Navy Medicine January-February 1945
Joseph Frechette

The first 2 months of 1945 saw the continued advance of the Allied forces on virtually every front while the exhausted Axis Powers gasped and sputtered their way toward defeat. Germany was on the verge of collapse. By February the Soviets had advanced to the Oder river preparing for the final push toward Berlin.(1) Meanwhile, the Allies had driven to the Rhine and were making ready for Eisenhower's broad
offensive that would carry them to the Elbe.(2)

In the Pacific, America's island hopping campaign would continue with the landings on Luzon, the
liberation of Manila, and the invasion of Iwo Jima. The Japanese resisted grimly and counterattacked with their fearsome kamikazes. However, with clear-cut naval superiority due to America's vast industrial output and the severe losses the Japanese had suffered at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the American forces closed in on the Japanese home islands.

The Big Three--President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin had their last
meeting in early February. At the fateful Yalta Conference they attempted to hammer out a plan for post-war Europe and Roosevelt tried to convince Stalin to join in the war against Japan. At the time everyone still believed it would take the invasion of the Japanese home islands to bring Japan to its knees and Russian
support was considered to be a great asset.

The Philippines Campaign Continued

The landings on Luzon commenced 9 Jan when GEN Walter Krueger's Sixth Army hit the beach at Lingayen Gulf with four divisions. Naval bombardment had begun 2 days before supported by the active Filipino rebels who harassed the Japanese throughout the island. By nightfall a beachhead 15 miles wide
and 6,000 yards deep had been established and 68,000 troops landed.(3) The tactics chosen by the Japanese commander GEN Tomoyuko Yamashita meant the U.S. suffered few casualties during the initial landings. Yamashita had decided to adopt an inland static defense to delay the conquest of Luzon as long as possible.(4)

Reports that the Japanese might massacre the POWs held at various prison camps throughout Luzon led to some spectacular rescue operations. In January the 6th Ranger Battalion liberated the prison camp at Cabanatuan in a daring raid behind Japanese lines. American forces then freed the civilians and 11 Navy
nurses interned at Los Ba¤os on 23 Feb. The rescue operation at Los Ba¤os was a combined airborne and amphibious assault made with the assistance of an escapee, Pete Miles, and Filipino guerrillas. LT Dorothy Still, NC, recalled the entrance of the rescuing forces:

"An amtrac pulled up in front of the hospital and the American troops jumped out. Oh, we had never seen anything so handsome in our lives. These fellows were in camouflage uniforms wearing a new kind of helmet, not those little tin pan things we were used to seeing. And they looked so healthy and lively."(5)

American forces entered Manila on 2 Feb and the next day released 3,500 internees from Santo Tomas University. On 4 Feb, after a brief firefight, troops liberated 1,300 starving Allied POWs from Bilibid prison. For many of the prisoners this was their first taste of freedom since the surrender of the Allied forces at Bataan and Corregidor in the spring of 1942.(6)

In a scorched earth retreat that left Manila in ruins, the Japanese resisted ferociously in house to house fighting and it would be until 4 Mar before the city was finally declared secure. Throughout the island the Japanese fought staunchly and although their forces were driven back into isolated pockets many refused
to surrender until the end of the war.(7)

Navy medical participation was largely limited to immediate treatment and evacuation in the early phase of operations while the Army took responsibility for hospitalization and later evacuation. Navy medical personnel from APAs went to the beach to administer additional first-aid to casualties brought in by Army medical personnel and to screen patients for evacuation. Cases in immediate need of surgery were sent aboard surgically equipped LSTs while more lightly wounded patients were evacuated directly to the APAs.(8)

Medical treatment and evacuation on the beaches was facilitated by the presence of five surgically equipped LSTs. Four stayed on shore to provide treatment and to collect cases for evacuation while the fifth stood offshore in reserve. Each was equipped with about 50 bunks and had emergency operating facilities. Treatment was eased by the light casualties suffered on the beaches and some corpsmen even had time to assist in unloading cargo. The surgical LSTs unloaded their cargo and remained on the beaches until Army medical facilities had been set up ashore. In addition to their usual complement they were staffed with two additional surgeons and five additional corpsmen. When a surgical LST needed to reduce its casualty load
it simply withdrew from the beach and unloaded onto an APA or APH.(9)

The Army supplied the surgical LSTs with whole blood as well as 20 million units of penicillin and additional gas gangrene anti-toxin. LST-464, acting as a blood bank, supplied the APAs with 400 pints of blood. Further blood supplies were flown in from the United States.(10)

