The Origin of the Concept of God
by Geoff Anders

Introduction

Whereas once God was central to much of philosophical inquiry, nowadays philosophers have for the most part moved away from discussion of God. This movement has occurred without much of an explanation. Is it simply no longer fashionable to talk about God? Possibly, but this should not deter philosophers. The concerns of philosophers tend to transcend the merely fashionable. Is it that philosophy cannot say anything about God, and that talk of God should be left to religion? Possibly, but this have never been shown for certain. Thus, this also should not deter philosophers. Is it that there was nothing to God in the first place, and that finally philosophers have come to understand that? Possibly, but this leaves the question of why so many philosophers in the past and so many people throughout human history spent so much of their lives thinking about and striving to be good to something that doesn't exist. It is clear that more work must be done with respect to the idea of God. Either God exists and thus deserves our attention, or God does not exist, and we should endeavor to determine why so many today and in the past have gone astray.

The questions surrounding God are many, and as such, this investigation will not endeavor to answer all of them. Instead, this investigation will take a narrower focus: the origin of the concept of God.


Methodological note

In discussing the origin of the concept of God, we will necessarily have to discuss the subjectivity in whom the concept arises. However, the question of the nature of our type of subjectivity is an investigation unto itself, and one that would take far more room than is provided here. Thus, instead of deducing and/or arguing for a particular conception of a subject and from there launching an investigation into the origin of the concept of God, I will simply describe a partial conception of a subject and go from there. The results of the investigation will therefore be necessarily contingent on the accuracy of my initial partial description of the subject.


Part I
A partial description of the nature of our type of subjectivity

This partial description of our type of subjectivity will include two main parts: a partial elucidation of the nature of the split subject, and a partial elucidation of the nature of action. First, the split subject.

The self is known in two distinct ways. First, we know ourselves empirically. We are the person who looks a certain way, dresses a certain way, acts a certain way, associates with certain people, likes a certain type of philosophy, and so forth. We also know ourselves in another way - as part of the a priori grounds for the possibility of experience (without the self, there would be no experience). In this way, we are not merely an empirical object, nor even a part of empirical reality, but something that stands outside of empirical reality and for whom experience exists. Terminologically, we will refer to the self known a priori as the "transcendental self," and the self known empirically as the "empirical self" or the "identity." We will refer to both together as the "split subject."

One place in which we can see the distinction between the two sides of the self is in Kant's notion of space as part of the a priori form of the intuition. According to Kant , space is not a mere object of experience, but instead is that which allows us to distinguish between the objects of experience. Space is therefore part of the grounds of the possibility of experience; without space, there would be no experience at all. Thus, space cannot be encountered in experience, but must supplied by us. We supply space, and then the objects of experience are laid out within it. Here, the transcendental self is the side of the self supplying space; the empirical self is the self that exists within that space, the empirical object we think we are.

Some may claim that the two sides of the self just described are actually the same. This may be the case in some sense , but not epistemologically. Epistemologically these two selves are utterly distinct - one is known a priori, one is known empirically.

Next, a partial description of the nature of action.

When a subject goes to act, a series of possibilities are laid out before it. Each possibility involves a different initial action by the empirical self, and then a probabilistic cause-effect sequence leading into different possible futures. These probabilistic cause-effect sequences are based on the subject's beliefs about the world. The possible futures are each valued on the basis of the subject's desires. The action commences once the subject chooses an option (via the will, which will be explained more thoroughly in a moment). Here is a simplified example: Valuing of alternatives, based on the subject's desires Probabilistic High probability Low probability Near certain cause-effect sequences, based on the subject's beliefs about the Call her Don't call her world

In this example, the subject is taking a particular conception of the world to be true. The subject believes that upon moving its hand, the phone will easily lift from the table. Upon pressing the on-button, a dial-tone will sound, and upon entering the girl's phone number the telephone and the wires and the electricity will "do their thing" and the call will make it to the girl's house. Once this happens, the girl will then answer the telephone, conversation will ensue, the question will be asked, and some answer will result. Beliefs, here and in general within this conception of action, are "what a subject takes to be true when it acts." Beliefs are revealed through action.

