ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

15 FEBRUARY 1944 -- 4 APRIL 1944

NEW GUINEA

After a long voyage from New York, the Swanson arrived in Milne Bay, New Guinea on 15 February 1944 and then on to Buna Roads, New Guinea arriving on 19 February 1944. From then until 3 March, the Swanson served as escort for convoys moving to and from Buna, Lae, New Guinea and Cape Gloucester, New Britain. Cape Gloucester had been seized on 26 December 1943 when transports carrying the 1^st Marine Division crossed the Dampier Strait and landed the Marines on the westernmost tip of Cape Gloucester, New Britain.

The officers and men of the Swanson were cognizant of the fact; they would now be fighting a different type of war and enemy. In the Atlantic and Mediterranean the major threat had been the highly efficient and successful German U-Boats. The real threat in the Pacific would be the Japanese air force and surface naval units. The Japanese military forces under their Shinto Religion, were bound by solemn vows never to surrender to an enemy. Suicide or hara-kiri was a moral principle to be followed in case of a military failure or in hopeless situations, which they demonstrated time and again during the months ahead. They had the utmost contempt for an enemy who surrendered and did not die fighting. Prisoners if taken, at best were treated harshly or they were executed. Japan did not recognize the Geneva Convention, and international agreement among some nations, governing the war-time treatment of prisoners and of sick and wounded.

The tide of the war in the Pacific was turning against the Japanese. In the coming months many vicious and brutal battles would be fought on land, sea and in the air, with a large loss of lives, ships and planes. Fortunately the Japanese sustained the greater losses, due to U.S. strategy, particularly the by-passing of Japanese strong holds, such as Rabaul, New Britain and leap frogging deep into Japanese areas leaving some major Japanese forces to “wither on the vine.” so to speak.

The Swanson in the months ahead would play a definite part in defeating the enemy. In course of those actions, the Swanson would fire in excess of 3110 rounds of 5”/38 caliber projectiles, 3577 rounds of 40mm, and 5556 rounds of 20mm at the enemy , while rendering close in fire support of troops ashore or at enemy aircraft.

THE ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed General MacArthur to by-pass Rabaul, New Britain and captures the Admiralty Islands, with a tentative date set for 1 April 1944. On 23 February 1944 B-25 bombers had flown over Los Negroes Island in the Admiralty Islands at tree top level for over an hour without sighting any sign of life. Previous intelligence estimates had put the Japanese troop strength in the Admiralties ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 troops. The assumption was that the Japanese may be evacuating or had abandoned the Islands. So General MacArthur ordered a “Reconnaissance in Force” consisting of one squadron squadron of the 1^st Cavalry Division (Dismounted) to be landed on Los Negros on 29 February with a provision in the instruction that if resistance to the landing is too great the landing force will be withdrawn.

Rear Admiral Barbey would be unable to use available LST’s, LCI’s and LCT’s because they were too slow to meet the scheduled landing date. There were 3 APDs available and 9 accompanying destroyers would be used to carry troops. This was one of the few instances in World War II that destroyers were used to transport troops for an invasion. As a fighting ship the destroyer lacks the accommodations for troops.

On 27 February a Navy seaplane carried a Scouting Party of 1 officer and 5 men to Los Negros for intelligence gathering. Later in the day they reported: “Could not get to the river lousy with Japs.”

The B-25 planes had not spotted life because Colonel Yoshio Ezaki had ordered his troops to stay out of sight during daylight hours and not to fire on reconnaissance planes.

On 29 February at dawn the Cavalry troops were beginning their landing under the cover of naval gunfire from destroyers off Hyane Harbor, Los Negros Island.. The Japanese withdrew into the jungle. By sundown the opposition had not been great and the reinforcements waiting at Finschafen, New Guinea had been ordered forward. At 1729 hours General Macarthur embarked in the cruiser Phoenix departed from the area taking the cruiser Nashville and destroyers Reid, Stevenson, Flusser, Mahan, Drayton, Smith, Welles, and the APD’s Humphrey’s, Brooks, Sands with him enroute to Cape Sudest. The destroyers Stockton and Bush were left off Hyane Harbor to furnish gunfire support for the troops ashore. By evening Brig. General W.C. Chase heard the unsettling reports by returning patrols that the Japanese were present in far greater strength than had been reported earlier in the day. So he withdrew his troops to a smaller perimeter.

