U.S.S. SWANSON with TASK GROUP 34.9
CENTER ATTACK GROUP
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
TO FEDHALA, AFRICA
The Swanson having arrived at Norfolk, Virginia,
with Destroyer Squadron 13 from Casco Bay, Maine on 2 October 1942 would now be
undergoing three weeks of training. There were Cruisers, Destroyers, Fast
Attack Transports, Cargo Ships and Fleet Tankers present or arriving. Troops were being embarked and Cargo Ships
were being loaded. A tight lid of security had been imposed, as secrecy was
vital. The officers and men of the Swanson knew that outside of HAMPTON ROADS
in the Atlantic ocean German submarines lurked and were very proficient in
their art of sinking ships. At that
time Germany had 382 submarines with 100 submarines operational.
On 23 October 1942, numerous Warships, Fast Attack
Transports, Cargo Ships and Fleet Tankers quietly got underway and proceeded out
of HAMPTON ROADS to sea. Which left officers and men of the Swanson wondering ;
where are they bound for? Task Group34.8 (Northern Attack Group) and Task Group
34.10 (Southern Attack Group) sailed on a diversionary Southeastern course from HAMPTON ROADS and would rendezvous with
Task Force 34 on 27 October.
At 0808 on Saturday 24 October 1942 the Swanson
got underway from alongside the USS
Wilkes at Pier #5 at the Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia and proceeded
out to sea. At 1700 the Swanson took station in the anti-submarine screen on
the starboard bow of Task Group 34.9, on a base course of 074 degrees true at
14 knots.
The speculation was now ended. LCDR. L.M. MARKHAM,
Jr., Commanding Officer of the Swanson had been briefed just prior
to sailing. When the Swanson joined Task Group 34.9 (Center Attack
Group) at sea, the officers and men were informed that we were bound for North
Africa. There was subdued elation and a feeling of satisfaction. The Swanson was part of a substantial Military
Force proceeding on an operation to move the United States one step closer to
victory. Germany had rolled swiftly across Europe and into Russia, and up to
the Suez Canal in North Africa. The Japanese had enjoyed spectacular success in
moving into the Western and Southwestern Pacific. The officers and men of the
Swanson had no way of knowing the true implications of the 4 June 1942 Battle of Midway; the 23
October 1942 British attacks in the
Second Battle of Alamein, North
Africa and the Battle raging around Stalingrad, Russia during November 1942.
The tide was turning in favor of the Allies.
The Swanson and Task Group 34.9 was sailing east
north east in perfect Atlantic Autumn weather with moderate sea and a brisk
wind from the southeast.
Radio silence had been imposed and line of sight TBS
(talk between ships) had been ordered to be kept to a minimum. During the first day there was unnecessary use of
the TBS. During daylight the main communication method was Flag hoist and 12
inch searchlight. The Swanson was on the inner sound screen in sight of the
Flagship USS Augusta carrying Admiral Hewitt, and responsible for relaying
visual messages to a Destroyer in the outer sound screen. At times it seemed if
the Signalmen were knee deep in signal flags and the 12 inch searchlights
really got a work-out relaying messages to the outer screen destroyers, however
all signals were promptly received, relayed and executed timely.
TASK GROUP 34.1
Covering Group
USS MASSACHUSETTS BB59 USS WAINWRIGHT DD419
USS WICHITA CA45 USS MAYRANT DD402
USS TUSCALOOSA CA37 USS RHIND DD404
USS
CHEMUNG AO30 USS JENKINS DD447
TASK GROUP 34.8
Northern Attack Group
USS
TEXAS BB35 USS ROE DD418
USS
SAVANNAH CL42 USS LIVERMORE DD329
USS
HENRY T. ALLEN AP30 USS KEARNY DD432
USS
JOHN PENN AP51 USS PARKER DD604
USS GEORGE CLYMER AP57 USS ERICSSON DD440
USS SUSAN B. ANTHONY AP72 USS DALLAS
DD199
USS
FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE AP70 USS EBERLE DD430
USS
ANNE ARUNDEL AP76 USS RAVEN AM55
USS ELECTRA AK21 USS OSPREY AM56
USS
ALGORAB AK25 USS BARNEGAT AV10
USS
KENNEBEC AO36 SS CONTESSA (Honduran)
TASK GROUP 34.9
Center Attack Group
USS
AUGUSTA CA31 USS WILKES DD441
USS
BROOKLYN CL40 USS SWANSON DD443
USS
LEONARD WOOD AP25 USS LUDLOW DD428
USS THOMAS JEFFERSON AP60 USS
MURPHY DD603
USS CHARLES
