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INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE
Current Issues Brief
No. 6 2001-02
Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism
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Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2001
Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism
Chris Wilson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
11 October 2001
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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Indonesian Islamist Organisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
What Kind of Threat do Indonesian Islamist Organisations Pose? . . . . . . . . 2
What is the Presence of Al Qaeda and Other Transnational Extremist
Organisations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Introduction
In the wake of the 11 September attacks on the United States, attention has turned to
Indonesia, and the possibility of Islamic terrorist groups operating from or within that
country. Indonesia has experienced a resurgence of Islamic activity since the fall of
President Soeharto in 1998, but the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims practice a
moderate form of the religion. Indonesia is the world's largest Islamic country, with
170 to 180 million Muslims out of a total population of around 215 million.1 Although
most Indonesians are concerned with the response of the United States to the
terrorist attacks, the vast majority do not as yet support militancy. However, some
Islamist organisations have become increasingly vocal in the weeks since the
attacks. In addition, a number of reports have pointed to connections between these
groups and transnational terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, the organisation
headed by Osama bin Laden. Rohan Gunaratna from the St Andrew's University
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence has stated recently that the Al
Qaeda network has a number of cells active in Indonesia.2
Indonesian Islamist Organisations
There is no organised hierarchy of radical Islam in Indonesia, rather a number of
largely unrelated groups. The main extremist Islamist organisations in Indonesia are
Darul Islam, the Islamic Defender's Front and Laskar Jihad.3 According to Al Chaidar,
an Islamic activist and leader of one of eight factions of the Darul Islam network, the
organisation is largely constituted by the approximately 15 000 Indonesians who
returned from Afghanistan after fighting alongside the mujahadeen against the Soviet
Union.4 Laskar Jihad is the most prominent and organised of Indonesia's radical
Islamist organisations. In 2000, Laskar Jihad sent around 5000 armed militia
members to the Maluku region in eastern Indonesia, where they are considered to be
the main reason for continuing conflict there.5 The government in Jakarta has been
criticised for not preventing the activities of the organisation, some analysts
suggesting the government is restricted in it's possible response, not wishing to
appear 'anti-Islamic'.6 The prospect of US retaliation for the terrorist attacks has
boosted Laskar Jihad membership, with 300–400 joining since 11 September.7
Laskar Jihad's popularity rests on more than its ability to support Muslims in conflicts,
such as that in Maluku, the organisation also providing a strong sense of Islamic
identity. Families of the young men fighting in Maluku also receive remuneration,
funded by such activities as garment exports.8 The country's ongoing economic crisis
makes such organisations more appealing.
What Kind of Threat do Indonesian Islamist Organisations Pose?
Indonesia's top Islamic authority, the Council of Indonesian Ulemas followed President
Megawati's meeting with President Bush (on 19 September) by calling for Muslims to
unite and join a jihad (holy war) against the United States in the event of attacks
against Afghanistan.9 Similar threats have also been made by Laskar Jihad, Laskar
Jundullah and the Islamic Defender's Front.10 Some of these claims have since been
moderated. Ulema Council spokesperson, Dien Syamsuddin, when asked if warnings
of a jihad meant armed struggle, said that the term may mean any number of forms of
struggle (including peaceful), and condemned plans to 'sweep' (locate and evict) US
citizens in Indonesia. However, the impact of calls for a jihad must have been
relatively predictable, the public likely to perceive the term in the literal sense of
armed struggle.11
However, daily demonstrations are taking place in front of the US Embassy, one
protest involving 4000 people on 28 September, and another on 8 October involving
over a thousand members of a number of different organisations including the Islamic
Defenders Front.12 These demonstrations have been largely peaceful although
Indonesian police fired warning shots to disperse protestors on 8 September,13 and
shouted threats outside the Embassy caused the US Ambassador, Robert Gelbard,
to pressure the police for a plan to evacuate diplomatic staff. On 23 September,
members of several Islamist groups calling themselves the Anti-American Terrorist
Soldiers worked through the town of Surakarta in Central Jakarta searching for
Americans to evict, although there are no cases of violence reported as yet.14 Two
powerful explosions were detonated in the busy Plaza Atrium Senen shopping mall in
Central Jakarta on 23 September, although they have not as yet been linked to the
'war on terrorism'.
However, radical Islamist organisations and anti-American protests do not currently
enjoy the support of the majority of the population. The vast majority of Indonesians
practise a moderate form of Islam, excluding practices such as the veiling of women.
This moderate position has been expressed by some Islamic leaders. Syafi'i Maarif,
the chairman of Indonesia's second largest Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah,
said Indonesian Muslims should focus on the problems of the Afghan people, rather
than attacking US citizens.15 Nonetheless, now that United States (and United
Kingdom) missile strikes against Afghanistan have occurred, demonstrations across
Java and elsewhere may become more widespread, greater in size and violent.
