 'The division of labour becomes a fragmentation of man himself, shackled for life to part-activities whose function of creating use-value is of no concern to him, since the subjective purpose of his work is not to produce useful articles but to satisfy his own elementary needs. Indeed, the capitalist system prefers a stupid, mechanised worker who has no human skills beyond ability to perform the task imposed upon him' (Kolakowski 1981, 286).

Marx's views on division of labour in his early writings are, no doubt, largely sketchy, but they are coherent. Bertell Ollman observes in this connection: 'Cast in many roles its essence easily eludes us. The division of labour serves Marx historically as the exit by which men leave primitive communism, sociologically as the root cause of the division of society into classes, economically as the fount of private property and psychologically as the means of anchoring their distinguishing characteristics in the people of different classes. Marx's treatment of the division of labour, therefore, is both analytic and synthetic, if one can call the imaginative reconstruction of pre-history "synthetic" ' (Ollman 1971, 159-60).

In the *EPM*, the principal objection which Marx raises against the political economy is that it is not able to prove the assertion that 'labour is the essence of private property' (117). This question is integral to the assessment of the nature of division of labour; a correct assessment of it has a direct bearing on the whole problematic of alienation. Marx reproaches the leading political economists in the *EPM* for failing to grasp the real nature of the division of labour, and

not appreciating that this division constitutes the alienation of human activity. Marx says: 'The *division of labour* is the economic expression of the *social character of labour* within the estrangement. Or, since *labour* is only an expression of human activity within alienation, of the manifestation of life as the alienation of life, the *division of labour,* too, is therefore nothing else but the *estranged, alienated* positing of human activity as a *real activity of the species* or as *activity of man as a species-being*' (113).

Under capitalistic mode of production, the phenomenon of alienation reaches its peak. Marx's concern throughout his economic studies and work was the problem of human alienation and the ideal of achieving human emancipation. 'His extraordinary achievement had been to take the ontological concept of alienation and invest it -- quite early in his thought -- with concrete social and economic content. It was because alienation and freedom remained central to his thought that the argument had to be followed to the bitter end' (Kamenka 1972, 151). Marx's critique of liberal, individualistic political economy, as Axelos points out, 'atomises' man, whereas the social, collectivistic economy of Marx would not cut man from society: 'Marx confronts Hegel, Smith, and Ricardo not for the purpose of providing a better history of philosophy -- and philosophy of history -- or a better systematic and historical exposition of political economy, but in order to introduce philosophical and historical *criticism* into philosophy and economy, criticism that would lead to a new "politics". Marx does not minutely trace for us the history of the division of labour from the dawn of pre-history up to modern times; instead, he conducts a critical attack only on certain main forms of the division of labour in society, with special concentration on the present misery that results from them' (Axelos 1976, 57).

According to Marx, the division of labour, private property, and production for monetary exchange, were the essential presuppositions for the appearance of alienation. If alienation had to be overcome in the present capitalist society then one of the first tasks was to eliminate these presuppositions. But the matter does not seem to be so simple. For 'in order to abolish the alienation of work we must overcome the division of labour but this is possible only at a high level of productive technique. The abolition of private ownership, although it may lead to the elimination of a market economy, does not by itself overcome the social division of labour and

thus the alienation of work. The abolition of private ownership is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for overcoming the alienation of work' (Schaff 1980, 204).

Having cited the views of Adam Smith, J.B. Say, and James Mill, Marx reaches the conclusion that all the modern political economists are in agreement that the division of labour and the accumulation of capital mutually determine each other, and they also agree that liberated private property can accomplish a useful and comprehensive division of labour. But their weakness lies in their attempts to locate the division of labour in human nature. Marx summarises Adam Smith's argument as follows: 'Division of labour bestows on labour infinite productive capacity. It stems from the *propensity to exchange* and *barter*, a specifically human propensity which is probably not accidental but is conditioned by the use of reason and speech. The motive of those who engage in exchange is not *humanity* but *egoism*.... As the division of labour springs from the propensity to *exchange*, so it grows and is limited by the *extent of exchange* -- by the extent of the market. In advanced conditions every man is a *merchant*, and society is a *commercial society*' (116).

But the relation between division of labour and the accumulation of capital as enunciated by the political economists, Meszaros points out, was not acceptable to Marx, for an acceptance of it would mean that alienation could not be superseded in reality: 'He defines division of labour as an economic expression that only applies to the conditions of alienation. In Marx's view the political economists confuse "the social character of labour" -- an absolute condition of society -- with the division of labour. One can think of superseding alienation precisely because it is possible to oppose the social character of labour to the alienating historical condition of the division of labour. According to Marx, once life-activity ceases to be regulated on the basis of private property and exchange, it will acquire the character of activity of man as a species-being' (Meszaros 1970, 142). In this way the social character of labour will appear directly, shorn of the alienating mediation of the division of labour.

The separation of town and country, in Marx's works after the *EPM*, is regarded as of vital importance in the division of labour. 'The most important division of material and mental labour is the separation of town and country. The contradiction between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilisation, from tribe to state, from locality to nation, and

runs through the whole history of civilisation to the present day [the Anti-Corn Law League]' (Marx & Engels 1976, 72). In *Capital* Marx repeats the importance of the separation between town and country: 'The foundation of every division of labour that is well developed, and brought about by the exchange of commodities, is the separation between town and country. It may be said, that the whole economic history of mankind is summed up in the movement of this antithesis' (Marx 1977, 333; for a full discussion of division of labour and manufacture, see ibid., 331-39.)

In *Capital*, Marx differentiates between social division of labour in society and the division of labour between the workers, or between the social and detail divisions of labour. By the former is understood the whole complex of different forms of labour which are carried on independently of each other by private producers. In Marx's words, it 'arises from the exchange between spheres of production, that are originally distinct and independent of one another' (Marx 1977, 332). The latter division results from the organisation within the workshop. This division in production, between capital and labour is within the production process. Marx says that these two forms of division of labour, while practically are mutually related and are similar in many ways, are different in their origin and development.

Coming back to the *EPM*, it seems that Marx was not able to draw a clear distinction between the social and detail divisions of labour. Barbalet writes: 'In his discussion of the concept "division of labour" in the writings of political economists Marx moves from a consideration of the social division of labour, in which the products of divided labour are exchanged socially in the market, to a consideration of the division of labour within production, which impoverishes the worker, without being aware that he is dealing with two different kinds of divisions of labour. The fault primarily lies with political economy, of course, and Marx had not yet picked it up in 1844' (Barbalet 1983, 113). At the same time, it is understandable that at this early stage in his studies in political economy, Marx needed a lot more work before he was able to offer a detailed critique of political economy.

5.7. Money as man's alienated self and political economy

We have seen the central role of money in the alienation of man when discussing Marx's earlier article *OJQ*. In the *EPM* Marx devotes a special section of about five pages to money as the very essence of man's alienation. In this section I will attempt only an overview of Marx's ideas, because it is not possible to summarise his views without losing their philosophical depth or their literary originality (see also Meek 1973, 135).

The analysis of private property and human needs under capitalism leads Marx to question the presuppositions of political economy, according to which the 'individuals in capitalist economy, were formally free, that in the contract between worker and employer a basic bargain was made. What, then, was the mechanism whereby a man, unbeknownst even to himself, was alienated and enslaved? Marx found the answer in "money". Money is the most impersonal form of value. It is seemingly neutral. A man who has a direct obligation to another, as a serf does to a master, knows directly the source of power over him. But one who sells his labour power for money may feel himself to be free. The product of the labourer can thus be easily "abstracted" into money and, through the exchange system, be "abstracted" from him' (Bell 1988, 361-62). In the earlier part of the third Manuscript Marx argues that money replaces human qualities to quantitative values. 'The need for money is therefore the true need produced by the economic system, and it is the only need which the latter produces. The *quantity* of money becomes to an even greater degree its sole *effective* quality. Just as it reduces everything to its abstract form, so it reduces itself in the course of its own movement to *quantitative* entity. *Excess* and *intemperance* come to be its true norm' (101).

The process of alienation which turns the worker into a thing, as an object to be bought and sold, also alienates the capitalist, who is deprived of his personality in a different way. He is reduced to an abstract money-power. As he becomes a personification of this, his human qualities are transformed into aspects of it.

The cool passion of the philosopher in the section on money, in Axelos's words, turns into a prophetic rage against a particular reality of the reified world: 'Logic and feeling take up the battle against the *res* par excellence, money.... Its essence is simply the universality of its properties, and its being can be seen as a being-able-to that is unlimited in power' (Axelos 1976,

72-73). Marx unleashes his violent denunciation of the corrupting power of money by quoting Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust:*

> Wenn ich sechs Hengste zahlen kann
> Sind ihre Krafte nicht die meine?
> Ich renne zu und bin ein rechter Mann
> Als hätt ich vierundzwanzig Beine. (MEGA I, 2, 435.)

And soon afterwards he cites Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens* apostrophising gold:

> Thus much of this will make black white, foul fair,
> Wrong right, base noble, old young, coward valiant.
> Will lug your priests and servants from your sides ...
> Thou common whore of mankind, that putt'st odds
> Among the rout of nations. (120.)

Marx explains Goethe's passage showing the power of money in these words: 'The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money's properties are my -- the possessor's -- properties and essential powers. Thus, what I *am* and *am capable of* is by no means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the *most beautiful* of women. Therefore I am not *ugly*, for the effect of *ugliness* -- its deterrent power -- is nullified by money. I, according to my individual characteristics, am *lame*, but money furnishes me with twenty-four feet. Therefore I am not lame. I am bad, dishonest, unscrupulous, stupid; but money is honoured, and hence its possessor. Money is the supreme good, therefore its possessor is good. Money, besides, saves me the trouble of being dishonest: I am therefore presumed honest. I am *brainless*, but money is the *real brain* of all things and how then should its possessor be brainless' (120-21)?

Marx chooses two leading properties of money from Shakespeare's passage: '(1) It is the visible divinity, the transformation of all human and natural properties into their contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of things: impossibilities are soldered together by it. (2) It is the common whore, the common procurer of people and nations. The distorting and confounding of all human and natural qualities, the fraternisation of impossibilities -- the *divine* power of money -- lies in its *character* as men's estranged, and alienating and self-disposing *species-nature*. Money is the alienated *ability of mankind*' (121).

In his 'Comments of James Mill', Marx regards money as the objective essence of alienation: 'The complete domination of the estranged thing *over* man has become evident in *money*, which is completely indifferent both to the nature of the material, i.e. to the specific nature of the private property, and to the personality of the property owner. What was the domination of person over person is now the general domination of the *thing* over the *person*, of the product over the producer. Just as the concept of the *equivalent*, the value, already implied the *alienation* of private property, so *money* is the sensuous, even objective existence of this *alienation*' (CW3, 221).

The analysis of capitalistic relations of production and the power of money involved in it, according to Marx, shows the inadequacies of political economy and its presuppositions. 'It reveals that the contradictions,' as Kamenka comments, 'of political economy and of economic life are not accidental, but necessary, results of the fundamental presupposition on which they rest -- that alienation of man's labour and man's products from man which is expressed in private property. Until political economy grasps its own essence as alienated human activity, and through the supersession of private property reunites man's activities and products with man as an undivided social and generic being, these contradictions cannot be solved and overcome' (Kamenka 1972, 79).

Political economy elevates the bourgeois activity as universal activity and sees the capitalist mode of production as the close of history. Thus political economy being a science of man, ends up denying man: 'Under the semblance of recognising man, the political economy whose principle is labour rather carries to its logical conclusion the denial of man, since man himself no longer stands in an external relation of tension to the external substance of private property, but has himself become this tense essence of private property. What was previously *being external to oneself*, man's actual externalisation -- has merely become the act of externalising -- the process of alienating' (84).

In the *EPM* Marx comes to realise that the money-system 'reaches its climax with the capitalist mode of production, its innermost nature cannot be understood in a limited historical context but in the broadest ontological framework of man's development through his labour, i.e. through the ontological self-development of labour via the necessary intermediaries involved in

its necessary self-alienation and reification at a determinate stage ... of its process of self-realisation' (Meszaros 1970, 98-99). Under capitalism whose presuppositions were the division of labour, private property and production for monetary return inevitably created alienation in its most acute and all-pervasive form.

