| SRI LANKA WATCH |
One for the Co-Chairs to Ponder Seriously In view of the meeting of Co-Chairs in Japan next week, SRI LANKA WATCH has reprinted below a thought provoking shot for the Co-Chairs to ponder seriously and do the necessary ground work to positively bring about an amicable settlement to the long drawn conflict in this island nation. To meet and donate is one thing, but to actively engage the warring parties, as in the ACHEH case, and bring a solution to the meet is another.It is hoped that the Co-Chairs will look to the ACHEH case as a model to work on.(Please refer to SLW article 12, Facts that Speak, for further details.) By Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi’s remarks about the Co-Chairs engaging in soul-searching draws attention to the possibilities and limitations that are integral to the role of the international community in the conflict transformation process in Sri Lanka. Akashi was at pains to point out — as indeed at various times have others — that the primary responsibility for conflict transformation in Sri Lanka lies with Sri Lankans and that the international community could at best play a supporting role. This of course is a truism, even though there is a national tendency to look to others to do what can only be done by ourselves. International angle What can the international community do and in particular, to halt what seems to be an irreversible slide to larger scale hostilities ? What indeed can it do to transform the current debilitating status quo into something positive and constructive in terms of conflict transformation? The national tendency to look to the international community to bail us out of debilitating situations is fed by the internationalisation of the peace process that commenced with the signing of the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) in 2002. What we failed to understand or appreciate is that this came about, not because of any intrinsic strategic importance attached to us by the international community, but rather because the international community was interested in a successful conflict transformation process and thought, erroneously, that the Sri Lankan one fitted the bill. In this respect international involvement was attracted by the prospect of success and now once attracted is trapped by the lack of it. It is not easy to find unembarrassing ways of disengagement without attracting in turn the charge of desertion and irresponsibility. Gamut of opinions In any event, what the international community can and cannot do is conditioned by what governments can and cannot do to each other and as important in the Sri Lankan case, to non state actors. Taking the Co-Chairs as representative of the international community at large, a clear asymmetry emerges in terms of the leverage and sanctions they can employ in respect of the government and the LTTE. There is a gamut of options in the case of the government. In the case of the LTTE this is not so. Of the Co-Chairs, the US has banned the LTTE, the EU has declared a travel ban and may be on the verge of going further, the Norwegians are the facilitators and Japan is Sri Lanka’s single biggest bilateral donor. Beyond banning the LTTE and then revoking that ban on the grounds of good behaviour, the international community is left with the sanction of more stringent action with regard to LTTE funding. However, there is the argument that although such action will reduce the amount of funds that get through — money is like water, some will always get through. Asymmetry There is however another dimension to this. The asymmetry can work to the LTTE’s advantage on the basis that as long as the international community retains an interest in conflict transformation in Sri Lanka, they will have to deal with the LTTE, however badly the international community believes they behave. Engagement in the conflict transformation process entails engagement with an actor that is relatively immune to international sanction or pressure and unfortunately both demonstrably insufficiently willing or able to effect a change in behaviour closer to international norms and standards. In addition the international community’s attitude towards the LTTE is also conditioned by the behaviour of the government — human rights violations and atrocities can soften the international community’s attitude towards the LTTE. Inhibiting factor Another inhibiting factor is that given the low strategic importance of Sri Lanka in the global balance of power, military intervention is not an option. Consequently, the Co-Chairs have been reduced to ratcheting up the level of sanction coupled with the issue of statements combining the stern with the plaintive. They may well decide to restrict themselves to the medium and longer term requirements of a settlement. The soul-searching after all is also an admission of limited effect and impotence. And perhaps it is best that the Co-Chairs see their primary responsibility in ensuring that the contours of a settlement and the framework for negotiations facilitate the attainment of a democratic and dignified peace. This must necessarily mean a settlement along federal lines. In addition it must be stressed that in the event of larger scale hostilities, the Co-Chairs must exert themselves in ensuring the observance of human rights and humanitarian norms. Indian role The Co-Chairs apart, there has been much lamentation about the Indian role. A number of points need to be taken on board here. They are: • The reference to India is not necessarily to a single actor but to a conglomeration of agencies including intelligence agencies. • There is no dispute amongst the local actors that India has a role and has interests in Sri Lanka. • India has not recovered from the IPKF experience and in terms of high profile political and military intervention is still caught in the once bitten twice shy syndrome. • India is also aware of the love/hate relationship that could come into play and the damned if you do/damned if you don’t syndrome. Those who want India to play a higher profile role may well be the first to turn against it once operationalised. • India’s economic stake in Sri Lanka grows and there is no reason to risk distracting from it and even jeopardising it with a high profile political role which could turn out to be a proverbial crown of thorns. • Coalition politics in India is another inhibiting factor. • India will act as a last resort and as the balancer of interests and forces — ensuring that the unity of Sri Lanka is protected and that the aspirations of minorities are heeded. Best interests It is the last point that could be the most important. A higher profile Indian role is conceivable when serious negotiations on core political issues commence. It is as important to ensure that India exerts itself to ensure that such negotiations do take place. That of course will not be necessary if there is a firm unshakeable conviction on the part of both the government and LTTE that conflict transformation requires a negotiated political settlement beyond the bounds of the current constitutional status quo. That still remains one point that the international community can ceaselessly reiterate in statement after statement. As long as we need to be, they must remind us of our better and best interests. MORNING LEADER, 17.5.2006 |