The Waray-speaking people of Leyte and Samar have been stereotyped as a fierce people when provoked. In the province of Leyte, this reputation is especially accorded to natives of Jaro, an interior town located 39 kilometers northwest of Tacloban City. Even the Philippine Law Dictionary added legitimacy to this stereotype by including among its entries the phrase "good-bye Jaro." This refers to the sharp long-bladed bolo, the ubiquitous tool of the Leyteño (i.e., Jaro) farmer, when used to stab or hack a person to death.

My readings, interviews, observations and related efforts to understand the popular stereotype on the people of Jaro, Leyte, made me conclude that it could have originated from the fierce resistance waged by the Jaroanons against the American regime during the Pulahan Wars at the turn of the century.

It may be noted that the "official insurrection" in Leyte collapsed after only 16 months of symbolic and so-so resistance with the surrender in May 1901 of Gen. Ambrocio Mojica, the Caviteño appointed by Pres. Aguinaldo as politico-military governor of the province. Col. Florentino Peñaranda, Capt. Jesus de Veyra, other leaders and a handful of their followers had surrendered by June 1902.

However, the surrender of the "official revolutionists" did not end the war in Leyte. Instead, the struggle assumed greater ferocity and force after it was picked up by the Pulahan (the freedom fighters in red uniforms), a pseudo-religious social movement with millenarian aspirations and mostly peasant membership. The so-called "Pulahan Wars" against the American regime in Leyte lasted five years from 1902 to 1907.

Among the Pulahan leaders in Leyte, official records acknowledged the leadership roles and importance of the brothers Juan Tamayo and Felipe Tamayo, who were labeled as bandits from Jaro, Leyte. Juan Tamayo seemed to have been the second-ranking leader of the Pulahan in Leyte after "Papa" Faustino Ablen, the Pulahan "pope" in the island. Felipe Tamayo served as "chief of staff" of Ablen.

This paper presents biographical profiles of the brothers Juan and Felipe Tamayo, famous Pulahan leaders from Jaro, Leyte. Data were taken from documentary sources, published books and articles, and family tradition.

JUAN TAMAYO

The Leyte governor's section in the Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission had the following account of Juan Tamayo around 1904:

Juan Tamayo was first officially acknowledged around January 1903 as one of nine sub-chiefs of a "band of 'Dios Dios' ladrones under the leadership of ... Papa Faustino Ablen," who established camp in the mountains of Ormoc. By March 1903, the report had it that "there remained only a band under Papa Faustino of about 50 men and a small band under Juan Tamayo of about 20 men ... Juan Tamayo was in command in the mountains of Carigara." ²

Tamayo figured in an incident detailed in an official report as follows:

The American authorities placed a head price of P1,000.00 for the capture of Juan Tamayo, dead or alive. He was considered the "other serious menace" to peace in Leyte. The other was "Papa" Faustino Ablen, who had a head price of P2,000.00. ⁴

Juan Tamayo was the first top-ranking Pulahan leader to fall after more than two years of incessant fighting against the Americans. Vic Hurley in Jungle Patrol gave the following account of the end of Tamayo's career:

Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, district director of the Constabulary, gave a clear summary description of Juan Tamayo. He wrote:

With some of the above published reports on Juan Tamayo at hand, I sought the family story about the man from his descendants. The initial picture I pieced out of this effort was that of a reluctant and indifferent demi-god who was caught in the crossfire during the Philippine-American War in Leyte. However, official reports I came across later suggest that he was an intense demagogue and a fierce nationalist, whose official label had to be changed three times.

Juan Tamayo hailed from the village of Bias (now Zabala), situated five kilometers southwest of the poblacion of Jaro, Leyte. He was presumably a member of the original group headed by "Papa" Faustino Ablen, which founded the "Dios-dios" sect in Leyte sometime in 1887 or 1889. ⁷ Through the "Dios-dios" sect, the core members gained local fame as tambalans (traditional medicine men) who were believed to possess anting-anting (amulets) that could render them invisible to the enemy and invulnerable to their weapons. Juan Tamayo's discipline as sect member included habitual abstinence from intoxicating drinks. He also did not marry and raise a family, just like his brother Felipe.

The Spanish authorities arrested and banished "Papa" Faustino Ablen, for this role in organizing the "Dios-dios" sect. This move perhaps forced the other members to lie low, but seemingly not for long. As tambalans with spartan discipline, they were looked up to as leaders of men.