CHAPTER 6

THE SUPERSESSION OF ALIENATION

6.1. The Aufhebung of private property

The subjective essence of private property, says Marx in the beginning of the third Manuscript, is labour. It was evidently so in the political economy of Adam Smith and his followers, which recognises labour as its principle and which does not look upon private property as anything more than a condition external to man: 'It is this political economy which has to be regarded on the one hand as a product of the real *energy* and the real *movement* of private property ... as a product of modern *industry*, and on the other hand, as a force which has quickened and glorified the energy and development of modern *industry* and made it a power in the realm of *consciousness*' (83). Adam Smith was rightly called 'the Luther of Political Economy' by Frederick Engels. Just as Luther had attacked the external forms of religion represented by Catholic priesthood, the rituals, etc. as paganism, and instead proclaimed and made religiosity the inner substance of man, so did Smith recognise in the modern political economy labour as the inner essence of private property. But this recognition did not extend beyond its apparent formulations because political economy at the same time was caught up in the contradiction by developing the idea of labour as the sole essence of wealth and yet showing that is had consequences inimical to man: 'Under the semblance of recognising man, the political economy whose principle is labour rather carries to its logical conclusion the denial of man, since man himself no longer stands in an external relation of tension to the external substance of private property, but has himself become this tense essence of private property' (84).

The political economists, argues Marx, 'make private property in its active form the subject, thus simultaneously turning man into the essence -- and at the same time turning man as non-essentiality into the essence -- the contradiction of reality corresponds completely to the contradictory being which they accept as their principle' (85). Political economy, as Chris Arthur

observes, 'cannot conceptualise the matter in a critical way because it takes property in all factors of production for granted. It sees labour as necessarily gaining social recognition only as the value of its product. It sees the social synthesis as achieved only through money and exchange on the market' (Arthur 1983, 12).

In accordance with the Hegelian epistemology, Marx delimits private property into the affirmative category of labour, on the one hand, and the negative category of capital, on the other hand: 'The character of private property is expressed by labour, capital, and the relations between the two' (81). Marx explains that the movement through which these two constituents of private property have to pass in the dialectical process should be taken into account.

Marx's analysis shows that private property can be grasped as a historically specific set of relations to labour. Marx, for instance, shows this relationship in landed property and industrial society thus: 'Just as landed property is the first form of private property, with industry at first confronting it historically merely as a special kind of property -- or, rather, as landed property's liberated slave -- so this process repeats itself in the scientific analysis of the *subjective* essence of private property, *labour*. Labour appears at first only as *agricultural labour*; but then asserts itself as *labour* in general' (86).

In modern industry where, 'all wealth has become *industrial* wealth, the *wealth* of labour; and *industry* is accomplished labour', the private property then reaches a point where 'it can complete its domination over man and become in its most general form, a world-historical power' (86, 87).

Private property as the material, perceptible expression of alienated human being is at the same time a historically necessary form of development leading to its negation, i.e. *communism*. The necessity of private property to the attainment of communism lies in their dialectical relationship, the latter transcending the former. Marx says: 'It is easy to see that the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of *private property* -- more precisely, in that of the economy' (91). It was in the movement of private property, in production and consumption that man up to now had his realisation. 'Religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc. are only *particular* modes of production, and fall under its general law. The positive transcendence of *private property* as the

appropriation of *human* life, is therefore the positive transcendence of all alienation, that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc. to his *human*, i.e. *social*, existence' (91). So far as religious alienation is concerned, it occurs only in the consciousness of man whereas 'economic alienation is that of *real life*, its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects' (91).

In the *EPM*, Marx conceives of private property as the opposite of labour. Its supersession is necessary to abolish the self-alienation of man. But in the creation of new society, the communist society, a partial, political revolution which changes only the balance of power in the existing social structure is not enough, because it does not do away with the alienation of the workers. Marx says explicitly: 'From the relation of estranged labour to private property it follows further that the emancipation of society from private property, etc. from servitude, is expressed in the *political* form of the *emancipation of the workers*; not that *their* emancipation alone is at stake, but because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation -- and it contains this, because the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation' (73).

In quite explicit terms Marx distinguishes between private property which is a result of alienated labour and the 'truly human and social property' (73). There is a commonly held view that Marx advocated a complete abolition of private property. This is a profoundly erroneous interpretation of Marx's views in the *EPM*. Chris Arthur is right in saying that 'Marx distinguishes the ontological necessity of objectification from the historical fact that this sphere has constituted in the shape of private property as a world of estrangement founded on the alienation of labour. This means there is something positive in property, disguised by its alien form as the power of capital, namely the wealth of human self-development.... It is not a question for Marx of annulling private property and all its works, then, but of taking possession of the immense powerful productive forces by and for society' (Arthur 1983, 13; see also Axelos 1976, 238-39). Schacht also is of the opinion that Marx 'accepts Hegel's contention that property is essential to the realisation of personality and urges instead its "genuine appropriation".... To be sure, the institution of private property *as it presently exists* is something he finds strongly objectionable' (Schacht 1971, 85).

Meanwhile, we see Avineri holding a contrary opinion when he contrasts Hegel and Marx for their respective views on the relation between property and human personality. Avineri says: 'Hegel held that property realises human personality in determining itself through objectification in the external, phenomenal world. For Hegel this externalisation constituted realisation and assertion precisely because all objects are ultimately imaginary and the only actuality is the human spirit at the root of creativity and production. Consequently property was to Hegel human freedom realising itself in the world of phenomena, and the lack of property prevents man from participating in this universality. Marx's discussion of property and alienation attempts to subvert the Hegelian identification of property and personality. For Marx property is not the realisation of personality but its negation: not only are the property-less alienated, but so are those who have property. The possession of property by one person necessarily entails its non-possession by another -- a dialectical relation totally absent from Hegel. Consequently the problem is not the assurance of property to all -- to Marx an inherent impossibility and immanent contradiction -- but the abolition of all property relations as such' (Avineri 1970, 109). Obviously, Avineri's interpretation seems to be at variance with Schacht's but it should be noted that Avineri presents Marx's views on private property in its alienated, negative form, and he does not discuss the positive supersession of private property in the passage. In the transcendence of private property -- the private property being a consequence of alienated social labour -- man returns to social labour and the real appropriation of human nature for and through man takes place.

In Marx's later writings, there is ample evidence to support the view that Marx does not think of the abolition of all types of property. For our present purpose, two quotations from two of his later works will be sufficient. First, in *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels say:

'The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property....We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom, activity and independence...

'Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form?

'There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

'Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

'But does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital, i.e. that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except upon conditions of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage-labour' (SW1, 47).

In capitalist society, the dominant form of property is capital, which is not a personal but a social power. Here the deprivation from personal property involves also the denial of individual in his human existence. In *Capital* Marx mentions the new form of unalienated from of property:

'What does the primitive accumulation of capital, i.e. its historical genesis, resolve itself into? In so far it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage-labourers, and therefore a mere change of form, it only means the expropriation of the immediate producers, i.e. the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner. Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labour and the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals.... The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself' (Marx 1977, 713).

Richard Schacht offers two reasons for the common misunderstanding about private property in Marx's writings. The first reason is that Marx in his later writings does not focus upon the inherently positive nature of private property, but rather upon its presently existing form. The second one, 'pertains even to his early writings, is that he employs a term in this connection which can be understood in two quite different ways: *Aufhebung*. This term -- which Hegel uses extensively -- can mean simply "abolition". But it can also convey the idea of elevation to a higher form and preservation in that form. In the latter sense that which is *aufgehoben* is abolished, but only in its existing form' (Schacht 1971, note 15, 85-86). Marx's use of the term needs to be understood in the latter sense, and not in the former, narrow sense. For Marx, the

oppressive and alienative form of private property needs to be replaced by its positive *Aufhebung*.

The solution to the riddle of history, the history of human alienation as a consequence of alienation of man's activity and private property as a consequence of this estranged activity, lies in the true emancipation of labour and the abolition of private property. Private property has made human beings so one-sided that an object is ours when we have possession over it. 'The transcendence of private property is therefore the complete *emancipation* of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and qualities have become, subjectively and objectively, *human*. The eye has become a *human* eye, just as its *object* has become a social, human *object* -- an object made for man by man. The *senses* have therefore become directly in their practice *theoreticians*. They relate themselves to the *thing* for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an *objective human* relation to itself and to man, and vice versa' (94).

The task of effecting this change is undertaken by socialist practice. Velkjo Korac emphasises the basic concern of Marx's conclusion that without complete and true emancipation of labour, people could not become human and society could not become human society: 'The abolition of private property and exploitation are only the first steps in that direction; the humanisation of labour is first immediate task of socialist practice.... Startling with the fact of alienation, Marx showed that total estrangement and dehumanisation (in his words "the complete loss of man") has become universal in modern society, causing universal suffering. Marx's aim was true *man* -- living under emancipated conditions of labour and not disintegrated by the division of labour. His vision of humanity's future was founded on the assumption that such a man was not only possible, but the necessary result of social development and essential to the existence of truly human society' (in Fromm 1967, 9; see also Fromm 1961, 58-69; Perlman 1972, 18-21). This society is the communist society, a definite phase but not the final stage of historical developments. In the following three sections, we outline Marx's theory of communism and of the 'total' man.

6.2. Communism: the negation of the negation

Marx in the *EPM* tries to show that the alienation phenomenon in its various forms cannot be remedied by political economy because of its uncritical acceptance of the presuppositions of private property as the foundation of the economic laws and the facts of economic life. Due to its inability to see the true basis of private property in human alienation, political economy was not able to offer any solutions to overcome alienation. Marx defines the general nature of private property as it has arisen as a result of alienated labour 'in its relation to truly human and social property' (73). The question of criticising private property in itself is not of prime importance so long as human alienation which underlies it goes unrecognised. As mentioned before, Marx in the *EPM* insists on the logical priority of alienation. Marx, as Wolfgang Jahn rightly elucidates, is not dealing with the problem of the historical origin of private property, but rather how it actually appears in mode of production based on alienated labour (Jahn 1957, 856; see also Kamenka 1972, 82). For Marx the real question was not to ask ourselves: What is the origin of the private property?, but rather: How does man come to alienate his labour? Marx says: 'We have already gone a long way to the solution of this problem by *transforming* the question of the *origin of private property* into the question of the relation of *alienated labour* to the course of humanity's development. For when one speaks of *private property*, one thinks of dealing with something external to man. When one speaks of labour, one is directly dealing with man himself. This new formulation of the question already contains its solution' (73-74). For Marx the question of alienation was not merely a question of economic facts. His arguments regarding communism in the *EPM* rely heavily on non-economic and non-sociological terms.

In the *EPM* Marx criticises the 'crude communism' for its failure to see the alienation behind private property. 'Marx's point seems to be,' explains Kamenka 'that if we regard private property purely as such we will think that the contradiction of political economy can be overcome by converting private property into public property, whereas in truth they can only be overcome by a thorough-going rejectlon and overcoming of all aspects of alienation, including the very concept of property and the very distinction between the "individual" and "society" ' (Kamenka 1972, 84).

We come across Marx's first extensive discussion of his conception of communism in a section of the *EPM* called 'Private Property and Communism', and some further remarks in 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole'. In this regard, Marx's peculiar use of the terms 'communism' and 'socialism' should be noted. Marx at this time does not seem to have worked out terms adequately expressing the conception of communism he was evolving. The ambiguity of the early works gives way to precise formulations of the terms in his later works. The editors of the *EPM* observe: 'In the *EPM of 1844* the word "socialism" is used to denote not the development of social thought, but the stage of society at which it has carried out a revolutionary transformation, abolished private property, class antagonisms, alienation and so on. In the same sense Marx used the expression "communism equating humanism" ' (189, footnote 32; see also McLellan 1972, 237).

