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Review
The
book offers a fresh perspective on the Cyprus problem. It offers
a clear and detailed account of the history of the region, and
the succession of powers that ruled the island since the Hellenic
age. What is different about Drevet's book is his views on the
role of the Cypriot orthodox church in the latter half of the
20th century. He accuses them of sabotaging favourable
independence agreements, such as the Winchester Constitution,
because of the narrow-minded objective of asserting its absolute
power over Cyprus. Indeed, he convincingly argued that the Church
used the issue of Enosis (unification with Greece) only to undermine
the Cypriot communists (AKEL). Indeed, the Communists would have
created a modern, secular state, in which the influence of the
Church would have inevitably waned. Of course, others are also
to blame, such as the colonial power Britain, which was loath
to abandon such a strategically-placed colony, and brutally repressed
the independence campaign. Once again, we see an island whose
destiny was never really in the hands of its own people, but was
decided by Greece, Britain and Turkey. This situation is a major
cause of the intercommunal violence following independence, and
ultimately of the 1974 partition. Thus, Cyprus never attained
true independence. The treacherous role of Grivas, former independence
leader who subverted the independence movement (EOKA) into a terrorist
organisation devoted to terrorising Turkish Cypriots and assassinating
communists, is also exposed. Drevet then examines the role of
Archbishop Makarios, first president of an "independent Cyprus".
He considers that one of Makarios' biggest strategic mistakes
was not to join NATO. Far from granting Cyprus more independence,
this served only to anger the USA, which would prove crucial in
later years. Fearful of losing vital strategic positions in the
region, the USA was then more favourable to the invasion of the
island by NATO member Turkey. Drevet then continues with a detailed
account of the events leading to the 1974 invasion, including
the dramatic events of 1972 when future president Clerides had
the opportunity to sign a reasonable agreement, but which Makarios
rejected. Drevet also reminds us that Rauf Dektash, the leader
of theCypriot Turks to this day, is an inextricable part of the
problem, in which he has been involved since the 1970s. Had Dektash
served the Turkish Cypriot interests rather than Ankara, an agreement
would have been possible and averted the invasion. As for the invasion itself, it is a humanitarian
nightmare. The Turkish army killed thousands of civilians, ravaged
the island with a heavy bombing campaign that was totally unnecessary,
and displaced nearly one third of the population. Following these
events, Drevet describes the influx of Anatolian migrants from
Turkey to Northern Cyprus, which is altering the balance of power
in favour of the Turks on the island, and making a solution more
and more difficult. After comparing and contrasting the economic
destinies of both sides after partition, he moves on to potential
solutions to the problem, which is of renewed interest since the
recent Annan plan. All
in all, Drevet has written a very detailed reference book, useful
to understand the complexity of the Cyprus problem, and to envisage
potential outcomes.
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