CARROLL AP58 USS BRISTOL DD453
USS
WILLIAM P. BIDDLE AP15 USS EDISON DD439
USS
JOSEPH HEWES AP50 USS TILLMAN DD641
USS
TASKER H. BLISS AP42 USS BOYLE DD600
USS
EDWARD RUTLEDGE AP52 USS ROWAN DD405
USS
HUGH L. SCOTT AP43 USS PALMER DMS 5
USS
ANCON AP66 USS HOGAN DMS 6
USS
ELIZABETH C. STANTON AP69 USS STANSBURY DMS 8
USS
THURSTON AP77 USS TERROR CM 5
USS
PROCYON AP19 USS MIANTONOMAHCM 10
USS
OBERON AP56 USS AUK AM
57
USS ARCTURUS AP18 USS WINOOSKI AO 38
TASK GROUP
34.10 Southern Attack Group
USS
NEW YORK BB USS MERVINE DD489
USS PHILIDELPHIA CL USS KNIGHT DD633
USS HARRIS AP8 USS BEATTY DD640
USS
CALVERT AP65 USS COWIE DD632
USS
DOROTHEA A. DIX AP67 USS QUICK DD490
USS
LYON AP71 USS DORAN DD634
USS
LAKEHURST AP49 USS COLE DD155
USS
TITANIA AK55 USS BERNADOU DD153
USS
HOUSATONIC AO35 USS HAMILTON DMS18
USS
MERRIMACK AO37 USS HOWARD DMS 7
USS MONADNOCK CM
9 USS CHEROKEE AT 66
The Center Attack Group,
Task Group 34.9 of which the Swanson was a part bound for FEDHALA,
French Morocco, North Africa was the key element of the Invasion Force. Failure
at Fedhala or Casablanca due to enemy resistance or weather such as high surf
delaying or canceling the landing could be a disaster.
When Task Groups 34.1, 34.8, and 34.10 joined Task
joined Task Group; 34.9, it was a magnificent sight to behold, with ships as
far as the eye could see and with the knowledge there ships beyond the horizon.
This was the largest and most powerful Naval Force to cross the Atlantic up to
that time.
On Wednesday 28 October 1942 Task Group 34.2, the
Air Group joined Task Force 34 and took station 12 miles astern of the main
body. Task Group 34.2 was composed of the following ships:
AIR GROUP CARRIERS
USS RANGER CV4 USS SANTEE ACV29
USS SUWANNEE ACV27 USS
CHENANGO ACV28
USS SANGAMON ACV 26
AIR SCREEN GROUP:
USS CLEVELAND CL55
USS HAMBLETON DD455 USS CORRY
DD463
USS MACOMB DD458 USS
HOBSON DD464
USS ELLYSON DD454 USS
RODMAN DD456
USS FORREST
DD461 USS EMMONS DD457
With the
Air Group now joined, aircraft from the carriers would maintain dawn to dusk
patrols ahead of and on the flanks of the Task Force. Aircraft would search for
and attack enemy submarines . The aircraft would also spot and notify the
Commander Task Force 34 of any Merchant
ships. It was important that Task Force 34 avoid being spotted by a neutral
Nation whose sympathy lay with our enemies. If the Germans, Italians or the
French had been fore warned, with
sufficient time, the Germans could have gathered U-Boat wolf packs to attack,
or move in dive bombers and fighters from France. The French could have moved
substantial Naval Units from DAKAR, Africa.
On Saturday 31 October 1942
at 1040 the Swanson left her station to sweep to sweep astern of the Task
Force. Destroyers in the anti-submarine
screen took turns in conducting sweeps astern of the Task Force. An enemy submarine may endeavor to trail the Task
Force but would have to run on the surface to keep up with the 14 knot pace of
Task Force 34. A destroyer coming in fast at 20 or 25 knots at dusk or darkness
stood a good chance of catching a submarine on the surface or at least forcing
the submarine to submerge and thereby
losing the Task Force. During daylight the mere presence of a destroyer would
keep the submarine submerged.
On Wednesday 4 November
beginning at 0100, the wind force increased to force 6 from the Northeast ,
with sea condition 4, according to
Swanson’s logs.
By 2200 the wind force
increased to force 7 and sea condition 5. One Mine Layer had to drop out of
formation due to rolling 42 degrees; One of the battleships feared losing her
boats and 20mm gun mounted on her forecastle.
All of the sips were rolling heavily with some pitching.
On Thursday 5 November at 0100 the wind and sea were
moderating and the ships were riding easier. At 2001 the Swanson sighted Porto
Santo Light bearing 181 degrees true at 32 miles distance.
On 7
November at 2158 the Swanson sighted Point d’El Hank light bearing 198 true
distance 30 miles. Now the navigators could breathe a little easier at the sighting of this navigation aid, even
though they had been able to obtain a celestial star fix earlier that evening.
At 2245 the Swanson sounded General Quarters as the
task force was approaching the transport area.