The discussion of communism in the *EPM* forms an essential phase in Marx's development of the philosophical basis of communism. The other important text in this respect is his *Critique of Gotha Programme*, which he wrote about thirty years later, in May 1875, criticising the programme of the German Workers' Party. It substantiates largely his views as outlined in the *EPM*. Marx, in both texts steers clear of outlining the shape of the future society. This limitation, according to Avineri, is due to Marx's own epistemological premises: 'Since the future is not yet an existing reality, any discussion of it reverts to philosophical idealism in discussing objects which exist only in the consciousness of the thinking subject. Marx's discussions of future society are therefore most austere and refrained. He never tries to rival those socialists whom he called utopians by construing detailed blue-prints for a communist society, since for him communist society will be determined by the specific conditions under which it is established, and these conditions cannot be predicted in advance' (Avineri 1970, 221; for a critique of Avineri's views on socialism as explained in the *EPM* and the *Critique of Gotha Programme*, see van den Berg 1988, 54-65; Elster 1985, 451-52). The nature of historical change up to 1844 did not find any clear expression in Marx's writing. According to David McLellan it would not be fair to say Marx had no developmental view of society in the *EPM*. But 'that view, however was vague and although Marx had used Hegel against Feuerbach to demonstrate the

importance of man's self-creation through labour, this still remained very abstract' (in Burke 1981, 118).

In the beginning of the section 'Private Property and Communism' Marx shows that there is an internal relation of antithesis between labour and capital, which has not so far been grasped in its contradiction. When viewed within the ambit of Hegelian dialectic of identity and difference, capital and labour form a unity of opposites in which one side reproduces the other. Labour is identified as 'the subjective essence of private property as exclusion of private property' and capital as 'objective labour as exclusion of labour'. On this basis the private property expresses to be 'in a developed state of contradiction'. It demonstrates, Marx argues, the comprehension of propertylessness and property as the antithesis of labour and capital can only be truly understood in its contradiction 'a dynamic relationship driving towards resolution' (87). It is by looking at labour as the over-riding moment in alienated labour and private property complex that we can establish the conditions of the supersession of alienation. The *Aufhebung* of self-alienation, according to Marx, follows the same dialectical course as the process of development as alienation, i.e. from the individual to the particular, and from particular to the universal. In this syllogism private property considered in its objective aspect, with labour as its essence, represents individual, capital the particular and communism the universal. Here Marx defines capital in terms of labour and labour in terms of private property, thus capital and labour forming the basic units of explanation. The contradiction described in the *EPM*, as Barbalet points out, 'is not a class contradiction between labour and capital, but an ontological contradiction internal to private property'. In addition, 'the dynamic relationship moving inexorably to its resolution is the dynamic of contradiction within private property' (Barbalet 1983, 77).

In this relation of opposites 'the worker has the misfortune to be a *living* capital, and therefore an *indigent* capital, one which loses its interest, and hence its livelihood, every moment it is not working. The *value* of the worker as capital rises according to demand and supply, and *physically* too his *existence*, his *life*, was and is looked upon as a supply of a *commodity* like any other. The worker produces capital, capital produces him -- hence he produces himself, and man as *worker*, as a *commodity*, is the product of this entire cycle' (75). At this stage, Marx does not

make any distinction between worker, labour and labour power. His mentioning of the value of the worker, should in fact be the value of the labour power, as a specific commodity, but it cannot be called capital. In fact, two important categories of Marxist economic theory, wage-labour and surplus-value are not even mentioned in the *EPM*. In view of this, *EPM* cannot be regarded a mature economic work. At this juncture, in Ernest Mandel's words, 'Marx has only a fragmentary grasp of the problem of an overall criticism of political economy. This criticism still trips over a fundamental stumbling block: Marx has not yet solved the problem of value and surplus value. He has not yet grasped what was rational in classical theory, especially Ricardo's, and his economic analyses inevitably suffer' (Mandel 1971, 35).

The conception of communism in the *EPM* is basically philosophical. The historical development of the present time is explained as taking place in different stages; communism being a part of this process, and passing through a set of stages itself. This development involves at least two main stages, which are decisive and necessary for the dialectical unfolding of the principles of the present society. Each stage, in Avineri's words, 'represents a further *Aufhebung* of these principles. The description of the future society becomes a posthumous analysis of the passing of the bourgeois world: the historicity of Marx's description of communism is thus strongly emphasised against the *a priori* "systems" of the so-called utopian socialists' (Avineri 1970, 221). 'Communism,' as Marx and Engels write in *The German Ideology*, 'is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise' (Marx & Engels 1976, 57).

Marx using the Hegelian terminology in the *EPM* says: 'Communism is the positive mode as the negation of the negation, and hence the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. *Communism* is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society' (100-101). As communism transcends private property, or negates the negation, it follows that private property is a necessity for the attainment of communism; because private property is the manifestation of the social labour which is totally alienated. Logically, it means as Barbalet puts it that 'social labour is the

point of departure for the movement towards communism because communism is the obverse of private property and private property is the denial of social labour. The negation of social labour as an empirical absence is the logical pre-requisite of communism and in this sense social labour as the negation of private property is the point of departure for the movement towards communism' (Barbalet 1983, 75).

In the first place we can mention the utopian socialist thought, where the socialists recognise labour as the essence of property, and see the abolition of private property only objectively. Proudhon, for instance, advocates the annulment of capital 'as such', and while Fourier, like the Physiocrats, present agricultural labour at least the exemplary, non-alienating and useful type. Saint Simon, on the contrary, holds industrial labour imbued with these attributes and would like to see the exclusive rule of the industrialists and a general amelioration in worker's condition. In this vast array of partial insights which utopian socialists offer, communism takes us a stage further and represents 'the *positive* expression of annulled private property' (87).

In the *EPM* Marx contrasts 'true communism' with the 'crude communism' of the French utopian socialists. Communism will pass through three forms: the first form, 'crude communism' will give way to the second form of communism which is political in nature and concentrates on the abolition of the state, and third form is that of the ultimate communism. I shall examine now Marx's views on each of these forms.

6.3. The three forms of communism

In its early primitive totalitarian egalitarianism of communist utopias which Marx classifies as 'crude communism', the abolition of private property is effected through its universalization, that is, property for all. This desire appears in a twofold form: 'on the one hand, the domination of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy *everything* which is not capable of being possessed by all as *private property.* It wants to disregard talent, etc. in an *arbitrary* manner', on the other hand, 'for it the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical *possession*.... The

relationship of property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things' (88). This conception of communism finds its clear expression in the animal form of its attitude towards women. To marriage (surely a form of exclusive private property), it contraposes the community of women, in which a women becomes a communal and common property. It is therefore clear that '*this idea of the community of women gives away the secret* of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism (*der rohe und gedankenlose Kommunismus*).... This type of communism, since it negates the *personality* of man in every sphere, is but the logical expression of private property, which is its negation. General *envy* constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which *greed* re-establishes itself, only in *another* way.... How little this overcoming of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor* and crude man who has few needs and who has not yet failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it' (88, 89; see also Berry, 'Need and Egoism in Marx's Early Writings' in Cowling and Wild 1989).

This form of communism, emphasises distribution and consumption without understanding the mechanism of production. It reduces human needs to the bare minimum; the people are driven to an existence of asceticism. Here the only community emerging is the community of alienated labour, and the equality of wages paid out by the community as the universal capitalist. 'Both sides of the relationship,' according to Marx, 'are raised to an *imagined* universality, *labour* as the category in which every person is placed, and *capital* as the acknowledged universality and power of the community' (89). The plight of the wage workers, typified by crude communism, keeps intact the distinct elements of alienation. This form of communism 'is not an assimilation of the alienated world but, on the contrary, an extreme form of alienation that consists in imposing the present condition of workers upon everybody' (Kolakowski 1981, 140; see also Avineri 1970, 223-24).

It is most likely that Marx's description of crude communism had especially two groups of French communists in view, who belonged to secret associations. Engels in his article 'The Progress of Social Reform on the Continent', published in *New Moral World* in November 1843, mentions the rapid spread of communism in Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, and other large

manufacturing towns. He writes: 'Various secret associations followed each other, among which the "Travailleurs Egalitaires", or Equalitarian Working Men, and the Humanitarians, were the most considerable. The Equalitarians were rather a "rough set", like the Babouvists of the great Revolution; they purposed making the world a working-man's community, putting down every refinement of civilisation, fine arts, etc. as useless, dangerous and aristocratic luxuries, a prejudice necessarily arising from their total ignorance of history and political economy. The Humanitarians were known particularly for their attacks on marriage, family, and other similar institutions' (CW3, 397; see also Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen 1976, 85-87).

The first form of communism containing its internal contradictions gives way to the second form of communism which, according to Marx, is 'still political in nature, democratic or despotic' and which is 'with the abolition of the state, yet still incomplete, and being still affected by private property, i.e. by the alienation of man' (90).

The reference to democratic communism by Marx, as McLellan suggests, must be the utopian sort which was advocated by Cabet in Paris at that time: 'The despotic type probably alludes to the transitory dictatorship of the proletariat advocated by the followers of Babeuf. The second type of communism, involving the abolition of the state, was represented by Dezamy, author of the famous phrase about an accountant and an a register being all that was necessary to ensure the perfect functioning of the future communist society' (McLellan 1972, 236). In both these forms, 'communism knows itself as the reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcendence of human self-alienation; but since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as little the *human* nature of need, it remains captive to it and infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence' (90).

The earliest forms of communism eventually lead to a higher form of communism. In September 1843, Marx had rejected communism as a 'dogmatic abstraction', and socialism at this time Marx regarded 'only a particular one-sided realisation of the socialist principle' (Marx 1971b, 80, 81). But Marx as a communist in 1844, sees communism which secures the full actualisation of human potentialities of the individual members for the sake of the community (see Elster 1985, 446; Conway 1987, 41). Marx's discussion of the future society was couched in general terms since he disclaimed any intention of writing '(Comtist) recipes for the cookshops of

the future' (cited in Bottomore 1988, 89). The projection of true communism as 'positive humanism' or the humanisation of mankind which Marx presents in the *EPM* deserves full citation. '*Communism* as the *positive* transcendence of *private property* as *human self-estrangement,* and therefore as the real *appropriation* of the *human* essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being (*als eines gesellschaftlichen, d.h. menschlichen Menschen*), -- a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous developments. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man -- the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution' (90). As the whole history of man has only been a history of alienation, man has found himself alienated from his activity and dispossessed of his being. As the man up to now has been alienated, so under communism he will return to his human essence. It is a society where people can employ freely their faculties and appropriate their products in their capacity as 'total men'.

Avineri views communism as a movement in capitalist society, and communism as a future organising principle of the new society to be two different modes of the same principle: 'communism as a movement is the microcosmos of future communist society' (Avineri 1970, 230). But Meszaros differentiates between communism as a political movement and communism as an all-inclusive social practice in the future communist society: 'When communism transforms itself into "positively self-deriving humanism" it necessarily ceases to be politics. The crucial Marxian distinction is that between communism as a *political movement* -- which is confined to a particular historical stage of human development -- and communism as comprehensive *social practice*. This second sense is referred to when Marx writes that "this communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully-developed humanism equals naturalism" ' (Meszaros 1970, 161). If we view politics as a partiality relevant only to communism as a political movement as Meszaros does, then we leave the sphere of social practice extremely vague. No doubt social practice in the future society can represent the totality of various spheres,

but it is hard to imagine a social totality where the political sphere has ceased to be of significance.

Marx is particularly emphatic in making the recovery of social character of man as an integral part of the new society. The social relationship that unites man with nature and the fellow human beings is a real and fundamental relationship, and 'it is this relationship that is alienated from the very origin of historical development. The being of man and the nature of things are alienated from the beginning. For man, in the course of his natural development, performs actions only as self-externalisation in self-alienation. By his social labour he creates a whole world of objects which is nevertheless foreign to him, having no part in his being. Natural drives and essential, objective forces urge human beings toward the object of their needs; yet this reign of objects implies the reification of everything there is. The activity of man, which by its essence is to be *natural* and *human*, stands as neither natural nor human in that it continues to be reifying and alienated' (Axelos 1976, 219). Man realises himself only through labour, but in the very act of self-realisation he is alienated. But under the new society a radical change in the character of labour, the conversion of man's productive activity into creative activity, will change the idea of the sense of life. Hitherto 'alienated labour had as its consequence the idea that the supreme goods of life were in the sphere of consumption, the conversion of production activity into a creative art will have as its consequence the idea that the true sense of existence lies in man's active life itself and in creation' (Shinkoruk 1988, 156).

