Summary
Germany has adopted an approach more attuned to the Rogoff model, where theindependence of the central bank has constitutional independence. The
Bundesbank is relatively unconstrained in the path it takes to achieve its final
objective.
On the other hand, the system adopted by New Zealand is along the line of the
principal – agent models designed by economists such as Walsh, Persson and
Tabellini where the Reserve Bank is bound in a contractual framework with less
room for manoeuvre. The differences in the two approaches are summarized in
Table 1.2.
Table 1.2
Alternative Approaches to Central Bank Independence
Constitutional / Legal/performance
reputational contractExample Deutsche Bundesbank Reserve Bank of
New Zealand
Policy objectivePrice stability Primary objective Sole objective
Supporting
government Secondary objective -
economic policyGovernment Only implicit (new law) Statutory provision
override in current lawPolicy targets
Obligatory No Yes
Agreed with No Yes
governmentEscape clauses No Yes
Time horizon No 3 years
Responsibility
Laid upon Board Governor
Monitoring Only implicit Dismissal of governor
for failure
Source: Eric Roll, 1993.