Eric Hammell

2/1/99

Media Law and Ethics

Synthesis #2

Conflict: Individual right to privacy and protection from defamation vs. freedom of the press and community’s right to know.

Precedents: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), St. Amant v. Thompson (1968), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Ass’n Foundation (1978)

Thread: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan added the burden of proving actual malice to defamation law. (LMC 207) St. Amant v. Thompson further defined Sullivan’s "reckless disregard" clause. (LMC 215) Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. later removed malice and left liability laws in the hands of individual states. (LMC 187) In Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Ass’n Foundation (1978), the court established means of determining liability of a distributor of defamatory statements. (LMC 151)

Explication: In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the traditional law of defamation which allowed the court to impose liability on the publisher of false statements regardless of the publisher’s degree of care or state of mind was called into question. This traditional law, it was found by the court, did not mesh with the First Amendment. (LMC 206) Public officials, the court said, couldn’t recover damages for defamation unless it is proven that the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice." (LMC 207) This meant the new organization must have known the statement was false, or must have known it was probably false.

In St. Amant v. Thompson, the Court explained that "reckless disregard," as used in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, means more than a failure to check the accuracy of a news story. Instead, there "must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as the truth of his publication." (LMC 215)

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the court found private people do not have to prove the "actual malice" Sullivan required against publishers in a libel suit. (LMC 193) States could establish their own standards of liability to be proven by private individuals, but the State law could not ignore the requirement of proving fault. (LMC 193) Also, "a private plaintiff proving negligence can only collect ‘compensation for actual injury,’ otherwise known as ‘compensatory’ or ‘general’ damages." (LMC 187)

In Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Ass’n Foundation, the court answered questions concerning the distribution of defamatory material. Could a distributor be considered the publisher? The court found, "Those who merely deliver or transmit defamatory material previously published by another will be considered to have published the material only if they knew, or had reason to know, that the material was false or defamatory." (LMC 151) This precedent protected news stand operators, broadcasters carrying network programs, and newspapers republishing wire service reports. (LMC 151). It also set the stage for internet providers’ liability, which was seen in Cubby Inc. v. Compuserve.