Just some food for thought. This reminds me a tad of a thread from years ago: Kundalini and the Holy
Spirit
My spiritual sensibilities have grown increasingly Franciscan, beyond my fascination with Francis and
nature, to include a few thoughts that are more philosophical like those of folks like Duns Scotus vis a vis
the Incarnation and also his scholastic realism, which influenced Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce called
Scotus and Ockham "the greatest speculative minds of the middle ages, as well as two of the profoundest
metaphysicians that ever lived." (Writings of Charles S. Peirce, Vol. 2, W2, p. 311.) In fact, I discovered
Peirce when someone pointed out to me that some of my writings resembled his, although I in turn pointed
out that I had never heard of Peirce and my writings in question were influenced, rather, by Scotus and,
before that, pseudo-Dionysius and some of the neo-platonic mystics of very early Christianity....
Consider the following mostly in the poetic vein. Take away from it what grows in your own heart.
I devised the following rubrics from meditating on Peirce:
The normative sciences mediate between phenomenology and metaphysics to effect the pragmatic.
The normative mediates between the descriptive and interpretive to effect the evaluative.
The philosophic mediates between the positivist and theistic to effect the theotic. (using Helminiak's foci of
concern)
The axiological mediates between the epistemological and ontological to effect the teleological.
Instrumental causes mediate between formal causes and efficient causes to effect final causes. (Thomistic
categories and tacit dimensionality)
The probable (necessary) mediates between the possible and the actual to effect the valuable. (modal
ontology)
Delimitations mediate between visualizations and actualizations to effect realizations (value-realizations).
Objective delimitations mediate between subjective visualizations and interobjective actualizations to effect
intersubjective value realizations. (relating this all to Wilber)
Peirce, in his epistemology, placed a great deal of emphasis on the
community of inquiry, which I havereemphasized as the
community of value-realization.Everything in my
tetradalectical fugues above is ultimately oriented, then, to value-realizations that are, inthe end, radically
intersubjective. Now, let me point out that, while this certainly has normative impetus,this has primarily been a descriptive enterprise. When it comes to epistemology, in other words, how we
realize what we realize, everything is inherently normative.
And this is why goodness mediates between beauty and truth to effect unity.
And why code (law) mediates between cult (liturgy) and creed to effect community.
Our love of God for sake of God mediates between our love of self for sake of self and love of God for sake
of self to effect our love of self for sake of God. (St. Bernard)
Agape mediates between eros and storge' to effect philia. (C.S. Lewis & You are my friends if you do what
I command you.)
Our love of God mediates between our love of self and our love of nature to effect our love of others.
(Merton)
And why our formative spirituality is ordered toward unitive strivings and communion.
In the context, then, of our manifold and multiform nondual realizations, those realizations are philosophic,
epistemic, aesthetical, moral, linguistic, semiotic, ascetical, psychological, spiritual, mystical, ecstatic,
metaphysical, ontological, social and religious and so on and so forth:
quote:
Nondual has different meanings that pertain to 1) theological concerns: journey toward intimacy; dance
between relationship and identity 2) psychological and affective states: altered states of consciousness,
ecstasy 3) epistemological states and structures: nondiscursive, preconceptual and transconceptual
awareness; avoidance of subject-object cleavage; epistemic vagueness; nominalism & essentialism 4)
linguistic and semiotic approaches: Dionysian logic, semantical vagueness, triadic semiotic grammar;
deconstruction strategies 5) metaphysical & ontological theories: idealist and materialist monisms;
aristotelian hylomorphism; ontological vagueness; modal ontology 6) philosophical categories: false
dichotomies; binary logic; dualistic conceptions 7) ascetical practices & spiritual disciplines of all sorts,
what we might call spiritual technology 8) aesthetical and moral sensibilities 9) social interactions and 10)
religious concerns.
from my page on Christian Nonduality
The practical upshot of our nondual realizations from a theological perspective as we gaze through this
Peircean prism, as amplified in the fugues above, is that
all value-realizations are radicallyintersubjective.
The nondual lens, then, yields a partial truth, is but an epistemic finger pointing to anotherreality, the moon, which but reflects the Light of the Sun.
Note: The reason that we do not conceive of good and evil dualistically is because they are not equal
members in comparison, good triumphing over evil.
64 Reasons Not To be Dualistic
Or,
64 Ways to Deny a Flip-flop (self-contradiction)1) I'm a politician.
2) I'm a mystic.
3) You missed the kataphatic predication.
4) You missed the apophatic predication.
5) You missed the unitive predication.
6) You missed the dionysian logic.
7) You missed the neoplatonic logic.
8) You missed the semiotic grammar.
9) You missed the deliberate parsing.
10) You missed the high nuance.
11) You missed the careful disambiguation.
12) You missed the rigorous definition.
13) You missed the antinomial paradox.
14) You missed the conditional paradox.
15) You missed the veridical paradox.
16) You missed the falsidical paradox.
17) You missed the literal and historical sense.
18) You missed the tropological and moral sense.
19) You missed the anagogical sense.
20) You missed the allegorical sense.
21) You missed the mystagogical sense.
22) You missed the univocal predication.
23) You missed the equivocal predication.
24) You missed the analogical and metaphorical predication.
25) You missed the temporal nature of the reality.
26) You missed the eternal nature of the reality.
27) You missed the eschatological nature of the reality.
28) You missed the proleptical nature of the reality.
29) You missed the implicit epistemic, ontological and semantical vagueness.
30) You missed the false dichotomy.
31) You missed the ecstatic nature of the utterance.
32) You missed the subject-object cleavage.
33) You missed the nondiscursive nature of the utterance.
34) You missed the preconceptual nature of the utterance.
35) You missed the transconceptual nature of the utterance.
36) You missed the deconstructive strategy being employed.
37) You missed the tautological structure being inhabited.
38) You missed the binary logic yielding to monadic and triadic reality.
39) You missed the evaluative nature of the utterance.
40) You missed the distinction between the descriptive and interpretive.
41) You missed the distinction between the descriptive and the prescriptive.
42) You missed the distinction between the given and the normative.
43) You missed the distinction between the phenomenal and phenomenological.
44) You missed the distinction between the epistemic and the ontological.
45) You missed the distinction between exegesis and eisegesis.
46) You missed the conflation of the metaphysical and theological.
47) You missed the distinction between the primary and secondary.
48) You missed the distinction between the essential and the accidental.
49) You missed the distinction between the propositional and the experiential.
50) You missed the distinction between the existential and the neurotic.
51) You missed the distinction between the altered state of consciousness and psychosis.
52) You missed the distinction between engagement and obsession.
53) You missed the distinction between being driven and being inspired.
54) You missed the distinction between being spontaneous and being compulsive.
55) You missed the conflation of the empirical, rational, practical and relational.
56) You missed the distinction between the practical and theoretical or speculative.
57) You missed the distinctions between primacy, autonomy and integrality.
58) You missed the distinction between the necessary and sufficient.
59) You missed the distinction between epistemic methodological constraints and ontological occulting.
60) You missed the distinction between the dogmatic, heuristic and theoretic.
61) You missed the creative ambiguity and creative tension.
62) You missed the distinction between phenomenal states, developmental stages and psychic structures.
63) You missed the distinction between visualization, actualization, delimitation and realization.
64) You missed the distinction between pattern & paradox, chance & necessity, order & chaos, symmetry
& asymmetry, random & systematic.
Christianity is recovering its mystical core via a neoplatonic-influenced dionysian logic. The classical
emphasis has been on the dialectic between the apophatic and kataphatic, the former referring literally to
what God is not, the latter an affirmation of what God is like, analogically. This has reduced all God-talk to
metaphor and leaves a question begging as to how there can be any causal efficacy between Creator and
creatures with such a causal disjunction as is necessarily implied by such a weak analogy.
The classical logic looks like this:
1) God is | x | is true analogically and kataphatically.
2) God is | not x | is true literally and apophatically.
Dionysian logic breaks out of this dualistic dyad, going beyond it but not without it:
3) God is neither | x | nor | not x | is true unitively.
This triadic perspective resolves the tension between the classical neoplatonic
henosis, which refers to thedance between intersubjectivity and identity with ultimate reality, and dinonysian
theosis, which refers tothe growth in intimacy with ultimate reality, by affirming both an interobjective identity between creature
and Creator, in a panentheistic divine matrix of interrelated causes and effects, as well as an intersubjective
intimacy between creature and Creator, the creature thus being quasiautonomous. (auto = self)
Metaphysically, this is best expressed in the neoclassical theism of Charles Hartshorne and the panentheist
divine matrix
of Joe Bracken.re: other examples
Although I'm preoccupied on another project, in case anyone comes across this and is interested, the
examples I am trying to gather or harvest re: my list of nondualia above are those that would take the form
of poetry, haiku, jokes, koans, riddles, short stories, cartoons and such. And these examples and this list
pertain to nonduality broadly conceived, the Big Tent approach, such as might be described at wikipedia or
the Nonduality Salon. I'm not really collecting examples of the more narrowly conceived, but most
commonly considered, "theological" interpretations of nonduality as it differs between, for example, the
Hindu Advaitic type, the Buddhist type: all is empty of self or neoplatonic henosis, or, in other words, those
conceptions that are often the subject of East vs West odium theologicum. So, this is to say that I'm
collecting nondualia that involve practice not doctrine, methods or processes and not systems (not to deny
that
sometimes these can seem inextricably intertwined, only to emphasize that quite often they are not).For Rohr, I'd say the nondual refers mostly to an epistemic process, such as in Zen's dethroning of the
conceptualizing ego in order to otherwise relate to some seeming contradictions, instead, as paradoxes,
which might perdure as mystery, resolve dialectically, dissolve from a stepping out of an inadequate
framework of logic or any other dispositions (or lack thereof) known to this paradox or another (see my
inventory of nondualia above). [This maps fairly well with the broad conceptions of nonduality such as at
Nonduality Salon and Wikipedia.] Predominantly, though, Rohr affirms nondual thinking in an over against
fashion as related to either-or thinking, i.e. false dichotomies, and as related to a failure to self-critique
one's own systems and logical frameworks, as a failure, too, to affirm the rays of truth in other perspectives
and traditions. It is a failure to move beyond the Law thru the Prophets to the Wisdom tradition, not to do
away with them but to properly fulfill them.
From Rohr's heavy reliance on Merton, to the extent the nondual refers to metaphysical realities, again,
looking to Zen, then I'd say Rohr would affirm its metaphysical intuition of the ground of being. [Of
course, this doesn't map perfectly well over certain Hindu and Buddhist ontological interpretations, which,
vis a vis creature and creator, impute complete identity rather then a causal nexus or matrix, relating them
wholly by nature rather than grace.]
My interpretation of Rohr is that he is pretty much grounded, as would be expected, in Franciscan
sensibilities, which includes a Scotist philosophy (Scholastic) and the theology of St. Bonaventure, who
was influenced by Dionysius, among others of neoplatonic leanings, and who was also influenced by
Richard of St. Victor. Interestingly, though, in his prayer life, Rohr chose Thomas Merton as his model,
which explains, I'd suppose, why he works with Jim Finley. In my view, these influences come together to
provide the leit motif of Rohr's teachings and the rosetta stone to interpretation of Rohr.
Richard of St. Victor thus informs the Franciscan tradition thru Bonaventure about the occulus carnis (eye
of the senses), the occulus rationis (eye of reason), and the occulus fidei (eye of faith). This "eye of faith" is
what Rohr would refer to as the "third eye" and, consistent with Merton, it integrally takes us beyond our
senses and reason but not without them. [In my view, this maps fairly well, but not completely, over such
as Jewish and Tibetan concepts of Third Eye seeing, for example.]
Zen, for Merton, gifts us with a process for going beyond both concepts as well as conceptual frameworks.
For some, per Merton, as a form of natural contemplation, Zen leads also to metaphysical insight or
intuition of being. (And this reveals Merton's reliance on Maritain. He employs other Thomist formulations,
too. I can only imagine that Rohr simply misspoke or was misdictated or there was a typo or something in
his Radical Grace article.) Merton could affirm Zen's metaphysical intuition of the ground of being as
compatible with Christianity but certainly distinct from infused contemplation.
Rohr often refers to knowledge through connaturality, which, per Maritain is
knowledge through union orinclination, connaturality or congeniality, the intellect is at play not alone, but together with affective
inclinations and the dispositions of the will, and is guided and directed by them. It is not rational
knowledge, knowledge through the conceptual, logical and discursive exercise of Reason. But it is really
and genuinely knowledge, though obscure and perhaps incapable of giving account of itself, or of being
translated into words.
Rohr writes:
quote:
Contemplation is also saying how you see is what you will see, and we must clean our own lens of seeing. I
call it knowing by "connaturality" (Aquinas), or knowing by affinity or kinship, it is the participative
knowing by which the Indwelling Spirit in us knows God, Love, Truth, and Eternity. LIKE KNOWS LIKE,
and that is very important to know. There definitely is a communion between the seer and the seen, the
knower and the known Hatred cannot nor will not know God, fear cannot nor will not recognize love.
Because this deep contemplative wisdom has not been taught in recent Catholic centuries, and hardly at all
among Protestants, it is a great big lack and absence in our God given ability to "know spiritual things
spiritually", as Paul would say (1 Cor.2:13).
As for a Zen Catholicism, Arraj writes:
quote:
We cultivate the intuition of being by pursuing our deepest inner aspirations that transcend metaphysics
itself. The more we situate Zen in this ascent, the better able we will be to let it inspire both metaphysics
and Christian mysticism, and be inspired by them in turn. Each is enamored by existence in its own way.
The metaphysics of St. Thomas wants to understand it, and to do so, it uses concepts and pushes them to
their ultimate limits where they display their innermost nature as reflections of existence. Zen wants to
actively embrace existence so it resolutely puts aside all concepts, and in this emptiness finds the way to
existence. Christian mysticism wants to be embraced by existence and see revealed in its depths its most
intimate face, which is love. There is no reason except our own weakness that prevents all three from
sharing with each other the riches they have found in the service of this one Existence, or Nothingness.
Zen Catholicism?
Here's a great quote from Pseudo-Dionysius:
quote:
Do thou, in the intent practice of
mystic contemplation,
leave behind the senses and the
operations of the intellect, and all things
that the senses or the intellect can percieve,
and all things which are not and
things which are, and strain upwards
in unknowing as far as may be
towards the union with Him who is
above all being and knowledge.
