Jean Mouin Main Page
FRENCH JFK
Conspiracy Theories
The Bénouville Affair
The Aubrac Affair
The Mouin Affair
Polemics of History
The Bénouville Affair
Guillain de Bénouville
René Hardy is then the French Harvey Lee Oswald to Moulin's JFK. The truth was secondary to political expediency. The Hardy affair had to be more than about Hardy.
Of all the conspiracy theories that cropped up since the Hardy trial, the most interesting one involves Guillain de Bénouville, also known as Pierre de Bénouville.
Bénouville was Henri Frenay's deputy and took his place on the central committe of MUR while Frenay was in London. He did not go to the Caluire meeting, but he knew about it. In fact, it emerged during the trial that he ordered Hardy to go to the meeting in a violation of basic security rules. He said at the second trial that he did not know that Hardy had been arrested by the Gestapo because Hardy had concealed it from him. He said he had sent Hardy to the meeting as a back-up for Aubry to prevent Mouin from imposing a new military commander on the Secret Army against the wishes of Combat.
However, it emerged much later that Bénouville knew about Hardy's arrest beforehand. He was told of this on the night-train to Paris by Lazare Rachline, who witnessed the arrest. He then met Hardy by chance on June 17 in Lyon and asked for an explanation.
In 1983, Hardy claimed that he told de Bénouville everything about his arrest and interrogation and that de Bénouville had suggested "a pact of silence." At the time, Bénouville indignantly denied this. In 1985, Frenay, Claude Bourdet, and other resisters gave evidence in a libel case insisting that Bénouville would never have sent Hardy if he had known of Hardy's interrogation by the Gestapo. The implication was serious. Henri Noguères has written that if de B&enouville knew that Hardy had been arrestd and released and was being watched, and decided nonetheless to hide these facts from other resistance leaders and send him to Caluire, then Bénouville should rightly be considered responsible for what followed. [2]
"Didot was arrested."
Hardy's words alone would have no credence. Yet, there is a documentary evidence suggesting that Bénouville knew all about Hardy's arrest.
On June 17, 1943, four days before the Caluire, he wrote to his correspondents in Switzerland that "Didot was arrested". [15]
But why would the no.3 man in Combat send Hardy to meet Moulin knowing that Hardy had been arrested?
Before the war, Bénouville was a active member of an extreme right-wing group called Cagoule, which split from the fascist organization, Action français because the latter was not extreme enough. It was a secret organisation that plotted the overthrow of Léon Blum and the his left-alliance Popular Front government. Bénouville was among the mob that tried to storm the National Assembly in 1934, in which distressed Moulin wept for the Republic. He was also in the mob that attacked Léon Blum; it was his eternal regret to have arrived too late to beat up the future prime minister.
After the armistice, de Bénouville contributed articles to a Pétainist, anti-Semitic newspaper in Nice and associated with Colonel Georges Groussard, who was then working for the Vichy intelligence service. Later he made contact with MI6 and the OSS, the American intelligence service based in Switzerland. It was through de Bénouville that Frenay contacted OSS, which became a bone of contention between Frenay and Moulin. And Bénouville knew who Moulin was; he stood literally on the other side of barricade.
Moreover, there is evidence in Combat's Swiss archives to suggest that by June 1943 Bénouville had become convinced that Moulin intended to put the Secret Army under communist control. He even spied on General Delestraint, having arranged to receive a copy of all communications crossing his desk.
If Bénouville was convinced that Moulin was working for Moscow, would he have betrayed Moulin to the Germans? Bénouville before the war would certainly have. The question is: would Bénouville have done this to his brother-in-arms in the struggle for liberation?
Furthermore, why did Combat leaders including Frenay, who shared Bénouville's suspicion on Moulin, continue to defend Hardy despite overwhelming circumstantial and documentary evidence against him? Was it purely camaraderie for one of their own? Were they goaded into Hardy's defense by the Communists' provocation, or was Hardy possibly a loyal soldier who simply followed orders? Were there certain anti-communist elements in the right-wing Combat that were willing to sacrifice Moulin if it meant preventing the communist takeover of the Resistance?
