Russia has made a clear choice for democracy, market economy and liberalism in
1991. Seven decades of Communist experiment had proved to be a violent and
tragic distortion of it’s historical development, which severely undermined
intellectual, cultural and economical potential of Russia, leaving it in the rear of
global progress. Post-Soviet Russia overcomes discontinuity of it’s XX century
history and traces it’s legitimacy and national identity to pre-October-1917
Russia.6
http://www.peter-club.spb.ru/library/Gaidar1.html
Disintegration of the Soviet Union was inevitable and strategically positive
outcome, as far as Russia historically belongs to European civilization and it’s
future supposes reorientation to and integration into Western political and
economical institutions. In post-Cold War world national interests of Russia
fundamentally coincide with the interests of Western democracies, which would like
to see Russia as a democratic, wealthy and peaceful partner.
As far as domestic policy is concerned, economic reforms of the early 90-es were
designed correctly but were not implemented properly because of the fierce
opposition of social and economical losers, unable to adapt to changing
environment, and the lack of political will and consistency of the national
leadership. Reformers should be given a second chance, this time provided with
proper political support and mobilization effort. Nevertheless, even inconclusive,
previous reforms created a basic institutional infrastructure and property
allocation necessary for market economy development, and the outcomes, though
not perfect, should not be revised in general (in particular the results of
privatization). Let market forces sort out effective and ineffective property owners.
Liberal-minded democratic elite is self-positioned as a force representing the future
of Russia, supported by the most dynamic and creative, well educated young
generations, which only can lead their country to the road of progress. In mid-term,
this electorate constitutes majority, but in short term it’s ideals and policy agendas
are being jeopardized by hardliners, speculating on the controversial outcomes of
liberal reforms and nostalgic sentiments of elder generations.
Current political situation in Russia is described as posing a most serious threat to
the future of democracy and liberalism since 1991. President Putin and his
supporting elite came to power as a result of a prolonged and sophisticated
conspiracy, carried out by the intelligence and military-industrial communities, and
facilitated by the lack of cooperation and mobilization among liberal-minded
political forces. Policy agenda of new Kremlin administration should be understood
as a hardliner offensive on the basic values and institutions of democracy,
undermining the roots of the civil society, and aimed at the concentration of power
in the hands of a state bureaucracy , control over and monopolization of all
resources and means for political influence, and first of all, mass media and mass
communications. In long term, new regime is doomed to failure, but in short term it
is able to severely undermine political freedoms and human rights in Russia, it’s
international political and financial credit, and as a result significantly slow down
it’s post-communist revival and reintegration into the mainstream of global
civilization.
History of Russia had been continuous through-ought the XX century. Soviet period
was not a black page which should be cut off, rather it was controversial, tragic
and glorious epoch, which constitutes the authentic heritage of Russia. One should
not be blamed or ashamed (any more) of his past, as far as he served and cared
about his nation, community and family, in good faith and in pursuit of common
good.9
August –91 putch was a tragic mistake, it led to disintegration of Soviet Union,
which was negative and avoidable outcome of Gorbatchev’s Perestroika.
Belovezsky treaty is a shame which has no excuse. Gradual and multi-speed
reintegration, at least within Slavonic core of former Union, should be a priority of
Russian foreign policy, though not of the first order .
At the same time Russia has to break out of the “post-soviet” geopolitical trap,
which keeps her foreign policy provincial and limited. The concept of “near
abroad” should be abandoned: Russia is a natural-born global power, able to
pursuit it’s interests on the global scale.
GLOBE lecture discusses current politics in Russia
Professor raises concerns over arrest of multi-billionaire mogul
By Allison Bruce
January 23, 2004
After a long downward spiral, Russia is finally getting back on its feet, according to history Prof. John Bushnell. But a number of political and economic problems have yet to be solved, he told an audience of 25 students and faculty members Thursday in Scott Hall.
The lecture, sponsored by GLOBE, a student group that promotes awareness of international issues at Northwestern, addressed recent events in Russia and their impact on the country and world.
Most of the audience members were students studying political science or international relations.
Bushnell focused on President Vladimir Putin's December decision to arrest Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the multi-billionaire head of Russian energy giant Yukos, for tax fraud. The move, which prompted international attention, caused many officials to question Putin's motives in the arrest.
Although Bushnell acknowledged Khodorkovsky committed tax fraud, he said Khodorkovsky was arrested because he posed a threat to Putin's authority.
"It didn't matter what Khodorkovsky did," Bushnell said. "It's clear Putin didn't want independent sources of power out there."
According to Bushnell, regardless of any illegal activities Khodorkovsky may have participated in, he was arrested because he and his business were too powerful.