For by unceasing and absolute
withdrawal from thyself and
all things in purity, abandoning
all and set free from all,
thou wilt be borne up to the
ray of the Divine Darkness
that surpasses all being.
Rohr goes beyond these Mertonesque Zen-like formulations though:
quote:
Contemplation is a long, loving look at what really is.
quote:
Contemplation means returning to this deep source. Each one of us tries to find the spiritual exercise that
helps us come to this source. If reading the Bible helps you, then read the Bible. If the Eucharist helps, then
celebrate the Eucharist. If praying the rosary helps, pray the rosary. If sitting in silence helps, just sit there
and keep silence. But we must find a way to get to the place where everything is. We have to take this long,
loving look at reality, where we don't judge and we simply receive.
quote:
Of course, emptiness in and of itself isn't enough. The point of emptiness is to get ourselves out of the
way so that Christ can fill us up. As soon as we're empty, there's a place for Christ, because only then
are we in any sense ready to recognize and accept Christ as the totally other,
who is not me.Simplicity
revised from 1991, Crossroad Publishing 2003Before answering that Rohr question re: the nondual, I was coming here to share these great quotes:
Cynthia Krkoska Nielsen
, in “The God Beyond Being in Dionysius and Jean-Luc Marion,” writes:quote:
As previously mentioned in passing, Dionysius (in contrast with, e.g., St. Thomas) held that our highest
activity is an un-knowing, a union. Yet, Dionysius also believes that in the life to come “we shall be ever
filled with the sight of God,” and “we shall have a conceptual gift of light from him.” In other words,
wewill be engaged in three activities: seeing, knowing, and unknowing (i.e., union).
For Dionysius, thehighest activity is an unknowing, a union—that which is beyond nous. In other words, for Dionysius our
perfection comes in a non-cognitive union with God.
Though Dionysius is denying that our ultimateperfection is in knowing, he does not deny that we have no knowledge or true apprehension of God
whatsoever. However, such knowledge is inferior to our ultimate non-cognitive experience of God,
i.e., to our union with God in the life to come.
Again, we find a very strict logic in place, yet a logic thatwillingly bows to mystical experience. That an unknowing union is our ultimate perfection must be the case
since our knowledge is limited to that which is and therefore necessarily excludes God who is beyond
being. “If all knowledge is of that which is and is limited to the realm of the existent, then whatever
transcends being must also transcend knowledge.”
I felt some resonance with that quote and the distinction theologians draw between primary and secondary
objects of our beatific vision (vis a vis my own interpretation of Thomas Keating's nonduality article in
Radical Grace).
Cynthia closes that paper with a quote from Jean-Luc Marion:
quote:
“[T]o say God requires receiving the gift and—since the gift occurs only in distance—returning it. To
return the gift, to play redundantly the unthinkable donation, this is not said, but done.
Love is not spoken,in the end, it is made.
Only then can discourse be reborn, but as an enjoyment, a jubilation, a praise.” p.107 God Without Being. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991.
Be sure to check out Cynthia's Blog if you're a fan of John Duns Scotus. At this link, she quotes Mary Beth
Ingham, who works with Richard Rohr, also, most recently in a conference on Paradox.
quote:
The soul utterly puts off itself and puts on divine love; and being conformed to that beauty which it has
beheld, it utterly passes into that other glory.
Richard of St. Victor
Excerpt taken from Thomas Merton's autobiography
"The Seven Storey Mountain" pgs.284-5quote:
I was in the Church of St. Francis at Havana. It was a Sunday. I had been to Communion at some other
church, I think at ElCristo, and now I had come here to hear another Mass. The building was crowded. Up
in front, before the altar, there were rows and rows of children, crowded together. I forget whether they
were First Communicants or not: but they were children around that age. I was far in the back of the
church, but I could see the heads of all those children.
It came time for the Consecration. The priest raised the Host, then he raised the chalice. When he put the
chalice down on thealtar, suddenly a Friar in his brown robe and white cord stood up in front of the
children, and all at once the voices of the children burst out:
"Creo en Dios.
"I believe in God the Father Almighty, the creator of heaven and earth . . ."
The Creed. But that cry, "Creo en Dios!" It was loud, and bright, and sudden and glad and triumphant; it
was a good big shout, that came from all those Cuban children, a joyous affirmation of faith.
Then, as sudden as the shout and as definite, and a thousand times more bright, there formed in my
mind an awareness, an understanding, a realization of what had just taken place on the altar, at the
Consecration: a realization of God made present by the words of Consecration in a way that made
Him belong to me.
But what a thing it was, this awareness: it was so intangible, and yet it struck me like a thunderclap. It was
a light that was so bright that it had no relation to any visible light and so profound and so intimate that it
seemed like a neutralization of every lesser experience.
And yet the thing that struck me most of all was that this light was in a certain sense "ordinary"--it was a
light (and this most of all was what took my breath away) that was offered to all, to everybody, and there
was nothing fancy or strange about it. It was the light of faith deepened and reduced to an extreme and
sudden obviousness.
It was as if I had been suddenly illuminated by being blinded by the manifestation of God's presence.
The reason why this light was blinding and neutralizing was that there was and could be simply
nothing init of sense or imagination.
When I call it a light that is a metaphor which I am using, long after the fact.But at the moment, another overwhelming thing about this awareness was that
it disarmed all images, allmetaphors, cut through the whole skein of species and phantasms with which we naturally do our
thinking. It
ignored all sense experience in order to strike directly at the heart of truth, as if a suddenand immediate contact had been established between my intellect and the TruthWho was now
physically really and substantially before me on the altar. But this contact was
not somethingspeculative and abstract: it was concrete and experimental
and belonged to the order of knowledge,yes, but more still to the order of love.
Another thing about it was that this light was something far and beyond the level of any desire or any
appetite I had ever yet been aware of. It was purified of all emotion and cleansed of everything that savored
of sensible yearnings. It was love as clean and direct as vision: and it flew straight to the possession of the
Truth it loved.
And the first articulate thought that came to my mind was: 'Heaven is right here in front of me: Heaven,
Heaven!" It lasted only a moment: but it left a breathless joy and a clean peace and happiness that stayed
for hours and it was something I have never forgotten. The strange thing about this light was that although
it seemed "ordinary" in the sense I have mentioned, and so accessible, there was no way of recapturing it.
In fact, I did not even know how to start trying to reconstruct the experience or bring it back if I wanted
except to make acts of faith and love. But it was easy to see there was nothing I could do to give any act of
faith that peculiar quality of sudden obviousness: that was a gift and had to come from somewhere else,
beyond and above myself.
It may very well be that, from a theological perspective, Rohr might, once again, if following Merton, view
the distinction between acquired and infused contemplation as irrelevant, see the argument as defunct with
no real differences in principle in play with respect to the kinds of experience to which they refer, those
experiences differing only in degree.
Merton, of course, was a big fan of acquired contemplation and would have, therefore, I suppose, heartily
endorsed modern contemplative prayer in most of its forms or structures, which dispose pray-ers to ever
more full realizations of God working in us. Rohr provides general counsel to people to "find that spiritual
exercise that helps them return to the source," however simple, whether discursive or nondiscursive, to
whatever extent facultative. As folks climb the classical (and apparently dynamic) prayer ladder (with
rungs added for emergent prayer forms), when they move into the contemplative forms, such general
counsel, of course, must yield to more specific spiritual direction because those distinctions we draw
regarding the fullness of experiences in prayer are certainly significant from a practical perspective.
Now, to the extent that this transcendental thomist take on divine action is taken seriously, this might seem
to introduce a problem in discernment of what exactly is coming from the world, the self, levels of
consciousness, the devil or God with regard to various human impulses, feelings, insights and images. That
problem is not new, however. The same question has arisen with respect to the inspiration and exegesis of
Scripture and with all manner of so-called private revelation, too, along with miracles, apparitions,
possessions, oppressions and so on and so forth, and we have time-honored rubrics for dealing with it all.
My favorite is called the hermeneutic of suspicion.
One doesn't need access to my library to discover how Rohr uses the word nondual. Google works well
enough. It's results are consistent with what I have gathered from all of my primary sources. And I have
already described that usage. I don't expect any surprises from Third Eye. He isn't talking ontologically or
metaphysically. He isn't denying relationality and neither is Keating. He's talking about transcending our
analytical and logical and empirical and practical and evaluative mindsets by engaging, also, for example,
our simple awareness, our nonrational aspects of knowing, our nonpropositional faculties that are precisely
involved in our grammar of relationship, etc.
Nondualism is the proper metaphysical term.
The other forms - nondual and nonduality - just aren't dictionary words (not even BIG dictionaries).
Duality, on the other hand, is an M-W word that corresponds to dichotomy. It is fair enough, then, to say
that nonduality is another way of saying no dichotomy. And that is the best definition, in fact, for Rohr's
habitual usage: no false dichotomies. He amplifies this in his teaching on paradox, which, as I mentioned
previously, he represents as a way to transcend those contradictions that are
seeming. It is not really a badword choice to explicate our c/Catholic both/and approach in relationship to an either/or approach.
I am a great advocate of disambiguating terms, parsing phrases, high nuancing, rigorous definition and selfcritique
of one's presuppositions. And I have been searching for a better way of saying what it is I advocate
and what I hear Rohr saying, too. I think a better term, for what I know we all advocate, might be
wholebrain approach.
Clearly, though, Rohr advocates nonduality and not nondualism. The latter is a metaphysical proposition;
the former is an epistemic method. In philosophy, we have recognized that methods can be successfully
extricated from systems. In our East-West dialogue, we have recognized that some practices can be
successfully extricated from their doctrinal contexts. Nonduality is a practice, a method, that can be
successfully extricated from nondualism (as system or doctrine). In fact, it has a philosophical meaning vis
a vis the false dichotomy fallacy that is quite independent of any Eastern traditions. That's the meaning
employed by Rohr.
Because of the plethora of misunderstandings coming out of the East-West dialogue, I recognize that
suspicions are warranted when certain terms that have become cultural buzzwords are being used, whether
facilely or properly. And I think I'll use
whole-brain approach more often because of this inasmuch asambiguous buzzwords can often do more to obfuscate than to clarify. I also hope I have laid any suspicions
to rest regarding Rohr because I earnestly believe that I have interpreted his true position, even if others
think his expression of same has been rather inartful. (I empathize due to my own habit of inartful
expression.)
Finally, as regard various practices, certainly, some require cautionary notes --- just like medical
prescriptions require contraindications and side-effects. Most cautionary notes deserve the status of
footnotes and fine print: if lasting longer than 4 hours ...
Zen practice is a natural contemplation. Merton is not describing this when speaking of
acquiredcontemplation (and he uses the words
active and masked, too, apparently interchangeably). So, Mertonrecognizes a distinction (in degree) between classical Eastern contemplation, classical Christian
contemplation and this
third way, all the same gift from God. Words that come to mind are simple,nondiscursive, affective, loving, gaze. Zen complements these other forms.
from p. 95 of Merton's
What is Contemplationquote:
Here the soul, aided by ordinary grace, works in the familiar natural mode. One reasons and one uses one's
imagination and elicits affections in the will. One makes use of all the resources of theology and
philosophy and art and music in order to focus a simple and affective gaze on God. All the traditional
means and practices of the interior life come under the heading of 'active contemplation' to the extent that
they help us to know and love God by a simple gaze on Him.
from p. 41 of Merton's
Spiritual Direction & Meditationquote:
What possible good can be done for a monk by deciding whether or not his contemplation is "infused"?
Even those who are interested in the defunct argument, acquired versus infused contemplation, agree that in
practice it makes little difference in the direction of a person whose prayer is simple and contemplative in a
general way. A contemplative is not one who takes his prayer seriously, but one who takes God seriously,
who is famished for truth, who seeks to live in generous simplicity, in the spirit.
from
The Published Articles of Ernest E. Larkin, O.Carm:quote:
In today’s spiritual theology the
distinction between active and passive prayer
tends to be downplayed. Long ago Thomas
Merton rejected the distinction between
infused and acquired contemplation as being
irrelevant. The experience is the thing, not an
abstract explanation of its principles.
Moreover, the mystical or grace character of
the entire spiritual life is being emphasized in
many sectors, for example, in twelve-step
spirituality and in writings inspired by Karl
Rahner’s theology.
For Karl Rahner, all experience of God
is the expression of faith and love, all of it is
rightly called mystical, and all knowledge and
love of God are infused. Not only prayer
experiences, but even the mundane
experiences of average Christians which are
products of faith are movements of the Holy
Spirit and constitute “ordinary mysticism” or
the “mysticism of everyday life.” In Rahner’s
view, what has been designated as infused
contemplation in the tradition is a high degree
of the one basic experience of a loving faith.
The classical mystical experience of the saints
remains “extraordinary,” not because of its
principles, but because of its perfection and
rarity. Theologically, the experience of God
in meditation or in human activity or in
classical infused contemplation is the same
one gift of God working within us, the same
one reality, different not in kind but in degree.
In the light of this Rahnerian theology,
the question raised in this paper is less urgent:
the contemplative prayer forms are
contemplation in one or the other sense, broad
or strict, ordinary or extraordinary, and the
two outcomes are only different degrees of the
same one gift of God.
A question persists for me insofar as I recognize a distinction between this
thematic grace of transcendentalthomism (Rahner, Lonergan et al) and
grace as transmuted experience (Gelpi). To the extent that I findgood reasons to reject some aspects of that Rahnerian account of grace, I am trying to wrap my mind
around such distinctions as we've drawn between different contemplative prayer forms vis a vis grace as
transmuted experience. See Donald L. Gelpi: Two Spiritual Paths: Thematic Grace vs. Transmuting Grace
(Part II). Initially, I am thinking that, in either model of grace, still, we are considering degrees and not
kinds of God-experience.