Colonel Ezaki, suspecting the landing in Hyane Harbor to be a feint and that the American main force would be landing in Seeadler Harbor, started committing his troops piecemeal against the U.S. troops at dawn on 1 March. The 1^st Cavalry troops were able to hold on but suffered large number of casualties. After sunset the Japanese attacked in greater numbers and with more determination. There was desperate hand-to-hand combat at times with the Japanese as the 1^st Cavalry troops held on.

The Japanese commander issued the following orders to an infantry battalion defending Hyane Harbor sector:

“Tonight the battalion under Captain Baba will annihilate the enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case of capture is imminent. We must carry out our mission with the present strength and annihilate the enemy on the spot. I am highly indignant about the enemy’s arrogant attitude.”

The only way for the 1000 cavalrymen to hold their small jungle area at night against an infiltrating enemy was for each man to stay in his foxhole and fire at anything that moved. A Japanese using a sword killed an officer who decided to sleep in a hammock above his foxhole.

On 2 March the USS Mullany accompanying two minesweepers within Seeadler Harbor was fired on from Hauwei Island. The fire was intense. The HMAS Warramunga, USS Bush and Ammen came to the assistance of the Mullany, in an attempt to knock out the estimated five 4” guns. It was assumed the guns were silenced. At 0930 hours the long awaited reinforcements of 1500 combat troops and 534 naval CB’s arrived at Hyane Harbor in six LST’s escorted by three destroyers, which would be able to furnish additional gun fire support.

The Seabees instead of being used to repair the airfield were pressed into service as combat troops. As the Japanese mounted stronger assaults and were frequently breaking through the American lines, the issue was in doubt. General Chase sent urgent appeals for help.

General Krueger requested Admiral Barbey to transport 1250 troops to Hyane Harbor from Oro Bay to arrive at dawn on 4 March.

Rear Admiral Barbey by visual dispatch dated 2 March at 0850 hours notified Swanson to transport 105 men of the 5^th Cavalry Unit, as part of Task Group 76.1.3.

At 0700 hours the 5^th Cavalry Unit came aboard the Swanson for transportation to Hyane Harbor, Los Negros Island, Admiralty Islands. Many of the Swanson seaman voluntarily gave up their bunks so the Cavalrymen would be able to get a nights sleep prior to landing.

At 1120 hours the Swanson was underway to join Task Group 76.1.3 composed of Destroyers: Drayton, Stevenson, Smith, HMAS Arunta, Wilkes, Flusser, Thorne, Nicholson, Swanson and four APD’s. Each destroyer of Task Group 76.1.3 had on board about 100 troops and 2 tons of stores. Each unit of Task Group 76.1.2 was transporting about 170 troops and five tons of stores. This Task Group would be able to cover the 500 miles from Buna Roads to Los Negros Island easily in 20 hours.

On 4 March at 0745 hours the Swanson began to patrol eastward of Hyane Harbor to provide anti-submarine protection for convoy, which was making preparations for unloading troops. In combat information center continuous radar sweeps were being made to warn of any approach of enemy aircraft or surface ships.

The enemy was still firmly entrenched north of native skidway (just northwest of Momote airstrip) in target area’s #7,8,9. General Chase ordered a bombard of this area beginning at 0500 hours, which was carried out by destroyers Warramunga and Welles, to prevent the enemy from firing on our landing craft as they entered Hyane Harbor carrying troops. During the debarkation the first few waves met machine gun fire from North Point. Warramunger assisted by Drayton took the enemy machine guns under fire and silenced them.

At 1305 hours Task Group 26.3 departed from the Admiralty Islands leaving the Swanson, Wilkes, Nicholson, and Smith as naval gunfire support vessels. Whose mission was: (a) Furnish fire support as called for by forces ashore, or at targets of opportunity. (b) Destruction of enemy barges. (c) Destruction of enemy surface forces attempting to support or reinforce Japanese troops ashore. The Swanson assumed Fighter Director duty.

At1745 completed receiving 14 wounded Army personnel aboard and they were placed under the care of Lieut. Sidney Gaines, M.D., Chief Pharmacist Mate John Anderson, and Pharmacist Mate 2/c Edward Engberg.

At 1930 hours an unidentified plane passed directly overhead. At 2115 the Smith reported unidentified planes in the area.

On 5 March the enemy resistance and strength to the north of our troops perimeter at Hyane Harbor was still strong and patrols sent out were unable to advance beyond the native skid way. Our patrols were able to reconnoiter freely in other directions. One patrol discovered a group of 79 Japanese in a group on Porlaka Road to the west who had committed suicide with hand grenades.