But in the new society man will recover his total humanity. 'The transcendence of alienation, the return of man to his human nature, to his social essence, universal reconciliation, this whole re-integration of man for the first time able to become reality -- all this means transcending simple *egocentricity* and *subjectivity*, transcending the reign of the *utilitarian* and *egoistic* need and enjoyment' (Axelos 1976, 22). Man's relationship to the fellow men will no longer be based upon the egoistic self-seeking and competition, but upon a conscious dependence of individual and the social community. 'Man's relation to his fellow men,' in Avineri's words, 'ceases to be competitive. He no longer achieves his goals at the expense of his fellow men, since competition was the natural corollary of a world which conceived the quantity of its objects and products as finite and given. In the new society man becomes conscious that the products are

human artifacts. As such their quantity is not limited but depends upon the proper organisation of man's creative powers' (Avineri 1970, 227).

Throughout his early writings Marx's thought centres round man and the nature of his relationships. The social character of labour in the non-alienated situation is the basic condition, because only then the products become a direct manifestation of his individuality: '*Just as* society itself produces *man as man*, so is society *produced* by him. Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and their *mode of existence*, are *social*: *social* activity and *social* enjoyment' (91-92). Marx presents the views on the relationship between individual and the society. He emphasises that social aspects of man's existence do not contradict his individuality: 'Above all we must avoid postulating "society" again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual *is the social being*. His manifestations of life, even if they may not appear in the direct form of *communal* manifestations of life carried out in association with others -- are therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life*' (92-93). The mutual relation between man and society also extends to nature: 'The *human* aspect of nature exists only for *social man*; for only then does nature exist for him as a *bond* with *man* -- as his existence for the other and the other's existence for him -- and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the *foundation* of his own *human* existence. Only here has what is to him his *natural* existence become his *human* existence, and nature becomes man for him. Thus *society* is the complete unity of man with nature -- the true resurrection of nature -- the consistent naturalism of man and the consistent humanism of nature' (92).

Under communism man's relation to nature ceases to be determined by objective necessity. Man, of his control over nature, creates objects according to the law of beauty. 'The process of human creativity,' as Avineri says, 'is no longer accompanied by alienation: the creation of objects becomes man's specific activity, no longer limited by the objective necessity of creating for mere survival' (Avineri 1970, 227; see also Shinkoruk 1988, 156-57). Thus human productive activity will create objects in a creative spirit, in pursuit of man's aesthetic needs. Under these conditions, man enters a new stage of development of his manifold potentialities. The products of his activity will no longer confront him as alien and hostile powers over him. By the 'annihilation of the alienated character of the objective world' (141), which is the positive

transcendence of private property, man will for the first time in history liberate himself from the shackles of an alienated existence. Historically, the lives of human beings have been under the sway of the compulsive acquisitive drive, and consequently their existence has been one of alienation. But in the new society, man will achieve a non-acquisitive appropriation of nature. 'The abolition of private property will lead man to the non-possessive appropriation of nature as it is manifest through his needs and his activity and to the conquest of his origin, his being and the totality of the world. He will thus be able to enter into the era of universal reconciliation and all antagonisms between man and nature, between man and man, between subjectivity and objectivity, between freedom and necessity, between reality and thought will have been abolished' (Axelos 1976, 239).

Marx clearly differentiates the historical bases of communism from those of utopian communists. The account of the empirical basis in the movement of private property that Etienne Cabet and Francois Villegardelle tried to show by appealing to certain historical forms of community in the past opposed to private property was untenable. Marx criticises such programme for 'tearing single phrases from the historical process and focusing attention on them as proofs of its historical pedigree ... By so doing it simply makes clear that by far the greater part of this process contradicts its own claim, and that, if it ever has existed, precisely its being in the *past* refutes its pretension to *reality*' (90). Private property, according to Marx, pervades an entire historical period of human development, because it 'is the material perceptible expression of alienated human life' (91). Communism can be a reality only after the *Aufhebung* of private property as an historical phase of man's development. The positive transcendence of private property under communism is therefore the positive transcendence of estrangement in all its forms.

For Marx 'the entire movement of history, just as its actual act of genesis -- the birth act of its empirical existence -- is, therefore, for its thinking consciousness the *comprehended* and *known* process of its *becoming*' (90). Thus the entire revolutionary movement, according to Marx, 'finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of *private property* -- more precisely, in that of the economy' (91). From this it emerges that Marx in 1844 did not regard the birth of new society a consequence of proletarian victory in class struggle. There is no

reference to class struggle in the *EPM*. Barbalet explains the Marxian view cogently: 'Logically, then, social labour is the point of departure for the movement towards communism because communism is the obverse of private property and private property is the denial of social labour.... When Marx does mention something like the victory of one class over another, as in his account of the "victory of the capitalist over the landowner" in the movement from feudalism to capitalism, it is regarded as the result rather than the cause of the "real course of development". What Marx holds to be responsible for this historical movement is the suppression of a previously dominant form of property by another form of property.... in [Marx's] explanation of the revolutionary movement towards communism the basic term is property, not class' (Barbalet 1983, 75-76).

The communistic transformation, envisaged by Marx, will unfold relationship of things to man, not as the extensions of his personality, but as mere external objects. Man will develop a new kind of appropriation, not limited to possession and consumption: 'The positive transcendence of private property -- i.e. the *perceptible* appropriation for and by man of the human essence and of human life, of objective man, of human *achievements* -- should not be conceived merely in the sense of *immediate*, one-sided *enjoyment*, merely in the sense of *possessing*, of *having*. Man appropriates his total essence in a total manner, that is to say as whole man. Each of his *human* relations to the world -- seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving -- in short, all the organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, are in their *objective orientation* or in their *orientation to the object*, the appropriation of the object; the appropriation of the *human* reality. Their orientation to the object is the *manifestation of the human reality*' (93-94). In this passage Marx presents his concept of an 'all-sided' and 'total' man, a humanised man. In the following section we have a closer look at the 'total' man.

6.4. The total man

Marx's concept of 'total' man offers a historically emerging perspective on the development of man. However, this concept of man is inseparable from the history of the ideal of humanism. We can briefly mention the idea of the universality of man in the Renaissance conviction that man is a being distinguished from God and from nature by his possession of a relative and an unstable place in the midst of all other, more stable, beings (see Baczko 1967, 167). For instance, Pico della Mirandola (1468-1494) views the emergence and place of man only after God had completed all things: 'But there was nothing in the archetypes from which He could mould a new sprout, nor anything in His storehouses which He could bestow as a heritage upon a new son, nor was there an empty judiciary seat where this contemplator of the universe could sit.... Therefore He took up man, a work of indeterminate form, and, placing him at the midpoint of the world' told him that 'in conformity with thy judgement, in whose hands I have placed thee, thou are confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. I have placed thee at the centre of the world, that from there thou mayest more conveniently look around and see whatsoever is in the world.... Thou, like a judge appointed for being honourable, art the moulder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer' (Pico 1986, 4, 5). For Pico the root of man's excellence and dignity lies in the fact that man is the maker of his own nature. Man may be what he wishes to be, he makes himself what he chooses. The feeling of man's autonomy and his responsibility for himself expressed man's self-assertion in the Renaissance thought in place of the world-views of the medieval ages where man was assigned a stable place in the hierarchical universe. According to Bronislaw Baczko, an important aspect of the idea of the 'universality of man in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the transcendence of those significant feelings of the Renaissance man. Various ideas, often heterogeneous, crossing with each other, culminated in that optimistic notion of the universality of man which was adopted by the philosophy and the world-view of the Enlightenment' (Baczko 1967, 167-68). Marx's concept of man is the bearer of this philosophical and cultural heritage.

For Marx the 'total' man symbolises the highest ideal of man, who is united with himself, with his fellow human beings and with nature. According to Milan Puracha, this concept is important because it expresses a perspective through which the existing alienation is to be overcome: 'The existential structure of man as an objective being and as a being whose essence is

not inherent in the abstract individual but is of a social nature has always determined the most general features of the mode of man's self-assertion: it has always been and will always be possible solely as an assertion of his essential powers, as an active and passionate relation of his being to the world, as the acquisition and the development of the possibilities and values that society imparts to the individual. The self-assertion of the individual occurs in an alienated form for a long period. The active being of the individual is suffering, because it is exploited in exhausting and deadening work; his social being is alienated and thus transformed into an uncontrollable power which opposes him and reduces him to a slave' (in Fromm 1967, 146-47).

Hitherto all human faculties have been vitiated by alienation; the supersession of this alienation inevitably paves the ground for a total human integration and reconciliation. All human faculties become means of appropriating human reality. But this was not possible for alienated man, whose sensibilities had been blunted by the egoistic drive to possessiveness, the sense of 'having'. The positive *Aufhebung* of private property will lead to human emancipation. All human senses, according to Marx, are degraded by private property. The dealer in minerals sees only the market value of the jewels, not their unique value. In the alienated condition, all physical and intellectual senses and human faculties are reduced to acquisitiveness and possession, the 'sense of having'. Marx writes: 'Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only *ours* when we have it ... In the place of *all* physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer alienation of *all* these senses, the sense of *having* (*der Sinn des Habens*). The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world' (94). The transcendence of private property liberates the human senses and man begins to see the world and things in a human, non-acquisitive way. 'The eye has become a *human* eye, just as its *object* has become a social, *human* object -- an object made for man by man. The *senses* have therefore become directly in their practice *theoreticians*. They relate themselves to the *thing* for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an *objective human* relation to itself and to man, and vice versa' (94).

The emancipation of human senses and potentialities will, as Axelos puts it, 'show forth all the wealth of his natural, human and social needs, his passion will become action, and his freedom will coincide with necessity' (Axelos 1976, 243). The socialist man, as Marx portrays

him, is the man returned to himself, complete, conscious and matured within the entire wealth of previous development. 'Man is to become "social" or "socialist" in the sense that he will dwell in aesthetic communion with the humanly produced world around him after he has arranged it according to the laws of beauty and trained his senses to relate to each thing for the sake of the thing. Mirroring the self-activity of the new freely creative and perceptive man, the external objects will confirm his essential nature instead of confronting him as alien and ugly denials of himself' (Tucker 1972, 159). This is 'total' and 'rich' man, where man has become fully human. As Parekh phrases it, this man 'is not a self-divided being caught up in the morbid and paralysing conflict between his flesh and spirit, or between his natural and human being. He does not deny the demands of his nature, but his behaviour is not dictated by them. He has humanised his nature ... Ascetic self-denial on the one hand, and indiscriminate self-indulgence on the other, are both alien to his way of life' (Parekh 1975, 59).

The total man is completely emancipated from the religious affliction of 'other worldliness' (for the conception of another life, see Murray 1964, 154-68). According to Marx, his model-man, as the Polish philosopher Marek Fritzhand comments, 'is a man completely absorbed in this world and not in "the next"; a man who does not brood over death, but fights for a meaningful and valuable life. Life is meaningful and valuable only when it is lived intensely and thoroughly, only when the human being can realise himself during his lifetime by developing all his human abilities and satisfying all his human needs.... The "total" man is a complete man, whose self-realisation knows no bounds. He is a human individual not separated by private property from the "totality" of the world of culture and civilisation. The "totality" of that human being consists in his "possession" of that total world -- possession understood here as the fullest possible share in the creation and enjoyment of the goods of culture and civilisation' (in Fromm 1967, 157-58, 159). Marx in his conception of 'total' and 'rich' human being works out a fascinating theory of human needs and outlines the sketch of the new society in which a fully human being is possible. Marx writes: 'It will be seen how in place of the *wealth* and *poverty* of political economy come the *rich human being* and the rich *human* need. The *rich* human being is simultaneously the human being *in need of* a totality of human manifestations of life -- the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as *need*. Not only *wealth*, but likewise

the *poverty* of man -- under the assumption of socialism -- receives in equal measure a *human* and therefore social significance' (98-99).

According to Marx's assumption communism will produce human beings with finer qualities than under capitalism. The actualisation of human potentialities which Marx regarded desirable were possible in the new society. This set of potentialities Marx calls the human essence. Conway makes a fair assessment when he says: 'The more fully these potentialities were actualised in human beings the more fully human did those individuals become.... In Marx's view capitalism was an extremely dehumanised and dehumanising form of society. This was because its central constitutive economic institutions militated against the actualisation of the distinctively human potentialities of its individual members. These potentialities are only able to achieve their maximum degree of actualisation within the framework of a communist society' (Conway 1987, 30). For the 'total man' societal dimension becomes a reality where man and society are not contraposed against each other, but are rather two different expressions of one thing. The things and products no longer dominate his life.