Again, this is all consonant with Rohr's approach (see below). Also, we draw a distinction between Rohr's
philosophical treatment or method of nonduality or nondual consciousness and the practice of
contemplative prayer forms. The former is at the service of the latter, to be sure, but it is also at the service
of all other epistemic value-realizations, as one should expect from a
whole brain approach. (This is why Iwrote an essay: Contemplation as Epistemic Virtue.)
quote:
Rohr goes beyond these Mertonesque Zen-like formulations though:
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contemplation is a long, loving look at what really is.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contemplation means returning to this deep source. Each one of us tries to find the spiritual exercise that
helps us come to this source. If reading the Bible helps you, then read the Bible. If the Eucharist helps, then
celebrate the Eucharist. If praying the rosary helps, pray the rosary. If sitting in silence helps, just sit there
and keep silence. But we must find a way to get to the place where everything is. We have to take this long,
loving look at reality, where we don't judge and we simply receive.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, emptiness in and of itself isn't enough. The point of emptiness is to get ourselves out of the way
so that Christ can fill us up. As soon as we're empty, there's a place for Christ, because only then are we in
any sense ready to recognize and accept Christ as the totally other, who is not me.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Simplicity revised from 1991, Crossroad Publishing 2003
He is not going pantheistic.
He is not abandoning relationality.
He is not equating nondual thinking with nondualism.
He's coming from a contemplative prayer tradition (per his report, Merton as model) that does not draw
distinctions in kind between natural, acquired and infused contemplation, so, what's the practical upshot,
from his perspective, of any failure on his part to describe the distinctions in degree properly?
As Merton writes:
quote:
A director who can encourage simplicity and faith will find many genuine, simple contemplatives
responding to his guidance, with little or no nonsense about ligature, prayer of quiet, prayer of full union
and so on. The trouble is not that these things are unimportant or unreal, but rather that the verbiage that
tends to surround them actually gets between the contemplative and reality, between the soul and God. ... ...
... Neither the director nor the one directed should become obsessed with the problem of gifts and graces,
but should concern themselves with God the Giver, not with His gifts. ... ... ...
Graces and gifts are never going to turn the head of anyone who keeps his attention fixed on God, instead
of on himself, and the more truly contemplative a state of prayer is, the more will it be obscure and
transparent and unaware of itself.
Merton sounds like John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila and Ignatius vis a vis consolations.
What's the practical upshot, from others' perspectives, of any failure on anyone's part to describe the
distinctions in degree properly?
re: acquired vs infused, as Merton says:
quote:
... in practice it makes little difference in the direction of a person whose prayer is simple and
contemplative in a general way ...
However, Larkin, re: acquired and infused, says:
quote:
Rahner’s theology does not erase the considerable differences between the two on the
experiential level, and this is terrain of our
inquiry. We are asking questions that are
important for spiritual direction, whatever the
explanations offered by systematic theology.
Larkin concludes:
quote:
A figure from twelvestep experience may help us understand the
widespread attraction of these new forms of
contemplative prayer and, at the same time,
serve as a bridge to St. John of the Cross. The
figure is this: It used to be said that a person
had to “hit bottom” before he or she were a
candidate for the twelve-step program.
Today, I am told, clients are advised to “raise
the bottom” and begin the program before a
crisis occurs. Something like this may be
working in contemplative prayer today.
The forms do not presuppose infused
contemplation or even an advanced spiritual
state, and they teach the person to be
appropriately active in the prayer. And they
promise a fuller outpouring of the Spirit.
In this time of ours, contemporary contemplative prayer forms are a providential gift of the Holy
Spirit.
And that is the best definition, in fact, for Rohr's habitual usage: no false dichotomies. He amplifies this in
his teaching on paradox, which, as I mentioned previously, he represents as a way
to transcend thosecontradictions that are seeming.
For Rohr, I'd say the nondual refers mostly to an epistemic process, such as in Zen's
dethroning of theconceptualizing ego
in order to otherwise relate to some seeming contradictions, instead, as paradoxes,which might perdure as mystery, resolve dialectically, dissolve from a stepping out of an inadequate
framework of logic
or any other dispositions (or lack thereof) known to this paradox or another (see myinventory of nondualia above). [This maps fairly well with the broad conceptions of nonduality such as at
Nonduality Salon and Wikipedia.] Predominantly, though, Rohr affirms nondual thinking in an over against
fashion as related to
either-or thinking, i.e. false dichotomies, and as related to a failure to self-critiqueone's own systems and logical frameworks
, as a failure, too, to affirm the rays of truth in otherperspectives and traditions.
He isn't talking ontologically or metaphysically. He isn't denying relationality and neither is Keating. He's
talking about
transcending our analytical and logical and empirical and practical and evaluativemindsets
by engaging, also, for example, our simple awareness, our nonrational aspects of knowing, ournonpropositional faculties
that are precisely involved in our grammar of relationship, etc.And, as I wrote elsewhere:
quote:
I see Keating saying that we and Jesus lose this self. I don't hear him denying that we and Jesus get it back.
I do hear him affirming that we and Jesus must also go beyond this self, Jesus, for His part, returning to His
essence in the Godhead, the primary object of our beatific vision and our essential beatitude; we, for our
part, becoming members of the Mystical Body; creation, for its part, the Cosmic Christ. Neither do I hear
Keating denying that, as an accidental beatitude, we encounter Jesus' full resurrected humanity as one of
the secondary objects of our beatific vision. I do hear Keating emphasizing the primary and essential and
not addressing the secondary and accidental but don't find anything inherently wrong in that.
And this wholly consistent with what Dionysius wrote, as well as this teaching:
http://oce.catholic.com/index.php?title=Heaven
quote:
It is controverted among theologians whether or not a mental image, be it a species expressa or a species
impressa, is required for the beatific vision. But by many this is regarded as largely a controversy about the
appropriateness of the term, rather than about the matter itself. The more common and probably more
correct view denies the presence of any image in the strict sense of the word, because no created image can
represent God as He is (cf. Mazzella, "De Deo creante", 3rd ed., Rome, 1892, disp. IV, a. 7, sec. 1). The
beatific vision is obviously a created act inherent in the soul, and not, as a few of the older theologians
thought, the untreated act of God's own intellect communicated to the soul. For, as seeing and knowing are
immanent vital actions, the soul can see or know God by its own activity only, and not through any activity
exerted by some other intellect. Cf. Gutberlet, "Das lumen gloriae" in "Pastor bonus", XIV (1901), 297 sqq.
Theologians distinguish the primary and the secondary object of the beatific vision. The primary object is
God Himself as He is. The blessed see the Divine Essence by direct intuition, and, because of the absolute
simplicity of God, they necessarily see all His perfections and all the persons of the Trinity. Moreover,
since they see that God can create countless imitations of His Essence, the entire domain of possible
creatures lies open to their view, though indeterminately and in general. For the actual decrees of God are
not necessarily an object of that vision, except in as far as God pleases to manifest them. For just as the
Divine Essence, notwithstanding its simplicity, could exist without these decrees, so God can also manifest
His Essence without manifesting them. Therefore finite things are not necessarily seen by the blessed, even
if they are an actual object of God's will. Still less are they a necessary object of vision as long as they are
mere possible objects of the Divine will. Consequently the blessed have a distinct knowledge of individual
possible things only in so far as God wishes to grant this knowledge. Thus, if God so willed, a blessed soul
might see the Divine Essence without seeing in It the possibility of any individual creature in particular.
But in fact, there is always connected with the beatific vision a knowledge of various things external to
God, of the possible as well as of the actual. All these things, taken collectively, constitute the secondary
object of the beatific vision.
The blessed soul sees these secondary objects in God either directly (formaliter), or in as far as God is their
cause (causaliter). It sees in God directly what-ever the beatific vision discloses to its immediate gaze
without the aid of any created mental image (species impressa); in God, as in their cause, the soul sees all
those things which it perceives with the aid of a created mental image, a mode of perception granted by
God as a natural complement of the beatific vision. The number of objects seen directly in God cannot be
increased unless the beatific vision itself be intensified; but the number of things seen in God as their cause
may be greater or smaller, or it may vary without any corresponding change in the vision itself.
The secondary object of the beatific vision comprises everything the blessed may have a reasonable interest
in knowing. It includes, in the first place, all the mysteries which the soul believed while on earth.
Moreover, the blessed see each other and rejoice in the company of those whom death separated from them.
The veneration paid them on earth and the prayers addressed to them are also known to the blessed. All that
we have said on the secondary object of the beatific vision is the common and reliable teaching of
theologians. In recent times (Holy Office, December 14, 1887) Rosmini was condemned, because he taught
that the blessed do not see God Himself, but only His relations to creatures (Denz., 1928-1930—old, 1773-
75). In the earlier ages we find Gregory the Great ("Moral.", 1. XVIII, c. liv, n. 90, in P.L., LXXVI, XCIII)
combating the error of a few who maintained that the blessed do not see God, but only a brilliant light
streaming forth from Him. Also in the Middle Ages there are traces of this error (cf. Franzelin, "De Deo
uno", 2nd ed., thes. 15, p. 192).
Although the blessed see God, they do not comprehend Him, because God is absolutely incomprehensible
to every created intellect, and He cannot grant to any creature the power of comprehending Him as He
comprehends Himself. Suarez rightly calls this a revealed truth ("De Deo", 1. II, c. v, n. 6); for the Fourth
Council of the Lateran and the Vatican Council enumerated incomprehensibility among the absolute
attributes of God (Denz., nn. 428, 1782—old nil. 355.1631). The Fathers defend this truth against
Eunomius, an Arian, who asserted that we comprehend God fully even in this life. The blessed comprehend
God neither intensively nor extensively—not intensively, because their vision has not that infinite clearness
with which God is knowable and with which He knows Himself, nor extensively, because their vision does
not actually and clearly extend to everything that God sees in His Essence. For they cannot by a single act
of their intellect represent every possible creature individually, clearly, and distinctly, as God does; such an
act would be infinite, and an infinite act is incompatible with the nature of a created and finite intellect. The
blessed see the Godhead in its entirety, but only with a limited clearness of vision (Deum totum sed non
totaliter). They see the Godhead in its entirety, because they see all the perfections of God and all the
Persons of the Trinity; and yet their vision is limited, because it has neither the infinite clearness that
corresponds to the Divine perfections, nor does it extend to everything that actually is, or may still become,
an object of God's free decrees. Hence it follows that one blessed soul may see God more perfectly than
another, and that the beatific vision admits of various degrees.
The beatific vision is a mystery.
Remember, mysteries are incomprehensible but not impenetrable. We DO know what the heaven is going
to happen and in such a measure as has profound existential import and great practical significance.
One dynamic that has interested me is how many of our growth paradigms in psychology and spirituality
have a sequential trajectory, an emergent dynamic, that lends itself to being characterized in terms of higher
and lower.
For example, some speak in terms of
lower and higher chakras
lower and higher levels of consciousness (in Yoga or in Wilber's Integral Theory)
purgative, illuminative and unitive ways
developmental psychology and Lonerganian conversion: intellectual, affective, moral, sociopolitical,
religious
personality development
Jungian individuation and self-realization
Enneagram directionality
Maslovian hierarchy
Initiation and Rites of Passage
Stage Theories of Cognitive & Moral & Faith Development
Spiral Dynamics
Prayer Ladder or Steps in Lectio Divina
Bernardian Love
Ascent of Mt. Carmel
and so on and so forth.
While there are general tendencies that can be observed cross-culturally, individual development remains a
rather uneven affair, which is to recognize that it is not always clearly linear or sequential, and sometimes it
exhibits modularity, which is to recognize some amount of independence between one type of development
or another. Overall, then, to use Wilber's description: "Thus, there is nothing linear about overall
development. It is a wildly individual and idiosyncratic affair (even though many of the developmental
lines themselves unfold sequentially)."
Even, then, it would be silly to deny that, in spirituality, there is clearly a stage-like dynamic in play, for, as
Wilber recognizes:
quote:
The fact that these three great realms/states can be engaged separately; the fact that many contemporary
writers equate spirituality predominantly with altered and nonordinary states (which is often called without
irony the fourth wave of transpersonal theory); the fact that lines in general can develop unevenly (so that a
person can be at a high level of development in some lines and low or pathological in others)--and that this
happens more often than not--have all conspired to obscure those important aspects of spiritual
development that do indeed show some stage-like phenomena. My point is that all of these aspects of
spirituality (four of which I mentioned and will elucidate below) need to be acknowledged and included in
any comprehensive theory of spirituality--and in any genuinely integral spiritual practice.
see One Taste(Wilber, 1999) and Murphy and Leonard, The Life We Are Given (1995).
If we combine the idea of levels of development with states of consciousness, and we realize that a person
at virtually any level or stage of development can have a peak experience or an altered state, we get a rather
remarkable grid of many of the various types of spiritual and nonordinary experiences.
Much genuine confusion sets in when we conflate descriptions of phenomenal states and stages of
development and structures of consciousness, so Wilber's grid approach does seem to better recognize how
such things do not lend themselves to facile mapping exercises. Perhaps a singularly important message we
might come away with is the old philosophical distinction between necessary and sufficient. This is
captured in Wilber's AQAL paradigm or in what I am calling a
whole brain approach. When it comes to aconsideration of salvific efficacy, living the good life is both necessary and sufficient. However, when it
comes to ad majorem Dei gloriam, giving God the greatest possible glory, as it pertains to Bernardian Love
or Ignatian Degrees of Humility or such, in some sense, then, our ongoing transformation or theosis or
deificiation or humanization will, for the most part, remain always a work in progress.
I mention all of this within the context of recognizing the natural human tendency and curiosity regarding
where we are on the journey, how we fit into this stage model or growth paradigm, and especially our
tendency, sometimes, to try to shoehorn or pigeonhole our experiences in an effort to present them in the
best possible light to others. And this has everything to do, then, with our remaining attached to our False
Self, our persona, confusing its quite natural construction and maintenance, which involves
humanizationand
socialization processes, with our realization of our True Self, which involves transformationalprocesses.
What I am suggesting, then, is that Merton's teachings on our False and True Self, and the Christian
paradigm of transformation, tends to cut to the chase vis a vis any considerations of who is where in this or
that ascent or level or stage and, more especially, serves to give credit where credit is due, to place the
glory where it truly belongs, to dismantle any silly meritocracies, to discredit any facile imperialist notions,
whether of the nondual variety or the exclusivistic variety of fundamentalistic Christians.
I say all of this to provide the backdrop for next examining, more precisely, what is going on in different
quarters regarding nondual consciousness, which is to say that I am asking who is getting it right or
properly situated and who is getting it wrong and to what degree.
quote:
Originally posted by johnboy:
I say all of this to provide the backdrop for next examining, more precisely, what is going on in
different quarters regarding nondual consciousness, which is to say that I am asking who is getting it
right or properly situated and who is getting it wrong and to what degree.
