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Page 3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MAY 5, 1862.--Battle of Williamsburg, Va. Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U.S. Army, commanding First Brigade. |
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I then sent Lieutenant Farquhar, of the Engineers, back to represent to General Sumner my position, with a view of showing the disadvantage of falling back at that time and giving up the advantages we had already secured, for which we might have to fight again the next day in order to recover, besides the bad impression it would make on my troops, and the inspiriting effect it would have upon the enemy, who were then engaged in a furious contest with our troops in front of Fort Magruder. I directed Mr. Farquhar to inform General Sumner that I would obey the order to fall back if no answer should arrive when a reasonable time had elapsed. While I was awaiting a reply to this message the crisis of the battle in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have arrived, and in order to furnish all the assistance possible our battery threw percussion shell into that fort. The artillery also fired into all the re-enforcements and caissons passing into Fort Magruder at and before this time. This annoyed the enemy so much that he finally brought out one or two pieces of artillery and turned them upon our advanced line, exploding shell within the line of our skirmishers, and in one instance reaching our battery. Previously the enemy had thrown round shot into the battery, killing and wounding some of our men. Our artillery was superior in efficiency to theirs, and the enemy, perceiving this, ceased firing. In the mean time I had two pieces disabled, one from carelessness in placing the shell in the piece in an improper position, and the other from its being fired at an elevation so great that the axle was broken. Affairs remaining in this position, and Lieutenant Farquhar not having returned, at 4.20 p.m. I addressed a written communication to General Smith, stating that I would wait a reasonable time to get an answer from General Sumner before falling back. I awaited an answer to this communication till 5.10 o'clock p.m. The clouds had become very heavy over us and the rain was drenching the troops. I concluded to make my dispositions for the night. I was just giving my orders to fall back and occupy the crest on which the redoubt was situated, as a preparatory movement to a further withdrawal, hoping, however, that I might yet receive re-enforcements before I was fully prepared to make a final movement to the rear. I trusted that the thickness of the weather would prevent the enemy from observing that I was retiring, and had delayed for some little time with that object in view. Just at this moment I observed that the enemy were throwing infantry into the redoubts on my front and that my skirmishers were firing on them. I immediately apprehended danger. A column of the enemy's cavalry now came out from behind a point of the woods near the redoubt to the right. The skirmishers kept up a constant fire upon this cavalry, doing good execution, at about 400 yards distance. Observing these movements, I immediately dispatched a staff officer to General Smith to notify him of the state of affairs. The enemy still persisting in their attempts to form, preparatory to a charge on my artillery, I ordered some shell to be thrown into them, and then directed the artillery to retire rapidly, piece by piece, to my second line. About this time I was informed that a regiment of the enemy had gone into the woods on my left, with a view of flanking me there, and seeing the enemy's infantry break through the woods in front of the right flank of my advanced line, and anticipating a still more serious movement from that direction toward my rear, I ordered the two regiments on the left of the battery to fall back in line of battle to the crest on the left of the redoubt. The Sixth Maine Regiment, the nearest to the battery, retired about half the distance to the crest, and then halted, faced to the front, and waited to collect their skirmishers, who were holding the ground in front with the greatest pertinacity against those of the enemy, who had occupied the left redoubt. In the mean time the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, on the left of the Sixth Maine, retreated steadily until it came to the crest, when it halted, faced to the front, called its colors and guides on the line, and dressed as if on parade. The Sixth Maine Regiment again faced to the rear, and falling back to the crest established a perfect line in the same manner as the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers. The Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, which was on the right of the battery, on first seeing the enemy's cavalry debouch from the woods had formed square to repel an assault. This cavalry, after great persistence, having been checked by our skirmishers and artillery, and a brigade of the enemy's infantry having broken through the woods and commenced deployment, I directed the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers to fall back in line of battle, fighting. The colonel had not thought of retiring until he received this order. The last piece of artillery, having thrown several discharges of canister into the enemy when within 100 yards, now limbered up and fell back as rapidly as possible, the ground being exceedingly heavy, to our second position. The Fifth Wisconsin Regiment, which had been firing for some time, then commenced retiring in the direction of the redoubt, disputing the ground inch by inch, and assisted somewhat by the artillery from the crest. Previous to this I had ordered the Seventh Maine