"Everyone in Russia understands that you're just not supposed to challenge Putin or his government in any serious way," Bushnell said.
Bushnell said that was not an isolated incident. Putin is known to have arrested other prominent businessmen in the past, he said.
The lecture also reviewed recent Russian history, tracing the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its effects on the country's political and economic climate through today.
Many of Russia's economic problems stem from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bushnell said Putin has been trying to stabilize Russia's economy since he became prime minister in 1999.
Weinberg senior Lourdes Aceves said she attended because she wanted to learn more about current Russian issues.
"I wanted a better understanding of Russia's contemporary state," she said.
Yuanxia Ding, a Weinberg senior, was more interested in history than current events.
"I wanted a better understanding of Russian economic history," she said.
McCormick sophomore Nikhil Chawla, who was a joint sponsor of the lecture, said he thought the evening helped GLOBE succeed in its goal to "create a forum on campus for international issues such as these."
Kathleen Ho, a member of GLOBE, said the group hosted the event because many members of the NU community often neglect international issues.
"(Students) should be paying more attention to a growing Russian economy," said Ho, a Weinberg junior.
GLOBE will host at least one more lecture this quarter, probably a discussion about current events in Pakistan, she said.
Russian liberals call for election boycott
By Associated Press
Tuesday, March 2, 2004
MOSCOW - A group of prominent Russian liberals on Tuesday denounced the March 14 presidential election as a farce and urged voters and opposition candidates to boycott the balloting.
World chess champion Garry Kasparov and other leaders of Committee 2008: Free Choice said the campaign's heavy tilt in favor of President Vladimir Putin makes it senseless to participate in the election.
``We are appealing to the reason and conscience of voters,'' committee co-chairman Sergei Parkhomenko told The Associated Press. ``The vote is just an imitation of elections, and they shouldn't allow themselves to be drawn into this show.''
The committee is also calling on the six candidates challenging Putin to withdraw in protest.
Four of the six have support, polls show, in the low single digits, and two say they support Putin. While the lack of a realistic challenger effectively has turned the vote into a referendum on Putin's rule, the Kremlin's main concern now is low turnout.
At least 50 percent of Russia's eligible voters must cast ballots to make the election valid, and a low turnout would embarrass Putin and cloud his mandate.
Parkhomenko said the Kremlin was encouraging the opposition candidates to stay in the race because their withdrawal would jeopardize the turnout.
Irina Khakamada, the top liberal candidate, said earlier that she would withdraw from the race if two other leading candidates, nationalist Sergei Glazyev and Communist Nikolai Kharitonov, did the same. However, both said they would remain in the race.
While reports on Putin's daily activities dominate state-controlled nationwide television stations, leaving little time for other contenders, state-run Rossiya on Tuesday gave unusually lavish coverage to a news conference during which Khakamada urged voters to come to the polls.
Despite the committee's call on candidates to withdraw from the race, Parkhomenko said they would likely stay on, guided by their personal ambitions.
Committee 2008: Free Choice, which was established in January, aims to conduct public education campaigns over the next four years on the importance of strongly contested presidential elections.
Parkhomenko conceded that the committee's move wouldn't significantly affect the vote, saying that the authorities would ensure a turnout of at least 60 percent by all means.
He described the action as part of efforts to increase the public awareness about authoritarian trends in the Russian politics and said a high turnout in the vote, which Putin is expected to win in a landslide, will further strengthen those trends.
``People must not take part in endorsing a mandate for dictatorship,'' he said.
UNITED RUSSIA CLAIMS GOVERNMENT KEY POSTS
MOSCOW, March 3 (RIA Novosti) - Members of the United Russia party "are in demand" and will take key posts in the government, said the State Duma vice-speaker and a member of the United Russia parliamentary faction, Vyacheslav Volodin.
He believes that the United Russia faction may put forward first vice-speaker Lyubov Sliska, vice-speakers Vladimir Pekhtin, Georgy Boos, Oleg Morozov and the head of the Duma committee on property management, Viktor Pleskachevsky to work in the government.
Mr. Volodin also noted that in line with delegating its members to the government, United Russia faction would nominate its representatives for the posts of the deputies of the ministers and department heads.
He said that the government must be formed according to the parliamentary majority principle, as it would make it possible to influence governmental decisions. (On December 7 Duma elections the United Russia got 37% of the votes, while the Communist party received only about 12 %.) Lyubov Sliska, in her turn, noted that during the meeting with the president as well as at the faction presidium sitting she turned down all proposals to take the post in the government.
Mr. Volodin also said that if the first Duma vice-speaker, Alexander Zhukov, was to leave for the government his position should be taken by the United Russia representative as well.
How much of Putin is a good thing for Russia?