The concept of a rich and total human being, the *socialist* man, is perhaps the best picture of man in our civilisation. It is the concept of individual who has boundless creative potential whose full development is possible within universal integration of new social reality. This idea of man, however, is not compatible with the man belonging to the cultural heritage whose alienated and reified existence is conditioned by egoism, the sense of 'having' and the ideological web of mundane and ultra-mundane illusions.

CHAPTER 7

THE CRITIQUE OF HEGELIAN CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

7.1. The influence of the Phenomenology on the EPM

The *EPM* contain a profound scrutiny of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (PG), which Marx regards as the true point of origin and the secret of Hegelian philosophy. The last chapter of the *PG*, Absolute Knowledge, is the focus of a detailed discussion, for 'it contains the condensed spirit of the *PG*, speculative dialectics, and also Hegel's *consciousness* concerning both and their relation to one another' (131. In this chapter, Marx, as Habermas indicates, 'follows the strategy of detaching the exposition of consciousness in its manifestations from the framework of the philosophy of identity. He does this in order to bring to light the elements of a critique that often "far surpass Hegel's standpoint", elements that are already contained, although concealed, in the *PG*' (Habermas 1987, 25).

In the preface to the *EPM* Marx declares that a critical discussion of Hegelian dialectic and philosophy as a whole is absolutely necessary, a task not yet performed. The German thought had the '*necessary* task of settling accounts between *criticism* and its point of origin -- the Hegelian *dialectic* and German philosophy as a whole' (19). The notes to accomplish this task, which form part of Marx's discussion of communism in the *EPM* were given the title 'Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' by the editors of the *MEGA.*

Which of Hegel's works has Marx in mind when he speaks of Hegelianism? Robert Tucker suggests that the views of those who assume that Hegel's *PR* to be the work from which Marx took his point of departure in the creation of his system, are mistaken: 'Marx's manuscripts ... make it unmistakably plain that the inference is erroneous, and that Hegel's *PG* is the work with which Marxism is immediately affiliated' (Tucker 1972, 125-26). Schacht disagrees with this view while he accepts the importance of *PG* in its own right. He writes: 'Tucker is right in

stressing the importance of the *PG* in the formation of Marx's views; but his depreciation of the influence of the of *PR* upon Marx is unwarranted, as the example of the central Marxian concept of the alienation of labour shows. While the term "alienation" occurs only in the *PG*, Marx's concept of the alienation of labour clearly has its origin in the *PR* as well. And his extremely important view that the alienation of labour and of the self involves the direction of labour by another man is comprehensible only in the light of the latter work' (Schacht 1971, 81).

The influence of the *PG*, no doubt, is paramount in Marx's formulation of his early theory of alienation in general but the specific concept of alienated labour is traceable to the *PR*. Hegel's discussion of the alienation of property (see PR, 52) contains the main element of Marx's conception of alienated labour in the *EPM*. Schacht's assertion that we meet the term 'alienation' only in the *PG* does not seem to be correct. In fact, the term 'alienation' (*Entäusserung*) has been used on a number of places in the *PR*, for instance, in Paragraphs 65, 66, 67, 69, 73, 77 and 80.

To contend that the *PG* or the *PR*, or both of these, as being the only works of Hegel which have a direct bearing on the *EPM*, is, in my view, a tentative undertaking. Marx, for instance in the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) mentions the *PR* specifically for his studies of political economy in these words:

'The first work which I undertook for a solution of the doubts which assailed me was a critical review of the Hegelian *Philosophy of Right*, a work the introduction to which appeared in 1844.... My investigation led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their root in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of "civil society," that, however, the anatomy of the civil society is to be sought in political economy' (SW1, 362). It all leads to the conclusion that Marx's point of departure for the conception of economic alienation and of alienated labour in particular is in the *PR*. The other works having a definite influence on the *EPM* are the *PG* and the *Science of Logic*.

In the following section, I will confine the discussion to Marx's critique of Hegel's notion of alienation and its supersession as contained primarily in the *EPM*. Marx discusses in detail the closing chapter, Absolute Knowledge of the *PR*, which, as cited earlier, 'contains the condensed

spirit of the *PG*, the relationship of the *PG* to speculative dialectics, and also Hegel's *consciousness* concerning both and their relation to one another' (131). In 7.2. and 7.3. I will pay special attention to this chapter.

7.2. The critique of Hegel's conception of alienation

The problem of alienation, according to Marx, occupies a central place in the Hegelian system. Hegel's *Encyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* 'is in its entirety nothing but the *display*, the self-objectification, of the *essence* of the philosophic mind, and the philosophic mind is nothing but the estranged mind of the world thinking within its self-estrangement -- i.e. comprehending itself abstractly' (128). His *Logik* starts with pure being, that is presented as the alienation of the absolute idea. It makes its reappearance at the end of the *Logik* and alienates its being as nature. 'The absolute idea, absolute knowledge, and absolute mind or spirit (concepts which Hegel ultimately regarded as identical),' explains Oizerman, 'first alienate their being as nature, i.e. material, non-thinking reality, and then overcome this self-alienation, i.e. return to themselves in the process of humanity's history, which is also interpreted as self-alienation and its transcendence' (Oizerman 1981, 258). The natural result of this process of passing through its various phases 'as the anthropological, phenomenological, psychological, ethical, artistic and religious mind is not valid for itself, until ultimately it finds itself, and affirms itself, as *absolute* knowledge and hence absolute, i.e. abstract, mind, thus receiving its conscious embodiment in the mode of existence corresponding to it. For its real mode of existence is *abstraction*' (128-29).

In the *EPM*, Marx develops his ideas on alienation by concentrating on the *PG*, and within this, the Hegelian notion of *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung*. Marx lays special emphasis on the *PG*, as mentioned earlier, which he regards as the source of his entire philosophy. The *PG* undertakes 'a systematic study of those phenomena collectively desirable as manifestations of human spirit' (Schacht 1971, 38). Raya Dunayevskaya describes Hegel's great elation at the time of his writing the *PG* thus: '[T]he excitement of the actual, of the arrival of a new epoch,

permeates the whole of the *PG*. So alive is this "presence" in the struggle, a life-and-death struggle, of consciousness with the objective world, with self-consciousness, with Other, be it between "Lordship and Bondage", or between self-consciousness and its own unhappiness; so exciting are these "Experiences of Consciousness", historical and "absolute", individual and universal, all breathing the "World Spirit" whose "time has come", that the reader is ready to follow Hegel upon the long, tortuous 2500-year trek of Western philosophy. We follow it from its birthplace in Greece around 500 B.C. to its total freedom in the Great French Revolution of 1789 to 1806, when Napoleon entered Prussia on horseback just as Hegel was completing the *Phenomenology*' (Dunayevskaya 1982, 8; see also Torrance 1977, 21-23).

The great importance Marx attaches to the *PG* can be explained with reference to the extreme subjectivisation of the Hegelian philosophy at the hands of the Young Hegelians, Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner. They used the *PG* for their purposes. It was essential for Marx to refute the views of the Young Hegelians and their philosophical base in advancing his views on dialectical materialism. Feuerbach had criticised Hegel's concept of alienation, and paved the way for the enormous shift from idealism to materialism in Germany in the 1840s. Marx in his critique of Hegel's concept of *Entäusserung* was able to draw from Feuerbachian heritage while he transcended the old materialism dialectically.

The second reason for Marx's emphasis on *Entäusserung* as the central concept in the *PG* is his grasp of the economic realities of which Hegel had an incomplete knowledge. Lukacs points to this in his *The Young Hegel*: 'Thus Marx's emphasis on "externalisation" (*Entäusserung*) as the central concept of the *PG* and of idealist dialectics in general was not the result of an arbitrary decision. Hegel's inspired guess on the basis of very incomplete knowledge of economics enabled him to see that "externalisation" (*Entäusserung*), alienation was a fundamental fact of life and *for that reason* he put it in the centre of philosophy. Marx's critique of Hegel proceeds from a more profound and accurate grasp of the *economic realities*' (Lukacs 1975, 548). Marx's critique for the first time in Germany since Hegel himself, observes Lukacs, combines economic and philosophical perspectives in the analysis of the problems of society and philosophy: 'Needless to say, this functions at an incomparably higher level in Marx than in Hegel, and this is as true of the philosophical as of the economic aspect. Philosophically ... the

problem is the replacement of idealist by materialist dialectics. The critique of idealism here is based on a much greater knowledge of economics than was available to Hegel. Marx's economic observations already contain a socialist critique of the ideas of the classics of political economy' (ibid., 548).

For Hegel alienation is the state of consciousness as it comes to know itself in the external, objective world. In the *PG,* Absolute Knowledge comprehends that 'the objectivity' standing over against a 'subjectivity' estranged from it is brought forth only within the self-alienating movement of the spirit. Hegel says: 'This surmounting of the object of consciousness is not to be taken one-sidedly to mean that the object showed itself as returning into the Self, but it is to be taken more specifically to mean not only that the object as such presented itself to the Self as vanishing, but rather that it is the alienation (*Entäusserung*) of self-consciousness that posits the thinghood (*die Dingheit*) and that this alienation has not merely a negative but a positive meaning, a meaning which is not only for us or in itself, but for self-consciousness itself. The negative of the object, or its self-supersession has a positive meaning for self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness *knows* the nothingness of the object, on the one hand, because it alienates its own self -- for in this alienation it posits itself as object or the object as itself, in virtue of the indivisible unity of *being-for-itself.* On the other hand, this positing at the same time contains the other moment, viz. that self-consciousness has equally superseded (*aufgehoben*) this alienation and objectivity too, and taken it back into itself so that it is in communion with itself in *its* otherness (*Anderssein*) as such' (PG, 479).

In other words, Hegel thinks that reality is Spirit which in its quest to reach ever-higher stages of development, creates a world of object-forms, existing externally. Only at the stage of absolute knowledge does the Spirit realise that this world was its own projection. Avineri presents the gist of Hegel's views on alienation in these words: 'According to Hegel, consciousness emancipates itself from this alienation by recognising that what appears as an external object and thus negates the sovereignty of consciousness is a projection of consciousness itself, i.e. that consciousness retains basically "self-consciousness" in that it perceives only itself. Objects that appear to exist outside consciousness are in the last resort only a phenomenal expression of consciousness. The final goal of consciousness is to arrive at this recognition: in

Hegel's language, consciousness thus returns to itself. This famous "negation of negation" -- the negation of the existence of objects that negate consciousness -- recognises that the objects are merely alienated, reified consciousness. When consciousness takes cognisance of this relationship, it recognises itself in its objectified, alienated otherness. As a result, there are no cognizable objects outside consciousness itself, and this is of course the quintessence of philosophical idealism' (Avineri 1970, 97).

The problem with Hegel's tendency towards, what Marx calls an 'uncritical idealism', is his view of philosophy. Hegel speaks of *Entäusserung* and its *Aufhebung* in philosophy, not in real life. The identification of man with consciousness, therefore, is understandably in consonance with Hegelian idealism. Marx strikes at the falsity of Hegel's conception of alienation which leads him to the identification of man with self-consciousness: 'All *Entfremdung* of the human being is therefore nothing but *Entfremdung of self-consciousness*. The *Entfremdung* of self-consciousness is not regarded as an *expression* -- reflected in the realm of knowledge and thought -- of the *real Entfremdung* of the human being. Instead, the *actual Entfremdung* -- that which appears real -- is according to its *innermost*, hidden nature (which is only brought to light by philosophy) nothing but the *manifestation* of the *Entfremdung* of the real human essence, of *self-consciousness*. The science which comprehends this is therefore called p*henomenology*. All reappropriation of the estranged objective essence appears, therefore as incorporation into self-consciousness. The man who takes hold of this essential being is *merely* the self-consciousness which takes hold of objective essences. Return of the object into the self is therefore the reappropriation of the object' (132-33; see also Dunayevskaya 1982, 9-10).

Marx points to a double error in Hegel's position. First, he criticises Hegel for his colossal subjectivism, according to which absolute self-consciousness lies at the basis of all objectivity. The economic and political alienation of man was reduced to the thought of economic and political alienation. 'When, for instance, wealth, state power, etc. are understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the *human* being, this only happens in their form as thoughts.... They are thought-entitles, and therefore merely an estrangement of *pure*, i.e. abstract, philosophical thinking. The whole process therefore ends with absolute knowledge. It is precisely abstract thought from which these objects are estranged and which they confront with their presumption

of reality.... The whole *history of the alienation process* and the whole *process of the retraction* of the alienation is therefore nothing but the *history of the production* of the abstract (i.e. absolute) thought -- of logical, speculative thought. The *estrangement* which therefore forms the real interest of this alienation and of the transcendence of this alienation, is the opposition of *in itself* and *for itself,* of *consciousness* and *self-consciousness,* of *object and subject* -- that is to say, it is the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself' (129).