Involvement in radical organisations may become more widespread if grievances
against the US strikes combine with the perceived benefits of joining such
organisations, and possible coercion on the part of the organisations. If the threats of
the Islamist organisations discussed above are carried out following these attacks,
the consequences could include a possible evacuation of foreign diplomatic and
commercial staff, and a flight of tourists and investment. Some of these
consequences have eventuated already. On 9 October, the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) issued a warning against travel to Indonesia.
Non-essential staff of the US Embassy in Jakarta were withdrawn on 27 September,
and the families of the staff of some American companies, such as Nike, have been
evacuated.16
One of the major dangers posed by Indonesian radical Islamist groups may be to the
Indonesian Government itself. While she was in the United States, President
Soekarnoputri pledged Indonesian support to the US lead coalition against terrorism,
receiving in turn from President Bush pledges of aid and loan guarantees.17 In
supporting the US lead war on terrorism, the government of Megawati Soekarnoputri
may face difficulties fending off challenges from the Islamic parties in her coalition,
who in turn will be pressured by Islamist sentiment. President Soekarnoputri has
already been criticised in political circles. House Speaker Akbar Tandjung stated that
she should be more critical of the US led attacks.18 Concerns within the Indonesian
Government have also become evident, with Vice President Hamzah Haz cautioning
the United States against attacking a sovereign country with the aim of targeting
terrorists. It is also possible that radical Islam may be aggravated and manipulated by
those wishing to destabilise Megawati.
What is the Presence of Al Qaeda and Other Transnational Extremist
Organisations?
For the past two years, the United States has warned that increasing Islamic
militancy in Southeast Asia was creating a large pool of potential recruits for
transnational terrorist networks. The United States Embassy in Jakarta had been on
high alert since August after receiving intelligence from Europe of bomb threats and
surveillance of the US Ambassador to Indonesia by Sudanese nationals linked to the
Al Qaeda network.19 According to Umar Juoro, an economist with the Habibie Centre,
while the known radical Islamist organisations within Indonesia are manageable, the
real problem lies with the activities of groups that are as yet not clearly identified.
Connections between the Islamist groups discussed above and transnational terrorist
organisations or networks are often claimed but generally not corroborated. It was
reported on 27 September that seven Afghan nationals flew into Ambon (Maluku) to a
welcome from local police and the Laskar Jihad.20 The Indonesian Director of
Immigration, Muhammad Indra, has agreed it is likely that members of Afghan militias
are entering Indonesia illegally.21 On 27 September a Muslim activist and writer
claimed that an envoy of Osama bin Laden had visited Indonesia at least four times,
and that the radical Darul Islam movement and Al Qaeda enjoy a 'special
relationship'.22
Indonesian students have long studied in the Islamic religious schools of Pakistan and
elsewhere, and reports suggest growing numbers are being exposed to the same
radical teachings as the Taliban. Throughout the 1990's the US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) monitored 700-1500 Indonesian students travelling to the Middle East
and suggests that 30–40 per cent never arrived at their stated destination. It is
thought many of these joined the Taliban in the Afghanistan civil war.23
However, many of the Indonesian Islamist organisations deny involvement with Al
Qaeda. While the leader of the Laskar Jihad, Ja'far Umar Thalib, fought alongside the
Mujahadeen in Afghanistan in the 1980's and met Osama bin Laden, he has stated
that he has little respect for the Saudi terrorist.24 According to Thalib, the Al Qaeda
organisation approached the Laskar Jihad, but he had declined to become involved
with the organisation. He also denied that there were any Afghan Mujahadeen in
Maluku.25 Ja'far does however support the attack on the United States, saying, 'it
should be an important lesson for America.' Another Islamist organisation with
supposed links to bin Laden, Majelis Mujahidin, also denies such links.26 The
Chairman of the Indonesian Ulemas Council, Nazri Adlani has described as
'slanderous', international reports that Indonesian Islamist organisations have become
involved in global terrorist networks.27
There are also official claims of links between Indonesian groups and Southeast Asian
terrorist and/or separatist organisations, although independent evidence for these is
also largely inadequate. In August, Indonesian police arrested a Malaysian national
following a bombing in the Atrium Plaza, and two others for bombings in churches
throughout Indonesia.28 Last year the Philippines Ambassador was injured in a
bombing, and the Malaysian Embassy was attacked with a grenade. Carlyle Thayer,
an expert on Southeast Asian security, has stated that there are groups of armed
militia members that move around the region.29 Ja'far Umar Thalib has stated the
Laskar Jihad does have links to the Malaysian Kumpulan Mujahadeen Malaysia
(KMM) Islamist organisation. Intelligence reports suggest these Southeast Asian
groups may be linked to international terrorist networks. The suspected hijackers of
the 11 September attacks were, according to US intelligence, sighted in the
Philippines and Kuala Lumpur.