The Army decided to wait the arrival on 6 March of the 12^th Cavalry before launching the attack on Salami Plantation. The objective was to gain control of the eastern side of Seeadler Harbor, formed by the Mokerang Peninsula. Seizure of Salami Plantation with its excellent beach on the west coast of the Peninsula, would furnish a base for shore-to-shore invasion against Lorengau. An enemy document entitled “Emergency Defensive Plan” dated 1 July 1943 and drawn up for the force defending the Hyane Harbor sector, gave directions based on the supposition Lorengau would be the point of the American main landings. Therefore the major defense was concentrated on Lorengau and Seeadler Harbor. Los Negros was designated as the place for a last-ditch resistance in the event of a landing at Lorengau.

The Army Shore Fire Control Party requested the Swanson to bombard Japanese along the west beaches inside Hyane Harbor (target 9). At 0600 hours the Swanson began firing main battery (5”/38 Cal.) and completed the mission by 0610 having expended 66 rounds.

At 1100 hours, General Swift arrived to take command of the advanced forces of the 1^st Cavalry Divisions. He immediately ordered the 2^nd Squadron, 7 th Cavalry, to move across the skid way to a point 500 yards north. The advance did not move out smoothly. The Japanese began strong attacks from both Porlaka and the skid way. Which resulted in the Shore fire control party calling on the Swanson for controlled fire against targets 7,8,9, beginning at 1345 hours and continuing until 1456 hours.

The following is quoted from the Swanson’s Commanding Officer Action Report:

“At 1345 the shore fire control party called for controlled fire against enemy positions in target areas 7, 8, and 9. Spots were made after each four-gun salvo and when the single salvos had been spotted on the target, three salvos of rapid fire were called for. This procedure was applied to five targets in all. Although the shoreline just in front of these targets was clearly visible, dense jungle foliage prevented observations of the results. However at least two straddles were reported on each target and direct hits are believed to have been made on a machine gun nest and a Japanese barge loaded with troops hidden in the foliage. Altogether this fire is believed to have been most effective in driving the Japanese from the strip of land west of Hyane Harbor.”

From 1345 to 1456 hours the Swanson fired 164 rounds of 5”/38 cal. projectiles into enemy targets.

On 5 March, the USS Nicholson DD442, (Cdr. W.W. Vanous) was ordered to approach Hauwei Island and Seeadler Harbor to draw fire from enemy shore batteries and thus determine their location.

The enemy withheld their fire until the Nicholson was at 850 yards range, then they opened fire with their120 mm (4.7”) naval guns. The Nicholson was hit in her #2 gun, which put the gun out of action, killed 3 men, and seriously wounded two.

The Nicholson was subsequently credited with destroying two enemy guns, including the one that struck her. The mission was a success in determining Japanese shore strength and gun positions, enabling the Army to select suitable landing areas in Seeadler Harbor out of range of hostile gunfire.

During the night of March 5/6 at 2105 Japanese planes were in the area and a stick of bombs was dropped in the vicinity of Momote Airdrome. Fire was not opened on these planes nor did they sight the Swanson.

This marked the end of the toehold phase of the operation, and the beginning of the successful seizure and control of the Islands. Our forces broke out of the tight perimeter the next morning and advanced northward nearly three miles to Salami Plantation. The following day it was westward to Papitalai Harbor. There was more to come, but we were now on the offensive.

On 6 March the Commanding Officer of the Swanson wrote in his Action Report:

“At 2100 hours the Swanson, in response from shore fire control party fired 41 rounds of 5”/38 cal. projectiles at Papitalai Mission using indirect fire and with no spots from shore. Results could not be observed, but the shore fire party reported that the fire was effective.”

Salami beach was won on 6 March and from captured enemy documents it was determined that it was the Japanese Iwakami Battalion that had defended this area. Six hundred men had been lost in the skid way area and in attacks on the perimeter. The remaining 200, with an additional 100 stragglers from other units, were ordered to retreat to Papitalai Harbor then to Papitalai Mission.

The following is quoted from Commanding Officers Action Report:

“During the morning word was received that our troops had advanced along the west coast of Hyane Harbor and were also on the North Point, and that at 1400 Papitalai Mission would be attacked by ground forces.

At 0915, shore fire control party called for bombardment of Papitalai Mission and at 0935, 39 rounds were delivered. In response to a smaller call 40 rounds were delivered at 1030.

