Stratfor Analysis, September 11, 2002
Indonesia: Possible U.S. Pressure Tactics May Backfire
Summary
Indonesian security officials expressed "surprise" over the Sept. 11 closure of the
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, amid comments by a U.S. ambassador cautioning
businesses to stay out of Indonesia until the country stabilizes. Washington is trying
to exert political and economic pressure on the government to do more in the
anti-terrorism campaign, but this may only serve to exacerbate tensions within
Jakarta.
Analysis
Government and security officials in Indonesia are questioning Washington's decision
Sept. 10 to close its embassy in Jakarta indefinitely due to alleged terrorist threats,
saying the closure could tarnish Indonesia's image. Washington's announcement
came on the heels of a comment by U.S. Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce that U.S.
businesses should refrain from new investments in Indonesia until after the country's
investment and security climates improve.
The embassy closure was one of many U.S. security measures taken in Southeast
Asia near the Sept. 11 anniversary, but when combined with Boyce's comments, it
appears to be a vote of no confidence in Indonesia by the United States. Though the
two recent actions may be unrelated or coincidental, they may also be part of a U.S.
effort to pressure Jakarta to do more in the war against terrorism.
But no matter what the intention, the U.S. actions are fueling tensions between
competing factions within the Indonesian government, which must balance support for
Washington with the interests of domestic groups. The U.S. move could backfire by
quickly widening these rifts and fractures.
Washington remains concerned that Jakarta has not done enough to prevent
Indonesia from becoming a convenient location for al Qaeda and other militant groups
to organize and plan operations. And the United States is not alone in this fear, as
Indonesia's neighbors Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and even Australia have
voiced concerns that Jakarta will not crack down on groups and individuals with
suspected al Qaeda links.
For instance, National Police chief Gen. Dai Bachtiar recently said there is no proof
that alleged militant leader Abu Bakar Bashir is involved in any terrorist activities, even
though Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have all accused him of having ties to
al Qaeda.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia's coordinating minister for political and
security affairs, said Sept. 10 he was "surprised" by Washington's decision to
indefinitely shut its embassy, local media reported. The effect this could have on
international perceptions of Indonesia is particularly troubling for a nation that
continues to struggle to attract foreign investments and aid.
Dai Bachtiar told the Antara news agency Sept. 11 that the embassy closure was
strictly on orders from Washington and not due to any immediate terrorist threat from
inside Indonesia. He also said Jakarta could not fault the embassy as it did not give
the order. But Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz has requested Boyce visit his
office on Sept. 12, Antara reported.
For Indonesian officials, the fear of U.S. pressure tactics is two-fold. First, Indonesia
is struggling for foreign investments to boost its economy, which still languishes from
the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Foreign investments into Indonesia have dropped 40
percent since the beginning of the year, BBC reported. And the continued appearance
of political and economic instability, the lax rule of law, rampant corruption and the
ongoing warnings about terrorism threats and anti-American sentiment in the country
only serve to exacerbate the difficulties of attracting new investments.
But government officials are also trying to appease internal interest groups, and U.S.
criticism stirs resentment among some sectors in the country. Furthermore, because
Indonesia is the world's most populous Islamic nation, the government must walk a
careful line in balancing the interests of the Islamic masses and the desires of the
United States or Indonesia's neighbors.
Many politicians are trying to rally the support of Indonesians by playing the Muslim
card, standing up to the United States in what they see as its undeclared war on
Islam. Even those officials who are not playing up their Islamic credentials still portray
themselves as Indonesian nationalists and cannot be seen as kowtowing to
Washington too deeply. By inserting itself further into this divide with its possible
pressure tactics, whether intentional or not, Washington may actually be making it
more difficult for Jakarta to cooperate against terrorism.
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