After all, it was not fully explained why Combat leaders who met Hardy after his arrest were not arrested themselves. Secondly, the Caluire arrest did not hurt Combat except for Aubry, who was responsible for Delestraint's arrest and compromised Combat. As for others, Bruno Larat was in continuous conflict with Combat over parachute drops. Aubrac and Lassagne belonged to Libération, which was a rival to Combat. Schwarzfeld belonged to a movement called France d'abord, which had refused the merger with Combat.
In 1984, Hardy, increasingly bitter and dying by then, uttered pregnant words like "We wanted to prevent somehow the takeover of the Resistance by the communists" and "No one except that crypto-communist, Jean Moulin, suffered because of my arrest by Barbie." [15]
There is some evidence that Bénouville was attempting to have Moulin removed. But from there to suggest that he wanted him betrayed by Hardy is a big step. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Bénouville would sacrifice Henri Aubry even if - and that is a big if - one is to assume that he was capable of handing Moulin over to the Gestapo. As one of top four leaders of Combat, Aubry was privy to much of Combat business and his arrest would have jeopardized the entire Combat movement. Aubry's severe torture presumably precludes any possibility of dealing between Bénouville and the Gestapo.
Bénouville may have subconsciously wished for Moulin's arrest, but it is entirely a different matter to speculate that he sent Hardy to Caluire to eliminate Moulin. In any event, straight after the Caluire arrest, Bénouville travelled to Pessan, near Toulouse, to celebrate his marriage. It seems unlikely that he was plotting a coup d'état in the Resistance on that day.
The Aubrac Affair
Raymond Aubrac
Lucie Aubrac
The second conspiracy thoery involves Raymond Aubrac, one of top leaders of Libération who became a prominent politician after the war.
This much weaker theory, which still got much of ink in France, hinges on three odd facts about Aubrac. Namely, Hardy was not the only man who was previously arrested. Aubrac was arrested on March 15, 1943. Secondly, he was the only person arrested at Caluire who was not taken to Paris but remained in Lyon, where he was rescued by his wife and her Resistance comrades. Aubrac himself could not figure out why he was not taken to Paris. Thirdly, Aubrac arrived with Moulin 45 minutes late at the Caluire house, and the Germans arrived shortly after as if they were following them. Moreover, explanations given by Aubrac and his wife, Lucie were sometimes contradictory and unconvincing on close examination.
Raymond Aubrac was first arrested in March 1943, along with several other Resistance organisers. Also seized that day was a suitcase filled with documents relating to the formation of a secret army. The Vichy and the Germans took the news of Secret Army seriously. Yet Aubrac, who claimed to be François Vallet, a black marketer, was scarcely interrogated by the Germans. He was released after less than two months in prison. Why? [2]
Lucie Aubrac explained in an interview in Hotel Terminus, a film by Marcel Ophuls:
The judge bought the black-market alibi. I asked for release on bail. But the prosecutor wasn't fooled and knew this was a resistance case, and would never agree.
I happened to know of a BBC message, one of those signals about parachute drops. They were broadcast everyday. I knocked at the prosecutor's door, told him: "I want to see you alone. I'm here representing General de Gaulle. Among those who've requested bail, there is a Mr. Vallet you've refused. Grant it by tomorrow, or you won't live to see the sunrise. I'll substantiate this. You'll hear 'Keep climbing the heights' if you turn on the BBC at 7:00 and 9:00 p.m. That will be proof."
Of course, I was bluffing, the British planes could have been grounded by bad weather. Then, the message wouldn't be broadcasted. But it was. Raymond was out on the street the next day. The prosecutor got scared. [15]
Like Hardy, Aubrac escaped from the Gestapo although this involved a daring rescue staged by his wife, Lucie Aubrac, who described it in her memoir, Outwitting the Gestapo.