When people speak of belief, they are often referring to the stuff that comes into the conscious mind when we ask ourselves what we believe. This is what we will call "consciously revealed belief," and it is different from belief as used within this conception of action. Beliefs (as used here) are necessary for action; consciously revealed beliefs are not. Without beliefs, a person would not have a conception of how the world works, and hence would have no way to distinguish options to choose between. Without consciously revealed beliefs, a person would simply not be privy to their own conception of the world. Empirically, this is rather common. People's consciously revealed beliefs are more than often cloudy, unstable and vague.

The concept of belief we have described is formulated explicitly as "that which is taken to be true when a subject acts." The conception of desire is formulated similarly: "that which is taken to be valuable when a subject acts." When a subject goes to choose between the options, the options must be valued relative to one another so that the choice can be made. These values are revealed through desires - someone values something the degree to which they desire it, and desire it the degree to which they value it. Like belief, desire is contrasted against "consciously revealed desire." Desire is necessary for action - without it one option could not be chosen over another. Consciously revealed desire, on the other hand, is not necessary for action. Without it, people would simple not be privy to their own values. Empirically, as with beliefs, this is rather common. People's consciously revealed desires are often cloudy, unstable, vague and even sometimes fully lacking (as when people say "I don't know what I want").

Some might want to claim that belief and consciously revealed belief or desire and consciously revealed desire are the same, but there are certain instances when beliefs and desires are clearly different than the consciously revealed beliefs and desires. A person, sitting in class, may think to themselves, "I don't want to be here." But yet they chose to be there - they could have slept in. Further, they could now choose to leave, but they don't. Class drags on, and the person begins to question themselves. "Why am I sitting here? I've had enough of this. Screw grad school. This is a waste of time" Still, they often don't get up and leave. Ask them later, and they are excited about grad school, and claim that they are efficient and never waste their time. Here, as in many other places in life, people's desires and beliefs do not always line up with their consciously revealed desires and consciously revealed beliefs.

Returning to our example, the subject's conception (conscious or otherwise) of their options was based on its beliefs, and which option will actually be chosen will be a result of the subject's desires. But how does the choice occur? Action, as previously noted, is based in belief, desire, and will. Having examined belief and desire, we must describe more thoroughly the nature of will.

Will describes an interaction between the transcendental self and the empirical self. A subject "wills itself" to perform a certain action - this is when the choice is made and the action commences. In order to understand this further, we will have to delve into a discussion of freedom of the will.

Either an event is determined according to rules or it is not. If it is not determined according to rules then it is by definition random. If the world is random, then free will has no place, as randomness precludes the subject's control of an action. One option cannot be "chosen" over another, as the choice is not the subject's to decide, but instead in the control of some impenetrable randomness. If the world is deterministic, then free will has no place, as determinism also precludes the subject's control of an action. One option cannot be "chosen" over another, as the choice is in the hands of the rules of cause and effect. If one part of the world is rule-based and another is random, then still "choice" is found to be untenable - the subject's "choice" was either random or determined by causes, and hence, outside of the control of the subject.

Noting this, we must consider that a subject's knowledge is contained within its beliefs. Its beliefs form a picture of the world and how the world would respond to various choices. However, if the world as a whole was understood, then the subject would recognize that certain options were not actually options, and indeed that "choice" as described was inherently impossible. The subject deliberating over calling the girl would recognize that it was either purely random, or that cause and effect dictated putting the call off for now. Choice would have evaporated, and with it the possibility of action, and thus the subject itself. The subject we are describing is not merely a subject occasionally capable of action, the way a human is occasionally capable of wearing a hat. The subject we are describing is fundamental constituted so as to allow for action. Belief, desire and choice are not occasional visitors but instead fundamental components of the subject. Neither the possibility of randomness, the possibility of determinism or some sort of mixture allow our subject to exist.

