Looking at the great picture at the start of the war, it could be said that the Romanian Supreme HQ's plans were reasonably correct. In the north, a general offensive all along the border launched by three armies would eventually converge to a shorter, more convenient defensive line. In the south and south-east, after holding their positions the Romanian troops were to go to the offensive after the Russians would have arrived. Due to the geographical situation Romania would have to fight on two fronts, more than 1500 km long, virtually without any kind of support from the Allies.

However, several elements of the plan and some decisions taken at strategic level range from questionable to downright mistakes. First of all, the three Romanian armies advanced far too slowly, so they were unable to help each other, but fought as three completely separate armies instead. When Turtucaia fell, this local insuccess was exaggerated up to the point where some kind of mass-hysteria broke out within the Supreme HQ. The three armies fighting in Transilvania were ordered to stop on totally unsuitable positions and several divisions were rushed to Dobrogea, weakening the Romanian forces just as the German 9th Army was pouring into Transilvania. Afterwards, the Flamanda operation was supposed to eliminate the threat to the south, but it was also stopped, this time due to the situation in the north. The truth is that of the two great strategic moves attempted, none was taken all the way to the end, as the Romanian Supreme HQ seemed unable to decide on which way should it attack. This was to have grave consequences for the months to come.

At the end of the 1916 campaign, Romanian losses stood at 200.000 men killed, wounded, captured and missing in action, which represented 37% of the initial manpower. Material losses were also heavy : 290.000 rifles ( 57% out of the original number ! ), 250 machine guns ( 55% ) and 450 artilerry pieces ( 24% ). These losses were now even more difficult to replace as all the armament shipped from France had to go through Russia.

In 1916, the fighting on the Romanian front was somewhat different from the west. Being much wider, there was not a continuous front line and maneuver was still possible, at least to some extent. Unfortunately, most of the Romanian officers were ignorant to the tactics of modern warfare, as the army fought after the manuals of the 1877 war.

If a Romanian division was in defensive, it usually massed its forces along the likely avenues of attack. Gaps between various units were lightly guarded by platoon-size units manning fixed positions, with the main task of delaying the enemy. A "mobile element" was held close by to provide reinforcements if they were needed. Still, by modern standards, the defense lacked depth as most of the division was deployed on the first line and reserves were too small. Some divisions had over 20 battalions, yet the division's reserve was usually made up of a single one, mayby 2 or 3 in some cases. Even worse, sometimes the reserve was not an organic battalion but a collection of smaller, separate units made up of older, poorly trained men. This meant that all too often, frontline troops had to be pulled out of quiet sectors and rushed to the area where they were needed. Trench warfare demanded a thorough study of fortifications and defensive works, an area where the Romanian army was weak. If there was enough time to prepare, three defensive lines were created : the main surveillance line came first, than 150-200 meters further back the main resistence line and finally the support line , 200 to 400 meters back from the main resistence line. All automatic weapons as well as most of the infantry were placed on the main resistence line. Barbe wire was laid out, but not to the extent of the western front. There was neverteless an interesting inovation : numeorous outposts were pushed forward, sometimes up to 4 kilometers in front of the main lines. This had the effect of taking the main forces out of the range of enemy light and medium artillery ( it's interesting to point out that the Germans didn't used outposts, they pushed their infantry forward as much as they could ). As the defense had to be active, counterattacks were very frequent. They usually targeted the flanks of enemy breakthroughs, but sometimes the forces thrown into theses counterattacks were far too small to achieve anything significant results.

In the attack, the pattern was similar. The division was split into several independent groups and a reserve ( 1-3 battalions and a few batteries ). Each group was preceded by a vanguard up to 30% of its infantry strength and 50% of the artillery. If the enemy resistance was weak, the vanguard was to attack immediately, even with little or no artillery support, as maneuver and initiative were considered far more important than firepower. The manuals stated that a flanking or enveloping attack was preferable, but in practice, frontal assaults were all too frequent, in spite of the heavy losses caused by the enemy machine gun fire. Sometimes, frontal attacks were combined with flanking maneuvers with a high degree of success, but there are not many such examples. The practice of creating independent detachments for specific tasks was sometimes exaggerated, like in the case of the 11th Infantry Division in October when it was split in seven parts. Artillery support was always limited, as there were few heavy batteries, and its effect was limited against dug-in opposition.

The artillery was still far from what the infantrymen needed. The rolling barrage was yet to be discovered and too many batteries were equiped with the puny 53 mm guns. Also, fire control was not efficient enough, just as counterbattery fire was a rare thing. All too many commanders directed the fire of their guns simply by increasing and decreasing the elevation of the guns, "sawing" the target area back and forth. The limited number of machine guns were used for frontal fire, instead of trying to catch the enemy in a crossfire.