Escape from Montluc
According to Lucie Aubrac, the Resistance initially planned to rescue Moulin and sent scouts on the lookout outside Fort Montluc, but they could not locate Moulin and other prisoners.
To learn whatever information she could find about them, Lucie decided to visit the Gestapo headquarter posing as Aubrac's innocent fiancée Mademoiselle Ghislaiine de Barbentanne, daughter of a 'cadre noir' at the renowned Saumur equestiran college.
Lucie recalled, "At first I thought of telling them I was Max's fiancée, but the trouble was I didn't know under which name he had been arrested. So I decided to become Claude Ermelin's [pseudonym Aubrac used this time] girlfriend, which meant I was my husband's bride-to-be! Well, it's worked."
Lucie visited Barbie and began, "I am a friend of one of Dr. Dugoujon's patients who were arrested in Caluire. Claude Ermelin - from Tunisia. You must let him go because he has serious case of tuberculosis and must have special medical treatment."
Barbie pulled open a drawer and threw a wallet onto the desk. Photos came out, one of them showing Lucie and Raymond Aubrac on a beach playing with their son.
Barbie asked, "Who's that child?" "My godson," replied Lucie, thinking quickly. "He's a war orphan and I look after him."
"His name is Vallet. They are all terrorists," growled Barbie, "The only medical treatment he needs is a last cigarette and a glass of rum."
Lucie Aubrac was frightened and began to faint. She started to weep, furious that she had weakened with Barbie. But suddenly she had an idea. She was pregnant.
The young fiancée told Barbie, "I'd like to ask you a favor. Allow me to marry him. I am expecting his child. I am disgraced."
Barbie perked up to be implored by the young lady for her maiden honor, "Ah, mademoiselle," he replied sympathetically, "Men, men, you should never trust them." But Barbie then dismissed her, and Mademoiselle de Barbentanne left without discovering where Max and the others were being held.
Lucie went off and told her wedding tale to another German officer, who grew accommodating with the aid of a little money, some cigarettes, champagne and silk. "They took it all and it never occurred to them that they might be betraying Germany," she sighed.
The upshot was that her story stuck; the Germans agreed to the wedding. She suggested September 21 as the date for the wedding, the anniversary of their first meeting. Serge Ravanel's group, to which Lucie belonged, planned to attack the German van carrying Raymond on its way to Montluc after the "wedding". Looking appropriately nubile, Ghislaine de Barbentanne turned up in a hat with a veil, and Raymond could only blink.
He recalled: "She drew close to me to kiss me and whispered in my ear: 'You jump first.'" So I knew right away that an attack was planned. For the journey back to Montluc with the other prisoners I got myself chained to the youngest of them, a lad who would not be scared if things got hot. I was sure he would jump from the truck and we climbed up last."
Lying in ambush, Ravanel's people decided to use an umbrella for the rallying signal. Unfortunately, the sky was completely cloudless, so the planned attack had to be abandoned. But at least they now knew that prison vans took that route.
One day the Germans took Raymond to the Gestapo headquarter, where they read out his death sentence handed down by some court or other. Raymond simply waited for death.
But Lucie told the Germans the wedding had to be legal, that the spouses had to go before a notary. A month later on October 21, the same procedure as in September took place. This time, the commando group was ready. Two trucks came into view and there was no telling which one contained Aubrac. The group selected the first vehicle, shooting the driver dead. The prisoners escaped, though some were later caught. As instructed, Raymond jumped first. He was hit in the cheek, but the bullet had only passed through the cheek. He recalled: "I shall never forget it. The attack took place just as the factory workers were going home. Right in the middle of the square, one factory worker running for cover was protecting himself from the bullets with his bike, of all things!" [8]
Aubrac and the Communists
This rescue mission was subsequently dramatized in the movie Lucie Aubrac directed by Claude Berri and became one of better known exploits of the French Resistance. But shortly after the movie opened, an author named Gerard Chauvy issued point-by-point debunking of Aubrac's story. Noting discrepancies in Aubrac's account and aforementioned curiosities in Caluire, Chauvy suggested that the Aubracs were passing information to the Nazis, who looked the other way when the rescue came.