Drawing on his firmer grasp of economics than that of Hegel, Marx attacks Hegel's theory of alienation on another point also. 'Marx's critical comments,' writes Lukacs, 'show succinctly how the false identification of man and self-consciousness necessarily springs from a false view of alienation in society. On the subjective side, there is the mistaken identification of man and self-consciousness demonstrated and criticised by Marx; on the objective side, there is the question of alienation and objectification in general' (Lukacs 1975, 551). Hegel identifies 'objectification' (*Vergegenständlichung*) with *Entfremdung*. Because of this in Hegel the material, objective world is reduced to a mere predicate of consciousness. Hence the objectification occurs in the realm of thought. Marx sums up Hegel's view: 'The appropriation of man's essential powers, which have become objects -- indeed, alien objects -- is thus in the *first place* only an *appropriation* occurring in *consciousness,* in *pure thought,* i.e. in *abstraction*: it is the appropriation of these objects as *thoughts* and as *movements of thought*' (129). Marx rejects the view which negates the existence of the objective world as external to consciousness. For Marx, there is a clear distinction between objectification, the premise of material existence, and alienation, as a state of consciousness disclosing the relationship between man and objects. Marx unravels Hegel's erroneous equation in the *PG*: 'It is not the fact that the human being *objectifies himself inhumanly,* in opposition to himself, but the fact that he *objectifies himself* in *distinction* from and in *opposition* to abstract thinking, that constitutes the posited essence of the estrangement and the thing to be superseded' (129).

The second error pointed out by Marx, virtually, amounts to the first one: the vindication of the objective world by reducing all objective and humanly sensuous entities to spiritual entitles, since only spirit (or mind) is regarded as being the true essence of man: 'The *human*

character of nature and of the nature created by history -- man's products -- appears in the form that they are *products* of abstract mind and as such, therefore, phases of *mind* -- *thought-entities*' (130).

Confronting Hegelian idealist theory of the annulment of objectivity, Marx offers the materialist theory of objectivity. The quintessence of this theory is presented by Marx as follows: 'Whenever real, corporeal *man*, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature, *posits* his real, objective *essential powers* as alien (*fremde*) objects of his externalisation (*Entäusserung*), it is not the *act of positing* which is the subject in the process: it is the subjectivity of the *objective* essential powers, whose action, therefore, must also be something *objective*. An objective being acts objectively, and he would not act objectively if the objective did not reside in the very nature of his being. He only creates or posits objects, because he is posited by objects -- because at bottom he is *nature*. In the act of positing, therefore, this objective being does not fall from its state of "pure activity" into a *creating of the object*; on the contrary, his *objective* product only confirms his *objective* activity, his activity as the activity of an objective, natural being' (134).

This is clearly a materialist critique of the idealist premises of the *PG*. Idealist dialectics is accordingly seen to depict alienation in its speculative form and thus distort the actual process with mystifications. Hegel's reduction of man and man's substance to self-consciousness means that alienation of human substance is no more than the alienation of self-consciousness. The object of consciousness is nothing else but self-consciousness, and the object being only the objectified self-consciousness: 'The issue, therefore, is to surmount the *object of consciousness*. *Objectivity* as such is regarded as an *estranged* human relationship which does not correspond to the *essence of man*, to self-consciousness. The *reappropriation* of the objective essence of man, produced within the orbit of estrangement as something alien, therefore denotes not only the annulment of *estrangement*, but of *objectivity* as well. Man, that is to say, is regarded as a *non-objective, spiritual* being' (132).

In contrast to Hegel, Marx regards the alienation of self- consciousness as a reflection of the actual alienation taking place in the social life. It occurs in a concrete relationship between man and his products. This relationship cannot be illusory as implicit in Hegel's idealism. 'For

Marx,' as Avineri says, 'human labour always presupposes a material basis, a "natural substratum" distinct from consciousness and from human effort. This, of course, is the difference between idealism and materialism, yet the sophisticated level on which Marx confronts Hegel reveals the extent to which he built his system out of the internal difficulties of Hegel's thought' (Avineri 1970, 98; see also Lukacs 1975, 553). For Marx, real man cannot be reduced to consciousness, to self-consciousness, or to the spirit. Consciousness and self-consciousness are attributes of human nature; human nature is not a quality of self-consciousness.

Despite his stringent criticism of Hegel's one-sidedness and limitations, Marx gives credit to Hegel for some remarkable insights in his *PG*. The *PG*, according to Marx, contains a hidden, mystifying and uncertain criticism, which, nevertheless goes far beyond the later developments in the expositions of his disciples. The sections on the 'unhappy consciousness', the 'honest consciousness', the struggle of the 'noble and base consciousness', contain 'in an estranged form, the critical elements of whole spheres such as religion, the state and civil life' (130). By his grasp of the alienation of man in society and the role of objects which man produced through his human capacities, in fact, belonged to him. These were important insights. Marx sums up the positive side of the *PG*: 'The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *PG* and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of *labour* and comprehends objective man -- true, because real man -- as the outcome of man's *own labour*. The *real, active* orientation of man to himself as a species-being ... is only possible if he really brings out all his *species-powers*' (131). Here Marx accepts the impressive dialectic of spirit's actualisation of itself through positing itself in the form of objectivity as the negative of itself and then negating this negation. 'Marx sees in this the hypostatisation,' Chris Arthur observes, 'of the abstract reflection in philosophy of man's objectification through his own labour. One should note particularly that he praises Hegel for grasping objectification as alienation. Since it is the historical experience of mankind that is reflected here, Hegel's greatness consists precisely in his granting it recognition instead of glossing over it' (Arthur 1983, 14).

Objectification in itself, according to Marx, is not the cause of alienation. In fact, it is the only means which integrates man and nature. 'Man transforms nature,' Jean Hyppolite elaborates, 'and makes it an expression of his humanity, and in the course of this transformation, natural man, confirmed by the particularity of biological need, becomes more universal in outlook; he educates himself and cultivates his true generic nature [as Hegel saw in part]' (Hyppolite 1969, 82). Marx's criticism of Hegel for his identifying 'objectification' **(***Vergegenständlichung***)** and 'alienation' (*Entfemdung*), as discussed above, is because of his confusing the two. Hyppolite writes: 'This confusion explain both the inadequacy of Hegel's social analysis, its inability to solve the problems it raises, or at least to do it effectively, and the mystification of his philosophical thought, which, instead of resulting in positive action, fulfils itself in a speculative idealism that fails to keep its own promises. As Kierkegaard said later, Hegel lifts us up to a speculative heaven but leaves us to live in the hovels of reality' (ibid., 81-82; cf. Arthur 1982, 18-19; Bernstein 1972, 45-46; for a very negative appraisal of Hegel, see Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. II).

Marx's general assessment of the Hegelian philosophy as a whole leads him to the recognition that 'Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy' (131). Robert Tucker names this insight about Hegelianism in a rather dramatic language as the 'generative idea' in systematising Marxism (see Tucker 1972, 118-20). The most important consequence of it is that it 'puts into Marx's hands the key to the unlocking the ultimate ontological secret of the "money system", thus enabling him to embark on a comprehensive elaboration of a materialist theory of value.... It is by no means accidental that a substantial part of these pages on *The Power of Money* had been subsequently incorporated by Marx in his *Capital*' (Meszaros 1970, 97).

Marx in his involved and often repetitious language returns to the recurrent theme of Hegel's understanding the role of labour, but only within the severe limitations of speculative dialectics: 'He grasps *labour* as the *essence* of man -- as man's essence which stands the test: he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labour. Labour is *man's coming-to-be for himself* within *alienation*, or as *alienated* man. The only labour which Hegel knows and recognises is *abstractly mental* labour' (131). It means that all productive activity and the activity of reappropriation for Hegel is the expression of absolute spirit. As a consequence, 'he has only

found the *abstract, logical, speculative* expression for the movement of history; which is not yet the *real* history of man as a given subject but only the *act of creation*, the *history of the origin* of man' (127). Thus labour represents for Hegel a spiritual activity and ultimately it is an activity of thought. It is for this reason that the alienation occurring in this sphere turns out to be the self-alienation of self-consciousness. But this criticism of Hegel is not quite right. Hegel, certainly took more factors into account than merely man's intellectual or cultural activities. The section on the dialectic of the master and the slave, the need and struggle for recognition and the emerging reversal of roles in the master-slave relationship in the *PR* are deeply political.

7.3. The supersession of alienation in the PG

The problem created by the mystification around Hegel's notion of alienation, according to Marx, leads inevitably to confusing the processes of history with the act of thinking; it ceases to deal with concrete events and concerns itself only with speculations, with little or no relation to concrete events.

For Hegel history is a permanent change. In contrast with the oriental conceptions, history for the occidentals 'is a history of the Spirit; and though it is also self-consuming, it does not merely return to the same form but comes forth "exalted, glorified", with each successive phase becoming, in turn, a material on which the spiritual history of man proceeds to a new level of fulfilment' (Löwith 1949, 54). The process of history through the 'cunning of reason' which 'works in and behind the passions of men as their agents' (ibid., 55), shows the hands of God in executing his grand plan. Gerry A. Cohen elucidates it well: 'Spirit is responsible for historical development because historically significant occurrences are its acts, and the latter display an intelligible progress because spirit is rational. History is spirit's biography. But history has not only an agent but also a purpose or goal, namely, what the agent potentially is in the highest grade sense and towards the realisation of which it consequently moves. Since spirit is the agent of history, and its essence is freedom, freedom, the idea of spirit, is the purpose or goal of history' (Cohen 1982, 18; see also Taylor 1987, chapters vi and viii).

In one of his most caustic and forceful passages Marx assails Hegel's entire theory of 'bearer' of history, the absolute spirit and the mystifications woven round it: 'This process must have a bearer, a subject. But the subject only comes into being as a result. This result -- the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness -- is therefore *God, absolute Spirit, the self-knowing and self-manifesting idea*. Real man and real nature become mere predicates -- symbols of this hidden, unreal man and of his unreal nature. Subject and predicate are therefore related to each other in absolute reversal -- a *mystical subject-object* or a *subjectivity reaching beyond the object* -- the *absolute subject* as a *process*, as *subject alienating* itself and returning from alienation into itself, but at the same time retracting this alienation into itself, and the subject as this process; a pure, *incessant* revolving within itself' (142).

Thus real history is made to depend on an abstract 'bearer' which can make history only in an abstract, mystificatory way. This highlights the premises of absolute idealism of Hegel. Such a view of history, according to Avineri, 'leads to quietism and conservatism, and Marx brings out the ambivalence of Hegel's political conservatism very clearly. Hegel does not derive his conservatism from his reaction to contemporary events: on this level he sometimes expresses surprisingly radical views. His conservatism stems from the ambivalence of his epistemology which ultimately makes thought dependent on existing, historical reality though it denies doing this' (Avineri 1970, 99; see also Lukacs 1975, 553-54).

In his Introduction to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), Marx turns once again, to the question of the philosophical foundations of Hegel's idealism as a whole. Here he also reveals his materialist theory of objectivity in contrast to Hegel's idealism: 'The concrete concept is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects. It appears, therefore, in reasoning as a summing up, a result, and not as the starting-point, although it is the real point of origin, and thus also the point of origin of perception and imagination. The first procedure attenuates meaningful images to abstract definitions, the second leads from abstract definitions by way of reasoning to the reproduction of concrete situation. Hegel accordingly conceived the illusory idea that the real world is the result of thinking which causes its own synthesis, its own deepening and its own movement; whereas the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is simply the way in which thinking

assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete mental category. This is, however, by no means the process of evolution of the concrete world itself' (Marx 1971a, 206).

