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In the definition of a god as epistemologically transcendent, the divine being exists beyond knowability; no aspect of such a god’s nature can be known. This epistemological definition of a god is acceptable, but it implies an egregious philosophical stance in the eyes of many theists: a believer in a god by epistemology must be agnostic of the god’s existence.
The conclusion of the epistemologically transcendent definition is that every characteristic of a god’s existence is unknowable. This situation may lead to the god being utterly divorced from physical reality (and thus the god is also metaphysically transcendent). This is the case in which the believer must be agnostic of the god’s existence. Because the god is detached from the human plane of existence and is entirely unknowable, no indications of his existence can exist unless the god operates on a transcendental level of existence and yet influences physical reality. While this interaction between god and universe may leave hints of itself, the signs are incomprehensible to humans. The exception is if the signs indicate the existence of such a god, a case that many religionists would argue, but this situation is contradictory. If the god is entirely unknowable, then it cannot interact with the universe in a way that indicates its existence without betraying its very definition as unknowable; giving clues of its existence is giving a clue of its nature.
A god may also simply be beyond comprehension but not beyond the physical realm of existence and have this dilemma apply to it. A god that exists beyond human knowability may exist immanently, but cannot indicate its presence without defying the definition of an unknowable deity. Because this dilemma applies to all epistemologically transcendent gods, the statement that any god by epistemology cannot give indication of its existence is valid. The believer in an unknowable god must profess agnosticism of the god’s existence.