By Vindya Amaranayake
The nation witnessed another round of peace talks between the government and the LTTE last week. The two parties have returned to the island without even setting a date for the next round of talks. Various political parties and analysts have rendered theories as to why the talks have failed and where the country is heading hereafter. Civil society is as involved in the peace process as the policy making bodies. Therefore, The Nation spoke to a member of a civil society organisation, Dr. Kumar Rupasinghe, Chairman, Foundation for Co-Existence for his insights into the failure of the latest round of talks. Dr. Rupasinghe believes that in order to revive the talks after the Geneva II failure, both parties have to agree on some symbolic gesture to build trust, but that what is essential is that hostilities cease.
“The format in both Geneva I and Geneva II had been confrontational. There were informal meetings but there was no preparation for the talks. If you are not prepared, it never works out. We can see from the examples of the other parts of the world that failed negotiations lead to a massive outbreak of violence. Therefore, lack of preparation inevitably leads to failure”
Following are excerpts:
Q: Why do you think the peace talks failed?
A: We need to go back to the period between Geneva I and Geneva II. A lot of things have happened. There has been a great humanitarian crisis, the resumption of hostilities starting from Mavilaru, then the taking over of Sampur, the LTTE attack in Muttur, Muhamalai, the attack on unarmed Navy personnel and the attack in Galle. All of these have created a different kind of climate where both parties were trying to restore the balance of power. Then, when they met in Geneva it was not in hope of trying to find a common solution as the psychological framework had changed.
On the other hand they wanted to play the media. At the Airport they made statements, then before the conference and during the coffee break, they made off the record statements. Both parties were trying to play the media. It was unfortunate because we cannot have a situation where you discuss the issues outside the conference room.
The other most important consideration is the format that was used in the talks. I call it positional bargaining where both sides were trying to push their own agenda in a context of conflict. Positional bargaining means that you do not give an inch to the other side. Both sides stick to their positions.
This particular format has been extremely unsuccessful in conflicts in other parts of the world. We should convert this format into a problem solving mechanism where either party should find a common ground, for example, the Israel Palestine talks that were held in Oslo, they all lived in one house during the period of the talks. It was very informal.
Q: What are the basic differences between the talks held by the UNF government and the present government?
A: The talks of the UNF period were based on the ceasefire agreement. They happened on a solid basis of confidence building and trust. Therefore the two parties were able to engage in successful talks. They were aiming for a problem solving arrangement. In this context, they were trying to understand each other’s problems and how to accommodate each other’s needs.
But this time it was very different. The format in both Geneva I and Geneva II had been confrontational. There were informal meetings but there was not preparation for the talks. If you are not prepared, it never works out. We can see from the examples of the other parts of the world that failed negotiations lead to massive outbreak of violence. Therefore, lack of preparation inevitably leads to failure.
Q: What are the differences between the set of negotiators sent by the two governments?
A: The UNF government sent a smaller team of negotiators, supported by the facilitators. A large delegation can have the tendency to lose the level of informality.
The other difference is that during UNF times the talks were about confidence building. Through confidence building, what is called a road map for peace was achieved in Oslo. But this time there was no confidence building. The government was insisting on core issues. The LTTE was insisting on the government’s attention on the suffering of the people but the government was focused on these core issues.
The other difference is that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe acted under an executive President who was hostile to him, who did everything in her power to undermine the efforts of the UNF government. In this case you have a very strong executive president, who can carry forward the peace process.
The paradox is that everybody thought that this time the government could find a breakthrough. Half of the work has already been completed by the UNF government. A successful ceasefire has already been agreed to by both parties. The current President has only to carry forward the negotiations.
Q: The opening of the A9 road; is it a political decision or a military decision?
A: It is possible for the government to create a humanitarian corridor to relieve the people of the North and at the same time place the SLMM in a position to monitor the troop movement along the A9 road. The concern of the government is that the LTTE would mobilise its troops along the A9 road. In the same way the government should be concerned about the humanitarian crisis in Jaffna. On the other hand they should review the possibility of the resumption of the peace talks.
