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"Don't you think they are worthy of some better enemy than the
Japanese?" Senior Australian officers on their bigger, tough, better paid and better hatted Diggers |
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"The whole operation seems incredible: 550 miles in 55 days
forced back by a small Japanese army of only three divisions,
riding stolen bicycles and without artillery support." Commander of the Australian forces on the conquest of Malaya and Singapore
"One Australian is equal to ten Japanese" |
Singapore - The Beginning of the End
Feb. 5th, 1942:
In Malaya, despite shortages of ammunition, the Japanese 25th
Army open their artillery bombardment of Singapore. Elaborate
measures are taken to conceal Gen. Yamashita's plans. Local residents
have been removed from troop concentration areas, daylight movements
of troops banned and communications silence imposed while false
telegraphic messages are transmitted. Arrangements for one-way
traffic made for the efficient transportation of ammunition and
materials. Furthermore, each division has been ordered to take
special precautionary measures to keep the plans under wraps.
One regiment had meals prepared 8 kilometres away from the Straits
and had them carried forward at mealtime. Another regiment that
assembled its troops at a location 10 kilometres away from the
waterway took pains to have meals prepared further inland in order
to prevent wisps of kitchen smoke being observed.
Yamashita also had the Guards running scores of trucks eastward
by night, with horns blaring and headlights on, and drove them
back in silence with dim lights. They set up a fake communications
centre, to suggest that a superior command post was there. all
these elaborate deception measures were intended to disguise the
real landing operations aimed at the northwest of Singapore by
the 5th and 18th Divisions.
Feb. 6th, 1942:
Yamashita summons his top officers at 11 a.m. to give them their
orders. The relatively inexperienced Imperial Guards Division
will feint on the evening of February 7th, by crossing the Straits
of Johore and taking Pulau Ubin island in the northeast of Singapore.
Constant artillery bombardment by the few Japanese artillery units
positioned in that sector on Johore, coupled with fake troop movements
and fake camps would delude the British into thinking that is
where the main invasion will take place. Next day, the 5th and
18th Divisions will assault Singapore Island's northwest corner,
a mangrove and mudflats sector held by the Australian 22nd Brigade.
It is also the narrowest portion of the Straits.
That evening, Gen. A.E.Percival is informed by British chief engineer
Brigadier Ivan Simson that the Japanese will probably attack the
northwest corner of Singapore island. Percival, however orders
Simson to concentrate supplies in the east.
Feb. 7th, 1942: Gen. Percival announces that Singapore will be held to the last
man. That evening, the Japanese invade the island, crossing the
Johore Straits, to seize Pulau Ubin island in Yamashita's strategy.
A small British detachment is dislodged from the island.
Two Australian recce teams had swum to Johore and had detected enormous Japanese troop movement, they however failed to find any evidence of invasion boats as these were moored further up the rivers. Percival thus gets word that the Japanese are moving up to invade Singapore's northwest corner and is requested for a spotter aircraft to observe fall of shot, so that Australian guns can disrupt the enemy invasion before it starts. Percival does not give such permission, saying there are no planes available.
Noted Percival: "The Japanese artillery adopted harassing tactics, batteries becoming
active in the plantations north of Pulau Ubin and on the high
ground east and west of Johore Bahru One battery, with a specially
long range of about 24,000 yards, shelled the Government House
area from near Johore Bahru. A balloon section was brought forward
to the high ground above Johore Bahru to assist in the observation
of this artillery fire. Our artillery replied with counter bombardment
and harassing fire within the limits laid down. The observation
posts on Pulau Ubin. proved of great service but had to be withdrawn
when enemy troops occupied the island early on the 8th February.
On all fronts our night patrols crossed the Straits and reconnoitred
the enemy dispositions. Two of the A.I.F. patrols which returned
on the night 7th-8th February, after being in enemy territory
over 24 hours, reported that on the 7th February large enemy reinforcements
had arrived in the rubber plantations opposite the western shores
of Singapore Island between the Rivers Malayu and Perepat."