Conclusion
The impact on Indonesia of the terrorist attacks on the US and the US reaction and
increasingly active local Islamist organisations is likely to be continued sporadic
outbursts of protest and occasional violence. The relatively porous nature of
Indonesian national borders and the weakness of the Indonesian Government in
detecting terrorists, means that Indonesia may well serve as either a transit point or a
sanctuary for international terrorists.
However, the Indonesian Government has a narrow path to tread in protecting
Indonesia from terrorist activity and ensuring the country is not used by terrorist
networks as a sanctuary, and preventing the spillover of radicalism from Islamist
organisations to moderate Indonesian Muslims.
Endnotes
1. T. Dodd, 'Megawati faces Muslim backlash', Australian Financial Review, 20
September 2001.
2. 'International Terrorism: Where to From Here?', Vital Issues Seminar, Department
of the Parliamentary Library, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 September 2001.
3. I am not considering the Free Aceh (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) organisation
as a terrorist group in this discussion, as this group is in armed struggle with the
Indonesian security forces.
4. 'Osama envoy made several trips to Indonesia: Activist', The Straits Times, 27
September 2001.
5. See 'Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku', International Crisis
Group Report, no. 10, 19 December 2000. The Maluku conflict has been particularly
bloody, with estimates of casualties since 1999 from 6000 to 9000, and the creation
of hundreds of thousands of refugees.
6. J. Solomon & R. Hindryati, 'Indonesian Radicals Rally in Support of bin
Laden–Western Agencies Suspect Organizational Ties', The Asian Wall Street
Journal, 21 September 2001.
7. T. Dodd, 'Megawati risks Muslim rage', Australian Financial Review, 29 September
2001.
8. ibid.
9. 'Indonesian clerics warn of jihad', CNN.com, 25 September 2001.
10. T. Dodd, 'Megawati faces Muslim backlash', op. cit.
11. Personal communication with Dr Greg Fealy, Australian National University, and
T. Dodd, 'Megawati risks Muslim rage', ibid.
12. D. Harsanto & H. Abu, 'Militant groups rally outside US embassy against attacks
on Afghanistan', The Jakarta Post, 9 October 2001.
13. 'Indonesian protests turn violent', BBC Online, 9 October 2001.
14. 'Terrorists Operate Freely in Surakarta', The Jakarta Post, 24 September 2001.
15. 'Top Muslim leaders stress aid, not violence', The Jakarta Post, 2 October 2001.
16. 'Mega slams radicals for anti-US threats', The Straits Times, 3 October 2001.
17. T. Mapes, 'Indonesia's US Ties Stir Militant Opposition–Groups Threaten to
Attack American Interests', The Asian Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2001.
18. 'RI expresses concern, urges US to limit strikes', The Jakarta Post, 9 October
2001.
19. J. McBeth, 'The Danger Within', Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 September,
2001, p. 20.
20. ibid.
21. T. Dodd, 'Megawati faces Muslim Backlash', op. cit.
22. L. Murdoch, 'Bin Laden 'funded Christian-haters', Sydney Morning Herald, 28
September 2001.
23. Many Indonesians are also thought to have joined the Mujahadeen struggle
against the Soviet Union, see 'Waiting for Osama's Blessing', Tempo, no. 03/11, 25
September 2001.
24. Thalib has stated that bin Laden struck him as a jetsetter when he met him in
Pakistan in 1987 during the Mujahadeen struggle against the Soviet Union, and has
taken a vastly different interpretation of Islam to the Laskar Jihad, see R. C. Paddock,
'Indonesian Extremist Backs Terror Southeast Asia', Los Angeles Times, 23
September 2001.
25. Harold Crouch of the International Crisis Group is quoted as questioning reports of
mujahadeen in the Malukus due to the lack of casualties with Middle Eastern
appearance, see S. Mydans, 'Militant Islam Unsettles Indonesia And Its Region', New
York Times, 21 September 2001.
26. 'Waiting for Osama's Blessing', Tempo, no. 03/11, 25 September-1 October 2001.
27. 'No global terrorist link in RI', Jakarta Post, 22 September 2001.
28. Dr Greg Fealy of the Australian National University urges caution when assessing
these claims of guilt, as the Indonesian Police have been known to frame suspects in
the past and little motive has yet been produced for the attacks, personal
communication.
29. S. Mydans, 'Militant Islam Unsettles Indonesia And Its Region', op. cit.
ISSN 1440-2009
Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2001
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