When the recruitment to the Katipunan of Andres Bonifacio reached Leyte, the members of the "Dios-dios" sect, perhaps appealed by its equally millenarian aims, became the logical link-pins for membership in the secret organization. Perhaps it was also during this time of the Katipunan in Leyte that the members agreed upon the red uniforms that would describe their external identity in later years. ⁸

When the Philippine Revolution broke out in August 1896 with the discovery of the Katipunan in Manila, the Katipunan in Leyte evolved into a para-military organization. This time, the group recruited women as well for housekeeping tasks. They established camp in a mountain fastness near Ormoc.

In due time, the Katipunan in Leyte, now known as Pulahan, became a full-blown movement. Its principal objective was to drive out the white man (originally the Spaniards, later the Americans). Its vision was independence, universal brotherhood and a just and egalitarian society. Its combat method was the peasant version of the Crusade Wars that drove the Moors out of Europe in the 12th century. The warriors in their red uniforms and flowing capes attacked the white enemy en masse, complete with flags, banners, bolos and "Tad-tad" (chop to pieces) battle cry. But they rushed barefooted and without armors or horses, unlike their European counterparts of long ago. ⁹

The Pulahan in Leyte tilled farms and planted crops for their sustenance, commune style. They also generated popular sympathy and solicited material support from the peasantry. For entertainment, they even had a bandmaster and a brass band. ¹⁰

Frightened by the magnitude and threat of the Pulahan in Leyte, the Spanish government officials turned over the reigns of the province to qualified local residents. Many Spanish residents also fled their houses in the rural towns and converged in safer central areas (i.e., Tacloban, Ormoc, and Cebu for Southern Leyte Spaniards). ¹¹

The absence of an effective central government left the tribunal (the seat of the municipal government) of the different towns prey to the Pulahan warriors. ¹² Some of these tribunal buildings were seized and the records therein were burned. The task was completed by 1898, about two years before Aguinaldo and the Americans expanded their conflict to Leyte. In the interim, the leaderships of the different towns were assumed by local residents or Spanish mestizos who were agreeable to the Pulahans.

With the death of Andres Bonifacio, the Pulahans in Leyte looked to Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo for leadership. When Dr. Jose Rizal died a martyr's death, he became an instant object of veneration by the Pulahans.

After Gen. Aguinaldo compromised the Philippine Revolution against the Spaniards through the Treaty of Biak-na-Bato in 1897, some revolutionists in Leyte applied for emoluments from the agreed monetary settlement. To their dismay, they found out that they were not even included in the official roster of Aguinaldo's revolutionary army.

The above realization might have initially embittered those who thought all along that they were official members of the revolutionary army. Yet they chose to forget their disappointment, though not their soldier's code numbers and their veneration of Rizal. They also kept their red uniforms. ¹³

Perhaps the forgiving attitude of the spurned Pulahans was demanded by social pressure to maintain good behavior in anticipation of an apocalyptic event to occur in 1900, which was hoped to finally drive the enemy away. Having discarded their Katipunan banner, the members resurrected their "Dios-dios" roots, this time with an expanded membership and a para-military experience.

On May 1, 1898, the United States Navy under the command of Commodore George Dewey attacked and routed the Spanish Armada in Manila. The ensuing Spanish-American War was probably taken by the "Dios-dios" members that, indeed, the apocalypse of 1900 was forthcoming. So they steeped up their recruitment activities and prepared themselves for their heavenly rewards.

Subsequent events, however, would frustrate the aspirations and expectations of the "Dios-dios" movement.

On June 12, 1898, after his return from exile in Hong Kong, Gen. Aguinaldo declared the Philippine Independence from Spain in Kawit, Cavite, and reasserted his leadership of the revolution that he had compromised and left behind. On August 18, 1898, the Spaniard forces and officials in Manila surrendered to the Americans following a token fight. On December 10, 1898, Spain ceded the Philippine Island to the United States through the Treaty of Paris for $20,000,000. And in the evening of February 4, 1899, the Philippine-American War broke out.