I generally like Wilber's AQAL approach and Integral account or psychological model when it is taken as a
heuristic device. It matches the intuitions I have regarding a genuinely whole brain approach to reality and
how I conceive epistemology, in general. I even like his description of mystical states and his discussion of
the hard problem of consciousness, from a vaguely phenomenological perspective and as heuristic devices.
Where I part company with Wilber however is when he makes the moves from the merely heuristical and
vaguely phenomenological to the clearly explanatory and robustly metaphysical. Unless I am
misunderstanding him, in his
Stages of Spiritual Unfolding? and in his The Hard Problem , he is precisely busting these moves.
In a nutshell, Wilber confounds knowledge with experience, conflates epistemology with ontology,
and, to me, most ironically, fractures the integral whole brain approach or full spectrum account into
discrete ways of knowing reality --- not only by overinvesting knowledge in the different structures of
human consciousness, one apart from the other, but --- by conflating data with "means" of knowing,
which I suppose is symptomatic of anyone who, essentially, denies the distinction between ontology
and epistemology, between system and method, between doctrine and practice, proposition and
process. The ultimate test for a good metaphysic is in the laboratory of reality. The claim of
explanatory adequacy over and above mere heuristic utility comes in the ability of a model to predict
and falsify events, to reconcile gravity and quantum mechanics, to predict psychic phenomena and
psychological behavior. True cartography and mapping can guide one from one place to another. To
characterize whatWilber is about, then, as any type of spiritual or psychological or metaphysical
cartography
, is an unwarranted and exaggerated use of the term.When Rohr speaks of Tolle, then, that "he is teaching process not doctrine or dogma. He is teaching how to
see and be present, not what you should see when you are present," and when he provides his inventory of
what Tolle is and is not doing, he is precisely drawing the distinctions that are necessary to avoid these
Wilberian pitfalls. The same is true of Keating when he speaks, for example, in terms of
intimacy and notrather
identity. And this has been the ongoing leit motif in my contextualizing of the Rohr and Keatinginterface with the Wilberian hermeneutic; this is how we must parse and nuance, in other words; what is
asserted in an epistemic mode and what is being affirmed metaphysically (where there
is a good bit ofwiggle room) and theologically (where there is less wiggle room); what is practice and method and what is
doctrine and system (and can they, indeed, be successfully extricated, because not all can).
Rohr writes:
quote:
Eckhart Tolle is not a Christian theologian or teacher.
He is not teaching Christian contemplative prayer or Christian prayer at all.
He is not presuming or teaching that there is a personal/relational God (but
neither is he denying it).
He is not a proponent of the social, communitarian nature of religion.
Eckhart Tolle is teaching a form of natural mysticism or contemplative practice.
In Tolle’s world, Jesus is not central.
He does assume and imply a worldview that is foreign to many, if not most Christians. For Tolle, Being,
Consciousness, God, Reality are all the same thing, which is not
all bad, when you come to think of it.He might understand reality itself as gracious. We would localize that grace in and through
Jesus, as the “Sacrament” of all of Creation.
It would be a shame if we required him to speak our language and vocabulary before
we could criticallyhear
what he is saying—that is true and helpful to our own message.Because of the profound existential import and immediate (as well as ultimate) practical significance of all
things having to do with heaven, moreso out of pastoral sensitivity than theological precision, I would tend
to want to go out of my way to affirm those heavenly realities that I know are of utmost concern to most
people. I know I mindfully take this approach with my children, for instance, in order to properly form their
hopes and aspirations and shape their outlooks and provide them the deep consolations that are so
desperately needed in a reality that can be so apparently contradictory, paradoxical, ambiguous. Now, there
are times when I might crowd their psychological threshold to lead them into paradox and thereby broaden
their perception and deepen their understandigs of certain mysteries, like the Easter realities, and I might do
so by precisely providing them a partial truth, as I hope Keating is doing, but I would not leave them
hanging long and would certainly amplify my account either in the next chapter, or in a footnote, or what
have you.
I was also supposing that Merton's dismissal of this concern, on the practical level, was due to the fact that
his experience addressed monastic religious, who enjoy a robust lectio divina and an environs more
generally conducive to acquired contemplation (or simplified prayer, which we're of course recognizing as
distinct from exercises that are moreso emptying). Acquired or active or masked contemplation does not
quite capture the significant nuances that are needed to describe the manifold and multiform approaches to
prayer in what are not otherwise described in, for example, Zen, natural mysticism, infused contemplation.
In otherwords, we have the Eastern and we have the classical Western (contemplation
sui generis, so tospeak), and we have the
tertium quid contemplative forms. Because so many of the "third way" prayerforms in modern Christianity might be Zen-informed, or vipassana-informed, for example, and, for another
example, because some emphasize, let's say, presence and others emptiness, all using these as gateways to
fullness (even the abyss, paradoxically, as the way to the ground), it would seem that these different types
of emphases are going to make direction a tad more problematical than what Merton either experienced or
imagined. Where Merton was concerned, that prayer form, for many of his monks, was already, in his
words, "simple and contemplative in a general way." In other words, Merton's invitation to contemplative
prayer to us anawim opened up quite the pandora's box of surprises and maybe he'd have a few revisions
for his spiritual direction book.
I have ordered the Third Eye and I am guessing that the dynamic, however implicit or explicit, will be
oriented toward moving people beyond the humanization and socialization involved in what Merton
describes vis a vis, in my words, the ongoing construction, maintenance and repair of the persona and False
Self.
For the possibility is that many, in their practice of religion, do not move beyond the socialization
processes, which enabled them to function in the world, to engage the transformation process, which helps
them realize the Good News of the Kingdom of God.
It is because so many get trapped in this false self dynamic, unable to self-critique their own
presuppositions and those of any systems --- philosophical, religious and cultural --- which they have
bought into wholesale, that we must then enlist the holistic help of any spiritual exercises, asceticisms,
disciplines, practices, methods, prayer forms, psychological individuation tools and advanced critical
thinking in order to get people to JOTS (jump outside their systems), not to abandon them but to critique
them. And to eventually realize that to engage God using only the logic of socialization, which is
sometimes, for example, avoidance-approach reinforcement at its crudest and an enlightened self-interest
meritocracy at its best, is utterly NUTS.
God loves us because of who we are, His creatures, and not because of what we do.
So, in addition to exploring various practices and prayer forms and ways of thinking to JOTS, to transcend
our humanization and socialization via transformation, we employ a Third Eye. Again, to wit:
quote:
Richard of St. Victor thus informs the Franciscan tradition thru Bonaventure about the occulus carnis (eye
of the senses), the occulus rationis (eye of reason), and the occulus fidei (eye of faith). This "eye of faith" is
what Rohr would refer to as the "third eye" and, consistent with Merton, it integrally takes us beyond our
senses and reason but not without them.
Rohr also teaches, as we know, how suffering and prayer can both be efficacious in moving us out of mere
socialization to "enjoy" transformation. If you've been on this journey, then you know that the word "enjoy"
marks my own introduction of paradox and creative ambiguity.
In a nutshell, the general thrust of this whole brain approach is that, in order to have a relationship with
your spouse in marriage, as was intended in creation, one has to approach one's spouse with more than
words, logic, science, math, analytical skills and pragmatic considerations. One has to go beyond (NOT
WITHOUT) these ways of knowing (Aquinas-like approach) to a knowledge that comes from love
(Bonaventure's approach). One must enter a relational realm, in addition to the logical, empirical and
practical realm. One must move beyond the language of math, philosophy, business & commerce,
engineering and so on to learn the language of relationship, the grammar of assent, loyalty, fidelity, trust,
faith, hope, love.
We tend to eventually "get this" in marriage, or it dissolves (and half of all marriages do). There is reason
to suspect, then, that "getting this" in our relationship with God is similarly problematical for most people.
Our institutions, in fact, tend to socialize and infantilize us and not, rather, grow us. Dogma deteriorates
into dogmatism. Ritual into ritualism. Law into legalism.
This is why we need to deconstruct (purgatively) this false self system. But not to leave it in a shambles. It
must be reconstructed (illuminatively) back into one of authenticity in relationship to creed, cult, code and
community. That places us, then, on the threshold of further transformation (unitively), and the realization
of our True Self (a la Merton, not a la some other conceptions of same).
Cautionary notes, as I said before, are like pharmaceutical contraindications and side-effects, and should
neither be neglected nor overemphasized.
I don't think I have misplaced my confidence in Rohr. I understand your concerns but, as I think you have
acknowledged, the jury is out on whether Rohr is being sloppy or heterodox. I don't fully share your
concerns for reasons already set forth. Rohr is heavily invested in Thomas Merton, who in turn was heavily
invested in Maritain when it comes to an understanding of contemplative prayer forms. And I encounter the
relevant distinctions in his work repeatedly, while seeing no serious problems, theoretically or practically.
You refer to other problems, in generalities; I can only address specifics. The man is extremely prodigious,
which makes it much less problematic to clarify any ambiguities; much less difficult to situate and
contextualize any of his more isolated sayings or essays; much easier to indict for any shortcomings, which
should be much more readily apparent to a much wider audience than most enjoy; much less susceptible to
having anything of his wrenched from its context in the whole and swollen to madness in its isolation.
And Maritain's leit motif was that
we distinguish in order to unite. Both Merton and Rohr are great menof distinction
(pun intended) because philosophical rigor (as lingua franca) in interreligious dialogue isvery complicated, corresponding to the manifold and multiform and complex realities that go with the
territory of our human depth dimension, which, as imago Dei, is richly textured and depthful indeed!
I think it is very important for us to recognize and affirm that, even as we draw distinctions between such as
natural, acquired and infused contemplation, between such as implicit and explicit faith, between such as
the immanent, impersonal, apophatic, existential and natural and such as the transcendent, personal,
kataphatic, theological and supernatural, between East andWest, between degrees of fullness of experience
in our God-realizations THAT
STILL, it is the same Gift, the same Holy Spirit, being experienced and at work in ALL of these practices
and prayer forms, and wherever else people of goodwill are practicing the upright and moral life ... now
implicitly, now explicitly, now understood anonymously, then inchoately, now incipiently, then
overflowing ...
even as we all continue to seek AMDG, ad majorem Dei gloriam, some implicitly, others explicitly, such
that we aspire to an ever more nearly perfect articulation of the truth through creed (dogma), an ever more
nearly perfect celebration of beauty through cult (liturgy), an ever more nearly perfect preservation of
goodness through code (law) and an ever more nearly perfect enjoyment of unity through community
(fellowship) ...
and it is this aspiration to AMDG that causes me to want to avoid, then, any facile syncretistic blending of
traditions; any insidious indifferentism regarding which contains the greatest fullness of truth, beauty,
goodness and unity even if as a pilgrim tradition; any false irenicism as if our great traditions were already
at peace and in unity; or any imprecise mapping by metaphysical and spiritual cartographers ...
but, nevertheless, being inclusivistic, at the same time, I take great comfort in knowing that, at least, from a
more minimalist perspective, these manifold and multiform paths, however perfect or imperfect in degree,
can and do indeed foster both salvific efficacy and Lonerganian conversion processes, again, all gifted
without merit by the same Gift, the Holy Spirit!
What you will encounter in his Third Eye rendition, I predict, will be Rohr's hauntingly beautiful litany to
the Holy Spirit, Whom we encounter as a Stable Witness to all of our interactions with others and life
circumstances. Rohr will emphasize that most of these interactions, even within our organized religions,
take place between one False Self and another, between our false self and life circumstances, and that we
must transcend our incomplete ways of knowing reality by going beyond our normal senses and critical
thinking, not abandoning critical thinking but sharpening it, by our turning to the Holy Spirit and
surrendering our False Self through prayer, realizing our True Self and then engaing it with other people
and life circumstances. And this entails detachment and poverty and dispossession and emptying, such as
through surrendering our mind in prayer, surrendering our will in fasting, surrendering our wealth through
almsgiving, while transcending our senses and thinking through relationship. The movement involves
transcending the merely functional to enjoy the robustly personal. It involves self-criticism of our different
logical frameworks, solving problems with a different consciousness than that which caused them. He uses
a lot of 12 Step metaphors, like
stinking thinking. The third eye, then, is faith. Transformative faith, notthe sterile religiosity of a spiritually impoverished false-self system.
He's not going to come out and deny the Holy Spirit's presence anywhere or in anyone or anything. That
would be the most arrogant of false dichotomies of all for a Franciscan, quite an impoverished
pneumatology, quite the tragically exclusivistic ecclesiocentricism! Even the Holy Spirit seems to have a
preferential option for the poor, while the spiritually "rich," He sends empty, away. Our answer to any
advaitic nondual imperialism is not going to be any ecclesiocentric pneumatological imperialism.
Rohr will, however, recognize the degrees of fullness in experience, hence the fruits, when he sees them,
wherever he sees them, in whomever he sees them. And he won't be preoccupied with experiences or gifts
but with the Giver and inviting us to thus "fix" (pun intended) our gaze!
Footnote: In his conference on
Holding the Tension: The Power of Pardox, Rohr says, when describingthe apophatic tradition, that he can see why the church backed away from it, because, he says, he'll be the
first to admit that this is sort of dangerous. He said, roughly: I've had all sorts of people come up to me and
say "I know. I know" and I've had plenty of them in my life and I just wanted to say: "Oh gee, she's nuts!"
So, I can see why the church backed away from this part of the tradition after the first thousand years. It
had a tendency to lead all sorts of people to claim authority and legitimation and validation for their
opinions when, frankly, they were nuts, when, in fact, they were egocentric idiots. The problem is, says
Rohr, that the tradition was nonetheless true and he goes on to describe it in a conventional manner and
how it is integrally related to kataphatic tradition. He adds that his use of unkind language was purposeful.
The reason we do not want to be indifferentist, syncretistic, falsely irenic or imprecise in our approach to
truth, beauty, goodness and unity, as we consciously choose creed, cult, code and community, is not so
much because we do not believe that the Holy Spirit is universally accessible, not because we deny salvific
efficacy in other traditions, not because we deny their ability to foster ongoing Lonerganian conversion, not
because we deny various degrees of fullness of the experience of God-realization in this or that practice,
method, discipline, asceticism or process BUT precisely because, to the extent anyone's orthopraxis
authenticates orthodoxy and to the extent we differentiate our tradition via a consciously competent theosis
... we have suggested that one can move more swiftly and with less hindrance toward this Giver of all good
gifts, best disposed and best prepared to experience and realize the utter fullness of relationship with one
another through our God, with our God through one another, in His creation for all eternity, through the
rich experience of knowing Christ with a full certainty and deep understanding!