There was some last minute emergency maneuvering by
the Transports to move to the proper designated anchorage, located 7 miles
north of Cape Fedhala.. An unexpected northeasterly current had moved the Transports
approximately 7 miles from their proper anchorage’s. Navigators by using the
wonderful new invention Radar discovered the error.
At a pre-sailing conference at Norfolk, Virginia,
General Patton had declared:
“Never in
history has the Navy landed an Army at the planned time and place.
But if you land us anywhere within fifty miles of
Fedhala and within one week
of D-Day, I’ll go ahead and win.”
Task Group 34.9 after a voyage exceeding 4,000 miles arrived at Fedhala on time. Task
Force 34 did not sweep over the ocean in vain!
Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean, roll.
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain:
Man marks the earth with ruin,- his control
Stops with the shore.
Lord Byron
1788-1824
TROOP LANDINGS
AND NAVAL ACTIONS ; FEDHALA, 1942
At 0000 hours on 8 November the Swanson was still at
General Quarters and lying to ahead of the Transports, waiting to lead landing
craft to the line of departure.
As control destroyers the USS Wilkes, Swanson,
Ludlow and Murphy were lying to 1,000 yards due south of the four leading
transports. (Wood, Jefferson, Carroll and Dickman). In an area designated as
“Rendezvous area”. The Swanson position
was 1,000 yards south of the USS Jefferson.
At 0310 the First and Second waves of landing craft
came alongside the Swanson, followed afterwards by the Third Wave. The landing
schedule was about one hour late due apparently to delay in loading troops into
the landing craft.
At 0357, the Swanson was underway at 5 knots on
course 180 degrees true leading the first 3 waves of landing craft to the “Line
of Departure”, which was located two miles off Fedhala. The Swanson landing
craft were assigned to Red Beach- two.
At 0445 the Swanson arrived at the “Line of
Departure”, dropped anchor at short
stay and the landing craft departed for Red Beach – two.
Landing craft waves six, seven and eight did not report,
and as almost all the waves from the other control vessels had departed.
Preparations were made to get underway after the “Line of Departure” was
properly buoyed .
It was imperative to get underway and avoid being
caught as a “sitting duck” by the French shore batteries in the breaking dawn.
As it turned out the USS Wilkes , Swanson, Ludlow and Murphy were the first to
come under fire from the French Shore Batteries.
At 0603 the Swanson observed fire from Battery
Blondin at Chergui directed at the USS Murphy and Ludlow. Commander Destroyer
Division 26 promptly ordered his ships to their Fire Support areas. Commander
Task Group 34.9 gave the order - “Play
Ball !” over the TBS.
At 0631, the Swanson opened fire with her main
battery (5”/38 caliber guns) on the French Battery located on Cape Fedhala. The
sea was calm with a 4 knot wind from the southwest. In the morning twilight
there was a low thick haze along the coast line obscuring the targets bearing
160 degrees true from the Swanson. The Swanson was firing intermittently and
counter marching; that is , reversing ships direction.
At 0650 the Swanson ceased firing on Cape Fedhala and
was proceeding to a Fire Support Area northwest of Battery Blondin at
Chergui, in accordance with orders from
Commander Destroyer Division 26 as a replacement for the USS Murphy which had
been hit in her engine room, killing 3 men and wounding 7 . The damage would
force this new ship out of action for
several hours. The Landing Craft with their assault troops were continuing to
move across the sea from the Transports to the landing beaches.
At 0657 the Swanson was returning fire from the
Shore Battery Blondin at Cherqui bearing 160 degrees true at a distance of
6,200 yards ( 3 miles). The Swanson was firing intermittently and counter
marching.
At 0714 the
Swanson received orders from Commander Destroyer Squadron 13 to take station in
Convoy Screen .
At 0720 the above orders were cancelled and the Swanson and Ludlow were ordered to
form a column astern of Commander Destroyer Division 26 embarked in the Wilkes
, proceeding to fire support area off Cape Fedhala. Batteries on Cape Fedhala
were silent during this period, and orders from fire control group had been
received indicating that further fire was not necessary.
At 0806 Batteries at Fedhala resumed fire on landing beaches and on our
naval forces.
At 0808 the Wilkes , Swanson and Ludlow returned
fire of the shore batteries.
At 0813 ceased firing after cessation of fire from
the shore batteries but remained in the fire support area.
At 0815 the French Destroyer Leaders Milan and
Albatross along with destroyers Frondeur, Fougueux, Brestois and Boulonnais
steamed out of Casa Blanca Harbor heading for our transport area off Fedhala,
approximately 20 minutes away.
At 0821 the Swanson sighted
the French men of war advancing towards our transport area and landing beaches.
At the time the Swanson mistook the French Destroyer Leaders as Cruisers.
