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The definition of “god” is exceedingly illusory. This fact is troubling because all discussions about the general conception of god (that is, not a single religion’s specification of god’s nature) must be prefaced by a definition of just what a god is. Because of the philosophically prominent role the idea of a god has played throughout the history of human thought, the definition is disputed; delineations of the qualifications of a god have achieved great diversity of the millennia and throughout the many cultures in which deities are present. But since a high magnitude of groups has used the term of “god” rather than a preexisting one, the word must convey some meaningful information about the entity it describes.
The ideal definition of god is a specific one because the term would then have more informational value attributed to it. However, the specificity of “god” is impossible given the diversity of its places of usage. Some cases in which an entity is called a god, however, can be eliminated as viable instances of articulating the nature of said entity. In cases in which the god describes a force or being immanent in or indistinguishable from nature the god can almost always be given a more appropriate appellation. For example, in a belief system in which god is essentially nature (case in point, pantheism), the denomination of “god” is unnecessary because that of “nature” preexists. While the divine sobriquet may connote reverence, the implications on human attitude are irrelevant; nature is nature even if it is worshipped. Thus the term’s usage is incorrect in any cases in which the god is something already named.
The most basic definitions of a god are, as noted, broad. The apparent vagueness of the definitions deceives, however, because, while it may suit a vast number of religions, the word also generally denotes a unique entity or pantheon within each of those religions. Hence there is little confusion in most religions over which beings qualify. Certain characteristics of gods are popular, such as omnipotence and its implications (omniscience, omnipresence) and consummate goodness. None of these characteristics is definitive, though. Other widespread divine aspects offer superior solutions to the crisis of defining a god: a god (or more specifically God) may be the Supreme Being or the Uncaused Cause (the uncaused catalyst of the natural chain of causality, derived from the cosmological argument). Between these two, the latter is more concrete; the idea of supremacy is itself shrouded in equivocality. The Uncaused Cause is thus the first plausible definition of God, although it necessitates monotheism.
Variations of the definition as the Uncaused Cause are the Creator and the Ruler. In most cases the first of these implies at least creation of the universe (although it is possible that the Uncaused Cause set in motion the creation of the universe without directly creating it) if not also dominance over the universe (a variation or corollary that contains the Supreme Being definition). These variations are inferior to the Uncaused Cause definition because of their major containment within it.
Other definitions of “god” call upon answers from within the set of epistemological inquiries. Of any conception it may be asked, “Is this knowable?” In this case, unknowability is congruent to anything beyond human potential for understanding. Should the answer to this question be negative, meaning that the conception at hand is unknowable and thus beyond man’s capacity for comprehension, then the subject in question is a god. Perforce, a god exists separately from the realm of knowledge because its nature cannot be known and, indeed, knowledge of its nature does not exist; a god, therefore, is a being that is epistemologically transcendent.
This epistemological definition of knowability almost always coincides with the third plausible definition of a god, which is that of metaphysical transcendence. Any being that exists beyond the confines of nature or the universe or physical reality is metaphysically transcendent and thus a god. This form of transcendence is distinct from the epistemological model in that the being transcends physical existence rather than knowable existence (note that not all metaphysically transcendent conceptions—such as, arguably, mathematical relationships or entities—are also epistemologically transcendent). The cases in which an idea is transcendental metaphysically and yet is clearly not a god flaw the efficacy of that definition; on the other hand, cases in which an idea is unknowable but in no way a god flaw the definition of epistemological transcendence. (While specifying that a god must be a “being” would correct these problems, the strict definition of a being is excessively limitative of that of a god.) A combination of the two transcendental definitions may be superior, but it restricts a sizeable number of the apperceptions of gods due to the popularity of gods that are metaphysically transcendent but whose nature is knowable.
Three definitions ideally demarcate the boundaries of godliness: the Uncaused Cause (which, since it exists beyond the causal necessity of having a cause, is causally transcendent), the epistemologically transcendent, and the metaphysically transcendent. Ergo, a god surpasses the limitations of reality in at least one way, be it causally, epistemologically, or transcendentally.