When the attack began, nearly 450 Japanese guns opened fire on the British defences before the main crossing of the Johore Strait began. Many machine-gun positions were destroyed, together with pillboxes and wire defences, but undamaged machine-guns cost the Japanese heavy casualties when the first units landed The invading Japanese were stubbornly opposed by men of the heavily outnumbered 22nd Australian Brigade, among them A and C companies of 2nd Battalion. In the first wave, the Japanese threw in some 4000 men, against whom the Australians could muster no more than 2500 for they had been badly hit by the artillery barrage. Japanese soldiers were hampered by the muddy shore, broken defences and mangrove roots, but they soon managed to gain a foothold.
Recounted Ochi Harumi in the 3rd person, a machine-gunner in the
5th Division whose unit came up against the Australian 2/20th
Battalion, "Tsuchikane had stumbled into another company's position. Quickly
he began to move back in the direction he'd come from. Again a
shell exploded near the soldiers he had just left.
"Mother! Mother!"
"Don't die! Don't die - you must not!"
"Tenno heika banzai - long live the Emperor!"
Tsuchikane pulled himself together, carefully lifting his legs
to join his unit. Close to him, fire lashed out over the burning
mangrove. it spread quickly, feeding on oil poured into the Straits,
gushing out onto the surface, and then shining on the water in
a ghastly scene of Dane's Inferno.
"Mother! Mother!"
The moaning voice could still be heard. it was a picture of hell
- Abikyokan - Buddhism's worst of all hells. Stumbling along the
edge of the beach, Tsuchikane's gun felt slippery in his hands.
Fire in all directions threatened to engulf him. Where to go?
It seemed impossible to advance or retreat!
"We'll burn to death just standing here - let's attack!" Corporal
Nemoto yelled to Tsuchikane.
"If we're going to die, better in an attack." agreed Tsuchikane.
Shouting out their battalion and platoon names, they advanced,
hoping to be recognised.
"Corporal Nemoto, Corporal Tsuchikane!"
One, then two comrades joined them.
Machine-gunner Ochi Harumi from the 5th Division described their
first contact with the Australian 2/20 AIF defence positions in
the Sungei Buloh beach area:
The Japanese tore into the enemy with blood-curdling sounds."Fix
bayonets! attack!"
No longer human at the hour of death, the Japanese darted after
the enemy, goring anyone in their path with the bayonet. During
the frenzied killing on the beach, the soldiers lost their spiritual
balance. Like rabid dogs they chased after the enemy, their sense
of self-preservation having turned them inside-out. Even platoon
and company commanders, men who were supposed to be level-headed
and calm, were carrying bloody swords, as they, too, were drawn
into the mad dance of death. The Australian 2/20 sentry units
were on the edge of annihilation.
Ochi reckoned that the Australians could have put a stop to the
killings with fire from a flank and a bit more sang-froid. it
would have been a simply remedy - just one heavy machine-gun opening
up suddenly from the side. Fire from the flank was the greatest
danger to the direct assault tactics that Ochi's platoon was using.
Without it, the chaotic killing became a one-on-one affair, direct
assaults in which the invader proved the more desperate. For the
defending Australians, it was kill or retreat. For the Japanese,
it could only be kill or be killed.
The Australians forces began to retreat with their Thompson guns.
Ochi's unit pursued them 100 metres into the jungle where in an
opening the ridge sloped down into a valley. Below ran the enemies'
silhouettes, south."
Cpl. Clarence Spackman, a dairy hand from Western Australia, was one of about ten machine gunners of the 2/4th Machine-Gun Battalion, armed with rifles and fixed bayonets trying to find their way through a swamp to 2/18th battalion's HQ when they bumped into a party of Japanese led by an officer brandishing a sword. In the darkness, it seems that at first both sides were too shocked to shoot. Spackman bayoneted the officer, seized his sword and then used it on a man who had rushed to the officer's help. In the mélee that followed, most of Spackman's section were wounded, but they stuck together and all of them came out of it alive.