The other project I have been working on, in fact, is a deeper investigation into the Wilber-Helminiak
dialogue. It is manifestly clear that, however much Wilber's work provides a helpful heuristic structure,
when Wilber ventures beyond the vaguely heuristic into the more robustly metaphysical and theological, he
is clearly revealing his departure into an arational gnosticism, fragmenting the integral nature of human
value-realization. I will share some of my assessment before I leave later this week, maybe even later
today.
On the other hand, what Rohr is talking about in regard to the False Self and tertium quid is not this
Wilberian nondualism but more of a Mertonesque transformational account, emphasizing that Faith is the
real tertium quid, that proper relationship to the Holy Spirit and proper realization of our True Self is
distinct from socialization process and persona or False Self construction & maintenance. To the extent we
successfully institutionalize conversion, then we will foster Lonerganian conversions and move beyond
functional relationships with God, one another and creation and into more robustly personal relationships,
which is all to say, toward authenticity. Rohr's advocacy of contemplative prayer forms, like CP, is but one
aspect of this larger project of not over-intellectualizing our God-relationship, not seeing this relationship in
functional terms, not experiencing this relationship out of the False Self. Apophasis is but one tool in the
spiritual technology toolbox to help us move out of our heads and away from our ego-centered agenda and
out of our False-self system frameworks to taste and see the goodness of God.
Rohr is using "dualistic" almost interchangeably with False-self and nondualistic almost interchangeably
with the life of faith and authenticity and the True Self. If you use this as your cipher or glossary, vis a vis
his vocabulary useage of dualistic and nondualistic, and recogize that it is moreso out of the dictionary
(dualistic is there, typically, not nondualistic, but one can infer the negation as etymologically correct) and
not so much borrowed from the rather esoteric literature, which is really dealing with metaphysical (even
theological) nondualism, then you will have a better grasp of his overall thrust.
Our churches can do a better job inviting people past the state of being good little socialized Christians and
into a disposition of being sweet little transformed Christians is his project, which was also Merton's.
It has always seemed to me that, in the East, the Bhakti movement had a better owner's manual in that it's
schematic more accurately depicted our human hardwiring as it was Designed and purposed. I resist too
facile a mapping of same but always felt an affinity for those particular Hindu sensibilities. I was initiated
into some of this by a friend over a five year period, but will desist from going into the details. It was
mostly positive.
I think we need a little more rigor in our descriptions such that we distinguish between epistemic stances,
phenomenal experiences and metaphysical propositions.
The descriptor, blissful non duality, applies to a pheneomenal experience. Nondualism applies to Eastern
metaphysics, which includes both epistemic stances and metaphysical propositions, since they conflate the
two by definition.
The predominant useage of nonduality vis a vis my major thrust here, lately, discussing what Rohr means,
merely means that we are being invited into a robustly personal relationship with God. In order to fully
enjoy same, we must supplement those value-realization strategies that we employ in science and math and
philosophy and engineering and business and commerce and government and crime & punishment (the
social matrix) with many of the same value-realization strategies that we employ in our love of Mom and
Dad, brother and sister, cousin and friend. And what are those? Those do not exclude our binary thinking,
our analytical left-brain, our categorical schemes, our pramatic concerns, which are inherently dual
(necessarily employ subject-object cleavage) but they certainly GO BEYOND them, to include the nondual
(the other than those dual things): the nonrational and superrational value-realization strategies like
affection, storge', philia, eros, agape, faith, hope, love, fidelity, loyalty, trust. Some mystics go BEYOND
even this: to love of God like the love of a spouse or lover. If you pay close attention to the nuance,
some are advocating going beyond the dual AND WITHOUT the dual, which then makes one's journey not
only nondual but also not nonrational and superrational but ARATIONAL.
That's what this whole conversation has been about, in a nutshell. A nondual approach that is
alsodual
includes the rational, nonrational and superrational. A nondual approach that is not also dualis, instead, arational.
This type of nondual approach, whether involving an epistemic stance, epistemological structure,
phenomenal experience, metaphysical proposition or theological dogma is, in my view, nothing but a
FETISH. Rohr would call it a heresy using the criteria that it has appropriated a partial truth as if it
were the whole truth. This is not a danger that exists for the gnostic arationalists, alone, however. A
thousand such blossoms bloom and are pejoratively labeled scientistm, fideism, fundamentalistic
religion, pietism, encratism, quietism, rationalism, empiricism, advaitic imperialism, exclusivism,
ecclesiocentrism, indifferentism, etc.
There are many tools in our spiritual technology toolchest. If we take the path VERY seriously, which is
not required (we must only take it seriously), then we will avail ourselves of many more tools, necessarily.
If we make the TOOL our focus, then we will have quite missed the point. If we make the gifts our focus,
then we will quite miss the Giver.
As we survey conventional religion today, we are interested in how well transformational dynamics have
been institutionalized. And, we've got to work the system to make the system work. If we keep doing only
what we have always been doing, then we will keep getting the same results we have always gotten. And if
institutionalized religion is turning out folks who have gone beyond socialized, ego-centered approaches to
more transformed, True-self realizations, then all is well. If not, reaching into the toolbox is not
contraindicated just because some folks misuse such tools. They should, of course, consult the owner's
manual.
Andre Marquis, Janice Holden, and Scott Warren at the University of North Texas write, in their Response
to Helminiak's Treatment of Spiritual Issues in Psychotherapy at
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/helminiak/index.cfm/ :
quote:
Thus, our appreciation and respect for Helminiak's (2001) efforts to develop a spiritual psychology for the
mental health profession are outweighed by our overriding reaction that his model provides a far less
comprehensive approach than does Wilber's (1999a) integral psychology model. We came to Helminiak's
work with a background in integral psychology, and we approached his work with the question of whether
it added to, or even might more comprehensively substitute for, the integral perspective. Our answer on
both accounts is, essentially, no. Whereas Wilber's integral perspective encompasses, clarifies, and affirms
Helminiak's views as well as numerous phenomena that Helminiak addressed incidentally or not at all,
Helminiak's (p. 17) outright rejection of Wilber's model shows that, conversely, Helminiak's model does
not encompass the integral perspective. We value the broadest possible approach to spiritual psychology
because it seems better suited to account for the experiences of all people across cultures and throughout
history; consequently, we opt to continue to use the integral perspective as our guiding model. However,
we want to repeat that the integral model does not reject but, rather, affirms much of Helminiak's model as
having some applicability for, but only for, the level of human experience it addresses. Because Wilber's
integral perspective subsumes Helminiak's, the integral model would appear to offer mental health
professionals a more complete framework with which to conceptualize and work with the varieties of
spiritual experiences and issues that clients might bring to counseling.
The dynamic going on here, in this critique of Helminiak, in my view, is the failure to draw the distinction
between what is a
comprehensive but necessarily vague heuristic device (Wilber’s integral account)and a more
robustly explanatory but necessarily incomplete theoretic account (Helminiak’sLonerganian account).
Both approaches aspire to the same goals of integrality but only Helminiak’s approach lends itself to
empirical falsifiability
within an appropriately fallibilist hermeneutic. Wilber’s approach, ironically,misses the integrality mark by facilely conflating same with comprehensivity, which is a confusion
between, on one hand, a
successful reference of a reality with, on the other hand, a successful descriptionof that reality, which again lends itself to empirical falsifiability and predictability, hypothetical fecundity,
rational demonstrability and a host of other epistemic criteria, which will be examined in my engagement
of this article. In other words, to talk about many, many things might meet the criteria of comprehensivity,
and that is fine for heuristic placeholding, but this is a distinct epistemic enterprise from explaining and
predicting in a robustly scientific approach.
ndre Marquis, Janice Holden, and Scott Warren at the University of North Texas write, in their Response
to Helminiak's Treatment of Spiritual Issues in Psychotherapy at
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/helminiak/index.cfm/
quote:
... from the integral perspective, a humanistic, existential perspective is not uniquely spiritual and is
inadequate to address the spiritual domain. In Wilber's (1999a) model, the existential domain is found at the
outer limits of the personal realm of development, just short of the qualitatively different transpersonal
domain. Helminiak (2001) did briefly mention that the cultivation of spirituality "would result in an ongoing
way of living and/or extraordinary experiences associated with enlightenment or mysticism" (p. 7).
However, he did not elaborate on these phenomena described by contemplatives the world over as
involving transcendence of some of the very precepts Helminiak considers central to spirituality:
"intelligence" and "rationality" (p. 9).
How can the cultivation of rationality spawn experiences and away of life that are transrational?
On a related note, Helminiak argued that his transcendental preceptsare self validating, in that, to critique them is to invoke them.
However, from the integral perspective,the entire domain of rational discourse belongs to the level of reason -- the personal spheres of
development; although they are highly appropriate within those levels, they are not inherently
spiritual.
Let's reintroduce the Peircean rubric, that the normative sciences (logic, ethics, aesthetics; the philosophic)
mediate between phenomenology (science, the empirical, the positivist, the descriptive) and metaphysics
(the interpretive; the thestic) to effect human value-realizations (the evaluative; truth, beauty, goodness &
unity; creed, cult, code & community; the theotic).
As a human being develops --- intellectually, affectively, morally, socially and religiously, there is already
an integral dance going on between all of these faculties --- rational, nonrational and transrational.
Rationally, we learn reading, writing and arithmetic. Nonrationally, we grow affectively, our neurotic
reactivity yielding to a more life-enhancing and relationship-enhancing existential responsivity.
Transrationally, our relationships with parent and siblings and society are slowly being transformed from
the merely functional to the robustly personal. The rational, in a real way, mediates along the way, between
our nonrational and transrational value-realizations effecting conversions: intellectually, affectively,
morally, socially and religiously.
Our transrationality does not emerge, therefore, out of our rationality, which did not emerge out of our
nonrationality. They were all already innately present and integrally-related.
From this perspective then, the question
How can the cultivation of rationality spawn experiences and away of life that are transrational?
is a nonsensical category error, the very premises of which we reject.Also, we categorically reject this:
However, from the integral perspective, the entire domain of rationaldiscourse belongs to the level of reason -- the personal spheres of development; although they are
highly appropriate within those levels, they are not inherently spiritual.
This is a flat-out denial of integrality from the standpoint of psychological development and Lonerganian
conversion.
Andre Marquis, Janice Holden, and Scott Warren at the University of North Texas write, in their Response
to Helminiak's Treatment of Spiritual Issues in Psychotherapy at
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/helminiak/index.cfm/
quote:
Helminiak (2001) also asserted that "spirituality names the committed pursuit to become the best one can
be" (p. 7) and that "spiritual practices are geared toward enhancing inner experiences" (p. 28).
From the integral perspective (Wilber, 1999a), the goals of self-improvement and experiential enhancement
belong to the domain of spiritual translation. However, the self-transcending dimension by which
Helminiak himself defined spirit pertains, in the integral perspective, to spiritual transformation.
Helminiak not only failed to discriminate between these two processes but actually entangled them.
Translation fortifies the self and its experiences; transformation aims to dismantle and destroy the
sense of separate self.
In Zen, enhanced "inner experiences" are called makyo (Ma -- devil; kyo -- theobjective world). Although they are not inherently "evil," they can powerfully divert spiritual seekers who
are "ignorant of [the] true nature [of these experiences] and [who are] ensnared by them" (Yasutani Roshi
in Kapleau, 1989, p. 42). Chogyam Trungpa referred to the pursuit of such experiences as "spiritual
materialism" (1973, p. 13).
From an integral perspective, what Helminiak's spirituality is "gearedtoward" actually interferes with his definition and defined goal of spirit: self-transendence.
At the crux of this argument lies the question of just what one might mean by self-transcendence.
So, if one takes that to mean going beyond one's sense of self or persona or False Self or socialized self or
functional self
to a sense of one's True Self, seeing oneself as God sees oneself with Ignatius, with a sense of self in
relationship to God and others that is no longer merely functional but robustly relational,
then, quite simply put, we do not disvalue our socialized, functional self
but, instead, realize that we need to get in touch with a sense of our more authentic self, beyond any facade
or persona or mask,
if we want to enjoy deeply personal relationships, intimate even, with God and others.
This does not comport with any notion that
transformation aims to dismantle and destroy the sense ofseparate self.
. Wilber and Helminiak are using two definitions of transformation, with different categorieseven. Helminiak's internal coherence and logical consistency cannot be subverted from without by using
Wilber's definitions and categories and it cannot be subverted from within because he is manifestly
consistent and coherent.
Finally, they begin to get the point, however incohately:
Helminiak not only failed to discriminatebetween these two processes but actually entangled them.
That is correct! They ARE "entangled ," which is another way of recognizing that they ARE integrallyrelated.
Andre Marquis, Janice Holden, and Scott Warren at the University of North Texas write, in their Response
to Helminiak's Treatment of Spiritual Issues in Psychotherapy at
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/helminiak/index.cfm/
quote:
Regarding theism, Helminiak (2001) asserted that the human concept of God is often merely projection
and, therefore, unreliable. He also cited Wilber's assertion -- and, we might add, the collective assertion of
contemplatives across history and cultures -- that the innermost consciousness of humans is identical to the
absolute and ultimate reality of the universe. Helminiak seemed to have concluded that this assertion also is
a projection and, therefore, is incompatible with his spiritual psychology. For people who have not directly
realized the Absolute, this issue becomes a question of authority. For ourselves, we find greater authority in
the collective wisdom of the world's saints and sages, and we consider the exclusion of that wisdom to
render any spiritual psychology incomplete, even potentially harmful.
Let us back up here and distinguish the nature of the claims under consideration by careful parsing.
Regarding theism, Helminiak (2001) asserted that the human concept of God is often merely
projection and, therefore, unreliable.
This is an empirical datum, verifiable and falsifiable by the science of psychology.
He also citedWilber's assertion -- and, we might add, the collective assertion of contemplatives
across history and cultures -- that
the innermost consciousness of humans is identical to the absoluteand ultimate reality of the universe.
The nature of human consciousness, in the philosophy of mind, is what is known as the
hard problem ofconsciousness
. Slowly but inexorably, scientists and philosophers have made progress on this. It is both anempirical scientific question and an empirical metaphysical question, and the question perdures.
