| SRI LANKA WATCH |
| Impact of EU resolution on LTTE
The European parliament, representative body of the European Union (EU) member states, meeting at Strasbourg on May 18, 2006 passed a unanimous resolution asking its member states to freeze all the assets of LTTE (including bank accounts, holdings, companies and undertakings) and take measures to prevent LTTE from collecting illegal ‘tax’ from the Tamil community living in their states. More importantly, the resolution made three points that gave an inkling of future trends: 1. It recalled the earlier EU call (made in September 2005) to member states not to receive any LTTE delegations in any of the member states and stated that EU was actively considering “the formal listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation”. 2. It stated that the LTTE does not represent all the Tamil peoples of Sri Lanka and called upon it to “allow for political pluralism and alternate democratic voices” to hear opinions of all communities in north and east. 3. It strongly condemned LTTE for its reckless attacks particularly on Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, Sri Lanka Army chief on April 25, 2006 and on Sri Lanka Navy ships on May 11, 2006 even though they were sailing with Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) flag flying carrying SLMM monitors on board. The resolution while condemning human rights violations committed by both sides, in particular the killing of journalists, asked the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) as a newly elected member of the UN Human Rights Commission to reactivate the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission and asked both sides to respect the human rights. The resolution of the European Parliament comes as no surprise. Even as early as September 2005 when it imposed a travel ban on LTTE delegations, it was clear that EU was adopting a graded approach in pressurising LTTE to conform to the terms of ceasefire and get back to the negotiating table. After the attack on Gen Fonseka in April 2006 and as the situation deteriorated, Sri Lanka President Rajapakse had sent emissaries to many international capitals with two requests curb LTTE fund raising and other activities in their soil and slap a ban on it, in case they had not done so. The US also had urged the EU to list the LTTE as terrorist organisation. (In fact, Donald Camp. U.S. State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, on a visit to Sri Lanka had said the LTTE “deserve that title.” His visit on May 15 and 16, 2006 showed the keen interest the U.S. had been taking in the current situation in Sri Lanka.) But why did the EU resolution spoke of “actively considering” of listing LTTE as a terrorist organisation, rather than doing so? There could be a few reasons for EU not going ahead with the ban: 1. There are a few member countries of EU who were not happy with the idea of banning LTTE. Perhaps EU has provided them a small window of opportunity to persuade LTTE to mend its ways and get back to the table rather than taking up arms. 2. EU might want to give another chance to LTTE, to rethink its strategy of reviving armed confrontation in the light of the difficulties caused with the freezing of bank accounts and other assets of the organisation. 3. Perhaps EU wants the ban to be offered as an incentive to GOSL provided it takes control of the deteriorating human rights situation and sets right it right. 4. Delaying the ban on LTTE could have been at Norway’s request, as it would make the mediation process more difficult, as LTTE might harden its stands on the ceasefire and peace process. Apart from the above reasons, there are a few practical problems in handling the peace process if EU had slapped a ban on LTTE now. These include the following: 1. While Norway is not a member of the EU and thus can continue its mediation process, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden - the four EU member countries officering the SLMM at present would not be able to continue their role as monitors. A new set of countries outside the EU membership will be required to officer the SLMM. Identifying such countries and requesting them to join the SLMM will take some time jeopardising the SLMM functioning at a crucial point when the future of the peace process is at stake. 2. Even if a few countries volunteer to participate, they should be acceptable to both the GOSL and the LTTE. This process also will take some time as both sides are indulging in real politick. 3. A ban would make it difficult for representatives of EU and USA - two of the four Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference (Japan and Norway being the other two members), to interact with LTTE freely and effectively. This would add further responsibility on Japan and Norway. For LTTE, the EU resolution is undoubtedly a big blow hitting at the heart of its strong European suite. LTTE think tanks in the U.S. and Europe are probably busy taking damage control measures to ensure the EU delays the listing of LTTE as a terrorist state as long as possible. As expected the LTTE negotiator Anton Balasingham has stated that LTTE would go to war if EU slaps a ban on LTTE. Probably this is more rhetoric than action. Karuna is making it more difficult for LTTE to operate in the east and the Sri Lanka armed forces are now responding with force to LTTE’s violent activities. Thus waging full scale war is a little more difficult now for LTTE. However, without going to full-scale war if LTTE continues to operate as before, it has the option of carrying out more selective assassinations and perhaps hit out at economically lucrative targets. Of course its operations in the sea and the propaganda war would continue. The Tokyo Donors Conference members meeting scheduled to be held in June 2006 assumes a great deal of importance now as it has to decide on future course of action and evolve a tangible approach without jeopardising the chances for peace. In this tricky situation, the role of India becomes more important than ever before. Already there had been a steady increase in inflow of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka into Tamil Nadu and the influx has crossed the 1000 mark. It is a fast developing situation and India does not want to get involved too closely in the sticky details of restoring peace in the Island; at the same time it cannot afford to sacrifice the essential interests of Tamils as well its own strategic interests. Thus it is clear the Sri Lanka desk of Indian Foreign Office is going to have a handful of problems in the coming weeks. (Col. R. Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist in counter-insurgency, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence.) WEEKEND STANDARD, 3.6.2006 |