Of course, Aubrac theory does not end with Aubrac. Noting Aubrac's postwar involvement with the communists (The Aubracs hosted Ho Chi Minh when he came to France to negotiate peace in Indo-China, and he became godfather to their daughter), some suggested that Aubrac was a crypto-communist. So it follows that the communists betrayed Moulin through Aubrac.
After the war, the rightists frequently alleged that Libération was infiltrated by the communists without much evidence. Supposedly, its leading members had acted as "submarines" for the Communists and occupied key positions. A number of historians disputed this; Libération could be accused of favoring "socialists, syndicalists, free masons, even Christians. The only suspicion that one could not legitimately have is precisely that they had favored leaders of communist background". (Douzou)
The proponents of this conspiracy theory contend that the Communists were the only political organization known to be ruthless and cynical enough to use the Gestapo against their opponents in the Resistance. As for Aubrac, the communists would not hesitate to sacrifice one of their own for the good of Moscow.
Yet there is nothing to support Aubrac's involvement in Caluire in the German documents or any other form of evidence. And the gunfight in Aubrac's escape can hardly be described as looking the other way.
In response, Aubracs asked for a roundtable discussion with historians to clear this calumny. Immediately, it was made clear that none of the historians believed that it was the Aubracs who had led the Gestapo to Caluire. However, this discussion also exposed discrepancies in their story. For instance when Lucie claimed that she frightened the French prosecutor with a BBC message, Daniel Cordier told her that no such message had been sent. Also Aubrac sometimes claimed that he was identified as Aubrac, but other times only as Vallet. (Aubrac's birth name was Raymond Samuel, but he adopted his code name after the war.) [20]
Then the Aubrac affair by itself is not that interesting as a conspiracy theory. Rather, its significance lies in the questions it raised in the relationship between history and personal memories.
As it has been noted, the history of clandestine resistance in France is constructed largely on basis of unverifiable testimonies of persons involved, and its characters are heroes who are untouchable. The Resistance has entered the realm of mythology and still remains such a sacred subject that makes historical analysis nearly impossible.
Many expressed outrage at the accusatory tone that historians took toward the Aubracs in the roundtable. Of course, it goes without saying that memories are imperfect. But historians can destory reputation of their subjects with their power of hindsight. And most of times, their victims are not alive to defend themselves like the Aubracs. [19]
But for others, the Aubracs illustrated how the historiography of the Resistance had degenerated into hagiography. Time was ripe for debunking of mythology. René Fallas, a former resistant who wrote the preface to Chauvy's book, declared: "The Resistance is not a myth, but the mythomaniacs of the Resistance and their sycophants are legion."
To debunk the mythology, who would then be better target than the greatest hero of this myth himself, Achilles of Resistance? Not surprisingly, the Jean Moulin affair began to emerge.
The Moulin Affair
In the recent years, the allegation of communist infiltration of the Resistance has become favorite mantra of the rightists, which had been emasculated by association with Vichy.
The controversy about Moulin was first provoked when Henri Frenay published a book called The Jean Moulin Enigma in 1977, in which he expanded his conspiracy theory that Moulin was a 'crypto-Communist'.
In 1993, Thierry Wolten wrote a book called The Great Recruitment, in which he claimed to prove the Communist connections of Moulin with the newly opened Russian archives.
Such allegations have led Daniel Cordier, who was one of Moulin's secretary in underground, to launch a massive six-volume biographical refutation which is still in progress.
A Crypto-Communist?
The case of this conspiracy theory rests solely upon Moulin's friendship with Pierre Cot and former colleagues in Air Ministry and his concealment of such associations from de Gaulle.