There are all sorts of philosophy of mind positions by some very competent philosophers and
neuroscientists. I lean toward a nonreductive physicalist account but am, at bottom, metaphysically
agnostic where this question is concerned.
To the extent, however, that Wilber has also introduced a theological assertion
that the innermostconsciousness of humans is identical to the absolute and ultimate reality of the universe,
at that pointwe are dealing with not only a metaphysically heuristic or scientifically theoretic matter but a
theologicallydogmatic
matter. And there is no real arguing over dogmatic propositions since they tend to beadjudicated, in the end, by nonpropositional aspects of our epistemic stance.
This is not to deny a place for natural theology which can demonstrate the reasonableness of our claims
even if not producing conclusive proofs beyond a mere Scottish verdict. What we can argue, however, is
Wilber's facile invocation of authority, a fallacious appeal but, like I said, we have to fall back on
nonpropositional aspects vis a vis our will to believe and the existential warrants that back it up as a living,
vital and forced option.
Ergo, to the extent that, for themselves, they
find greater authority in the collective wisdom of theworld's saints and sages
, then they have ipso facto dismissed the authorities of all monotheistic traditionsand movements, in general, and the Abrahamic traditions, in particular.
Not only have they cursorily dismissed the authority of philosophers and scientists who remain
conflicted over the nature of consciousness, considering it both epistemologically and ontologically
open, they have dismissed any religious or ideological tradition that is not either pantheist or based
on some idealist monism.
Andre Marquis, Janice Holden, and Scott Warren at the University of North Texas write, in their Response
to Helminiak's Treatment of Spiritual Issues in Psychotherapy at
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/helminiak/index.cfm/
quote:
We believe Helminiak's (2001) model will not be very helpful to mental health professionals (MHPs) who
are not already proficient in spiritual matters. Take, for example, his approach to validating aspects of
spirituality. Referring to a client's belief in God, the need to have meaning in one's life, and so forth
(translative spirituality), he wrote,
"Insofar as these beliefs and practices facilitate the integration oforganism, psyche, and spirit in the client, a therapist's support of them is actually fostering spiritual
growth"
(p. 18).How is an MHP to determine whether or not a belief or practice is facilitating integration or reinforcing
pathology in the sense of Battista's (1996) offensive and defensive spirituality? We believe the integral
model has provided far more guidance. One example is Wilber, Engler, and Brown's (1986) accounts of
how Vipassana meditation loosens and breaks down psychic structure. Thus, for a client suffering from
psychotic, borderline, or narcissistic disorders -- disorders involving an insufficiently organized sense of
self -- recommending or affirming such meditation is contraindicated. This notion has been corroborated
even by those unsympathetic with the transpersonal perspective (Yalom, 1989, p. 52-53).
We endorse Helminiak's (2001) attempt to establish criteria for evaluating the healthfulness of
various spiritual/religious beliefs -- at least of clients in the prepersonal and personal spheres of
development with little or no experience of the transpersonal.
However, one of us (Holden) has beenusing a similar criterion for years which, compared to Helminiak's, she still finds more elegant: the old "1,
2, 3" National Association of Mental Health criteria of whether a belief or practice helps one 1) feel better
about oneself, 2) have more harmonious relationships with others, and 3) carry out more effectively the
tasks of daily life. In addition,
from the integral perspective, once one crosses into the mystical domainof the transpersonal, criteria such as these remain valuable only to a point.
At what point would criteria like these lose their value?
I have my sneaking suspicions as to how this would be answered by one who disvalues the socialized,
functional sense of self.
ndre Marquis, Janice Holden, and Scott Warren at the University of North Texas write, in their Response to
Helminiak's Treatment of Spiritual Issues in Psychotherapy at
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/helminiak/index.cfm/
quote:
We further believe Helminiak's (2001) limited existential perspective could risk laying the groundwork for
a counselor to do harm. One form of potential harm involves category errors, as when, for example, a
counselor indiscriminately conceptually reduces a near-death experience to a consoling fantasy built into
the human brain through evolution to comfort the person facing existential annihilation. Another form of
potential harm in an exclusively existential view is that the counselor lacks a framework to offer a client
who seeks to understand a transpersonal experience. For example, how can an existential perspective
explain spontaneous physical healing or the complex phenomenon of spiritual emergency (Holden,
VanPelt, & Warren, 1999)? "At stake," as Helminiak likes to say, is whether to affirm a spiritual reality that
is not merely existential: not merely "intelligent" but also intuitive and contemplative, not merely "rational"
but also transrational, not merely "humanistic" but also transpersonal yet apprehensible to humans.
Yes, I like to say that, too. Beyond but not without. What's at stake is integrality, itself.
What seems to be missing from this account is that Helminiak's paradigm does not begin and end with the
positivist and philosophic foci of human concern. It precisely anticipates the broadening of these foci to
include the theistic and theotic, which have all manner of interpretations available for all manner of
experiences, none of which a good MHP would cruelly dispossess a client.
Might radical grace be a redundancy? Or is it, rather, an oxymoron?
Does an analogical imagination affirm the radicality of grace and gift us with an optimistic theological
anthropology, while a dialectical imagination denies it, while gifting us with a pessimistic stance toward
human nature?
Perhaps there is a tertium quid that will mediate these extremes, gifting us, instead, with a Goldilocks
anthropology that is “just right.”
Will such mediation dissolve this dichotomy by revealing some category error and thus the nonsensical
nature of our approach? Or might this mediation resolve it in a Hegelian-like, dialectical synthesis? Perhaps
the mediation will maintain a creative tension between these extremes, gifting us with a supremely
intelligible but otherwise utterly incomprehensible mystery?
There are worldviews, some ancient and others modern, that venture an answer to these questions about
human nature along this optimism-pessimism spectrum. These manifold worldviews represent both ends of
this spectrum and every conceivable point in between. Even within Christianity, there are theological
anthropologies representing both ends of this spectrum and every conceivable point on it.
As we consider our own answer, perhaps there is a clue in our preparation for communion as we pray with
the centurion, “Lord, I am not worthy to receive you, but only say the word and I shall be healed.”
One might be tempted, due either to habitual piety or self-image, to find the answer in the most obvious
place, at the beginning of that prayer, which matter of factly dismisses our worthiness. There are more
compelling reasons, however, to focus on the clause, “only say the word and I shall be healed.” Those
reasons are not found at the beginning of that communion prayer, but are found at the beginning of
creation, when the foundations of the world were laid: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God.” Still more reasons are found in the Magnificat: “Be it done to me
according to Thy word. And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.”
Any lingering doubts we might entertain about human nature and whether or not optimism or pessimism is
most warranted in our theological anthropologies have been laid to rest, because the Word was spoken; we
have been healed; He did come, is with us now and will come again, in glory.
Our optimism or pessimism is not rooted in any consideration of our worthiness or what we can do on our
own behalf. We turn our attention, rather, to our primal origin, primal meaning, primal cause, primal
support and primal destiny. We look not at the gift, then, but to the Giver. How can we keep from singing?
All may be well. All can be well. All will be will. All shall be well. And you will know that all manner of
things shall be well.
From John Duns Scotus, we properly gather that the Incarnation was part of God’s Divine Plan from the
very beginning, notwithstanding our almost reflexive felix culpa. This is not a theology of atonement but
one of at-one-ment, which is to say that Jesus was coming, anyway.
Of course Jesus’ coming has salvific efficacy but, if everything is honky dory, why is it, we must ask, that
we really don’t feel so very well? And this is a subtle way of framing the timeless question of theodicy,
which addresses the meaning of suffering and evil. The honest, hence humble, response must first be that
we are dealing with an immense mystery, even as the overall plan has been revealed. So, we do not know
exactly why it is that there is evil or that we suffer.
From a Scotistic perspective, however, two partial responses to this theodicy mystery suggest themselves.
To some extent, the vision of creation that we have been gifted by Scotus, and repeatedly regifted by his
Franciscan family, is that of an aesthetic teleology, which is to say, a striving toward beauty, toward the
attainment of the maximum aesthetic value.
We can glimpse something of this dynamic in the science of nonequilibrium thermodynamics, whereby the
greater the number of bifurcations and permutations underlying an emergent, but otherwise still dissipative,
structure, the greater that structure’s fragility. The more fragile, as we have experienced, the more beautiful
something is. And beauty entails, in this same dynamic, the shedding of monotony and the appropriation of
novelty, which further runs the risk of disintegration toward the amplification of even more beauty.
We have not explained suffering, here, but have described it, have discerned a pattern of how evil and
suffering seem to get trumped, over and over again, and transformed into ever greater realizations of
beauty. We witness this dynamic on microcosmic and macrocosmic scales and can testify to it in our own
lives as there can be efficacy in suffering. And there are many varieties of efficacies in suffering. Foremost,
though, we are created co-creators as we set out on this grand cosmic adventure and, in such a role, the
Scotist witnesses evil and suffering and, rather than ask why it is so, instead, asks what can be done about
it. Thus Francis loved not only Brother Sun and Sister Moon but, also, the leper.
This turns our attention now to the question of how we are to inhabit this Kingdom, even as we all groan in
creation’s ongoing act of giving birth. What does all of this mean for our journey?
Thomas Merton describes the earliest part of our individual journeys in terms of humanization, which is
nothing more or less than our early formation from being little animals to becoming little humans. (Many
teachers seem to testify that this has not always been accomplished by the commencement of grade school.)
Following this earliest formative period, we are next socialized, which is to say that we learn how to
function in society in order to get what we both need and desire. Even our earliest relationships to parents
and other significant others are mostly functional, oriented to meeting needs and desires, and only slowly
transform into the robustly personal, where we value one another for our intrinsic worth.
This early formative development, Merton tells us, is necessary. It is not, however sufficient --- at least, not
where transformation is involved, which is to speak of theosis or deification, as we move from image to
likeness of God. This socialized self, or persona, oriented to mostly functional relationships but with the
incipient emergence of a few more authentically personal relationships, is ego-centered and oriented toward
ongoing construction, maintenance and repair of one’s self and one’s needs and desires. It is a program. It
was taught. It was necessary. It is good. And it is unfortunate, then, that in the formative spirituality
literature it has been given the name False Self.
The False Self got its name honestly, though, because this descriptor has significance in our relationship
with God, which, if it is going to ever be more robustly personal needs to be engaged with something
beyond our socialized self with its needs and desires orientation. And this is just to say that, if we are going
to realize a more robustly relational experience of God and others and all of created reality, then we
certainly would aspire to value them all beyond what it is that we can extract from them all in terms of our
own needs and desires, which is to value them all, again --- not for any extrinsic value, but --- for their
intrinsic worth, in and of themselves. That’s our aspiration. It is very often frustrated.
Let’s look at what might be going on with this intractable frustration regarding our ongoing failure to enter
into more robustly personal encounters with all of reality, employing not the socialized self but what
Merton calls our True Self. If only, with Ignatius, we could see ourselves as God sees us, we would be
moved into proper relationship (justice) out of pure love.
I like to describe the human psyche in terms of value-realization using something derived from the great
American pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce. My Peircean formulization goes something like this: the
normative mediates between the descriptive and the interpretive to effect the evaluative.
The normative entails the philosophic (philosophical methods), and traffics in logic, aesthetics and ethics,
which correspond to our value-realization approaches to truth, beauty and goodness (How do I get that?).
The descriptive entails the scientific, or the empirical, and traffics in data or facts (What is that?).
The interpretive entails the hermeneutical (Is that what I think it is?), metaphysical, theological and
ideological, and it traffics in worldviews, philosophical systems and, plain and simple, strategies to get
what one needs and desires and all manner of perversions and illusions regarding same.
The evaluative entails the objects of our needs and desires (What’s it to me?) and traffics in what we value,
which is truth, beauty, goodness and unity.
Philosophers have labeled, arranged and related these foci of human concern in many different ways,
which, to a great extent, correspond to the subject matter of our opening consideration regarding
theological anthropology. All are philosophers, each of us, even the Rolling Stones, “You Can’t Always
Get What You Want,” and the Beatles, “All You Need is Love.”
In order to get what one wants or desires, two immediate problems present themselves. The normative
(How do I get that?) and evaluative (What’s it to me?) realms or foci of concern pretty much take care of
themselves, in an unconsciously competent manner, or through what we call instinct, which gets trained
somewhat through socialization. The descriptive (What is that?) and interpretive (Is that what I think it is?)
foci of concern, however, continue to confound individuals and professional philosophers, alike.
If the descriptive focus asks: What is that? And the interpretive asks: Is that what I think it is? --- then a big
problem immediately arises between our subjective take on reality and reality’s objective status. Do our
concepts correspond or cohere with reality?
Philosophy of mind academics and major philosophical schools remain divided in their accounts of how it
is that humans know reality and whether or not our concepts truly refer to actual realities. In an overly
simplified scheme, one can imagine them divided into those that think we know reality just as it is
(essentialism) and those that think we only know our concepts (nominalism).
And this includes the Aristotelian and Humean schools as well as the Kantian tradition, which took the
Humean critique of the Aristotelian seriously, which Mortimer Adler rightly suggests that it should not
have done, for all practical purposes. And it included the Platonic tradition, too.
Somewhere along the way, in the 3rd Century, a Neoplatonic tradition began and, its accommodation to
Christianity was attributed to Dionysius, in the 5th Century, whose work was translated by John Scotus in
the 9th Century and further transmitted by Bonaventure, Duns Scotus and other Franciscans in the 12th
Century. The common theme that I picked up on, years ago, unwittingly as to any historical philosophical
lineage, was that of breaking out of this either-or, dualistic mindset of nominalism versus essentialism, with
a triadic approach, a language of mysticism that inchoately resembles the more modern semiotic science of
Charles Sanders Peirce, who was heavily influenced by Duns Scotus.
It is the Peircean formula above that I am amplifying now but it represents a modern semiotic realism that
marked an advancement and improvement of Scotus’ own moderate realism, which was inherently triadic.
What is going on in this triadic approach? When we suggest that the normative mediates between the
descriptive and interpretive to effect the evaluative, to a large extent, we are saying, at a much more basic
level, that the necessary mediates between the possible and the actual. This is pretty straightforward. All it
is saying is that, as we survey possibilities and wonder which will become or already is an actuality, we
only need recourse to the necessary in order to figure it out. This is almost too simple. But that is how
profundity operates, with elegance.