We have encountered a seeming contradiction. As a subject who engages in actions, it is impossible to not recognize choices. But, given the either random or deterministic nature of the world, it is impossible to have choices. The resolution of this seeming contradiction allows us to more fully explain the will.

If it is impossible to have choices, then that's that. No choices. However, it is certainly possible within a deterministic or random universe to have the illusion of having choices. If the recognition of choices is not actually a positive thing, but instead a negative thing (a lack of knowledge about how the world works), then the problem is solved. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with a deterministic world where a subject is fundamentally constituted so as to lack a particular type of knowledge.

Adding this to our conception of will, we now have a more detailed picture of our subject: The subject is split into two sides, the transcendental self and the empirical self. The empirical self is an object in empirical reality that we think we our - it is our identity. The transcendental self, however, is the self we have been primarily discussing - the self with desires, beliefs, and will - it is the self of action. However, as a result of being a subject of action, and as a result of having will, it necessary lacks a certain amount of knowledge. It cannot, now or ever, describe the way in which the will operates, the way in which the transcendental self wills the empirical self to take action. If it ever were to fully understand the will, then it would recognize the fact that the will (and its freedom) is actually an illusion, and would at that moment cease to be a subject. In other words, part of the nature of the transcendental self is the illusion of free will; this is what allows for the possibility of the subjective experience of having and making choices, and thus being a subject of action.

As a few final notes, first, it is important to recognize, as mentioned previously, that the fundamental elements of a subject cannot fail to hold for that subject. The subject, for example, cannot experience a world without free will, or a world without an empirical self. To do so would be to remove the possibility of action (free will allows for choices, the empirical self is vehicle of the will), which would be to undo a fundamental part of the subject. This will be returned to later. Second, it is important to recognize that the preceding description matches up excellently with experience. People do indeed have the subjective experience of having options, making choices, taking actions that reveal desires and beliefs about the world, and having the subjective experience of free will. Finally, it is important to recognize that the preceding analysis is not meant to prove that this is the type of subject we are. It is only meant as a description. If it is accepted, then what follows should be accepted. If it is not accepted, the skeptic will perhaps have to explain the results of the investigation in another way.


Part II
A partial analysis of belief, desire and will

Desire is always the desire for something. This desire could be for something contained within empirical reality, for example, a flashy car. This desire could also be for something outside of empirical reality, for example, the acceptance of God.

Further, you cannot desire what you have. If you desire a particular car, and then buy the car, you no longer desire it - you no longer pursue it in action. You could desire to maintain the car; the future maintenance of the car is something you do not yet have. However, if the future maintenance of the car is guaranteed by a 24-hour professional car-maintenance service, then you would no longer desire it - you would have it. If you are worried that the service may not work, then you could desire to insure that the service will always function as guaranteed; in this case, a guarantee has not yet been obtained. But if a 100% a priori guarantee was granted, then you would no longer desire it. In order to desire something (sticking rigidly to the conception outlined in Part I), it must be weighed when valuing various possible courses of action. However, no course of action could give you something you already have. Because you cannot act so as to achieve it, you cannot desire it. Desires are necessarily for things you lack.

Action is a fundamental part of our type of subject. To act, one must have desires. Hence, it must be impossible to fulfill the last desire. The world perceived by the subject is necessarily a world where some desire is going unfulfilled. If the last desire was fulfilled, then the subject would necessarily cease to exist. However, this is extraordinarily bizarre. If my final desire was to see the Nile river, and I did, I (the transcendental self) would die upon seeing it. This would necessitate a very interesting connection between myself and an empirical state of affairs. For the purposes of this essay, I will discount the possibility of such a connection between a particular empirical state of affairs and the transcendental subject (i.e. I will discount the possibility of death through the fulfillment of the last empirically-based desire).