Following the connection between Hegel's epistemology and its political consequences, Marx goes on to show that the *Aufhebung* of alienation within the framework of Hegel's idealism is no more than a mental illusion, because Hegel by inverting the actual relation between consciousness and being sees actual human alienation and its supersession reflected in the realm of knowledge and thought. It leaves the real world of alienation intact: 'Hegel having posited man as equivalent to self-consciousness, the estranged object -- the estranged essential reality of man -- is nothing but *consciousness*, the thought of estrangement merely -- estrangement's *abstract* and therefore empty and unreal expression, *negation*. The supersession of the alienation is therefore likewise nothing but an abstract, empty supersession of that empty abstraction -- the *negation of the negation*' (142).

Because of Hegel's inability to explain the rise of bourgeois economy in terms of historical alienation, the consequence of private economy and capitalism, he, according to Hyppolite, fails to provide a practical solution to alienation: 'The *PG* is only a caricature of what is offered by communism. Each confronts the same task of overcoming the alienation that is the misfortune of man. But what is the prescription in the *PG*? Absolute Knowledge, that is, the triumph of *intellectual self-consciousness*. Alienation is overcome in thought but not in deed. Religion and the beyond that it proposes are conquered by the philosophical conception of man reflecting upon himself and the alienation of his being, *but in practice nothing is changed.* Pure speculation is unable to resolve a particular historical problem which requires nothing else than a historical revolution' (Hyppolite 1969, 84-85). But on the other hand, it is not the same with communism. In communism which 'is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private property' (141), the supersession of alienation takes place not in philosophy but through the mediation resolving the contradictions between man and man, and between man and nature. With communism, 'nature's objectivity does not simply disappear, even when it is adequate to men, but remains something external, to be appropriated' (Schmidt 1971, 71).

According to Hegel, man's political, juridical, and civil being is his alienated being, which, as a result of negation and subsequent supersession, is not abolished but continues to

exist, in its true form. 'Consciousness, self-consciousness is *at home* in *its other-being as such*. This implies, for one thing, that consciousness ... pretends to be directly to be the *other* of itself' (138). It means that alienated is in fact 'the other of itself', that is why there is no actual abolition of alienation. Here the subject recognises himself in the alienated being. This cognition of the nature of alienation is presented as its supersession. For instance, the supersession of religion, first having recognised religion to be a product of self-alienation, turns out to be the establishment of religion in its true form, the philosophy of religion. Marx comments: 'Here is, the root of Hegel's f*alse* positivism, or of his merely *apparent* criticism: this is what Feuerbach designated as the positing, negating and re-establishing of religion or theology, but it has to be expressed in more general terms.... The man who has recognised that he is leading an alienated life in law, politics, etc. is leading his true human life in this alienated life as such. Self-affirmation, self-confirmation *in contradiction* with itself -- in contradiction both with the knowledge and the essential being of the object -- is thus true *knowledge* and *life*' (138). Thus the Hegelian supersession of *Entäusserung* on the level of mere cognition, according to Marx, is the perpetuation of alienation. It does not resolve the contradictions but rather reconciles itself with existing reality: 'If I *know* religion as *alienated* human self-consciousness, then what I know in it as religion is not my self-consciousness, but my alienated self-consciousness confirmed in it. I therefore know my self-consciousness that belongs to itself, to its very nature, confirmed not in *religion* but rather in *annihilated* and *superseded* religion' (138-39).

Marx's critique of Hegelian approach to supersession also extends to his interpretation of the negation and the negation of the negation. In Hegel, the negation of the negation is not the confirmation of the true essence: 'With him the negation of the negation is the confirmation of the pseudo-essence, or of the self-estranged essence in its denial; or it is the denial of this pseudo-essence as an objective being dwelling outside man and independent of him, and its transformation into the subject' (139). Marx argues that in Hegel the concept of supersession is formulated in such an ambivalent way that in the act of superseding 'denial and preservation' are bound together. In Hegel's hands purely philosophical speculation leaves the existing reality unchallenged. Marx writes: 'Eine eigenthümliche Rolle spielt daher das *Aufheben*, worin die Verneinung und die Aufbewahrung, die Bejahung verknüpft sind. So z.B. ist in Hegels

Rechsphilosophie das aufgehobne *Privatrecht* = *Moral*, die aufgehobne Moral = *Familie*, die aufgehobne Familie = *bürgerlicher Gesellschaft*, die aufgehobne bürgerliche Gesellschaft gleich *Staat*, der aufgehobne Staat = *Weltgeschichte*. In der *Wirklichkeit* bleiben Privatrecht, Moral, Familie, bürgerliche Gesellschaft, Staat, etc bestehn, nur sind sie zu *Momenten* geworden, zu Existenzen und Daseinswesen des Menschen, die nicht isolirt gelten, sich wechselseitig auflösen und erzeugen etc, *Momente der Bewegung*' (MEGA I, 2, 412; for the English text, see EPM 139).

Marx's critique of alienation does not amount to a rejection of Hegelian category of supersession. On the contrary, as Oizerman observes, he regards it 'as a reflection of the real process of negation, a necessary element of which is continuity, transformation of what existed earlier into something that is its opposite but that preserves and develops some of the earlier features' (Oizerman 1981, 263). While correcting and reworking Hegel's conception of supersession, Marx subjects idealist dialectics to criticism and transcends it critically, confining his attention exclusively to Hegel's idealism. 'Marx utterly ignores,' Lukacs writes, 'Schelling's definition of "supersession": the destruction of the annulled determinations, their annihilation through their elevation into the absolute. Nor does he so much as mention the Kantian variant of agnostic antinomy. Marx regards the Hegelian dialectics as the complete and definitive answer to all the previous versions. Accordingly it is with the Hegelian conception that he takes issue, i.e. with that highest form of "supersession" in which the annulled determinations are not simply negated but also conserved at a higher level, a "supersession" in which otherness is not annihilated in the absolute but finds its existence and its relative justification respected' (Lukacs 1975, 555).

As mentioned earlier, for Marx communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-estrangement. According to Marx, what Hegel achieved positively in his dialectic within the realm of estrangement was the insight into the process of alienation and its supersession, even though in an alienated form. Hegel's dialectic can be used to show as to how atheism superseded God to produce theoretic humanism, and how communism superseded private property, to be the vindication of real human life as man's possession: 'Atheism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of religion, while communism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private property' (141). Marx

concludes: 'Only through the supersession of this mediation -- which is itself, however, a necessary premise -- does positively self-deriving humanism, *positive* humanism, come into being' (141).

From the above discussion, we can conclude that the crucial difference between Marx and Hegel in the application of dialectics to the modern society is that Hegel 'stays within the circle of circles of his absolute while Marx wants to open out new historical perspective subsequent to the supersession of alienation' (Arthur 1983, 14). Marx succinctly describes the relation of Hegel's philosophy to real history as follows: 'He has only found the *abstract, logical, speculative* expression for the movement of history; which is not yet the *real* history of man as a given subject, but only the *act of creation*, the *history of the origin* of man' (127). Here Marx makes the point that 'within the sphere of abstraction, Hegel conceives labour as man's act of *self-genesis*' (141) and its alienation, which is given under his concept of the 'absolute negativity', which 'is nothing but the *abstract, empty* form of that real living act, its content can in consequence be merely a *formal* content produced by abstraction from all content' (142). Within this sphere of negation and the negation of the negation, Hegel states as an absolute what is in real history relative only. For instance, Marx views communism as the necessary form and dynamic principle of the near future, but only a passing phase in the historical developments of human society: 'Communism is the positive mode of the negation of the negation, and is hence the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development ... but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society' (100-101; for a comprehensive comparison of Marxist and Hegelian dialectics, see Hunt & Swan 1982).

The criticism of Hegel's dialectic in the *EPM* was a serious undertaking. Here Marx 'although still at home with Hegel's concepts and terminology, did not confine himself to internal criticism. At the same time, he still respected Hegel as a great thinker and considered his dialectic a valuable instrument for investigating the world. He also credited Hegel with having discovered, though in a mystificatory form, the process of man's alienation and of its overcoming' (McLellan 1972, 262). In 1873, after more than thirty years, Marx included in a passage in the preface to the second edition of the *Capital*, which can be seen as the essence of his critique in 1844, saying that his dialectical method was not only different from Hegel's but also was its

direct opposite: 'To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of the "Idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of the "Idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought' (Marx 1977, 29). At this point, Marx abruptly cuts short his explanation, in which, 'he epitomised his relation to Hegel in a single enigmatic proposition that has baffled the critics and commentators to this day' (Tucker 1972, 129). In the next paragraph, Marx explicitly refers to his critique of the Hegelian dialectic in the unpublished *EPM*: 'The mystificatory side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago when it was still the fashion.... With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel with the mystical shell.' Marx explaining the mystical form of dialectics which became fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things, continues: 'In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary' (Marx 1977, 29). For Marx the dialectic is the study of the general laws of change in nature and human history. The law of contradiction in things forms the basis of the materialist dialectics. The dialectical method seeks to analyse the cause of the development of a thing in the internal contradictions of its parts which are interrelated and are interactive on the things round it. It is due to the internal contradiction in every single thing that change and development takes place. But the process of development is not to be regarded as a simple growth; it passes various and different stages, from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to fundamental changes, the qualitative changes. Within the domain of human history, all forms of social organisations and institutions are subject to the inexorable laws of dialectical transformation.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The last section of the *EPM* 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole' adumbrated in chapter 7 brings us to the end of the present study. My primary task throughout this book has been to offer a close descriptive analysis of alienation as this concept appears in Marx between March 1843 to August 1844. In these last few pages, I will sum up some of the points and conclusions in the light of our discussion of Marx's theory of alienation.

The period of the present inquiry covers approximately eighteen months of young Karl Marx's writings. The choice of issues and problems for discussion has of necessity been determined by the problem of alienation which is the focal point of this study. In places, I have presented philosophical problems in Hegel and Feuerbach, as well as in Marx rather sketchily with a view to give more space to the central area of the topic. As there was quite a lot of material at my disposal for the inquiry, I had to be selective in the presentation. Marx's suggestion that 'the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry' (Marx 1977, 28) has been an excellent guide. In this connection, the dilemma of every writer as to how much material to use and how much to leave out has been well put by Dr Johnson: 'It is impossible for an expositor not to write too little for some, and too much for others. He can only judge what is necessary by his own experience; and how long soever he may deliberate, will at last explain many lines which the learned will think impossible to be mistaken, and omit many for which the ignorant will want his help. These are censures merely relative, and must be quietly endured' (*Works of Samuel Johnson, VII*, New haven and London 1968, cited by Suchting 1979, 26).

The preceding chapters demonstrate that the leading thread which runs through the early (and mature) writings is unmistakably Marx's concern with man, and his incessant effort to seek man's emancipation from his alienated existence. The arguments that this concern in his later writings dissipates due to the problematic of his new science of history cannot be accepted.

Whatever arguments one may have for the new science, this science in itself cannot be seen in separation from Marx's view of man and his place in the world. Marx declares his attitude towards science and the scientist in unequivocal terms: 'Science should not be an egoistic pleasure. Those who are fortunate enough to be able to devote themselves to scientific work should be the first to apply their knowledge in the service of humanity' (cited in Israel 1971, vi). Marx emphasises the historical genesis of man in the *Theories of Surplus-Value* thus: 'Man comes into existence only when a certain point is reached [as the result of an earlier process which organic life passed through]. But once man has emerged, he becomes the permanent pre-condition of human history, likewise its permanent product and result, and he is *pre-condition* only as his own product and result' (Marx 1975, 491). The author of the history of man is none other than man himself. The Hungarian writer Eva Ancsel puts it pithily: 'The reason why man has a history, in the true sense of the word, is that they make it themselves and it does not only happen to them as a series of changes independent of them' (Ancsel 1978, 8). The development of the richness of human nature depends upon the development of man as a personality in the process of his material and spiritual activities.

In this way Marx's early articulation of 'humanism' expresses the ideal of a community of men where individual's free and harmonious development is related to his relation with others. Tom Bottomore writes in this connection: 'Marx takes for granted the creed of the Enlightenment -- the innate goodness of man, human perfectibility, the power of human reason -- but he expresses it in a new form which is influenced by the development of industrial capitalism and the new science of political economy. Marx's ideal is the *productive* man, contrasted with the *acquisitive* man' (Bottomore 1963, viii). Our discussion of Marx's concept of man in chapters 5 and 6 has been an endeavour to explore this basic presupposition of the Marxian thought. Now, we can recapitulate Marx's theory of alienation in his writings from the *Critique* to the *EPM*, which form different phases in Marx's intellectual development in quick progression.