In January 1899, Pres. Aguinaldo sent General Vicente Lukban to Tacloban to assume as military-political governor for Leyte and Samar. A few days later, Leyte was removed from the jurisdiction of Lukban, who received amended orders to concentrate his activities in Samar. ¹⁴

General Ambrocio Mojica, a fellow Caviteño appointed by Pres. Aguinaldo, became the military-political governor of Leyte as of February 7, 1899. He reorganized the various towns of the province, at times in competition with Lukban, who continued to make his presence felt, until the "official insurrection" erupted in Leyte a year later, with the arrival in Tacloban of the American troops under the command of General William Kobbe in February 1900. This short-lived insurrection would later appear as the only struggle in the official history of the Philippine-American War for Leyte. ¹⁵

In the "Dios-dios" camp, the leaders, presumably stung by the Biak-na-Bato fiasco, chose to stay away from the conflict between the Americans and the official revolutionists, although many "Dios-dios" members joined the ranks of the revolutionaries. However, the "Dios-dios" movement would soon be caught in the crossfire between the warring factions. Their crops were razed by the invading army or solicited by the revolutionists, and members of their families had become war casualties as well. Thus, they were forced to become partisans in the war. By this time, "Papa" Faustino Ablen had also returned, perhaps with his tales about the new enemy. Begrudgingly, the "Dios-dios" leaders tolerated their members to side with and support the revolutionists.

Then the year 1900 came to pass, but the expected apocalypse also did not occur. Instead, another set of white men had invaded the country. Just like the Spaniards, they too had to be driven out. However, by the time the "Dios-dios" leaders had decided to fight against the Americans, the "official insurrection" had collapsed after 16 months of struggle with the surrender of Gen. Mojica in May 1901. The other leaders including Colonel Florentino Peñaranda, Captain Jesus de Veyra and a handful of their followers had surrendered as of June 1902. ¹⁶

Thus the "Dios-dios" movement, Pulahan to outside observers, picked up a fight that they did not create. They waged their unofficial but fierce and expanded fight for five more years.

Juan Tamayo appeared to have assumed temporary leadership of the "Dios-dios" movement in Leyte during the decade-long absence of "Papa" Faustino Ablen. Upon Ablen's return, Tamayo promptly returned this role and led a semi-nomadic life outside of the Pulahan camp but within access of his own people in Jaro. He also served as contact person between the Pulahan in Leyte and the Pulahan in Samar.

The behavior of Juan Tamayo from around 1902 to 1904 was described to me by his nephew during an interview. I was surprised to know that this nephew had seen his uncle many times as a child. Official documents tell that Juan Tamayo was an elusive person who was rarely seen by people associated with the American authorities. ¹⁷

I learned that Juan Tamayo lived in the wilds, although he occasionally saw and associated with relatives, friends, and acquaintances in his home village. Though unschooled, he was highly respected by his people. His narrow escapes from pursuing troops and patrols had become legend. This was attributed to the potent anting-anting (amulet) that he possessed, which was popularly believed to make him invisible in tight situations.

Juan Tamayo was described to be of medium build, alert, and always acted like he was being trailed. Sometimes he would appear in the poblacion (town center) of Jaro, but he would quickly get lost. He was usually accompanied by a Pulahan woman believed to be his live-in partner. He was not known to have a wife and children. He supposedly refrained from alcoholic drinks, but I would not be surprised if he occasionally drank tuba, the native coconut wine.

Juan Tamayo usually slept in a hammock made out of cloth, tied with ropes at both ends, and hung between two trees in the wilds. He was lying in a hammock when killed on the island of Buad in Zumarraga, Samar.

The family story of the death of Juan Tamayo was very different from the official version, which I thought was effected during an armed encounter. This did not happen.

I learned that Juan Tamayo had confined himself to a hammock for days, too ill (perhaps of malaria) and perhaps dying. During his agony, his aide was perhaps nabbed by the authorities, subjected to water cure, and forced to report his whereabouts. After surrounding Juan Tamayo's temporary hideout, a debate erupted about how to kill him. He was reputed to be invulnerable to bullets, and shooting at him might enable him to shoot back. His apparently all-native attackers finally flogged him to death in his hammock with pieces of wood.

It is therefore surprising that the death of Juan Tamayo had to be misrepresented by the American authorities. It was made to appear that he was killed in a fair fight, not treachery.

From the viewpoint of military strategy and tactics, the misrepresentation of the cause of Juan Tamayo's death was justifiable. He was the first top-ranking Pulahan leader in Leyte to fall to American hands. Every propaganda effect therefore had to be squeezed out of his death, to boost the morale of the American and constabulary troops in Leyte, which had been shattered by two years of disappointing stand-off, incessant fighting, and heavy casualties on both sides. Unfortunately, the same propaganda was later became official history.

After the death of Juan Tamayo, his role was assumed by his brother, Felipe Tamayo.