Volunteers, on my extreme right, to fall back behind its original line, with its right thrown back against the woods, in order to be ready to meet an assault from that quarter. Intending to place the Fifth Wisconsin into and on the right and left of the redoubt, I withdrew the three companies of the Thirty third New York Volunteers who were in it, and formed them on the left of the Seventh Maine, placing a portion of my artillery between them and the redoubt. The necessity of throwing back the Seventh Maine, and also the three companies of the Thirty-third New York, to make my right flank more secure, prevented me from having a direct fire from them over the crest. I had great difficulty in getting the artillery into position on the right and left of the redoubt, owing partly to the bad state of the ground from the long-continued rain, and partly to the fact that in the gallop from their first position the cannoneers had generally been left behind. Some few pieces unlimbered, and several discharges were delivered at the enemy; but finding the firing very slow, seeing also that the enemy had no artillery in his advance, and having sufficient infantry to line the whole crest, I ordered the artillery back to a third position on the plain between us and the dam, sending the caissons and the disabled pieces in advance. I then threw two companies of the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania in the woods on the left, to give me notice of the approach of the enemy from that direction. Colonel Mason, of the Seventh Maine, anticipating my order in this, as in every case, threw a portion of his regiment into the woods in his rear, to defend a road leading to the right of our position toward Williamsburg. Fearing that the Fifth Wisconsin would not arrive in time I directed four companies of the Sixth Maine, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler, to march into the redoubt, and now only waited for that gallant regiment, the Fifth Wisconsin, already sorely pressed by the enemy, to get into position before I advanced to the attack. When the advanced companies of the Fifth Wisconsin had reached the crest I formed a part of them on the left of the redoubt, on the same ground from which I had taken the four companies of the Sixth Maine, to garrison the work, and formed the remainder behind the crest on the right of the redoubt. At this moment the advance of the enemy was under the crest and within 30 paces of my command. I ordered a forward movement to the crest. The whole line advanced cheering, and on arriving there delivered two volleys, doing great execution. The order was then given to charge down the slope, and with reiterated cheers the whole command advanced in line of battle. A few of the leading spirits of the enemy were bayoneted; the remainder then broke and fled. The want of protection in my rear, and expecting an assault from that quarter every moment, I ordered a halt at the foot of the slope, and delivered a terrible fire along the whole line, expending from 15 to 20 rounds. The plunging fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the right, and the oblique fire from the left were so destructive that after it had been ordered to cease and the smoke arose it seemed that no man had left the ground unhurt who had advanced within 500 yards of our line. The enemy were completely routed and dispersed. The circumstances before mentioned only prevented me from reaping the entire fruits of the victory by continuing the advance. The second line of the enemy, yet in position on our front, seemed to halt paralyzed. At the movement of the advance, having sent for a section of artillery, I directed a few shell to be thrown at them, when they disappeared. The regiment that had entered the woods on my left flank also retreated rapidly, not having had time before the defeat of the first line to become engaged with us. Having learned from the prisoners captured that the enemy had sent two regiments to my right and rear I made preparations to receive them, expecting an immediate attack, knowing full well the importance of the position I held, and the necessity the enemy was under of driving me across the dam, if they intended holding Fort Magruder that night. As soon as the action was decided I sent out men to succor the wounded and collect the dead for burial. The flankers of the Thirty-third New York Volunteers, who had been on my right, held their position during the fight, with the exception of one small company, which was separated from the remainder by one of the enemy's columns piercing them in passing through the woods. They are missing, supposed to be taken prisoners. These skirmishers were in a favorable position to capture fugitives of the enemy when they made their disorderly retreat before our line, and they returned burdened with them. It being now late in the evening, and my re-enforcements not yet having arrived, I could not pursue with prudence the retreating enemy, and held my position, believing it to be the best ground for us, should the enemy renew the contest. For these reasons I permitted the enemy to pick up a great many of the wounded and dead on the field and in the woods. A large number were thus carried off, and many died in the woods, of which we had no account at that time, although they were discovered the next day, together with those in the hospitals, in the rear of the woods and in Williamsburg. |
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Reports Index |
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Williamsburg Correspondence |
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Page Two | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Page Four | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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