Much more serious than the casualties suffered on the beaches was the devastation wrought by the kamikaze attacks on the U.S. task force. Fortunately, the attacks ceased after 13 Jan because the Japanese had decided not to replace the planes they had lost. In actions around Mindoro and Lingayen from 13 Dec through 13 Jan, 20 ships were sunk, 24 heavily damaged, and 35 lightly damaged.(11)

A kamikaze struck USS Manila Bay (CVE-6) on 5 Jan directly above the sick bay. Although many medical personnel were injured, they continued to function and set up a new sick bay in the forward battle dressing station. Another suicide plane struck the superstructure of the USS New Mexico (BB-40) killing 30 and wounding 129. Unfortunately the casualties could not be evacuated for the next 13 days. On 6 Jan USS California (BB-44) was struck and one of its own 5-inch shells exploded resulting in 203 casualties. These were augmented the following day by the addition of 52 casualties in need of medical care from three other ships.(12)

Treatment of battle injuries aboard ship had become relatively standardized by this time. In order to better deal with the kamikaze threat medical supplies were distributed throughout ships in metal cases. After medical personnel applied first aid they debrided wounds and applied sulfanilamide powder and sterile
dressings. More and more often casualties were administered type O blood during transfusions in place of plasma.(13)

Recommendations were made for greater numbers of cots, increased plasma allowances, use of
protective clothing, even leaving the hair long to help reduce the risk of head trauma.(14)

The Hell Ships

On 13 Dec a work draft of 1,619 men from Manila's Bilibid Prison had embarked on a disastrous
journey to Japan. The Japanese were trying to evacuate the prisoners before the arrival of Allied forces in the Philippines. They were to serve in forced labor camps in Japan and Manchuria. The draft included Medical
Corps personnel from Bilibid under CDR Thomas Hayes. Conditions were horrific, the prisoners rations were

far from adequate, and the conditions in the holds they were travelling in were overcrowded and unsanitary. The two ships carrying those that had survived since leaving Manila put in at Takao, Formosa on 31 Dec. This was to be a tragic layover and many would not leave the port alive. On 6 Jan the Japanese transferred the
approximately 200 surviving men in the hold of Brazil Maru to Enoura Maru to join the approximately 1,000 men in that ship's holds.

Since arriving in port the prisoners' rations had improved somewhat but were still far from adequate. Sanitation consisted solely of horse troughs, and none of the POWs wore proper clothing for the more northern latitudes they had entered since leaving the Philippines.(15)

The Japanese opened the forward hold the following morning to ease the overcrowded conditions. Five hundred men were moved forward from hold number two including CDR Hayes and most of his medical staff. On the morning of 9 Jan an American air raid attacked the dock area. Enoura Maru drew the attention of the American pilots as it was tied up alongside a Japanese destroyer. One bomb exploded alongside Enoura Maru wrenching the bulkheads between the two prison holds. A second bomb exploded directly in the forward hold killing about 250 and wounding the rest. CDR Hayes and nearly all the doctors and medical personnel were killed by this blast. Another bomb landed aft and sent hatch planking crashing down on top of the prisoners there, killing about 40 and pinning 80 under the debris.(16)

The Japanese refused to allow the wounded to be sent ashore for treatment nor did they allow the
prisoners to receive medical supplies. A portion of the hold was set aside to serve as a make-shift hospital. The dead were stacked up under the hatch but the Japanese prevented the bodies from being removed for 4 days. Surviving doctors and corpsmen continued to care for the wounded despite their own injuries until many dropped from exhaustion. Some even died in their sleep.(17)

The Japanese transferred the remaining prisoners on 13 Jan to Brazil Maru. By this time the 800-900 men still living were so weak that 12 died during the transfer. As they continued north toward Japan the weather became bitterly cold. The scantily clad men began suffering from chills and pneumonia; 47 died
during the first day at sea. In addition the Japanese still provided food and water in insufficient quantities. By the time the ship docked at Moji, Japan the death toll had risen to 40 men a day including the senior medical officer, CDR Maurice Joses. Only 425 prisoners were left alive. Of these 235 more would die in prison camps in the next 6 weeks and 80 more in a local hospital! Only a few would survive the war.(18)

Navy Medicine at Yalta

The conference between the "Big Three" took place 4-11 Feb. Yalta was chosen as the site for the
summit because Stalin was determined that it should be held on Russian soil and it was the only place in the Soviet Union not vetoed for health reasons by Roosevelt's physician Surgeon General VADM Ross T. McIntire. However, before the conference took place there were details that required attention.

