SRI LANKA WATCH |
A STATE IN CONFUSION By Sonali Samarasinghe The government is akin to a whirling dervish as the cost of living reaches Himalayan heights even as the Treasury decides to pay billions of rupees in subsidies to the Lanka Indian Oil Company (LIOC) and peace negotiations pirouette out of control. The Treasury decision to pay LIOC a colossal US$ 76 million as subsidy payments came even as Indian newspapers earlier this week reported that Pakistan had opened a US$ 250 million credit line for the Sri Lankan government to purchase 40 tanks and other offensive weaponry. Earlier India rejected a request for such assistance by the Rajapakse government in deference to Tamil sentiments, its own local political balance and its desire to keep from getting mangled in the ethnic crisis. International noose Meanwhile, the international noose is tightening around the government as both the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and the Co-Chairs apply pressure on the Mahinda Rajapakse regime to keep to its agreements on the peace process. Last week the Swedish Head of Mission warned that aid will dry up if Colombo did not make a concerted effort to find a political solution acceptable to all parties. In an SLMM report on the implementation of the agreements between the government and the LTTE at the Geneva talks in February, SLMM Chief Ulf Henricsson blamed the breakdown of the talks on the government’s unwillingness to implement all its commitments. Shocked at govt. denial The SLMM expressed shock that the government went so far as to even deny the mere presence of armed groups in their areas. "In addition the GOSL showed little willingness to accept requests by the LTTE aimed at normalising the situation," the report says. While accusing the LTTE of continuing to recruit and abduct children, the SLMM charged the government failed to implement any of the commitments it made during the Geneva talks in February and was responsible for the breakdown of the Geneva Agreement. The government response to the SLMM Geneva Report was to continue to deny that there are ‘paramilitary groups’ as defined in the CFA operating in government-controlled areas and to bring counter charges of violence and mayhem being perpetrated by the LTTE. It also accused the SLMM of bias. No positive effect While international bans on the LTTE have had no positive effect in local terms, the Wanni has used the recent European ban to call for a recomposition of the SLMM in Sri Lanka. It has refused to permit any monitors from the EU nations to operate in LTTE-controlled areas in the north and east. This would reduce the number of monitors by 60 percent. The SLMM team comprises 57 members of whom 37 are from Denmark, Finland and Sweden while only 20 are from Norway and Iceland. However, Norway is unwilling to take on the burden alone with only Iceland and has sought an amendment to the CFA clause that deals with the composition of monitors in order to bring in more countries from outside the EU. Both the government and the LTTE are opposed to the amendment of this clause, the government maintaining there should be no change in the present composition while the Tigers maintain that no new members should be brought in. Oslo fiasco Last week’s fiasco in Oslo is further compounded by the low level government delegation returning to Colombo in a state of pique while the LTTE as usual emerged as a more rounded and patient negotiator. Again the government lost the international initiative to the Wanni through its lack of diplomacy and depth. What appeared to be LTTE’s intransigence was negated, with the government team on the orders of President Rajapakse upping and leaving Oslo before the scheduled two days fixed for the talks were over. Instead, if the government continued to stick it out for the two days insisting the LTTE returns to the table and used the international stage to paint the LTTE’s reluctance to meet as an act of bad faith, it could have wrested the initiative but it was not to be. On the contrary it was the LTTE that manipulated the world stage to their advantage instead. In fact, LTTE Peace Secretariat Head S. Puleedevan speaking to this newspaper from Oslo said, "Even though the government was aware of the LTTE composition in advance it had sent a third level delegation that lacked any decision making authority to Oslo." "The LTTE team arrived in Oslo and learned about the composition of the government team and saw it as an act of bad faith and lack of seriousness on the part of the government," he said. Puleedevan also maintained that LTTE Political Wing Head S.P. Tamilselvan had already informed Erik Solheim in the afternoon of June 6 at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that it would not engage in direct dialogue with the government. The LTTE maintained that due to the limited agenda which included only the safety and role of the monitors, there was a need to review the CFA and for this limited purpose bilateral talks with the SLMM along with the Norwegian facilitators would be sufficient. Backroom parley However, just the evening before the talks were to commence, the Norwegian facilitators requested the LTTE to have direct dialogue with the government. The LTTE maintained that at this time it had shown flexibility and requested its Peace Secretariat Head Puleedevan and Dr. Palitha Kohona’s counterpart to participate in the dialogue following which bilateral talks could take place. This discussion with the Norwegians was to end half an hour past midnight with the facilitators assuring the Tigers they would convey the LTTE suggestion to the government and revert. On Thursday morning around 9 a.m. Solheim informed the LTTE delegation that they were still awaiting the government response. At 12:30 p.m. the Norwegian facilitators were to hold another meeting with the LTTE delegation and convey to them that the government delegation had been instructed by President Mahinda Rajapakse to leave Oslo immediately. However, the LTTE continued in Oslo and was able to hold discussions with the facilitators headed by Solheim on Thursday (8) evening, following which the LTTE even held a press conference. On the next day, Friday (9) they sat down for talks with the SLMM and formulated and presented a detailed Oslo Communiqué. Meanwhile, Puleedevan was to tell this newspaper, "The government team in an uncivilised manner abruptly left Oslo. Had the government team stayed behind, it would have been possible for the facilitators to come up with some modalities acceptable to both sides." "Patience and diplomacy," he opined, "are essential for conflict resolution. Unfortunately the Mahinda government lacks both." Puleedevan recalled that "even during the earlier rounds of talks when provocative events against the LTTE had taken place, the LTTE lodged their protests but continued their negotiations." Be that as it may, President Rajapakse, having lost the international initiative time and again, is now between a rock and a hard place. With economic issues and the prospect of an aid freeze looming large before him, he must decide between the international community on the one hand and his extremist political allies, the JVP and the JHU, on the other. Southern consensus Meanwhile, Rajapakse’s