So, all that little socialized person needs to know in order to have his or her needs and desires satisfied is,
descriptively - What is that?; and interpretively - Is that what I think it is?; and if normatively, it necessarily
is or is not, then, evaluatively, one’s needs and desires are then met or not.
By now, you might see a problem in this schema. Who in the world, interpretively, has unfettered access to
the necessary? Peirce suggested that, recognizing our intractable fallibility, we need to back up, or prescind
from this interpretive stance, in order to better grapple with reality. Too many mistakes were being made,
mistakes that had profound existential import and enormous practical significance in human valuerealization
strategies.
This Peircean maneuver can be thought of as a move from ontological certainty to ontological vagueness.
Now, vagueness is not the same as being occulted completely. It just makes things a little fuzzier, like our
logic for example. So, ontological vagueness looks like this: The probable mediates between the possible
and the actual. All we did was change the necessary to the probable.
What happens to our logic, then? What happens, in other words, epistemologically? Peirce would have us
adopt, of course, epistemological vagueness, too. What does that look like? It merely involves a change in
our application of First Principles, such as Noncontradiction [PNC] and Excluded Middle [PEM]. What
makes a reality “possible” is the status where PNC folds (doesn’t apply) and PEM holds. An “actual”
reality is the status where both PNC and PEM hold, as would any necessary reality. A “probable” reality is
one where PNC holds but PEM folds, which is to say that something is going to definitely be determined
here, within given boundaries or limits even, but it is “not necessarily” this or that. And that, my friends, is
the philosophical nonfoundation of nondual thinking. It inheres in Dionysian and Scotistic logic and in
Richard Rohr’s appropriation of Merton. Here’s how.
Coming full circle back to the normative mediating between the descriptive and interpretive to effect the
evaluative, a person locked into any interpretive stance that relates to other people and God in a mostly
functional mode, where one’s needs and desires are to be necessarily met, is going to eventually experience
a great deal of cognitive dissonance and existential anxiety as the gap between the descriptive – “What is
that?” and interpretive – “Is that what I think it is?” grows larger and larger, with the practical upshot being
that either one’s normative or interpretive stance is going to have to go, or at least be suitably amended or
addended. This is because “How do I get that?” isn’t working any longer. When it comes to a robustly
personal relationship with God, it doesn’t work at all.
Now, to some extent, we might consider our evaluative concerns as nonrational or nonpropositional. We
don’t really reason our way into intrinsically valuable relationships with people or other aspects of reality.
We already experience a deeply seated existential orientation to these theological imperatives of truth,
beauty, goodness and unity.
Our realizations of these values, evaluatively, might also be considered transrational in that they certainly
require our rational faculties as employed in our normative, descriptive and interpretive foci of concerns in
order to be effected but they clearly go beyond those propositional aspects in their essentially evaluative
aspirations and realizations.
These different foci of human concern are, then, intellectually-related but not strictly logically-related in
that they represent distinctly different value-commitments. Differently formulated, goodness often comes
flying in on the wings of truth and beauty as uplifted by unity.
The transrational, then, does not orphan the rational but merely goes with it and then beyond. To jettison
the rational is not a transrational or even nonrational maneuver, it is an arational maneuver that leads to
arational gnosticism.
The present point is, however, that the False Self, or socialized self, similarly needs to be transcended,
neither annihilated nor orphaned. And this process of True Self realization requires a new way of looking at
reality, at God, at other people. And, in order to JOTS [jump outside the system], our old false self system,
we need to make this transrational move. We need to go beyond the dualistic thinking that predominates in
the mind of one who relates to reality in a solely functional way, which is what dualistic thinking was
designed to do: “What is that?” and “Is that what I think it is?” and “How do I get that?”.
To go beyond such thinking, not without it, we need to embrace both ontological and epistemological
vagueness, to prescind from the a priori metaphysics of the dualistic dead-ends of nominalism versus
essentialism.
We even need to embrace epistemic vagueness, a recognition of our fallibility, which does not rush to
closure when confronted with reality, does not even rush to closure when confronted with paradox and
whether it should be dissolved, resolved or maintained in creative tension, as would be appropriate vis a vis
the demands of reality.
Fallibility (semiotic and critical realism), again, is not a recognition that reality is in any way occulted, in
principle, which some aspects might be, only a recognition that we cannot stand in an ontological bucket
and pull our epistemological systems up by the handles (classical foundational systems and naïve realism).
Neither do we saw off the epistemological limbs where our ontological eggs are nested (radical
postmodernism and agnosticism).
Nor do we go beyond our rational faculties by going without them (arational gnosticism).
Fallibility is the tertium quid, the Third Eye, between gnosticism and agnosticism, between scientism and
fideism, between religious fundamentalism and Enlightenment fundamentalism. We prescind from the eye
of the senses and the eye of reason to employ, also, the eye of faith, where, early on our journey, all was
clear but tentative, while later, all was certain but obscure.
Because these human foci of concern are intellectually-related and not logically-related, we have something
to learn from every perspective, from every person, who offers a ray of God’s truth, beauty, goodness and
love. As Fr. Rohr says, then, Everything Belongs.
We can, then, in our East-West contemplative dialogue, as well as in other interideological and political
discourse, abstract their good descriptive and normative methods, practices, disciplines, asceticisms from
their otherwise seemingly heterodox interpretive stances and appropriate them for use in our own traditions,
such as when Dionysius accommodated the neoplatonic triadic logic for Christianity long, long ago, such as
when Charles Peirce turned to the brilliance of a medieval Franciscan and elaborated his own triadic
semiotic realism, which might recommend a more fully inculturated American theology for our new
millennium, which, at bottom, would be as old as the hills of Athens and Jerusalem.
Radical grace is, then, a redundancy.
Below is a unproofed summary of Fr. Rohr's The Third Eye from some rather sketchy notes. There's
nothing new in his approach here except for his emphasis, perhaps, on praxis vis a vis our realization of
True Self.
Father Rohr spent five weeks, this past Lent, in a hermitage, in solitude. He spent this time reflecting and
writing a new book, The Third Eye. On Easter Monday, he made a presentation of an outline of these
thoughts and this conference is available in a 4 CD set.
It’s not until the 3rd CD of this 4 CD presentation that Fr. Rohr speaks directly to or defines the Third Eye
per se. His use of this descriptor, he then explains, is derived from two 11th Century monks, Hugh and
Richard of the Monastery of St. Victor in Paris. The flowering of this thinking in his Franciscan tradition,
he tells us, took place in the 12th and 13th centuries.
Although the metaphor is similar to the same concept of Hindu and Buddhist traditions, it is independent of
those in that there was no contact between those and this Christian conceptualization.
As I mentioned elsewhere, we are talking about the eyes of 1) sense, 2) reason and 3) faith.
Basically, Fr. Rohr is amplifying his teaching on contemplative living, which continues to be heavily
informed by his love of Thomas Merton. He makes frequent references to Merton, False Self and True Self
and compares and contrasts them in many different ways, using many different adjectives and metaphors.
Fr. Rohr likes the word “realization” and sees it as being richer than the word “experience” for he describes
the robust encounter of God as a “total body blow,” where not only head and heart are engaged but the
body, too. Unfortunately, we “localize knowing” and too often try to access God only in the top 3 inches of
the body and only on the left side at that. This dualistic, binary or dyadic thinking, which we employ in
math, science and engineering, or when we are driving a car, is of course good and necessary. It is the mind
that “divides the field” into classes and categories and then applies labels through compare and contrast
exercises. It is the egoic mind that is looking for control and order, but, unforunately, also superiority. It
can lead to both intellectual and spiritual laziness, however, to an egoic operating system (Cynthis
Bourgeault), which views all through a lens of “How does it affect me?”
An aside: Rohr says that all that participates in love in our lives is forever, even your dog. So, there’s one
view of heaven among others.
The contemplative mind goes beyond the tasks of the dualistic mind to deal with concepts like love, mercy,
compassion and forgiveness. It doesn’t need to “divide the field” for such tasks.
The contemplative mind is practicing heaven in that it sees the Divine image as being “equally distributed”
and present in all others. We see that presence, honor it and know it. The contemplative mind starts each
moment with “yes.” It is vulnerable before the moment, opening “heart space.” It is present to people and
does not put them in a box. So, in our primary level encounter with others, we do not prejudge. At the
secondary and tertiary level, a “no” may be absolutely necessary. Once you know you can say “yes,” then it
is important to be able to say “no,” when appropriate.
Rohr makes clear, in his words, that we “include previous categories” and “retain what we learn in early
stages.” Our goal, in his words, is to master both dualistic and nondualistic thinking.
We must go beyond (not without) that part of our tradition that was informed mostly by Greek logic in
order to be more open to paradox and mystery. Rohr described some of the early apophatic and nondual
elements of the Christian tradition, especially in the first three centuries with the Desert Mothers and
Fathers, especially in the Orthodox and eastern Christian churches, and describing John of the Cross and
Teresa of Avila as the last supernovae. The apophatic and unknowing tradition has not been constant. For
400 years after these Carmelites there has been no real tradition. He credits Merton with almost singlehandedly
retrieving authentic contemplative teaching that has not been taught for almost 500 years. This
type of mysticism, he, like Merton says, is available to all but it takes a type of humility to “let go of our
control tower.”
We and others are living tabernacles, even given the contrary evidence. That God dwells in us is the
foundation of human dignity.
Fr. Rohr discusses the Gift of Tongues in this contemplative vein and notes that when it died out, prayerbased
beads emerged. He apparently went on to discuss prayer beads in other traditions but that part was
truncated.
Fr. Rohr notes that the East and West differ in that more emphasis is placed on discipline, practice and
asceticism in the East, while, in the West, we emphasize surrender and trust.
Our Christian path is more one of letting go and yielding of self. He believes that most of us, a very high
percentage, have enjoyed unitive moments, but that there was no one there to say “that’s it.” He thinks that
it would be useful to retrieve our contemplative tradition because we apparently need some degree of
discipline or practice to keep seeing and trusting our unitive moments, our union, our communion. The
Spirit will thus teach us all things and re-mind you that you are in union with God, that you are select; you
are chosen; you are beloved. We need to learn how to live in communion, now, for that is what we’ll enjoy
in heaven.
Fr. Rohr then describes practices that open up this contemplative mind: silence, stillness, solitude, patience
about needing to know everything, poetry, art, body movement, music, humility and redemptive listening.
He describes how we need to stand back and compassionately and calmly observe reality, without initial
regard for how it affects us, but to see persons and events nakedly, seeing our drama almost as if it wasn’t
us. If we cannot thus detach, then we are over-identified. Whenever we’re defensive, it is usually our false
self. What characterizes an addict is typically all or nothing thinking. We do not hate the False Self. We
must simply see it. It is not our “bad” self, just not our “true” self. We need to better learn to hold together
opposites and contradictions. A modern retrieval of our ancient practices of contemplative seeing can foster
this type of nonjudging awareness. Rohr says that a master of nondual thinking needs to also be a master of
dualistic thinking. Our Catholic tradition has great wisdom in retaining icon and art and symbols and
music. The primary teachers of this approach to God and others and all of reality are great love and great
suffering. Our primary paths have been suffering and prayer.
When head and heart and body are all connected, that is prayer. This, says Fr. Rohr, is not esoteric
teaching. Everybody has the Holy Spirit!
What appears to be the new theme emerging from Fr. Rohr’s latest thought is that of supplementing and
complementing our traditional approach to belief-based religion with more practice-based religion. In
particular, he sees great wisdom in retrieving those practices which have been lost or deemphasized that we
can better cultivate a contemplative outlook. In prayer, we are like “tuning forks” that come in to God’s
presence and seek to abide inside of a resonance with God. We need to set aside whatever blocks our
reception, especially a lack of love or lack of forgiveness.
Fr. Rohr does describe much of Buddhism as gifting one with “practices” and not “conclusions.”
In our Catholic social justice approach there has been remarkable growth in our methodologies as I have
documented elsewhere (at the ethos_eros link at the bottom of this post, for example. Scroll down, about
half way, where it is subtitled: The Witnesses to Revelation & New Methodologies). These new
methodologies reflect updated understandings that provide a better bridge to interreligious dialogue and
dialogue with the modern world. They have not been adapted, however, to our classical moral theology,
which remains stuck in old categories, essentialisms and legalisms, in many ways, although not wholly
unimproved.
Now, when it comes to spiritual theology, which is a practical discipline, moral theology, ascetical theology
and mystical theology should form an integral whole, even though, traditionally, they represent rather
sharply distinguished areas of study. What I'd like to more fully explore is how our traditional categories in
spiritual theology writ large might be updated in a manner that does not jettison the insights of the past but
that deepens our understanding of our tradition.
For example, what does it mean to articulate a more robustly Christocentric inclusivism over against an
ecclesiocentric exclusivism? How would these reflections inform, for example, sanjuanist categories,
Maritain's distinctions and Merton's experiences vis a vis East-West contemplative dialogue? Might some
of the old categories be, indeed, untenable, as we compare and contrast the spirituality of East and West, or
even try to deepen our understanding of such distinctions as have been controversial even within our
tradition, like that between infused and acquired contemplation?
If, as I have suggested elsewhere, an inclusivistic Christocentrism is best understood as our tradition gifting
us with the ways and means to move more swiftly and with less hindrance to our unitive destinations, to
more nearly perfectly articulate truth in creed, more nearly perfectly celebrate beauty in ritual or cult, more
nearly perfectly preserve goodness in code or law, more nearly perfectly enjoy fellowship and community
in unity, better avoiding dogmatism, ritualism and legalism, avoiding, at the same time, any facile
syncretistic blending of traditions, any false interreligious irenicism, any insidious indifferentism toward
traditions, any imprecise cartography in our mapping of moral, ascetical and mystical experiences in our
spiritualities ...
Then, does that mean that we are in any manner also suggesting that we must necessarily view other
traditions as if they otherwise differed from our own with respect to our unitive destinations, themselves,
however ultimate or proximate, however fleeting or enduring?
Certainly, as it pertains to our ultimate unitive destinations, in terms of ultimate salvific efficacy (getting to
heaven), we in no way maintain any distinction between religions, even as we maintain our giftedness in
moving more swiftly and with less hindrance with our explicit faith. At least we have updated this vision
since Vatican II and its document regarding nonChristian religions. We trust that even nonbelievers,
explicit atheists, can be saved by living the good and moral life.