As was often the case, it was the men that one could least afford to lose who most frequestly appeared on the casualty lists. Both the lieutenants who led the reconnaissance patrols across the Straits died. Lt. Ottley of the 2/19th was found, still cluching a Bren gun, outside the ambushed ambulance that had been taking him and others to a casualty clearing station. He should not, of course, have had a Bren gun in an ambulance, but then neither should an ambulance have been ambushed. Lt. Homer of the 2/20th would die of wounds in Alexandra Hospital. In the first 24 hours of fighting on Singapore, this battalion lost seven officers killed, three wounded and one captured. Among them was their commanding officer Lt.Col. Charles Assheton, a civil engineer from Tamworth in New South Wales, who died shortly after dawn, organising a rearguard of three Brens gunners on a knoll, sparsely covered in rubber saplings, in order to cover the withdrawal of some wounded by road towards Tengah airfield.
February 8th, 1942: Noted Percival: "At about 1330 hrs. on the 8th February heavy artillery fire
opened on the fronts of the 22 Australian and 44 Indian Brigade
Groups following lighter shelling during the morning. Forward
defences, headquarters and communications received special attention.
After a lull at sunset the bombardment continued with increased
intensity. It was apparent that the enemy had greatly strengthened
his artillery during the previous week, the bombardment being
reminiscent of that during the World War I. Casualties to personnel
were, however, not heavy owing to the protection afforded by slit
trenches, but cable communications were cut and damage was done to
searchlight and other equipment.
The 22 Australian Infantry Brigade was disposed on a three battalion
front, each battalion finding its own reserves. The Brigade front,
which stretched from the River Kranji on the right to the River
Berih on the left measured 16,000 yards. In rear of the position
there is a comparatively narrow neck of about 3,000 yards where
the headwaters of the Rivers Kranji and Berih nearly join. The
problem was whether to allow the enemy to land unopposed and to
endeavour to stop him on this neck or to hold forward positions
near the coast with a view to attacking the enemy when he was
most vulnerable, i.e., when he was crossing the Straits and landing
on the shores of the Island. In accordance with the general policy
laid down by Headquarters Malaya Command the forward positions
were occupied.
The 2/20 Battalion A.I.F. with a company of Dalforce attached
was on the right on a front of 8,000 yards between the River Kranji
and Sarimbun Island. The 2/18 Battalion A.I.F. was in the centre
on a front of 4,000 yards between Sarimbun Island and Murai Point.
The 2/19 Battalion which had absorbed a large number of reinforcements
since its heavy losses at Muar, was on the left on a front of
4,000 yards between Murai Point and the River Berih. There was
a machine gun company distributed along the front. The Brigade
was covered by Australian Field Artillery, the total number of
guns which could bear on this front being about 30.
I have no record of the orders issued by the Commander 22 Australian
Infantry Brigade, but it appears they were to the effect that
the forward troops if overrun were to fall back successively to
company and battalion peri meter positions.
The first landings took place at about 2045 hrs. 8th February
and very soon the whole of the front between the River Buloh on
the right of the 2/20 Battalion and the right company of the 2/19
Battalion was being attacked. Some craft also attempted to enter
the mouth of the River Berih but wore driven off. The troops which
formed the first flight of the attacking force were conveyed across
the Straits in special armoured landing craft. Successive flights
came in more vulnerable types of craft. These landing craft were
available in very large numbers, as many as 40-50 appearing on
the front of one of the forward companies in the first flight.