FELIPE TAMAYO

The Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1906) published the following account of Leyte Governor Jaime de Veyra about Felipe Tamayo:

Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, district director of the Constabulary, also filed this tart report about Felipe Tamayo:

Gov. de Veyra, the writer of the first cited report, was the first elected Filipino governor of Leyte. Elected in 1906, he succeeded Colonel Peter W. Borseth, a former Constabulary Inspector who became the second American civil governor of Leyte.

De Veyra was singularly acknowledged by the American officialdom for suppressing the Pulahan movement and improving the peace and order condition in Leyte. For this feat, de Veyra gained prestige that enabled him to later get elected for two terms as Leyte representative in the Philippine Assembly from 1907 to 1912. (He resigned from his governor's position and ran for the national position.) From 1913 to 1916, he was appointed one of the four Filipino members of the Philippine Commission. In 1916, he was appointed Executive Secretary of the Commission. From 1917 to 1923, he served as Filipino resident commissioner in Washington, D.C. ²⁰

In his retirement years, de Veyra admitted in an interview with a priest-historian that Felipe Tamayo, "who had been a fierce Pulahan leader, helped the government in pacifying Leyte after his surrender." ²¹ Unfortunately, de Veyra did not share this honor during his influential and younger years.

Except for the above reports on the surrender of Felipe Tamayo, I have not come across other published accounts on the man. This is surprising, considering that other Pulahan leaders of lesser feats and accomplishments, both in Leyte and in Samar, had beed described in detail elsewhere. It seemed that Felipe Tamayo just came out of the blue and surrendered. ²²

Perhaps the reason for suppressing information about Felipe Tamayo was his unassuming and pragmatic nature. An effective combat leader and organizer of men, his decisions and actions did not fall under the American categorization as belonging to that of a bandit or a crackpot. He seemed to be the gallant enemy who must be respected and spared the disparaging military accounts of the Pulahan Wars.

Parenthetically, the reader must be warned to read carefully between the lines when reading American and official versions of the Pulahan Wars. They tend to downplay those ingenious defensive maneuvers of the Pulahan warriors that required massive American troop reinforcements, and they feign harassment and heroic deeds in those simple situations that actually led to the rout or murder of the resisting Filipino forces. ²³

Felipe Tamayo was the "chief of staff" of "Papa" Faustino Ablen. He probably rose to this position by virtue of his impressive performance as a revolutionary fighter, presumably with the troops under the command of Captain Jesus de Veyra (brother of Jaime de Veyra). However, he did not join the surrender of the revolutionary leaders and some of their men. Instead, he probably influenced the Pulahan leaders’ decision to fight the Americans.

As "chief of staff," Felipe Tamayo probably plotted the course of the tenacious and scary Pulahan resistance against the attacking American and constabulary troops from 1902 to 1904. This largely consisted of attacks on American garrisons and outposts at night, and defensive maneuvers and ambushes of patrols during daytime.

Felipe Tamayo's effectiveness as a war plotter could be comparably established. After he left "Papa" Faustino Ablen to assume the leadership of the Pulahan band left by Juan Tamayo, Ablen's troops suffered drastic reverses after being taken over by desperate and impatient leaders, who led their men to slaughter in 1906 and 1907.

There appeared to have been restiveness and agitation among the Pulahan in Leyte to conduct suicidal attacks and reprisals against the American and constabulary troops following the death of Juan Tamayo. This reaction seemed to have been provoked and expected by the American military authorities in Leyte, a result of their official misrepresentation of Juan Tamayo's death and their ruse that "Papa" Faustino had also been killed. For precaution, they sought and were granted reinforcement of U.S. Army regulars from Cebu. ²⁴

However, the expected bloody showdown did not occur. When placed on the spot, Felipe Tamayo, aggrieved by his brother's death and swamped with sympathies and condolences, probably appealed for calm and moderation instead, and proposed the disbanding of the "Dios-dios" movement.

This proposal presumably created an impasse in the "Dios-dios" camp. "Papa" Faustino and other leaders wanted to continue fighting. To break the impasse, Felipe Tamayo peacefully broke away from "Papa" Faustino by pulling out the Jaro contingent (who were his relatives and friends) and Tiya Goyang, the mother figure (Nanay-nanay) of the Pulahan movement in Leyte.