feeble attempt to reach a southern consensus through the All Party Conference (APC) has proved futile. Peace Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona recently wrote to all the main political parties requesting each party to nominate a representative to participate in an advisory committee under the APC. This followed a decision at the last APC meeting to appoint an advisory committee to formulate proposals for a devolution package acceptable to all parties. UNP in full form In this respect UNP General Secretary N.K. Weragoda was to receive a letter as well and the matter was taken up at its political affairs meeting yesterday. The UNP, which had earlier unanimously decided to take the fight to the government on pressing issues such as widespread corruption and the rising cost of living, was to now take action with regards to Kohona’s letter. The UNP therefore decided that it would not send a UNP representative to the advisory committee of the APC and would inform Kohona of this in writing. The UNP decided that the party position was very clear on the issue of devolution and it was in fact the government and its extremist allies that must first make their position known to the public. The UNP decided in this context to demand that the government immediately make known its position on the peace process and the CFA and also state what the government’s thinking was on the several agreements made between 2002 and 2004 including the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) of 2002, the Oslo Communiqué, the Tokyo Declaration, and more recently the Geneva agreement following the February talks. Therefore, the UNP was basically calling upon the government to make its position clear by posing to them the very questions posed to Rajapakse’s regime by the international community, the Norwegian facilitators and India. Rocky road For Rajapakse, the road ahead is a rocky one. His dilemma is whether he is to fall in line with the thinking of the international community and the UNP or face world isolation by siding with the JVP. Further, a peace process without the support of the single largest political party in Sri Lanka is like Rajapakse trying to stage Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Questionable motives What is particularly damning for Rajapakse is that Norway has requested a written response by June 20 to five searching questions posed to both Rajapakse and Tiger Leader Velupillai Pirapaharan. The questions posed are whether the parties stand committed to the CFA, want the SLMM to continue operations under Norwegian facilitation, willingness of the parties to guarantee full security of all monitors, acceptance of an amendment to the CFA dealing with the provision of Nordic monitors, and security guarantees for the current SLMM personnel during a six month transition period in the event there is agreement to amend the CFA on the composition of the monitors. While the questions are posed by the Norwegians to Rajapakse and Pirapaharan as the leaders of the two parties to the conflict, Rajapakse is obviously none too pleased with Pirapaharan being addressed on par with his status as a head of state. MR will not sign Despite rumours spouted by some sections of the daily media that Rajapakse will reply Norway in the strongest possible terms with a hard-hitting letter under his hand, this column learns that Rajapakse will not even sign the letter but leave it to either Kohona or a Foreign Ministry official to do the honours. The government thinking as officially expounded is that Sri Lanka, while being a small and weak nation, is nevertheless a proud one, and President Rajapakse as Head of State will only deal with a head of state and not Solheim, who is of ministerial rank. That the President nevertheless met with Solheim on several occasions despite him being only a minister is to be brushed under the carpet. While this explanation may suffice in diplomatic circles, on a superficial level Rajapakse has not saved himself the embarrassment of contradicting himself. A bundle of contradictions If the Rajapakse government states that it endorses the CFA and the role of the Norwegians in writing, it comes directly in contradiction with the agreement he entered into with the JVP where Rajapakse signed a document which stated the CFA was a treasonable document that envisaged the breakup of the nation. Certainly, if he or indeed an official from his government signs a later document that accepts the CFA, then it would supercede the earlier JVP agreement and vitiate its contents just like a subsequent will or codicil. Mangala in Oslo Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera in Oslo for a round of talks with Norwegian government officials assured the Nordic government that Norway’s role in the peace process is in fact useful but that the government did not feel the Tigers were serious about talks. A solution must be found within an "undivided and united Sri Lanka," the Foreign Minister has reportedly stated, once again in complete contradiction to Rajapakse’s stated commitment to a unitary state. Samaraweera has thus expounded the very same words used by Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, but whether Samaraweera’s verbiage will be reflected in the letter to be sent to the Norwegians by his government before June 20, remains to be seen. Confidence shaken It is this doublespeak by the government and its policy of talking peace while waging war that has shaken the confidence and indeed sorely tried the patience of the international community. Rajapakse declining to sign the reply to the Norwegians will also serve to create more suspicion at a time when the world seems to have all but given up on the sincerity of the LTTE and the Rajapakse regime with regard to the peace process. Once again it is left to be seen whether Pirapaharan will also decline to send a written response to the Norwegians under his hand or steal a march on Rajapakse by replying the five questions posed and thus succeed in amassing brownie points yet again. UNP communiqué Meanwhile, the UNP yesterday while rejecting any participation in the advisory committee of the APC decided to also issue a written communiqué to Rajapakse and his government charging that the country is facing a war situation which must be averted and the UNP urges the government to work closely and sincerely with the Co-Chairs and India to this end. Earlier, India also advised both Rajapakse and Foreign Minister Samaraweera to work with the Co-Chairs and the SLMM to find a political solution within a united Sri Lanka. For Rajapakse the issue is between united and unitary. It is this that lends itself to his desperation and a possible fall of government. Knowing full well his dependency on the JHU and the JVP for his political survival, it is this desperation that perhaps drives him to contemplate a general election in August. An election that may help him obtain a better mandate and whittle down the JVP power in parliament in general and over him in particular. But a general election may be a luxury Rajapakse can ill afford given the crashing economy, the rising cost of living, the peace talks fiasco and the general sorry state of a nation in chaos. MORNING LEADER, 14.6.2006 |