(re Constitution Day and presidential terms)
Tomorrow is Russia's Constitution Day - though this had to be checked and rechecked by some of my employees, just to make sure. However, all agreed that Wednesday in not a working day. Russia's Constitution is young, thus memories still short - civic practices take time to take root. Many Russians are not aware of what the national holiday commemorates, though the newly elected Federation Council Speaker - Sergei Mironov - is certainly not among them.
Mironov shows no signs he intends to slowly grow into his new position. He has already found a new mission for a body that seemingly is without a mission. His mind is very much on the Constitution - and how to amend it. Mironov is of the opinion that the present presidential term of four years is too short and should be lengthened. In a short article published in Kommersant, one could easily gather that Mironov could find himself in hot water with Putin for airing this opinion. Kommersant's comment is odd - there has been talk of changing the Constitution for some time. The proposal to lengthen the president's term has been mentioned by many across the political spectrum over the past year. The only difference in this case is that Mironov can actually do something to make this happen.
The Moscow Times, in an article today titled "Constitution's Strength Is in Immutability", is of the opinion that lengthening the presidential term is "Lurching in this direction will bring Russia closer to Kazakh and Belarussian practice, and take it much further away from the Western democratic norms...". This is an exaggeration. Constitutions change, some very often - even in the west. Even the US Constitution was changed in respect to presidential terms - a constitutional change that was politically motivated. Constitutions are, after all, a guide and a reflection of a political order. Russia's current political order is clearly evolving; changes to the Constitution may be necessary.
Is the lengthening the presidential term to five or seven years a good idea for Russia? Before I express my thoughts on this, a SWOT analysis of this proposition may be helpful. Also, it needs to be kept in mind that amending the Constitution before the next presidential election may allow Putin the "start all over again". Thus, in theory, if Putin so desired, he could be President of the Russian Federation for fourteen years or even, as some claim, nineteen years.
Strengths: Lengthening the presidential term would allow Putin to see his reforms come to fruition. Even eight years is not enough to push through meaningful banking and military reform, to cite just two examples. Russia's political parties remain immature and without large constituencies focused on discernable political agendas. The next decade is critical for Russia to reform and restructure itself in a fast-moving international environment. Having Putin at the helm for longer than eight years would guarantee Russia stays the course.
Weaknesses: Foreknowledge that his administration could last into the middle of the next decade could engender presidential complacency. Political and economic imperatives could be put off. Serving for up to fourteen years may retard the development of a new and alternative political elite. The Kremlin always has the advantage at the polls and new leaders my find "high politics" an impossible goal to attain. The importance of politics will lessen and cronyism (around Putin) encouraged.
Opportunities: Putin would have the chance to radically change Russian political culture. Rooting out corruption and promotion of merit could be strongly embedded in political life and the economy. Putin could allow the civil society project to finally pick up momentum. Putin could become its "roof" and protector. He could become the "little father" for those the political process in the Duma leaves out as reforms progress.
Threats: The democratic process comes to a halt and presidential rule - virtual power structures - becomes the norm. Politics remain within the purview of the bureaucracy, civil society and small and medium sized businesses derived of any form of agency. Democracy is not learned, but acted out in a way dictated by the Kremlin. Putin could represent the past with only a more humane face.
Granted, I have only touched in few issues for each category. However, the positives and negatives of Mironov's idea are apparent. Given the enormity of Russia's reform project, someone like Putin would clearly like to have more time to see his vision through. On the other hand, when is Russia to learn about democracy, checks and balances, the rule of law, and the very process of politics itself? At this stage of Russia's development some of these points seem a bit mute for many Russians, I would agree. But if Russians can't remember what December 12 stands for a decade from now not only will have Putin's reforms failed, but also democracy itself will not be doubt - it will have failed as well. The Russian Constitution is important, but it also should be deemed as a living document. Russia has changed a lot since 1991 and will continue to change a lot for the time to come.
I appreciate the thoughtful and informative comments of Professors Colton and McFaul in their article on Russian politics in the July/August issue of the Problems of Post Communismm ("Russia Democracyy under Putin," reprinted in JRL 37264). However, I fear they once again they mistake form for substance.
For purposes of brevity let me focus on the last paragrah of their article, each sentence of which I disagree with:
"In Russia, though, the most likely outcome for the near future is neither more democracy nor more autocracy-neither liberal democracy nor dictatorship-but a stable regime somewhere in between."