Felipe Tamayo probably ordered his followers to return to their homes and farms. However, he kept enough men for local perimeter security and for dilatory harassment of the American and constabulary troops, while his followers repaired their lives that had been shattered by the war. When this goal had been substantially attained, he surrendered to Captain Crockett of the Philippine Constabulary on May 11, 1906. ²⁵

The American military officials in Leyte probably feared Felipe Tamayo's cunning as an enemy. Take for example the attacks on the mail carrier between Ormoc and Jaro by Tamayo's men in 1906. The official reaction to these incidents was suspension of the mail service for a month. This was unusual and contrary to the standing military policy of the period, which was to retaliate and inflict complete devastation in areas where destruction of communication facilities occurs. ²⁶

It may be noted that, at the time, Jaro had a station of U.S. Army regulars, a telegraph station of the U.S. Army, and a telephone station of the Philippine Constabulary. ²⁷ Constabulary patrols also scoured the area. Still, the presence of the soldiers and military facilities did not deter the provocative attacks. There were enough men and resources to implement the retaliatory policy. Yet the response was - surprisingly - inaction!

The inaction on the part of the authorities could be interpreted two ways. One was that Gov. de Veyra prevailed upon the American military officials to avoid bloodshed and show maximum tolerance, on the assurance that he will effect the surrender of Felipe Tamayo. The other interpretation was that the American military officials were uncertain of success in implementing their standing policy of total destruction. Both interpretations are logically defensible.

What might have prodded Felipe Tamayo to proposed the disbandment of the "Dios-dios" movement in Leyte?

It may be noted that the main objective of the "Dios-dios" movement was to drive the white man out, in anticipation of an apocalyptic event in 1900. The experience proved romantic at first: the brown man effectively drove out the demoralized and vastly outnumbered Spaniards from Leyte. Unfortunately, the white men that they drove out were merely replaced by a more murderous breed of white men with vastly superior killing machines, who insisted on staying, and who they failed to dislodge. Also, enthusiasm for the "Dios-dios" movement among the members themselves died down after the apocalypse of 1900 failed to occur.

In their simple thinking, the "Dios-dios" members were probably convinced that evil had triumphed instead, and they were helpless about this. They also lost most of their carabaos, their principal work animal, due to a plague brought in by the new white men. ²⁸ With the motives for the movement already lost, it had become necessary to unconditionally submit to the invading force in the meantime; until the next sign of the apocalypse would be seen.

The treacherous death of Juan Tamayo was probably the last straw for Felipe Tamayo. It must have firmed up his conviction that fighting against the Americans had become an unromantic affair. It had lost the fervor of the white-man-versus-brown man conflict of the Katipunan and revolutionary days. The Americano had become a scarce and elusive target. He had buffered and shielded himself with fellow brown men, the civil (native conscripts to the Philippine Constabulary, which was created as a native force officered by Americans, and experimented in Leyte and Samar.)

The American military's practice of forced conscription of adolescents and able-bodied males for the civil affected a break-up of the households in the Pulahan-controlled towns of Leyte. ²⁹ Thereafter, the families (both pro-Pulahan and those indifferent to the conflict) divided their households. The younger, unmarried females would stay in the poblacion house, or with relatives there if without a house. The adolescent and able-bodied males would stay in the farm-house, but should hide in the bush during the day, and sneak home to rest only at night. Unable to withstand the inconvenience, many young males migrated to other places. To avoid detection by both the Pulahan and military authorities, they changed or altered their names, the safest of which were that of respected families in their adopted localities. Those who survived made contact with their families years later when peace had reigned again. ³⁰

The loss of the motives for the "Dios-dios" movement, the treacherous death of Juan Tamayo, the break-up of the Jaro household, and deference to Gov. Jaime de Veyra (whose brother Jesus was probably Felipe Tamayo's senior officer as a revolutionist) - and not combat considerations - were perhaps the principal reasons for the surrender Felipe Tamayo.

After his surrender, Felipe Tamayo forcefully communicated the futility of further resistance to his former comrade-in-arms perhaps by first sending word to them. When this failed, he fought against them on the side of the American and constabulary troops in the battle at Tabontabon, Leyte, on July 24, 1906. This was probably the biggest encounter of the Pulahan Wars, during which "Papa" Faustino's troops suffered the highest number of casualties - around 450 dead in one report - from their mad rushes at the enemy.

Felipe Tamayo was probably confident that his former men will spare him during the actual combat, out of fear and reverence for him. His never-say-die tactic, which apparently succeeded, probably confused the American officers who watched him fight.

Thereafter, the Pulahan resistance quickly dissipated, and the stereotype on the people of Jaro was ingrained in the folklore of Leyte.