Cot denounced the Nazi-Soviet Pact and broke his ties with the Communists, but the Soviet archives revealed that Cot had been their `honourable correspondent'.
Pierre Meunier, who was Moulin's chief assisant in the Resistance and became the general secretary of CNR, was Moulin's chief of staff in Cot's cabinet. Also Moulin's most trusted associates in the Resistance, Henri Manhès and Robert Chambeiron, were also Air Ministry colleagues. The trio became prominent pro-communists after the war.
After Moulin was dismissed by the Vichy government, Moulin's first contacts with the resistant groups were through Meunier, Manhès, and Chambeiron, who continued to work as Moulin's secretaries in the Resistance when he came back from London as de Gaulle's delegate.
But more significant is the fact that Moulin was went to some length to conceal his contact with this circle from the Gaullists.
This is understandable since Cot's cabinet was widely thought to be the nest of pro-communists and such reputation would not have been desirable in his mission. Yet Moulin also sent Manhès to the northern occupied zone of France as his own delegate when his mission was limited to the southern, nonoccupied zone. Was Moulin simply preparing for his eventual mission in the northern zone or was it for more ulterior "Mission"? Was Moulin's secrecy due to his distrust of reputedly rightist Colonel Passy or personal conflict with Pierre Brossolette?
For these reasons, an editor of Espoir speculated that Moulin may have been initially working for the Communist Party. According to this theory, it was when Moulin became a Gaullist and ceased to serve the Party that he met his death. Therefore, it follows that the Communists were behind the betrayal at Caluire.
A Soviet Agent?
The theory that Moulin was a crypto-communist was immediately refuted by historians when it was first proposed by Frenay, but this debate was given a new life when the Soviet archives were opened with the fall of Soviet Union.
When Moulin conspired to smuggle warplanes in this French version of Iran-Contra scandal, he and his colleagues worked closely with a Comintern group organized from the Soviet embassy. One of them was Moulin's close friend, André Labarthe, who became a familiar voice on BBC during the war. The Soviet documents tend to indicate Labarthe not only worked against de Gaulle in London during the war, but were also passing information to Moscow. In 1976, Passy told Henri Frenay that there would have been no question of sending Moulin to France if his old friendship with Labarthe had been known. [2]
And Maurice Panier, with whom Moulin was close, was a Soviet agent who worked with the spymaster named Harry Robinson. The record of Robinson's transmissions to Moscow in the second half of 1940 shows that on four occasions he passed military information from the Eure-et-Loire, where Moulin was the prefect.
Howerver, when Moulin was in Paris using his own false papers for short stay, Robinson reported to Moscow on April 15, 1941, "I have every reason to believe that the Americans are organizing an intelligence service. In connection with this, one of their informers who is currently in Paris, a former colleague of Pierre Cot, was able to get here by using false documents provided by an American agency . . . " If this American "informer" refers to Moulin as it sounds, the identification does not identify him as an informer of Robinson's. Moreover, this message suggests that Robinson might not have been as close to the core of Cot's clan as it was alleged. [2]
Simply put, nothing in the Soviet archives suggests that Moulin was a Soviet agent. But a more legitimate question is whether he was aware of such cozy relationship with Soviet intelligence, which extensively infiltrated the Air Ministry, and whether he approved it.
Uncertainties about Moulin's last days also led some people to go so far as to believe that Moulin did not die a hero's death but that the Germans exchanged him for one of their own agents with Soviet Union. The idea seems too far-fetched. Yet in the idealogoical warfare, it makes perfect sense.
The latest theory on Moulin claims that he was killed as he was about to transfer his allegiance from de Gaulle to the Americans, which makes as much sense as the Soviet agent theory.
Moulin's wartime clothing (an exhibit at the Museum of the Order of the Liberation)
Furthermore, unlike so many resistants who were tragically inept in clandestine skills, Moulin showed such a surprising aptitude that some wondered aloud where the Prefect of Chartres might have learned his spycraft such as using the same initials for pseudonyms, selecting a town where records had been destroyed for his false papers, and staying in houses that had more than one exit.