At 0825 the French men of war opened fire on Wilkes,
Swanson, and Ludlow. These vessels began zig zagging at full power to avoid
enemy fire which was straddling the
Swanson and other ships in the column. The Swanson and other ships were
returning fire, while retiring northward to join the Cruisers Augusta and
Brooklyn, who were proceeding from Convoy area to intercept the enemy. During
this action the Ludlow was hit by a 6” shell at 0834, wounding 4 men and
starting a blaze which was quickly put out. The Ludlow was ordered out to the
Convoy area. The Milan was also hit by shell from U.S. Naval Forces.
At 0846 the Augusta and Brooklyn opened fire on the
enemy ships. The Wilkes and Swanson assuming position to screen our cruisers
and to deliver a torpedo attack if the opportunity should present itself.
French fire and fire from the Brooklyn
and Augusta, later augmented by fire from Massachusetts, Cleveland, and Tuscaloosa
continued intermittently until about
0945.
At 0945 the Wilkes and Swanson opened fire on French
Cruiser Primauguet and Destroyers
Brestois, Frondeur and L’Alcyon
standing out of Casablanca Harbor bearing about 200 degrees true at
approximately 13,000 yards. The range closed to 12,000 yards and this was a
brief furious fight. At 0952 the enemy ceased firing and disappeared in a haze
and smoke, apparently heading for Casablanca. The Swanson ceased fire.
At 0953 the Wilkes and Swanson formed a column
astern of the Bristol. At 0954 the ships in column turned 180 degrees and
proceeded towards Cape Fedhala with the
Swanson leading . The Swanson observed shore batteries firing on our landing
beaches.
At 1004 the Swanson opened fire on shore Batterie du
Pont on Cape Fedhala, bearing 166 degrees true and a range of 6,750 yards.
Commander Task Group 34.9 ordered the
Swanson and Edison to cease fire based on a report that they were firing into
our own troops and civilians. This report was later proved to be false.
Commander Destroyer Squadron 13 protested to CTG 34.9 that Batterie du Pont was
still firing on our troops and requested permission to open fire. CTG 34.9
granted permission and the Wilkes was given the task.
At 1010, the Swanson having been replaced by the
Edison proceeded to area southeast of
the Transports and began anti-submarine patrol. This concluded the Swanson
participation in engaging the enemy shore batteries and naval surface forces.
During the day of 8 November the Swanson fired 797
rounds of 5”/38 caliber shells at the French Forces.
Gun
#1 41 rounds
Gun
#2 246 rounds
Gun
#3 395 rounds
Gun
#4 115 rounds
The rammer of Gun #1 overheated to such an extent as
to cause it to jam firmly in a partially retracted position. Hand ramming was
resorted to but failed when one incompletely rammed round left a projected
lodged in the bore.
Gun #4 was out of action due to a broken extractor
and a case jammed in the breech in such a manner that it was eventually removed
only with the aid of a chipping hammer.
CONCLUSION
Fifty percent of the officers were young naval
reserve officers and the remaining officers were Naval Academy graduates. The
Chief Petty officers were in their early to mid thirties with a length of
service of about 15 years. The other Petty Officers were in their mid twenties
with a length of service of about 7 years. The non-rated enlisted men average
age was 18 years and most had less than one-year service. For some this was their
very first trip to sea. They had barely gained their sea legs when the heavy
sea of 4 November struck but fate smiled upon the American invasion fleet and
blessed them with a calm sea on 8 November. The novice sailors performed like
old salts.
The Swanson had crossed the Atlantic ocean as part
of the largest Task Force ever to do so, up to that date.
The officers and men received their baptism of enemy
gun fire from the shore batteries at Cape Fedhala and the French Warships that
stood out of Casablanca Harbor.
The late LCDR. L.M. Markham, USN, who was commanding
officer at the time had this to say in his Action Report to the Commander in
Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet:
“The officers and crew conducted themselves in a
cool and efficient manner while under fire and in accordance with spirit and
tradition of the naval service.”
Captain Markham should be included in the above
statement , as he did a remarkable job in handling the Swanson throughout the
hectic day. He was particularly adroit in handling the Swanson when the ship
was being straddled by shells from the enemy ships.
The heavier and faster firing guns of the U.S. Navy,
particularly the light cruiser Brooklyn who was quite impressive when she went
into rapid fire overwhelmed the French forces. The French must have lacked fire
control radar and were relying on spotting to acquire their targets.
Subsequently the Swanson participated in the sinking
of the U-173, which had sunk the Transport USS Hewes, damaged the Fleet Oiler
USS Winooski and torpedoed the destroyer USS Hambleton amidships which almost
gutted her but she made port. The American cargo ship Electric was torpedoed
and damaged.
The Swanson had come of age and was truly a fighting
machine with trained and experienced officers and men.
Related Information
Chart of Task Force Route from USA to North Africa
Chart of Fedhala Landings
Chart of the Order of Battle with French Opposition.