I begin with the *Critique*. The *Critique* is essentially Marx's critical dialogue with Hegelian social and political philosophy. Admittedly, the sententious criticism of Hegel's theories is often abstruse and at times is in need of a clear line of direction. It was due to such factors that Marx did not think it appropriate to publish the *Critique*. In the Preface to the *EPM*, he mentions

the stylistic shortcomings of it as 'the intermingling of criticism directed only against speculation with criticism of the various subjects themselves' which made the *Critique* 'utterly unsuitable' for publication (17). Yet, despite its inadequacies, the *Critique* is Marx's first important work wherein he makes an earnest beginning in his search for a critical social theory.

The elaboration of the phenomenon of alienation pervades the whole of the *Critique*, whose explicit formulation as a coherent theory of alienation later on finds expression in the *EPM*. The root-cause of alienation in the *Critique* is located in civil society. The political state represents the alienated social power of civil society. We may recall that the theoretical assumptions of Marx's analysis of the state and civil society are basically Hegelian. As mentioned before, it was Hegel's separation of civil society from the state which had effected a conceptual revolution in the traditional political thought. Prior to Hegel, the terms 'civil society' and 'state' were regarded as synonyms, representing the *societas civilis* in contrast to the family or household (the *societas domestica*). Hegel's threefold division of *Sittlichkeit* into family, civil life and the state meant the dissolution of the old dichotomy.

We have seen in considerable detail Hegel's views on the relationship between civil society and the state and Marx's criticism of these. In his writings of 1843-44, Marx pays a focal attention to the relationship between civil society and the state. While he agrees much with Hegel's views on the state, especially the division between civil and political life that distinguishes the modern society from the feudal one, Marx does not accept Hegel's account of relationship between civil society and the state.

Marx's main point of divergence from Hegel's views is with regard to the civil-political division. For Hegel this division as a contradiction is resolved in the form of the modern state as the embodiment of society's general interest, and for that reason it is deemed as standing above particular interests. The state in this capacity, according to Hegel, overcomes the division between civil society and the state as well as the split of individual between private person and the citizen. Marx rejects these postulations. He argues that the state does not stand above the particular interests in society; it in fact defends the interests of property. For Marx it is the continuing persistence of this contradiction in the post-feudal society that is instrumental in bringing into existence the modern state .

In the *Critique*, Marx advances a purely political remedy to resolve the contradiction between civil society and the state through 'direct democracy' (3.4.4.). This was seen as resolving the conflict between civil society and the state. In direct democracy, all as individuals take part in the legislature and this, according to Marx, puts an end to legislature as a separate function. The reason why Marx rejects the political state is due to its inherent inability in providing the possibilities for man to realise his full nature. Being an expression of the alienated social power of civil society, political state operates within the narrow confines of political sphere. Therefore its inability to advance social and communal content is evident in its partisan nature. Marx says, to repeat a text already cited in 3.4.4. that individual is left to an atomistic existence in civil society: 'The atomism into which civil society plunges in its *political act* follows necessarily from the fact that the community, the communal being in which the individual exists, is civil society separated from the state' (CW3, 79).

In contrast to political state, democratic state meets the conditions of man's development in all his universality. Democracy, in Marx's view, is founded on the actuality of human beings as the prime factor in history: 'Here, not merely *implicitly* and in essence but *existing* in reality, the constitution is brought back to its actual basis, the *actual human being*, the *actual people*, and established as people's *own* work' (CW3, 29). In this perspective, the mystifications around the social or political system vanish and the reality of 'the constitution appears as what it is, a free product of man' (CW3, 29). The democratic state creates the necessary conditions where the alienating division between civil society and political state is overcome by man's integration in a new social system. In this context, universal suffrage provides the key to solving the problem of alienation. However, the ideas of democracy and democratic state in the *Critique* are quite vague, and are steeped in abstractions which are not explained. Marx, for instance, does not undertake the task of explaining the role of government, the nature of representation, or the related problems of the control of governmental authority under the new set of possibilities in the democratic state. The political solution offered here relates only to the political alienation. This is in sharp contrast to the problem of economic alienation and its supersession as in the *EPM*.

However, within a few months of his espousing the political solution of democracy to overcome alienation in the *Critique* Marx moves on to the view that much more is needed to

bring about 'human emancipation'. It points to gaining some new ground in Marx's theoretical approach to deal with the issues. In *OJQ* the question of political alienation comes under revision. Marx no longer regards that the democratic state through its universal suffrage can emancipate man. He criticises Bauer for implying that political emancipation could be equated with human emancipation.

The political rights and freedoms, no doubt, form an important step forward, but they are only a political solution to alienation within a limited sphere. This leaves the alienation of individual in civil society intact, and this also contributes to political alienation. The actual alienation of human essence, according to Marx, takes place within civil society. The political state and civil society do not represent the opposite poles of a single contradiction, but rather it is the civil society which is the principal aspect of the contradiction. In civil society man's egoistic life exists outside the sphere of the political state and its communal content. Drawing on the comparison with religion by analogy, Marx observes: 'The relation of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relation of heaven to earth. The political state stands in the same opposition to civil society, and it prevails over the latter in the same way as religion prevails over the narrowness of the secular world, i.e. by likewise having always to acknowledge it, to restore it, and allow itself to be dominated by it' (CW3, 154). Marx clearly differentiates between the cause and effect of political emancipation. The state, political activity and religion are *effects* of civil society, and any transformation in these is veritably a result of the struggles within civil society.

The emergence of a democratic political system therefore cannot do away with the contradictions of civil society. The achievement of 'truly human emancipation' necessarily goes beyond political emancipation (the extension of political rights). In his article 'Critical Marginal Notes on the Article by a Prussian', Marx says that '*man* is more infinite than the *citizen*, and *human life* more infinite than *political life*' (CW3, 205). The problem of alienation cannot be addressed through the merely partial, political means.

In the *Introduction*, the proletariat is seen as instrumental to bring about total transformation in the prevailing system. The revolutionary potential of the proletariat is actualised through the revolutionary philosophy, the philosophical world-view which rejects the

existing world order. 'As philosophy finds its *material* weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its *spiritual* weapons in philosophy' (CW3, 187). The impact of industrialisation on the emergence of proletariat and the special place of the proletariat in the capitalist system is described in philosophical terminology. These insights, however, form the nucleus of later development in the idea of the historic revolutionary role of the proletariat by Marx after 1844.

We have seen the marked difference between the solutions offered to overcome alienation in the *Critique* and the *EPM*. In the *Critique*, unlike his later writings, Marx advocates only the abolition of the non-democratic state and he advocates wholeheartedly the democratic state. In the *EPM* the cause of alienation is seen in the alienation of labour. Marx propounds a solution which strikes at the root cause of alienation. The supersession of alienation is achieved by the positive transcendence of private property under communism. The establishment of communist society, which advances the communal and collectivistic level is considered as an indispensable prerequisite for the rehumanisation of egoistic and fragmented man. The concept of economic alienation in the *EPM*, where Marx undertakes a comprehensive analysis of alienated labour within the capitalist mode of production is in sharp contrast to his views of political alienation in the *Critique*.

Along with his new ideas regarding 'human emancipation' in *OJQ*, Marx carries further the discussion of civil society and the state he had started in the *Critique*. In *OJQ* Marx examines the abstract nature of political state. The re-organisation of civil society is deemed a necessary condition for human emancipation. For the first time Marx deals with the problem of religious alienation adequately. His views on the separation of the state and religion have deep insights. The state of affairs where religion is not removed from the sphere of public law to private law, religion comes to represent the egoistic sphere of civil society. Marx also discusses the problem of the Christian state to highlight the problems of the religious state as anachronistic, discriminatory and anti-democratic. A state where a religion is elevated to the state religion, an exclusive attitude towards other religions becomes a matter of state policy. Hence it is of utmost importance for the democratic state to consign religion to the sphere of private law like other elements of civil society. In very clear terms Marx proclaims: 'The so-called Christian state is the Christian negation of the state, but by no means the political realisation of Christianity. The state

which still professes Christianity in the form of religion, does not yet profess it in the form appropriate to the state, for it still has a religious attitude towards religion, that is to say, it is not the *true implementation* of the human basis of religion, because it still relies on the *unreal, imaginary* form of this human core' (CW3, 156). On the other hand the democratic state, whom Marx designates as 'the real state' (CW3, 157), does not need religion to complete its political form. In fact, a truly *democratic* state, an *atheistic* state is the perfect Christian state (not the *Christian* state, which acknowledges Christianity as the state religion and adopts an exclusive attitude towards other religions) which 'relegates religion to a place among the other elements of civil society' (CW3, 156). Thus it is evident that democratic state's attitude towards religion is dictated by no other considerations than by the '*human* basis' of religion 'in a *secular, human* form' (CW3, 156). It means that the democratic state does not concern itself with the abolition of religion as a private interest.

The vision of the future society where democratic process through the universal suffrage leads to the emergence of a truly democratic state in place of a political state is no longer regarded in the *OJQ* as a possible solution to overcome alienation. The former difference between the political state and the democratic state as in the *Critique* is not upheld in the *OJQ*. The democratic state, in fact, is the political state. The operation of political emancipation accords only a limited emancipation; it cannot overcome man's alienation. The difference between form and content of democratic state and other types was said in the *Critique* to be that 'in all other states other than the democratic states, the *state*, the *law*, the *constitution* is what rules, without really ruling ... In democracy the constitution, the law, the state itself ... is only the self-determination of the people, and a particular content of the people' (CW3, 30-31). Thus in the truly democratic state the form and the content, as opposed to a political state (republican states included), are the same. In *OJQ* both the form and content of the democratic state are regarded as political, a consequence of the duality of civil society and political state. Political emancipation, which cannot address itself to the real problems of human alienation, does not offer the solution. However, Marx at the same time, as mentioned before, does not underscore the importance of the political emancipation (the extension of political rights), no matter how partial and of what limited nature. Political emancipation, like the property qualification for the

suffrage is, no doubt, a step forward, but this political change occurs within the existing world order: 'The state as state annuls, for instance, *private property*, man declares by *political* means that private property is *abolished* as soon as the *property qualifications* for the right to elect or to be elected is abolished ... Nevertheless the political annulment of private property not only fails to abolish private property but even presupposes it' (CW3, 153).

The dualism between the state and civil society continues to be a prominent concern to Marx in *OJQ* as in the *Critique* but the cause of human alienation is no longer seen in the dichotomy between the state and civil society. The state, according to Marx, is a consequence of civil society. It means that the cause of human alienation lies in the very nature of civil society. Consequently, the solution to alienation is not related to political emancipation within the sphere of political state.

In fact, the whole question of human alienation in *OJQ* hinges on a fundamental reorganisation of civil society. This will put an end to the egoistic man driven by his private needs and interests. This egoistic individual is the precondition of the state. The political emancipation reduces man to his division in civil society as egoistic man and in the state as a juridical person, a citizen. Human emancipation, by contrast, means that the state is absorbed in civil society, whose re-organisation sees the abolition of the state. The state in *OJQ*, unlike its exposition in the *Critique*, is not perceived as a means to human emancipation.

In *OJQ*, Marx introduces the concrete category of money in explaining alienation. Money is regarded as the cause of alienation. It is the estranged essence of man's work and existence. It dominates him as an 'alien essence and he worships it' (CW3, 172). Marx elaborates this theme further in the *EPM*. But money in the *EPM* is no longer viewed as the cause of alienation; it is only a manifestation of alienation. Money mediates individual's life to him as well as the existence of other people to him, thus practically having man's qualities and appearing as 'the *other* person'. In the *EPM*, the roots of alienation are grounded in the alienated labour operating under conditions of private property.

To conclude our discussion, we have found that Marx offers different causes of alienation in the *Critique*, *OJQ* and the *EPM* respectively. We have seen that the different causes of alienation in these writings are not a result of a mere difference in emphasis. These, in fact,

pertain to substantive matters of conceptual significance in Marx's quest to overcome human alienation. Marx in each of these works undertakes a critical scrutiny of his earlier views and comes with a modified version to explain the causes of alienation. In a sense, all his writings prior to the *EPM* pave the way for his thorough analysis of the phenomenon of alienation in the *EPM*. In short, the formulation of a coherent theory of alienation in the *EPM* is the culminating point of his previous writings. It also shows how assiduously Marx endeavoured to locate the causes of alienation in the present society.

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