This target was visible and fire on both occasions appeared to be extremely accurate. Bursts were seen all around the Mission house and holes were visible in the mission itself after the firing.”

At 2020 hours the Swanson in company with the Wilkes and seven landing barges, with the Swanson providing anti-submarine screen for Wilkes and barges, which are in column; set course for Seeadler Harbor.

At 2140 hours enemy aircraft bombed and strafed U.S. positions on Los Negros Island.

On 8 March at 0720 the Swanson sighted the USS Long and Hamilton bearing 110 degrees true, 12 miles. These high speed Minesweepers were assigned the task of removing 11 magnetic mines previously sewn in Seeadler Harbor by U.S. Aircraft and to sweep for any mines placed there by the Japanese.

The following is quoted from the Commanding Officer Action Report:

“At 0745 March 8, Hamilton and Long also arrived off the entrance to Seeadler Harbor and a conference of destroyer and mine sweeper commanding officers was held with CDD26. As a result the Hamilton, Long, Wilkes, and Swanson formed column in that and proceeded through the harbor entrance at 0945. Hamilton was fitted with paravane sweeps and Long with Magnetic. The mission of Wilkes and Swanson was to protect these vessels as they swept a channel and also to protect the seven landing barges as they proceeded to newly won beach on the west shore of Salami Plantation. Ineffective heavy machine gun fire was encountered from enemy batteries on the eastern point of Hauwei Island, which was quickly silenced by 40mm fire from the Wilkes. During the morning and afternoon sweeping operations continued, interrupted at intervals by casualties to the sweeping gear. Three magnetic mines were destroyed near the harbor entrance by Long and the swept channel buoyed.”

Upon entering the harbor entrance the formation had fired upon the machine gun nests on Hauwei Island and then at 1056 the seven landing craft left the formation and proceeded to their assigned landing area. At 1145 a Japanese Machine gun nest on Hauwei Island opened fire on Minesweepers and Swanson silenced the machine gun nest with 40mm gunfire.

The following is quoted from Commanding Officers Action Report:

“At 1317, this vessel fired 165 rounds 5”/38 ammunition at Lombrum Point (Shaded area on enclosure (A) shows extent of target coverage). This fire, which was continued until 1344, was requested by shore fire control party to precede assault by our ground forces at 1400. Since the target was clearly visible and the range short almost every shot burst within the area and it is believed that enemy forces were completely cleared before the arrival of our troops.

At 1600 Wilkes, Long, and Hamilton departed for the Hyane Harbor area, leaving the Swanson to patrol off the entrance to Seeadler Harbor in order to prevent the laying of mines in the newly swept entrance.

The records of Colonel Ezaki messages to the 8^th Area Army Headquarters ends after this message on 8 March:

“The Sabukaleo Sector unit carried out a night attack and did considerable damage, but the enemy successfully increased his strength with support of terrific bombardment and shelling; moreover, they have established a gun position by the water’s edge at Papitalai and are advancing. Tonight the 8^th (March) the Garrison Unit, together with the Sabukaleo Sector unit, as well as a platoon of infantry will carry out a night attack against the enemy at Papitalai and Sabukaleo”.

These planned night attacks did not take place. The Sabukaleo Sector unit referred to was located at Papitalai Mission and the Garrison unit was the 51^st Transportation Regiment of Manus.

Colonel Ezaki Headquarters during the early days of the invasion was located at Papitalai, and then at Papatalai Mission. It is not known where he next moved his Headquarter to. Did he move his Headquarters to Lombrum Point?

The following is quoted from Commanding Officer Action Report:

“At 0930, March 9, a convoy consisting of 6 LST’s and 6 LCM’s and USS Etamin escorted by six destroyers stood towards the entrance to Seeadler Harbor, accompanied by Wilkes, Hamilton, and Long. At 1106 this vessel led the six LST’s and six LCM’s in single column down the swept channel into Seeadler Harbor from the inner end of which the LST’s and LCM’s proceeded to the beach at Salami Plantation. At 1245 Etamin proceeded by Hamilton and Long with sweeps streamed, proceeded to an anchorage off Salami Plantation.”

As of 9 March the Japanese had lost 1,288 troops killed. The U.S. had lost 116 killed and 434 wounded. No prisoners had been taken by either side, which considered along with the Japanese suicides occurring when they failed to take their objective was indicative of the type of combat taking place ashore. It was kill or be killed.