-- Comment: Whatever the ultimate trajectory of the Russian system, certainly the Khodorkovsky Affair shows that politics in Russia are not stable. Stability is - as the distinguished political scientist Seweryn Bialer once noted -- the balanced outcome of numerous, sometimes contradictory forces. While the major elite players such as Big Business and the security services have coexisted under Putin (to the extent that they are unitary, which they are often not) they have not been in balance -- just relatively quiet. Morever, the current array of elite forces excludes other potential actors from power, such as the small business class and intellectuals. This could be a factor in increased future instability. Finally, as Georgiy Satarov has stated - Satarov has conducted carefully quantified broad-based multiregion surveys -- corruption is an additional factor of instability. The topic of corruption is conspicuously absent in the article.
"Putin has eroded democratic institutions and practices but has not destroyed them, nor has he articulated a plan for their further erosion."
-- Comment: Russia's institutions and practices were not "democratic" under Yeltsin, nor are they now (Calling these some of these personalized, politicized, erratic loci of power institutions at all is often stretching the point). We usually describe nations "democratic" if they conform to a principle of governance articulated by Joseph Scumpeter, that they posses institutional arrangements for decisionmaking "in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Neither Putin in 2000, nor Yeltsin in 1996 was selected by such a "competitive struggle."
"Russian society seems content with the current quasi-democratic, quasi-autocratic order. Russians value democracy but are too exhausted, from decades of turmoil, to fight for better democracy. Stability is the greater priority."
-- Comment: It is not at all clear what Russian's "want," nor, to the extent that they endorse democracy in the abstract, how intensively they favor it compared to other values such as security or economic well being. Moreover, public opinion data in many countries -- including in the US -- shows that people can support "democracy" or "civil liberties" in the abstract, but reject it in specific instances. In any case, the most important thing to remember about public opinion in Russia is that it is extraordinarily passive compared to many Westerm democracies, and plays little role the country's politics. The plain fact is that the population is atomized and easily manipulated by Russia's elite. In 1999, for example, an government-backed bloc with no ideology or even a platform garnered 23.3 percent of the vote.
"Managed democracy could be around in Russia for a long time."
-- Comment: Having already mentioned my reservations about whether Russia is a democracy, I would add that elite attempts at systemic "management " are not something invented by Putin, but a practice inherited from his predecessor. Putin himself is the product of managed democracy, selected as he was by a small coterie around Yeltsin. More noteworthy are how often and why the efforts at management of the system do not work.
What is striking about politics under Putin is not how much of a departure they are from politics under Yeltsin -- there are of course some changes -- but the continuities. Despite Putin's reputation in the West as a strong leader, he continues to struggle with the same crises of efficiency and decay that confronted his predecessor and, frankly, the last few Soviet General Secretaries. That he has been so unsuccessful in slowing the decline suggests more turmoil ahead.
MOSCOW - In a move that has surprised some Kremlin insiders and observers, as well as political opponents, President Vladimir Putin told a gathering of parliamentarians on Dec. 9 in the Kremlin that he does not intend to amend the Federal Constitution and called for all speculation related to such expectations to stop immediately.
“It’s time to end all speculation on the need for constitutional amendments. I absolutely agree with those who have said that the present Constitution has been the basis of stability in the country for the past decade,” Putin said in televised reports. “I believe that the current basic law in our country has definitely not exhausted all its positive potential,” he added.
Following pro-Putin United Russia’s landslide victory and those of other Kremlin-affiliated parties, pro-government parties now control over 300 seats in the Duma, the legal benchmark required for major constitutional amendments.
According to rumors, Putin might alter the Constitution to enable him run for a third term — it is generally assumed that he will have no substantial opposition in his campaign for a second term in 2004. The length of the presidential term might also be extended from the current four years to five or even, seven years, also according to rumors.
The rumors were to some extent spread by Kremlin-affiliated think tanks. Such organizations are often seen as public-opinion sampling tools.
But Putin’s pronouncements at the gathering, at least for the time being, appeared to rule out the possibility that he was contemplating making it possible to serve for a third term after 2008 or executing any other constitutional amendments between now and then.
“Our task is to preserve the Constitution and use all its potential and legal provisions to develop the country,” he said. The Constitution is up to the task, he added.
http://english.pravda.ru/society/2001/11/15/21007.html
In September 1993, Yeltsin dissolved Parliament and called for new elections. Vice President Rutskoi and his supporters refused to obey Yeltsin's orders. On October 2, they constructed barricades and blocked traffic on Moscow's main streets. On October 3, a mob of parliament supporters stormed the police line around the White House territory and seized also the Moscow City Mayor offices. On the morning of October 4, several elite divisions of Russian military forces decided to support Yeltsin. Tanks rolled up to the White House at around 5 am. Firing began at 7 am and the assault continued throughout the day. At 5pm, special troops entered the White House and arrested Rutskoi and several leaders of Parliament.
http://www.acerj.com/CommOnline/Timeline.htm