Going now on that assumption, we come to an odd interaction between desire and will. Will is the mechanism by which the transcendental self causes the empirical self to perform actions. The power of the will is thus limited to those things the empirical self can do. The empirical self can only alter empirical circumstances. As a result, even in the most extreme case, where the empirical self was maximally powerful, the most that the empirical self could do would be to align every aspect of the empirical world so as to be in accordance with the desires of the transcendental self. As the final desire cannot ever be fulfilled, even this extreme case would not fulfill all of the desires of the transcendental subject. Thus, at least one of the desires of the transcendental subject must necessarily be for something outside of empirical reality.

Insofar as we desire something outside of empirical reality, we will be unable to pursue it - the will can only guide the empirical self, and the empirical self can only alter the content of empirical reality. Thus, the object of desire will be unattainable. However, insofar as we pursue it, we will necessarily believe that it is attainable. Action reveals belief; pursuit reveals the belief in the possibility of attaining the thing pursued. Thus, subjects of action necessarily have a desire for an unattained, unattainable thing. They will not recognize it as unattainable insofar as they pursue it, but instead will fall victim to the illusion that the thing is within their reach.

Examples will clarify. A person desires food. They eat, the desire for food is gone. The same person desires success. They are promoted, but yet the desire for success remains. They are promoted again, but still the desire remains. They buy a new car, and become CEO, and quit and start their own business, and still the desire for success remains. Another person goes to the park. They enjoy themselves, and the desire to be at the park dissipates. The same person desires to be close to God. They worship, but yet the desire to be close to God remains. They study, and they pray, and they go through all of the steps dictated to them, and still the desire to be close to God remains. For both individuals described here, the first type of desire is a regular desire. It can be fulfilled, for it truly deals with some aspect of empirical reality. The second type of desire is different however. Its object is not actually a part of empirical reality, no matter how much the pursuer falls victim to the illusion. We shall call this object of desire, the one that cannot be achieved through a mere change in an empirical state of affairs, the "transcendental object of desire."

Empirically, this fits with reality. Some of people's desires are fulfillable and are eventually fulfilled. Others are not fulfillable. No matter what they do, the object of desire (be it success, God, love, acceptance by one's parents, etc.) stays one step from their grasp. Further, when we encounter someone who has "given up" the pursuit for the transcendental object of desire, we do not consider them as having come closer to the truth, regardless of what they might claim. The fact that the person has turned away from the church or business or their family or love or whatever they once believed would let them fulfill the desire is not something the person is "okay with." It remains as a sore spot - they are not enlightened, but resigned. The reason for this is that the transcendental object of desire, as argued, is a necessary part of the subject. It cannot be avoided, and the illusion cannot be transcended, at least insofar as the subject remains a subject.

To recap: The will at its most powerful can realign all of empirical reality in accordance with desire. However, as desire is a fundamental part of the subject, not even such drastic measures as this will succeed in fulfilling the last desire. Thus, the last desire must not deal with empirical reality, but must deal with something outside of empirical reality - something transcendental. This thing, as it is desired, will be seen as good. Also, as desired, it will be unattained. Finally, as transcendental, it will be unattainable, though it will not necessarily be recognized as such. In fact, insofar as it is pursued, the subject will necessarily believe that the object can be obtained, and thus will fall victim to the illusion again and again that the object of their desire is just out of reach. Insofar as they continue their pursuit, they will not recognize that as they fulfill their desires, the object of desire stays one step ahead of them, and can never be attained.


Part III
The nature of the unsignifiable

Moving to a seemingly unrelated subject, we will now examine the nature of "the unsignifiable." A signifier is something that refers to something else. In referring to something, it necessarily points it out in contradistinction to the things not pointed to. All of meaning is contained within signifiers, and as a result, all of truth and knowledge are formulated in signifiers.