For instance, when Moulin was yet a prefect in Chartres, he issued himself a bogus identity card in the name of Joseph Jean Mercier, born at Péronne on 20 July 1896, that is, one month later and three years earlier than the correct date.
When he needed to get a stamp for his exit permits in the winter of 1940, Moulin went to a subprefecture on a quiet Saturday afternoon and posed a question which he knew the junior clerk would need to ask his boss, waited until he was alone in the room and then opened the desk, took out the official rubber stamp and stamped his passport with the required permit.
Also Moulin worked out a system for traveling inside France which was based on an imaginary straight line running east-west through Avignon. South of this line, he retained his real identity and lived in public; north of it, he traveled under pseudonym with false papers, identified himself within the resistance by his code name, "Rex." When he had to travel with two sets of papers, he often used a courier who carried the second set. [2]
But it is not far-fetched to think that Moulin might have been interested in clandestine matters when he was in the smuggling operation rather than to conclude that Moulin acquired these skills as a Soviet agent.
To each his destiny
The truth is Moulin's Secretariat in the underground included only naturally his pre-war friends like Meunier and Manhès, whom Moulin could trust with his life. But it also included Gaullists such as Daniel Cordier, who could hardly be considered leftist. Moulin placed Georges Bidault, a young Catholic member of Combat in charge of the clandestine press agency BIP.
Moulin worked closely with the Communists just as he did with the rightists like Henri Frenay and the center, which were mostly supportive of Moulin's efforts.
All that these "evidences" suggest are that Moulin was possibly a fellow traveller during the Spanish Civil War, which is unremarkable in the political context of 1930s.
The suggestion that he was more, that he was a Comintern agent, is not supported by known facts. His actions point toward the restoration of the Republic and its democratic values rather than its overthrow. Rather, Moulin effectively limited the Communist ambitions at the heart of the Resistance. It was after his elimination that de Gaulle's hold on the Resistance waned while the Communists gained a upper hand.
As for much mentioned relationship with Cot, Moulin parted the way with his former mentor when he decided to go to England. He wrote to Pierre Cot while in Lisbon:
As you have known for some time I have decided, after all, not to go to America, believing that I can serve our unhappy country better in following another path and in remaining closer to our English friends . . . I have learnt by various means that you, on the contrary, are much more useful in the United States, where you continue to do good work for the allied cause. To each his destiny . . . [2]
And once in London, Moulin avoided a contact with André Labarthe. Meanwhile, Moulin's leftist reputation did much to sway those who were suspicious of an English-backed general, and de Gaulle appreciated this.
When de Gaulle asked by a rightist minister, Alain Peyrefitte the usual right-wing question, "Did Jean Moulin help you to contain the communist offensive, or did he on the contrary accentuate it?", he finally exploded:
Well, for goodness sake! He contained it! Exactly because he had the reputation of being a left-wing prefect, and one close to the communsts, exactly because he had been in Pierre Cot's cabinet, they could not object to him. His mission was to reintegrate he communists in the national community. He was the best for that. He was straight as a die. A right-wing prefect could never have succeeded in that task. [2]
Polemics of History
It is not all that surprising that some French were ready to demolish their national hero on such flimsiest evidence, or rather insinuation.
The bitterness surrounding Moulin reflects profound disappointment of those whose political vision was not fulfilled by the liberation.
With his canonization in the Panthéon, Moulin became the official personification of the Resistance. Yet before 1964, Moulin was a hero of particular factions within the Resistance - the Gaullists and the Left. Even Moulin's faithful secretary, Daniel Cordier noted: "He is not a hero of national union, but one of the heads of a minority party of honor which won."