The American forces including the destroyers had extracted a toll upon the enemy. More than a ten to one kill ratio. Particularly effective was controlled fire when spotters working with a naval liaison officer could direct the destroyer fire onto enemy troops or when the target was visible to the destroyers for direct fire.

Although the Army now had their own artillery in place and were using it to support their troops. They had developed an appreciation of a destroyer capability and asked for one of our gunnery officers to be assigned ashore with them as liaison and as a spotter. Ensign John V. Lindsay, assistant gunnery officer drew the assignment and left us temporarily for instructions on the USS Bush and further transfer ashore.

The following is quoted from the Commanding Officer Action Report:

“Naval gunfire was extremely accurate and apparently had a devastating effect. Conditions were ideal both for direct and indirect fire. The ship dead in the water, no appreciable wind or sea, good visibility, short range, and no distraction by enemy forces simplified the gunnery problem resulting in accurate firing with a minimum of compensation.”

At 2045 the Swanson took station on the port beam at 3000 yards from convoy guide. Steaming in company with USS Stevenson, Welles, Smith, Wilkes, Nicholson, Hamilton and Long as escorts for six LST’s enroute Los Negro Island to Buna Roads, New Guinea.

On 16 March at 0850 LST convoy H-4 and the Swanson arrived at Seeadler Harbor entrance and the LST’s were proceeding into the Harbor. The Swanson began patrolling area northeast of the Harbor entrance.

At 2116 hours the Swanson as requested by Army shore fire conrol party commenced firing at targets 134 and 135, bearing 202 degrees true distance 11,800 yards. (Lorengau Airfield area). The destroyers and the Army artillery were putting down harassing fire on Japanese bunkers as close as 50 yards from our own troops in order to prevent any infiltration or movement of the enemy during the night.

Ensign John V. Lindsay who was on temporary duty with the Army shore fire control party was directing this controlled fire from the Swanson, which continued until 0548 hours on 17 March. During that period the Swanson 36 rounds of 5”/38 caliber ammunition.

At 1435 hours on 18 March Ensign John V. Lindsay reported aboard the Swanson to resume his regular duties having completed temporary duty as Liaison officer with the Army forces ashore on Los Negros and Manus Island.

By voice radio the Army ashore thanked the Swanson for John Lindsay services and the excellent manner in which he carried out his duty.

At 1250 hours on 19 March the Swanson in company with the USS Stevenson and Wilkes was steaming enroute to the south side of Los Negros Island to bombard enemy positions on Los Negros Island.

The 2^nd squadron 5^th Cavalry was advancing from South east point towards Palapi Hill.

At 1501 as requested by Army shore fore control party, the Swanson commenced firing on enemy shore positions bearing 002 degrees true, and at a range of only 3000 yards. The firing was almost point blank. 1540 hours the Swanson ceased firing on Japanese positions having expended 388 rounds of 5”/38 caliber ammunition. This completed the Swanson’s firing of guns at the Japanese of the Admiralty Islands.

CONCLUSION

The number of men, weapons, ships, and planes involved in the battle for the Admiralty Islands was small; however the consequences of failure would have been extremely significant. The purpose of the war in the Southwest Pacific would have been drastically slowed by our defeat in the Admiralties, but our successes there, culminating in the seizure of the finest harbor- SEEADLER- in the whole Pacific, was a great step forward at a relatively minor cost, and considerably ahead of schedule.

In addition the seizure of the Admiralties sealed off the Bismarck-Solomon’s area from the enemy supply and reinforcements, thereby isolating and making impotent over 100,000 enemy troops.

The Swanson along with other destroyers performed effectively during the critical period when the 1^st Cavalry Troops were in a bitter life and death struggle for Los Negros Island. At times the fight became hand-to-hand combat. The Swanson delivered close in fire support when called upon to do so. That was her duty and she did it.

Brig. General W.C. Chase , USA, who was ashore commanding the 1^st Cavalry Troops and involved in the fighting, has this to say when asked afterwards about the Naval support: “They didn’t support us, they saved our necks.”

Admiral Fletcher who commanded the Naval Task Force at the Admiralty Islands, lauded Destroyer Division 26,which at that time consisted of the USS Wilkes, Nicholson, Swanson, and Smith for : “An excellent performance “;” Fire support units on call in immediate assault area contributed materially to progress of forces ashore.”

Even more important, the officers and men of the Swanson knew they had done their duty.

CASUALTIES

Japanese US

Killed 3,280 326

Wounded 1,189

Missing 4

Captured 79