On 3 Jan the medical department of USS Catoctin (AGC-5) received orders to make the Crimean
conference site at the Czarist Livadia estate habitable for about 300 people. Soviet troops had just liberated the Crimean peninsula from the Nazis and the facilities were in deplorable condition. Catoctin transited the Dardenelles and Bosporus on 21 Jan, becoming the first Allied vessel to enter the Black Sea since the beginning of the war.(19)

After assessing the situation the Medical Corps personnel constructed latrines, chlorinated the water supply, provided the maids with disinfectant, inspected the food, and exterminated insects. The sick bay was so efficient that the British delegation asked for and received aid from the Americans.(20)

Iwo Jima

On 19 Feb 1945 the Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions landed on Iwo Jima; the Third Marine Division was held in reserve and landed two days later.(21) The bloody battle was fought so the B-29 Superfortresses returning from their bombing missions over Japan would have a base to make emergency landings if they
couldn't make it back to their home airfields in the Marianas. Iwo Jima would also provide a base from which escorting fighters could operate. At the end of the first day's fighting the Marines had cut the island in half but had already suffered 2,420 casualties.

On 23 Feb Marines took Mount Suribachi in the south of the island and PhM2c John H. Bradley helped raise the second American flag flown from the summit thereby gaining immortality. The photograph by Joe Rosenthal of that event is one of the most widely known pictures of the war and served as the model for the Marine Corps Memorial in Arlington, VA.(22)

Four medical shore parties landed by H-hour-plus-120 minutes and other medical units came ashore as rapidly as possible. The ferocity of the fighting made treatment difficult. Corpsmen often had to work in shell craters and foxholes while dodging incoming fire.(23) Due to the extreme number of casualties many of the hospital sections of the medical companies that had landed to support the regimental combat teams simply stayed on the beach to assist with evacuation until division and corps hospital installations were functioning. Despite the intensity of the fighting and a casualty rate in excess of 1,000 per day for the first 21 days of the operation, casualties were evacuated as quickly and efficiently as possible. By D-day-plus-33, 17,677
casualties had been treated and evacuated.(24)

Casualties among corpsmen were extremely high; 38 percent of the corpsmen with the Fourth Division were injured. Medical companies furnished replacements but, contrary to established doctrine, in some cases were depleted too severely to render proper care to the wounded once they were off the front lines.(25)

Four surgically equipped LST(H)s were on hand to assist with evacuation and LST(H)-929 served as a floating blood bank for the forces afloat and ashore. The LST(H)s received casualties at night and provided emergency treatment during the early stages of the operation and distributed the wounded to the APAs and AHs. On D-day, the LST(H)s evacuated 2,230 casualties between 0900 and 1530, an average of 6 casualties per minute.(26)

Originally only two hospital ships, Samaritan (AH-10) and Solace (AH-5), had been scheduled for evacuation operations. But on 20 Feb Pinkney (APH-2), Bountiful (AH-9), and Ozark (LSV-2),
commandeered to transport the wounded, joined them. These ships evacuated casualties to Saipan and Guam and by 21 Mar had transported 4,879.(27)

Further Back in the War

Return to WWII History index page

Foward in to the War

References

1. Keegan J. The Second World War, p 512-515.

2. Ibid., p. 518-519.

3. U.S. Navy Medical Department Administrative History, 1941-1945, Vol. I: Narrative History, chap.10, p22.

4. Esposito V. The West Point Atlas of American Wars. Vol. II, sec. 2, map 153.

5. Herman J, "Reminiscences of a Nurse POW," Navy Medicine; 1992 83(3), p 36.

6. Esposito, p 155-157.

7. Ibid., 157-159.

8. U.S. Navy Medical Department Administrative History, 1941-1945, Vol. I: Narrative History, chap. 10, p 22-23.

9. Ibid., p 23-24.

10. Ibid., p 26.

11. Esposito, map 154.

12. U.S. Navy Medical Department Administrative History, 1941-1945, Vol. I: Narrative History, chap. 10, p 29-33.

13. Ibid., p 33.

14. Ibid., p 35.

15. Crews J, Hostetter R. "Prisoners' Voyage of Doom," Hospital
Corps Quarterly; 1948 21(3), p 40.

16. Ibid., p 40.

17. Ibid., p 40-41.

18. Feuer A. Bilibid Diary, p 239-244.