Reports
Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, 2d Corps
Falmouth, Va., December 25, 1862.
MAJOR: During the evening of the 10th instant, I was instructed to send two regiments of infantry, the Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman commanding, and the Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Bull com-manding, to the Lacy house, immediately opposite Fredericksburg, in order what they might serve as a protecting party to the engineers engaged in the construction of the pontoon bridges, which were to be erected there in the course of the ensuing morning, and to march with the remainder of my division, at 6 a.m., to a point on the railroad near the bridge over which the division was to cross the Rappahannock.
Late in the afternoon of the 11th instant, orders were received to cross the river at Fredericksburg, by the third bridge. The division moved to effect that object, but, finding that the bridge was not completed, the troops were ordered into bivouac.
The next morning, the 12th instant, at daylight orders were received to march the entire division into Fredericksburg across the second bridge.
At 8 a.m. the division had arrived at that bridge and commenced the passage, the troops of General French's division crossing the upper bridge at the same time. My division was then formed in line of battle, on the street nearest the river, with the left resting on the third bridge, over which the Ninth Corps then commenced marching. French's division formed the second line in my front, and Howard's the first line, in a street nearer the enemy.
At a later hour orders were received to march by the left flank across Hazel Run, thence down the Rappahannock, forming in the rear of General Franklin's grand division, my division taking the lead, and each division of the corps marching in three parallel lines of brigades, the Ninth Corps marching parallel to us, and between our line and the river. To perform this maneuver it became necessary to erect bridges over Hazel Run. Three bridges were constructed. Subsequently it was determined to defer this movement until the next morning.
About 8 a.m. on the 13th instant, I was notified by Major-General Couch, commanding Second Army Corps, that General French's division would attack the enemy in front of the town, and that my division would support him. The formation for the attack was prescribed in the orders received: Brigade front, intervals between the brigades of 200 paces. I first relieved the pickets of General French's division by two regiments of my own, instructing them, however, to reform and join in the assault after General French's skirmishers had driven in the opposing pickets.
At 12 m. General French commenced the attack by a cloud of skirmishers, followed by Kimball's brigade, and subsequently, at intervals, by his other two brigades. My division followed that of General French, without intervals, so long as we moved by the flank. The difficulty of the movement consisted in the fact that we had to march for a considerable distance by the flank through the streets of the town, all the time under a heavy fire, before we were enabled to deploy; and then, owing to obstacles-among them a mill-race--it was impossible to deploy, except by marching the whole length of each brigade by the flank in a line parallel to the enemy's works, after we had crossed the mill-race by the bridge.
The troops then advanced, each brigade in succession, under a most murderous fire of artillery and musketry, the artillery fire reaching the troops in a destructive manner in the town, even before they had commenced the movement. The distance to overcome by the way the troops were obliged to march before reaching the enemy's works was probably 1,700 yards. It took an unusually long time to advance that distance, as the planking of one of the bridges was found to be partly taken up, requiring the men to cross on the stringers.
Colonel Zook's brigade was the first in order. As soon as it had formed line, it advanced to the attack with spirit, passing the point at which the preceding troops had arrived, and being joined as it passed by the brave regiments of Kimball's brigade and some other regiments of French's division. It failed, however, to take the stone wall, behind which the enemy was posted, although our dead were left within 25 paces of it. These troops still held their line of battle in front of the enemy and within close musketry range.
The Irish Brigade next advanced to the assault. The same gallantry was displayed, but with the same results. Caldwell's brigade was next ordered into action, and, although it behaved with the utmost valor, failed to carry the enemy's position. All the troops then formed one line of battle, extending from a point a little distance to the right of Hanover street, in a line nearly parallel to the enemy, with the left thrown back, the extreme left extending about the front of two regiments to the left of the railroad culvert. This line was held during the entire day and until it was relieved, some of the regiments not coming off the field until 10 o'clock the following morning. This line was held for hours after the troops had exhausted their ammunition, and after the ammunition of the killed and wounded within reach had been expended.
Shortly after the last of my brigades came into action, it appeared as if the front crest of the enemy's hill might have been taken had there been other troops at hand, for the enemy were at that time running from their rifle-pits and works on the crest directly in front of our right. But by the time Howard's troops were ready to attack, the enemy had repaired this, and making a strong attack at the same time toward our left, it became necessary that a portion of that division should be detached toward that flank. After this hour it appeared to me, although reports were occasionally received that we were gaining ground, which led us to hope it might prove true, that, our object having failed, the only thing to be done was to maintain our front line by constantly supporting it until darkness covered the scene.
At one time, about 3 p.m., the enemy essayed an attack in column down Hanover street, and advanced within 150 yards of our front line. The leader being killed, the column was dispersed. Several gallant attacks by Howard, Sturgis, Humphreys, Griffin, and others were afterward made in support of these brave troops, who could not advance and would not retire. These subsequent attacks, although conducted with spirit, failed to produce any more serious impression upon the enemy.
Late in the evening three companies of Colonel Owen's brigade relieved three companies of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, of my division, which had exhausted their ammunition.
No ground was held in advance of our line, nor did any soldiers fall nearer the enemy than those of the regiments of my division and those of Kimball's brigade, of French's division. It seemed that the defenses of the enemy were too powerful to be taken by an assault of infantry. One serious difficulty in the advance was in the nature of the obstacles already referred to, and the fact that a number of substantial fences intervened, which were required to be pulled down before the troops could continue their advance. Each of these fences destroyed the unity of at least one brigade. These obstacles naturally caused brigades and regiments to lose somewhat their solidity of organization for an assault, for all these operations were conducted under a terrific fire.
The bravery and devotion of the troops could not have been surpassed, as an evidence of which it is but necessary to mention the losses incurred. Out of 5,006 men, the maximum taken into action by me, the loss was 2,013 men, of whom 156 were commissioned officers. It will be observed that the losses in some of the regiments were of unusual severity, such as is seldom seen in any battle, no matter how prolonged. These were veteran regiments, led by able and tried commanders, and I regret to say that their places cannot soon be filled.
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