The Age [Australia], October 14 2002
Jakarta's day of reckoning
Indonesia has failed to take the threat of Islamic violence seriously, writes Tony
Parkinson.
Indonesia has been playing with fire. Despite the shock effect of September 11, and
for all the warnings from friends and neighbours, political leaders in Jakarta have
refused to take seriously the threat of radical Islamic networks in their midst. "They
have been in denial," says respected Jakarta-watcher, Deakin University's Greg
Barton. "They have refused to accept all along that they have serious problems."
Now comes the gruesome day of reckoning. The body count in the Bali bombings will
stand as condemnation of the cynicism, complacency - and, sometimes, plain
cowardice - of the Indonesian authorities.
Why didn't Jakarta arrest or detain key figures in Jemaah Islamiah, the militant
Islamic cell with tentacles across Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore?
According to Clive Williams, director of terrorism studies at the Australian National
University, Jemaah Islamiah terrorists must be prime suspects for the carnage. It is
an organisation with well-documented links to al Qaeda. It shares Osama bin Laden's
vision of an Islamic super-state. And it exhibits the same pathological hatred of all it
sees as symbolising "Western decadence".
"I put them at the top of the list," Williams said yesterday. "Laskar Jihad cannot be
discounted as a possibility. They have undertaken bombings before. But never on this
scale."
Williams said Jemaah Islamiah was the more likely perpetrator, pointing to its role in
the plot to bomb Western targets in Singapore last December.
It is worth recalling the scornful response at the time from the government of Megawati
Sukarnoputri. Not only did senior Indonesian politicians rebuke Singapore's Lee Kuan
Yew for daring to point to the fact that extremists were walking freely around
Indonesia, but the authorities refused point blank to detain Jemaah Islamiah's spiritual
leader, Abu Bakar Bashir.
Bashir lives in a village in central Java. Today, he leads Islamic militants in protest
marches on Jakarta, demanding that Islamic law be entrenched in Indonesia's
constitution. He says he admires the words and deeds of Osama bin Laden. But
Bashir, who heads Indonesia's Mujahideen Council, is apparently untouchable. As
recently as August, Indonesia's Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, made a public show of
inviting him to dinner.
Last week, Hamzah issued a stern warning to those agitating for tougher action
against the ringleaders of radical Islam: "If you want to arrest Abu Bakar Bashir," he
was quoted as saying, "you will have to deal with me first."
Worse still, it is widely suspected in Western intelligence circles that Jemaah
Islamiah's chief operations officer, Hambali, is also in hiding in Indonesia. "No great
effort has been made to locate him," says Williams. "He is an Indonesian national, so
it would be easier for him to hide there than anywhere else."
There is no proof of complicity by Indonesian authorities in the conduct of Jemaah
Islamiah, or other Islamic militant organisations, although there is speculation of
connections between some of these shadowy groups and troublemakers loyal to the
Suharto family.
The reluctance, politically, to confront the fanatics appears to be driven more by fears
of provoking a moderate Muslim backlash. Grotesque though it may seem to
outsiders, Hamzah Haz's intense efforts to gain favour with radical Islamists is seen
essentially as a populist device to enhance his chances of becoming the next
president, when elections are held in 2004. It says something for the profound malaise
in Indonesian society that cavorting with extremists can somehow be seen as a
vote-winner.
Where does Megawati stand on all this? In short, she has said very little, and done
even less. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Megawati offered strong
public support for the global war on terror. She was the first leader of a Muslim nation
to visit Washington after the attacks. She subsequently signed a memo of
understanding with Australia on a joint approach to counter-terrorism. But, so far, her
actions have not come close to matching the fine words.
That Megawati has accepted without demur the suggestion of an Australian role in the
investigation of the Bali bombing indicates she understands the deep anxiety - and
anger - about Indonesia's failure to take firmer action.
Washington, too, is likely to ramp up its demands that Jakarta take far more seriously
the concerns expressed by Indonesia's friends and neighbours.
At the very least, the Bali bombings should inject far greater urgency into the
challenge of developing a more coherent regional strategy for countering terror in
southeast Asia.
How can governments pool resources better to manage the consequences of mass
terror attacks? The atrocities in Bali are proof of the devastation that can be inflicted
by fanatics with access to rudimentary conventional explosives.
How would the region respond to an attack with biological or chemical weapons, or
radiological "dirty bombs"?
In June, 17 defence ministers from across Asia met in Singapore, for a discussion
organised by the London-based Institute of Strategic Studies. They swapped notes on
their efforts to cope with the "front-end" challenges of detecting, arresting and
prosecuting terrorists. But they also agreed more should be done to address the
"back-end" challenges of managing a crisis if, and when, a major terrorist atrocity
occurred in the region.
Subsequently, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute commissioned Professor Ross
Babbage to put together a draft plan for action.
Babbage concluded: "The types of terrorist strikes that may be launched in the
Asia-Pacific in the future could be so catastrophic as to be beyond the immediate
capacities of local authorities to manage alone."
He called for far greater coordination, from hospitals to police organisations to water
management authorities.
Babbage's recommendations have been taken up by the Australian Government,
which is seeking urgent talks among officials in the region. Too late to save lives in
Bali, admittedly, but potentially it is an important ingredient if a more systematic
region-wide approach is to be found for confronting the terrorist threat in this part of
the world.
There are dangerous days ahead. It can only be hoped that, this time, Indonesia will
be ready to listen.
* Tony Parkinson is international editor of The Age.
Copyright © 2002 The Age Company Ltd
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