The battle at Tabontabon appeared to be the final showdown for "Papa" Faustino and Felipe Tamayo after their peaceful break-up. The type of bravado that Felipe Tamayo displayed was taken as a show of fidelity to the Americans. He was presumably amnestied because he escaped trial and execution that befell all the other captured or surrendered Pulahan leaders of Leyte.

When peace reigned, Felipe Tamayo sank back to his obscure origin, while the person he had helped, Gov. Jaime de Veyra, rose to national prominence. Tamayo resumed his practice as tambalan, for which he gained local fame, until his death due to natural causes sometime in 1917 or 1918.

By local wisdom, Felipe Tamayo was a man who knew how to build a fire, how to keep it burning, and how to put it out.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The tiempo Pulahan (Pulahan Era) was a frame of time in the past that is casually referred to by elderly peasants in the rural areas of eastern Leyte. It was followed by "peace time," the time of the Commonwealth (government), the time of the Japanese (occupation), the time of liberation (from the Japanese by the Americans), and references to the incumbencies of the various post-war presidents of the country.

I estimate that the Pulahan era started sometime in September 1896, after news of the outbreak of the Philippine Revolution in Luzon reached Leyte. Almost immediately after that, the Pulahan (as Katipunan) started raiding various towns of Leyte to drive out the Spaniards. More than 10 years and two sets of white enemies later, the Pulahan era formally ended on June 11, 1907, with the capture of "Papa" Faustino Ablen, who was whisked away by American military operatives and was never seen again. ³¹

It is therefore surprising that the Pulahan era was overlooked by most Filipino historians, who instead focused on and magnified beyond proportion the brief (16 months) and so-so "official insurrection" led by the native elite in Leyte.

Contrary to the disparaging claims of many historians, the Pulahan movement in Leyte had a clear and resolute objective: to drive the white man out, as a precondition for the emergence of universal brotherhood and a just and egalitarian society, which was naively believed to come through apocalyptic intervention.

The seeming irrationality of the Pulahan movement was largely influenced by the changing character of the overall Philippine resistance to the Spaniards, and later the Americans, and by the expediency of keeping the Pulahan membership when the apocalypse of 1900 did not occur.

This paper, in narrating the biographical sketches of two Pulahan leaders from Jaro, Leyte, carefully reconstructed the Pulahan movement in Leyte and came up with a revisionist interpretation of events, a history by the people. By this act alone, I was able to uncover a big historical gap that was thinly veiled by the apologetic history of the "official insurrection" in Leyte. This study supports Agoncillo's historical thesis that the Filipino war effort against the Americans was primarily fueled by the masses, and that the Filipino elite betrayed the masses by collaborating with the Americans and undermining the Filipino resistance.

American military accounts of "Papa" Faustino Ablen and Juan Tamayo, the recognized Pulahan leaders of Leyte, alluded to them as military tacticians as well. It might have been officially convenient to picture them as such. But my analysis showed that the two leaders had little tactical sense at all, although they might have been effective rabble-rousers and totem figures. The needless massacres of Pulahan fighters during broad-day encounters between 1905 and 1906 showed "Papa" Faustino's brand of military prowess. As for Juan Tamayo, he seemed to be more of a rabble-rouser than a fighter.

This paper also disproves various American military propaganda that had been accepted as official history.

Virtually absent from published American military accounts were details of the Pulahan Wars from 1902 to 1904, when Felipe Tamayo commanded "Papa" Faustino's troops. Broad hints attributed to the Pulahan during this period suggested a standoff in the war. Constabulary prestige suffered damage from the death of an American captain during an attack on a Pulahan fortress and his abandonment by his lieutenant. This act of cowardice led to the lieutenant's dismissal from the service. There were also descriptions of ingenious but successful guerrilla tactics adopted by the Pulahan, including their appeals of common heritage to, and hesitation to shoot at, native conscripts of the constabulary. These years were conveniently separated under the label: First Pulahan Campaign in Leyte. ³²

Comparably, the Second Pulahan Campaign, which resulted in American victory, contained minute and gory details of their won encounters. ³³

The creation of the American-officered Philippine Constabulary appeared to be the principal factor that defused the intensity of the Pulahan fight against the Americans. My informants heard only of the program to forcefully conscript native males of Leyte for militia duty as civil, but published sources claimed this was part of the combat experiment of the Philippine Constabulary in Leyte.

REFERENCE NOTES

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