India has to play an important role. In Tamil Nadu there are about 15 000 refugees. They cannot keep tolerating the exodus of people from Sri Lanka. This had created various difficulties for the State government. Therefore the State should put pressure on the Centre to find a viable solution to this problem.
The A9 road was officially closed from 1995 to 2001. Then there was a war situation. The A9 issue is regarded by the government as a military decision because the road provides LTTE access to the Vanni district. But the LTTE regards the opening of the road as a humanitarian decision.
Again, it is an issue that the two parties should sit together and discuss in order to reach a negotiated settlement. In a power sharing arrangement with a road map of peace all these issues can be settled. There has to be some way to restore the trust. It is that trust that is absent at the present. And it has to be regained by some kind of a symbolic gesture on both sides.
Q: The two parties have failed to fix a date for a next round of talks. Where would the peace process lead from there?
A: The LTTE has indicated that if the A9 is opened the question of a date would not be a problem. That is why it is needed to create conditions for talks to begin. Therefore, both parties need to make some form of a symbolic gesture in order to get the talks back on. The primary condition is that the hostility between the two parties must stop.
Q: Why do you think the government is not taking proper use of the MoU signed with the UNP?
A: For the first time the government has the support of the UNP and it is a very good climate for peace talks. The LTTE has also welcomed this alliance between the two main southern parties. Therefore, the President has the support and the blessing of the majority of the Sinhala voting public to carry forward the negotiations.
I hope that President Rajapaksa had the power and strength to go forward with the peace process. In a context like this they should have taken the maximum use of this opportunity.
There has to be multiple efforts to restore the confidence between the two parties. Norwegians must make an effort to bring back the two parties back to the negotiation table. They should have extensive discussions with the government and the LTTE.
Q: The LTTE has asked for a referendum. During Ranil Wickremesinghe regime, this was offered and the LTTE refused. Do you think the ground situation allows for a referendum at this point in time?
A: I do not think the ground situation allows for a referendum right now. I would probably argue that there should be a national referendum now that the President has come to an agreement with the UNP this is the best opportunity to go to the people and ask for a fresh mandate to create a power sharing agreement by changing the constitution. And to obtain through that referendum a mandate to go forward with the negotiations with the LTTE, especially now that 90 percent of the voting population is with the government.
However, there is the question of the de-merger. Therefore the government has to address this issue as it is directly related to peace talks. The Muslims in the East feel sandwiched between the government and the LTTE.
Q: Ranil Wickremesinghe has said that they will agree to the Indian Model of power sharing but the TNA has recently declared that they believe the Indian Model ill-suited for Sri Lanka.
A: there is a lot of play of words. What is important is that we should have the Indian Model as a starting point. But there should be changes and new provisions. We already have a mechanism of power sharing. Within the 13th amendment there is the provincial council system. Now the question is to go beyond the 13th amendment. They should also look at the Panchayat system. This should be as a complement or an addition to the power sharing arrangements at the top. Then the system should be able to introduce both the power sharing agreement for the top and the Panchayat system for below, with major radical changes to the constitution.
Q: The government has put down several points before the LTTE, including the conditions; political parties should have access to all parts of the island, democratic institutions should be allowed to function freely and a single mechanism of law and order should be able to function throughout the country. How practical are these conditions?
A: This is basically a case of putting the cart before the horse. There is a long way to go before achieving these. Certainly they are important points. But the primary matter is how do you avoid hostilities, secondly how do you implement the cease fire agreement, and thirdly how do you address the humanitarian crisis in the North East.
Q: Where do we go from here?
A: The country cannot afford another war. We have to wait for Prabhakaran’s heroes day speech in November which might give an indication in to what Prabhakaran might want. The signals coming out of there however are not very encouraging. There were some LTTE leaders saying that the Tamil people are prepared for a long drawn-out far and that they have to rely on their own strength. Now that kind of signal before the heroes day speech is not a good sign.
TN, 6.11.2006