What is "unsignifiable"? It would seem to be a flat contradiction, as here we are, staring at the signifier "unsignifiable." However, we can understand "unsignifiable" in two ways. First, we could understand it in the way that yields the contradiction, something that a word cannot possibly refer to in any way. Second, we could understand it as something that cannot be directly signified. Things in empirical reality - coats, hats, books, computers - can be signified directly. The word refers to a thing without any sort of logical intermediation. However, some things cannot be referred to directly, but only by looking at their opposite and attaching a "not." It is this sense of "unsignifiable" that we shall use. For example, consider infinity. We cannot signify infinity directly, for it has never been presented to us in empirical reality, nor can we understand infinity as a synthesized whole; we can only understand it in terms of a signifiable rule ("keep adding one," "keep going in all directions," and so forth). Thus, infinity is unsignifiable in the sense we are using the term.

What is the nature of the unsignifiable? All of truth and knowledge are formulated in signifiers, so if something cannot be signified directly then it cannot be known directly. To be unsignifiable is to be unknown. Further, "unsignifiable" is stronger than "unsignified." To be unsignifiable is not only to be unknown, but to be unknowable.

Anything that is signified is necessarily finite - the signifier delimits the boundaries of the thing and separates it from other things. Anything unsignifiable, therefore, is necessarily infinite. As mentioned, when we claim to "know infinity," we certainly do not - we merely understand it in terms of a rule or a negation of the finite.

Anything that is signified directly has been experienced, and hence is containable within time and space, the a priori forms of our intuition (according to Kant). Hence, the unsignifiable does not exist in space or time, and could be considered either outside and above time and space, or else eternal and omnipresent.

Finally, anything that is unsignifiable is not contained within empirical reality, and hence is unattainable. Again, those who pursue it will not believe it is unattainable, just as those who seek to know it will not believe that it is unknowable.

We have just mapped out the concept of the unsignifiable, and found it to be unknown, unknowable, infinite, eternal, omnipresent and unattainable. This list of attributes should sound extremely familiar.


Part IV
The conflation of concepts

Despite what we might want, our minds are not the clearest things, and the concepts contained therein do not always obey the strictest rules of rigor and reason. Were this the case, philosophy might be easy to do. However, it is not the case, and as a result we sometimes find non-logical interactions between concepts in the mind. One of these interactions is conceptual conflation.

Conceptual conflation is the coming together of two concepts such that they are joined as one and treated as one. I am not here offering a full account of conceptual conflation - it seems to me at first glance to be a relatively complex phenomenon and I imagine that little to nothing has been written about it. However, that having been said, we can see that concepts are from time to time fused into one, that this process is not logical, and that it seems to depend to a high degree on the relation between the concepts. For example, a person might conflate the concepts "love" and "desire to be with forever." Another person might conflate the concepts "knowledgeable" and "wise." Another might conflate "efficient functioning of markets" and "good for people." And so on.

Hence, from time to time it will come to pass that similar concepts will come together into one. Sometimes this is not earth-shattering. Sometimes it is.

The unsignifiable and the transcendental object of desire both share the attribute of being unattainable. It is this link that allows for their easy conceptual conflation. Obviously, it does not logically follow that if A is unattainable and B is unattainable then A is B. However, when two things share very similar characteristics they may sometimes end up conceptually fused. When that happens, we end up with a thing that is good, desired, unattained, unattainable, unknown, unknowable, infinite, eternal, and omnipresent. In other words, we end up with God.

God is good, unattained, unattainable (though those who pursue it will necessarily believe that God can be attained); God is infinite, not bound by time or space, unknown and unknowable (though again those who pursue it will necessarily believe that God can be known). When people encounter the mysterious, they often will call it God. When people talk of the great purpose, the ultimate goal, the final Good, they often will be speaking of God. The formal concept of God is a result of the conflation of the transcendental object of desire, and the concept of the unsignifiable.

But what about the human attributes so often attributes to God?