I am precisely thinking that we must be open, in a similar way, to breaking open our old categories of
ascetical and mystical theology over against what I have been calling an ecclesiocentric pneumatological
exclusivism. And this is to suggest that it is indeed untenable to maintain distinctions that would suggest
that, while we may indeed move more swiftly and with less hindrance with our explicit faith toward our
more proximate unitive destinations, let's say in terms of mystical experience and infused contemplation,
for example, we may not want to
a priori and categorically deny the flowering of those unitive strivingsthat are informed only by implicit faith, which, when animated by love, are undeniably guided by the Holy
Spirit.
If we view grace as transmuted experience (Don Gelpi) and not thematically, as do the transcendental
thomists (Rahner), then, there is a greater sense of urgency, perhaps, to evangelize the world with the Good
News so as to gift others with the benefits of explicit faith, that they may move more swiftly and with less
hindrance to the blossoming of unitive experiences, infused contemplation and mystical graces, of which
their natural mysticism certainly places them on the threshold, and where, as the Spirit moves, the threshold
is most certainly crossed, from time to time? The distinctions between grace as transmuted experience
(Peircean) and thematic grace (Rahner & Lonergan) I must leave to the academics. Whetever the case may
be, we needn't deny all the giftedness of our own tradition even as we affirm the rays of truth in others.
And, of course, we remain mindful of the caveats I listed re: syncretism, indifferentism, irenicism,
imprecisions in mapping across traditions.
put the question of how to properly interpret what Fr. Rohr meant by infused or natural contemplation, as
employed in the Tolle article, to a friend. As a result, I just got a response from Fr. Rohr.
In a nutshell, Fr. Rohr follows the
newer teachers, Rahner and Merton. If you refer back to the explicationsI have provided by the Merton biographer, Shannon, regarding natural contemplation as mystical, and by
Larkin, who describes Rahner's conception of "infused," then you will properly gather Fr. Rohr's meaning.
Also, his meaning is consistent with the excerpts below.
Who Can Be A Mystic?
quote:
Both Thomas Merton and Karl Rahner, a major Modern Catholic theologian, insist on a mysticism of
ordinary living. For Merton, the incarnation has sanctified all of human living. Far from taking the
contemplative above and beyond the ordinary, contemplation, if it is authentic, roots the human being in the
ordinary. The ordinary routine of daily life becomes the texture of contemplation for the devoted Christian.
Merton insists there is a “latent, or implicit, infused dimension to all prayer.”
quote:
In different language Karl Rahner makes a similar claim: everyone is called to the immediacy of God’s
presence. A supernatural, graced, “anonymously Christian” mysticism may even exist outside of
Christianity; that is to say, Christ himself may be working outside of established Christianity to be in touch
with mystics (known and unknown) in all parts of the globe. Rahner sets no limits on the power of God.
Rahner writes: “In every human being ... there is something like an anonymous, unthematic, perhaps
repressed, basic experience of being orientated to God, which is constitutive of man in his concrete makeup
(of nature and grace), which can be repressed but not destroyed,
which is ‘mystical’ or (if you prefer amore cautious terminology) has its climax in what the
older teachers called infused contemplation.”quote:
Mysticism is sometimes a sweeping category for a variety of esoteric religious experiences. At other times
it is restricted to higher forms of the experience of God found in the saints. In this article we follow Karl
Rahner and define mystical experience as the same one experience of the Holy Spirit, given and received in
faith and love, and present as the transcendent reality within all morally good human activity. This graced
orientation to God is the unthematic, ordinarily anonymous experience of the self-communication of God.
It has multiple manifestations that differ only in degree from one another. These experiences are also called
contemplation and all of them by definition are infused. Fr. Larkin
As I mentioned previously, a major critique of this Rahnerian outlook is provided by Fr. Don Gelpi, my
fellow Yat, from New Orleans: Two Spiritual Paths: Thematic Grace vs. Transmuting Grace .
With Scotus and the Franciscans, one will already view the world through radically incarnational lenses.
Magnify that view through Merton and Rahner, where the world is not divided into natural and
supernatural, secular and sacred, where there is ONLY the supernatural, where ALL experience the Holy
Spirit, the Divine Indwelling and Infused Contemplation, then any reference to the natural refers to the
object of contemplation and not the origin, then any reference to the extraordinary refers to differences in
degree and not in kind, then the distinction that comes to the fore is whether or not the experience is
conscious or unconscious, whether or not one's faith is explicit or implicit.
No one has ascribed explicit faith to Tolle. There is no reason to
a priori conclude that ascetical disciplines,practices, methods or prayer forms of the East do not lead to experiences of God that are infused. Neither is
there a reason to conclude that, when they do, Eastern practitioners are obliged to use the categories of an
explicit Christian faith to describe their experiences. It is absurd to suggest that I mean to say any such
thing. That one might be inspired toward a contemplative stance toward the world by Tolle and would
thereby experience a blossoming of infused contemplation, does not mean that one has necessarily been
formed by our explicit teachings, only that one has implicitly grasped same. Rohr makes clear that Tolle is
not employing Christian doctrine or making explicitly Chrsitian references.
That's why one can maintain, as I did, that
Rahner didn't contradict John of the Cross. What we are asking,in general, is did Rahner and Merton deepen our understanding of what we mean, in this sanjuanist sense,
even, when we say that an experience is 1)infused, 2) mystical or 3) a movement of the Holy Spirit. And
what I have maintained, then, is that they did both deepen and broaden our understanding in the sense that
they democratized our understanding of where the Holy Spirit might be moving, broadening our
conceptions to recognize that
mysticism, outside of Christianity, can be graced, supernatural, mystical,infused
and so on, all of this over against any narrower conceptions, as I said, that were ecclesiocentric andexclusivistic.
I was not suggesting that the sanjuanist and Rahnerian lenses differed in their affirmation and description of
the extraordinary and higher forms of the experience of God found in the saints. I was recognizing, rather,
that the Rahnerian lenses had a wider field of vision and thus affirm and describe the experience of the
Holy Spirit in all morally good human activity, which can also be called mystical, graced, infused and
contemplation.
The sanjuanist account addresses a narrower category of experiences that is restricted to those found in our
saints. That account is
necessary in our description of the Ranhnerian account but it is not sufficient,because the Rahnerian account covers a wider variety of religious experiences and mysticism, then, in this
account, is a more sweeping category. That's why one would employ Rahnerian lenses to make sense of
Rohr's interpretation of Tolle, disambiguation of natural and supernatural and perspective on words like
mysticism, contemplation and infused. We are distinguishing between the sanjuanist and Rahnerian only to
unite them.
Clearly, Merton advanced our understanding of contemplation and invited us to look at contemplation as a
vocation for all. Clearly, Rahner advanced our self-understanding from an exclusivistic ecclesiocentrism to
an inclusivistic Christocentrism. Clearly, without the interreligious dialogue of these men and others like
them, no one would be affirming either Eastern practices or contemporary contemplative prayer forms as
providential gifts of the Holy Spirit. Can we call them infused? Can we call them contemplation?
Apparently, we do disagree, here, and that's okay.
think the way to reconcile the apparent differences is this. The old sanjuanist usage of the term infused
contemplation described an experience that was 1) infused 2) contemplation and 3) extraordinarily FULL.
This Rahnerian usage, as explicated by Fr. Larkin, describes experiences that are 1) infused 2)
contemplation and 3) of all manner of manifestations of varying degrees.
In this sense, what really distinguishes an experience as infused contemplation in the classical, sanjuanist
sense is NOT that it is infused or not but whether it is extraordinarily FULL or not.
So, we can all affirm that there is this experience that differs in degree and that St. John highly nuanced and
well-described it. And he called this infused contemplation. But, that's unfortunate in the same way that
calling both Cardinals and Scarlet Tanagers red birds does not serve to properly and diagnostically
distinguish the two. The term "Infused" is not what diagnostically sets apart the experience St. John wrote
extensively about, for other experiences are also infused. The term "contemplation" is not what
diagnostically sets apart the experience either, for other experiences are contemplation. Rather, the
DEGREE of fullness is what diagnostically distinguishes the sanjuanist description.
Now, there is a practical consideration for our contemporary contemplative prayer forms, broadly
considered, and it is whether or not, in Fr. Larkin's words, they teach the person to be appropriately active
in their prayer. I think, with Larkin, that most do.
The confusion is rooted, as I pointed out, in the fact that people understandably have misunderstood the
classical categories in terms of kinds and not degrees, with respect to origins and not objects, and,
resultingly, miss seeing the Holy Spirit's movements in other places and peoples. That's neither trivial nor
nitpicking.
Sorry for the delay. I was Gustaved and am about to get Iked, but I'll give you a head start based on what
Fr. Richard told me.With this glossary, below, maybe you can more precisely map his terminology and
better discern his meaning in the Tolle article:
1) Contemplation is broadly conceived, not narrowly.
2) Everything is supernatural and at God's disposal. Natural and supernatural comprise a distinction without
a difference (Rahner).
3) The Holy Spirit dwells in all (infused) and is experienced by all (naturally), not necessarily consciously
but certainly efficaciously, if we don't oppose or resist it (Rahner). It's cultivated through contemplative
practices or natural mysticism.
4) Asceticisms, teachings, disciplines, practices, exercises and such can build on this divine indwelling
bringing it to new levels of freedom and praise and conscious choice, hence acquired and theological.
5) Rohr bases his understanding of these spiritual realities, in part, on Rahner. Please understand, however,
that this is not the same thing as saying that he literally employs Rahner's specific jargon, which I have no
reason to think is not, itself, conventional. (I say this because, notwithstanding my several
acknowledgments that Rohr's usage was confusing, still, it seems that my explications in the posts above
somehow continued to be mistaken for a
defense of Rohr's idiosyncratic terminology rather than merely anexplanation
of same. Thanks for your forbearance --- and longsuffering --- with my own inartfulexpressions.)
6) There is a natural contemplation (natural with respect to object and not origin and also where one is
cognizant of the divine indwelling) that Merton spoke of and which his biographer described as infused,
truly mystical, but this was not under consideration by Rohr, although I had earlier thought that it might
have been. At any rate, this is not exactly the same as Underhill's first type but more in the theological vein.
7) That's all that comes to mind.
I hope this helps.
I will provide, below, a quote and comment on what I think Rohr refers to in Underhill. First, let me further
explicate myMerton reference above.
I first thought that Rohr might have been speaking of Merton's teaching on Maximus regarding natural
contemplation. It is the
physike of the Patristics and is kataphatic and mystical. Evagrius treated it as adevelopmental (serial) stage in theosis. Maximus saw it more as a parallel experience in which we all
properly balance our practical and contemplative approaches. Since Rohr had mentioned Orthodoxy, I
thought he might have been talking about this. As we know now, he was, rather, invoking his Ranhnerian
hermeneutic. As for the natural contemplation of Evagrius or of Maximus, its departure point is theological,
so it doesn't really play into this Tolle consideration, at least not directly.
Underhill, regarding nature, discusses what mysticism and vitalism have in common, then goes on to show
how the mystics surpass mere vitalistic intuitions, such as the pantheists, for example. But she distinguishes
further what she calls a full mystic consciousness, which goes beyond the mere immanentist intuitions to
apprehend the utterly transcendent. Prior to that consideration, she discuses the different conceptions of
being --- naturalism, idealism, skepticism, and the religious notion that the suprasensible is important and
real.
Underhill says that the philosopher guesses and argues, the mystic lives and looks, tastes and sees. All
mystics are mystical philosophers but not all mystical philosophers are mystics. So, Underhill's "Point of
departure" chapter seems metaphysical. The chapter on vitalism seems geared toward a contemplative
stance toward nature that goes through a sort of evolution of mystic consciousness, from a mere vitalist
philosophy to a more robust immanentism to the apprehension of the transcendent.
In her consideration of the theology of mysticism, she affirms the inchoate religious forms and intuitions of
other traditions even as she exults our incarnational understanding: "It is true that the differentia which
mark off Christianity from all other religions are strange and poignant: but these very differentia make of it
the most perfect of settings for the mystic life. Its note of close intimacy, of direct and personal contact with
a spiritual reality given here and nowits astonishing combination of splendour and simplicity, of the
sacramental and transcendentall these things minister to the needs of the mystical type. Hence the Christian
system, or some colourable imitation of it, has been found essential by almost all the great mystics of the
West."
So, as I read it, Tolle does address what Underhill considers the metaphysical departure point. He also
could be addressing nature as a departure point as it culminates in the immanentist intuitions. Others could
address even the more theological departure point, at least to the extent there is a devotional component as
in Bhakti, but might only be addressing what are inchoate formulations and imitations that only hint at our
more robustly incarnational understandings. I haven't picked up Tolle in awhile and so don't know if he
goes there, but I don't see why he would not, in principle. As I observed before, he seems mostly focused
on fostering affective, moral and social conversions while being a tad cavalier about doctrinal differences.
I'm not saying he doesn't foster crtitical thinking and intellectual conversion, necessarily, but that he glosses
over, too easily, our differentia. Oh well, I get just as easily dismayed by folks on the opposite extreme who
bog down in mythic membership mindsets.
So, when I ascribed Rahnerian lenses (glossary) to such as Rohr and Larkin, I was not so very narrowly
conceiving such lenses in terms of awareness of some isolated dictionary entry as it might elucidate who
employs idiosyncratic vs conventional usages, but was thinking, instead, of the familiarity that comes from
a much more depthful critical scholarship, which is to say, one that has engaged transcendental Thomism,
in general, and Rahner’s entire life’s work, in particular, as it might shed light on comparative religion and
foster interreligious dialogue.
Whether she is talking about metaphysical mysticism or contemplation of the natural world or even
theological contemplation, all distinguished by their departure points (or what I would call objects),
Underhill seems to speak in terms of an evolution of mystical consciousness, recognizing in other traditions
inchoate forms and imitations of what we most fully experience in the Western Christian tradition with our
incarnational stance. All of those departure points seem to be, in principle, accessible to all. They can all
lead to very full experiences of the divine indwelling, even if unconsciously so. Our Christian formation, it
would seem, would help us move more swiftly and with less hindrance on this race set before us and, so, it
is out of compassion for all and in solidarity with all that we share this Good News. Even as Right Speech
may compel us to speak the truth as we best know it and so bring others to a more conscious competence,
still, there is something poignantly beautiful in unconscious competence whenever we see it in play in our
humanity, n'est pas?