The Gaullist memory of Moulin is de Gaulle's supremacy over the Resistance which was unified through his personal envoy. The Communist memory of Moulin is more artificial. The communists had always liked to claim that Moulin was one of theirs since they tended to appropriate the Resistance for themselves, generally speaking. (Moulin's leftist background and personal friendship with prominent communists did not hurt either) For them, Moulin was a proof that de Gaulle was not the first resister and represented the alternative that might have been. Calling itself "the party of 75,000 martyrs", the Communist Party was very successful in identifying their Party with the Resistance in the minds of the French public.
Between these two political identities that centered around Moulin, the French Right found itself without its own Resistance memory. As Pierre Péan noted, polemics surrounding Moulin is a reaction to the dominant image in the collective memory of a Resistance which have been an only gaullist or Communist.
Eldorado for Historians
"Beyond the Communists," historian Olivier Wieviorka also noted, "a certain number of people would be happy to demolish Jean Moulin and through him of de Gaulle. Part of the rightists never forgave [de Gaulle] for his refusal of any compromise with Vichy and abandonment of Algeria."
With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, certain journalists and historians saw the opening of the shooting season for Gaullist or Communist mythologies. The newly available KGB files became Eldorado for those who sought to score big scoops with startling "revelations."
Certainly there were rooms for legitimate revisionism since both Gaullist and Communist version of the Resistance were based on myths. When General de Gaulle installed the provisional government after the liberation, he founded it on a myth that the whole of France resisted the Germans and Vichy government. The sins of Vichy were committed by only a tiny handful of traitors who had sold out to enemy, and they were duly punished. The rest had always been behind de Gaulle and the Free French.
Another myth was that Paris liberated herself. For de Gaulle, concealing the Vichy collaboration was essential not only for restoration of France's honor and grandeur but also for the process of national reconciliation. It was thanks to de Gaulle's myth of Resistance France that France was included as the victors of the Second World War, rewarded with her own zone of occupation in Germany and her own judge at the International Military Tribune of Nuremberg Trial.
This mythology culminated in 1964 when Moulin's ashes were transfered to Panthéon. He became the symbol of the mythological France in which every Frenchman was a Resistance fighter between 1940 and 1944.
As for the Communist, they were fighting the Nazis out of a patriotic devotion more to the Soviet Union than to France. But that is not how they prefer to remember. So they falsified their documents to make it appear that they engaged in resistance from the very beginning when in fact it began only after Germany invaded their motherland, Soviet Union.
Instead, the result from this gold rush was not a disciplined historical research, but a coarse falsification of the Resistance history on a doubtful methodology. In this new trend of historical revisionism, the fight against Nazism was relativized altogether and was reduced into a questionable alliance with communism. The Resistance was no longer heroic or even patriotic. On the other hand, the Vichy regime, which participated in massive deportation of the Jews and violent suppression of the resistants, simply made innocent mistakes.
The conspiracy theories surrounding Moulin became more than sensational insinuations of certain journalists because they served political agenda. Revived by anniversaries and current events such as new "revelations" of KGB files or trials of men like Klaus Barbie and collaborationist Paul Touvier, the struggle for the legacy of Resistance is still on going in French newspapers and books, academic conferences, and public opinion. As François Mitterrand said, "the history of Resistance remains to be made."
And a question remains to be answered. Regardless of who betrayed Moulin, was Caluire an aberration - a human failure of one person - or was it an inevitable progression of circumstances in the Resistance? Everyone - the right-wing faction in Combat, the Communists, even the Gaullists in BCRA - seemed to have a motive to eliminate Moulin.
Most likely, there was no conspiracy behind Caluire. But 60 years after the fact, this still cannot be answered with certainty and it may never be.
Suffice it to say that de Gaulle was distressed at the implication of Caluire. After Hardy had been acquitted in the first trial, de Gaulle said to his aide-de-camp, Claude Guy:
The comrades of the resistance reached such depths of ignominy . . . that they betrayed their brothers. Why? To get the advantage of them at the liberation. They did that. They did it when the Germans held a knife to their throats, they did it by using the Germans.
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