Each landing craft carried 40 men. It is now known that two divisions,
the 18th right and 5th left, took part in this attack. It has
been ascertained from Japanese sources that 13,000 troops landed
during the night and a further 10,000 soon after dawn, so that
our defending troops were heavily outnumbered. The landing craft
emerged from the rivers opposite the north-western and western
shores of Singapore Island. It is now known that the Japanese
carried them overland by road from Pontian Kechil on the west
coast of Johore. There can be no doubt that preparations for this
attack on Singapore Island had been made a long time before the
war started.
The enemy landing craft in the first flight were in many cases
sunk or beaten off by the Forward Defended Localities and the
machine guns, but they were quickly followed by others and the
enemy succeeded in landing at many points. Very heavy, and, in
many areas, fierce hand-to-hand fighting developed. Some of the
machine guns continued fighting until their ammunition was practically exhausted.
Unfortunately, it appears that the S.O.S. calls for artillery
support were not answered until some time after the attack started.
This was due partly to the inadequacy of Verey Light signals in
that close country, partly to the severing of cable communications
by the enemy's bombardment and partly to a failure to make full
use of W/T. When the artillery fire did come down, however, it
was maintained, within the limits of the resources available,
at a high level throughout the night and must have done considerable
damage.
There was also a failure to make proper use of the beach searchlights
for reasons which it has not been possible to ascertain. This
disadvantage was, however, countered to some extent by the illumination
provided by burning ammunition barges.
The strongest enemy attack was directed from the west up the banks
of the River Murai with Ama Keng Village, the key point lying
between the headwaters of the River Kranji and the River Berih,
as its objective. In this area a wedge was driven between the
2/18 and 2/19 Battalions A.I.F.
At about midnight the commanders of the three battalions, in accordance
with their instructions as outlined above, ordered the for ward
troops to withdraw into battalion perimeters. The 2/20 Battalion
on the right concentrated in a position about the Namazie Estate,
but the 2/18 Battalion was too closely engaged with the enemy
and only a small pro portion of them reached their perimeter at
Ama Keng Village. A similar fate befell the 2/19 Battalion on
the left. At about 0900 hrs. the commander of the 2/20 Battalion
ordered a withdrawal to the Ama Keng Village area where he hoped
to join up with the 2/18 Battalion, but found it occupied by the
enemy.
The plan for the forward troops to fall back to battalion perimeter
positions was contrary to the policy laid down by Headquarters
Malaya Command and, in my opinion, involved an operation which was
too difficult in the middle of a night battle which was being
fought fiercely at close quarters. As a result of it there was
much confusion and disorganization, groups of men becoming detached
and lost in the close country. Some were collected and taken back
to the Base Depot where they were refitted and reorganized. Others
made their way to Singapore Town. The 22 Australian Infantry Brigade,
however, did not cease to exist - on the contrary it continued
to fight well later on as will be seen - and it would be very
wrong to judge the performance of the A.I.F. by these stragglers.
The action of these men must be judged in relation to the existing
conditions. They were not long-service soldiers and discipline
was not deep-rooted. They had volunteered for service and had
been sent to Malaya to defend the Naval Base. The Naval Base was
no longer of any use, but Australia, their homeland, was being
threatened. Many of them belonged to units which, after heavy
casualties on the mainland, had been reorganized but had had no
time to regain their full fighting efficiency. They had fought
well throughout a long night against heavy odds and were exhausted.
This is the true picture and should be judged on its merits. Active
and effective measures were quickly taken by Headquarters Malaya Command and by Headquarters
A.I.F. to deal with the situation by means of reinforced stragglers posts
and officers' patrols in the Town area."
February 9th, 1942: Japanese troops fan out from their bridgehead on Singapore island,
beneath skies blackened with smoke from burning oil tanks. At
sunset, Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita crosses the straits, walking over
bound British and Indian PoWs. More than a million civilians have
no relief from constant Japanese air attacks, and food is becoming
short. The Japanese Imperial Guards Division beheads 200 British
and Indian PoWs. Yamashita and his officers make numerous notes
in their diaries about what poor soldiers the British and Indians
are.