The transcendental object of desire and the unsignifiable are not always conceptually conflated; many times they are only conceptually linked. Indeed, when we as humans first become subjects, we are caught up in the empirical world. The transcendental object of desire is likely originally seen in the parents. Children typically want mommy and want daddy to approve of them. Of course, the child is in the grips of the transcendental illusion - that the thing they want is actually a physical thing that can be had. In some people, the locus of the transcendental illusion (what physical thing they think will fulfill the transcendental desire) doesn't change; at 50 with their parents both dead they are still trying to prove to their father that they can be successful. However, always ready and waiting is the conceptual space of the unsignifiable, and sometimes, sometimes dramatically, the transcendental object of desire detaches from the parents, and there is a conceptual conflation with the unsignifiable.

When this happens, the split with the parents is not necessarily perfect. A partial movement of the transcendental object of desire will lead to a three-way conceptual conflation - of the transcendental object of desire, the unsignifiable, and the parent(s). The result is a parent-God hybrid, where God is both a human and not a human, and becomes all-powerful, all-knowing, conscious, loving and even fatherlike.

This is the origin of concept of God, and at least partially explains the prevalence of the concept of God in the history of the human race.

It is important to note that the conceptual conflation of the transcendental object of desire and the unsignifiable does not have to be called "God" by every individual. Some will have the same set of concepts, though treat them under a different name. For example, consider Kant. As far as I can gather from my reading of Kant, I found him to be speaking of the thing-in-itself as unattained, unattainable, unknown, unknowable, standing outside of time and space, and the place where infinity, God and goodness (through morality) meet. This is of course not to say anything of the validity of Kant's claims, just as the argument about the origin of the concept of God does not render judgment on God's objective existence one way or another. The point is merely that the conceptual conflation of the transcendental object of desire and the unsignifiable can manifest itself in many different ways.


Conclusion

Philosophical claims have historically resisted empirical validation, and for good reason. After all, if the claim is an empirical one, shouldn't it be left to the empirical sciences? In this essay we began with philosophy, first describing the nature of the subject, then deducing the necessity of a transcendental object of desire. We continued with philosophy as we mapped out the nature of the unsignifiable. However, once into Part IV we introduced a psychological notion - the empirical fact of our own fallibility (specifically, the empirical possibility of conceptual conflation). This is the tiny empirical link that allows our otherwise a priori analysis to be tested empirically.

The various psychological phenomena at least partially explained in this paper include the subjective experience of freedom of the will, the reason why people are constantly striving for something, but only to have it move beyond their reach once they grasp it, some aspects of children's (and some adult's) behavior (treating parents as the transcendental object of desire), one possible type of religious experience (the moment of conceptual conflation of the transcendental object of desire and the unsignifiable), and the origin of the concept of God. It also explains the prevalence and importance of the concept of God throughout human history. Prevalent because every logically fallible (in terms of conceptual conflation) subject of action is equipped with the capacity for coming to believe in God in this way; important because of the importance of the transcendental object of desire - people pursue it unceasingly.

The empirical confirmation of the results of this philosophical analysis poses a problem. First, the analysis was based upon a particular (partial) conception of subject (the split subject / the subject of action). Is that conception of our type of subject correct? If so, a more rigorous metaphysical basis than what was supplied here is necessitated. If not, how then do we explain the match between the results of the argument and empirical reality?

Also, the analysis was based upon a type of argumentation that has fallen into disrepute in various communities. Some deny the meaningfulness of words; others deny the existence of beliefs, desires, action, and even the transcendental subject, claiming things like "talk of ideas is bad business even for psychology." If we grant empirical validity to this investigation, then we also implicitly (or explicitly) validate the investigations claims about meaning, beliefs, desires, actions, the self and the appropriate standards of argumentation.

Putting aside these questions for now, however, I would like to comment on one last thing. The result reached here may seem to conflict with certain conceptions of God and the world that include evil. This is not true. The preceding arguments only tell part of the story. There is much more to be said, on gods, devils, good, evil, and the self. The same questions asked of God in the beginning can be asked of mystical notions in general. Where did they come from? Where did they go? If there was nothing to them, why were they at one point so important? Clearly, the investigation has only begun.