| |||
One of the most abstruse concepts in the human idiom is that of truth. It is at the center of the likewise fundamental idea of knowledge, the study of which, in turn, comprises the branch of philosophy known as epistemology. This study does not comment on the veracity of claims in particular—this service falls within the realm of other studies, such as science, theology, and so on—but rather examines the validity and the very essence of the mechanisms by which knowledge may be obtained.
The effectiveness of the known mechanisms is disputed, hence the existence of the aforementioned theology and science, both of which profess knowledge. Were the rectitude of the vehicles of knowledge indisputable, then not only would epistemology be obsolescent, but there would exist only one framework on knowledge within which the disputes would consist solely of contentious assertions of the worth of various parcels of knowledge rather than additionally of the proper ways of obtaining knowledge. As it is, however, epistemology is not moribund and multiple systems of knowledge coexist.
The infrastructures of the numerous paradigms of knowledge embody clashing propositions that answer the question of how man can identify certainties. The most obvious illustration of a vehicle of knowledge is reason. Reason is the overarching morphology within which logic percolates; the latter assays claims to determine if they are in accordance with the broader concept of reason. There are three broad syllogistic subsets of reason: deduction, induction, and abduction. The first is defined by the inevitability of the conclusion in any sound argument: given that the premises are true and that the arguments are valid (that is, the statements all proceed from an accepted logical lexicon, such as the propositional calculus), then the conclusion must be true. Unlike deductive reasoning, neither induction nor abduction ensures the certainty of the conclusion given true premises. These two less certain forms of reasoning are substantiated by inference. A foremost characteristic of deduction is apriority: any claim that can be made about a set may be stated with certainty about any subset thereof. Apriority hinges upon analytic propositions; the certainty on deduction derives in part from the necessity of the verity of definitions. Induction, quite oppositely, relies upon a posteriori conclusions, or those that are made based on experience. A common example of the usage of a posteriori logic is in the generalization, wherein observed qualities of a sample of a type are generalized to apply to all instances of that type. In all cases of induction, an assumption must be made that introduces uncertainty to the truthfulness of the conclusion. Abduction, similarly, involves inference and a blatant assumption: abductive reasoning is the generation of the conclusion that best describes a set of truths.
The boundaries of reason demarcate the demesne of the reliable vehicles of knowledge, and merely stepping outside of the bounds of dianoetic thought causes the loss of certainty. In actuality, the effectiveness of deduction does not fulfill its promise. Conclusions of deductive arguments spawn from three classifications of premises: pre-established deductive conclusions, axioms, and foundational knowledge that is in someway inherent to man or the universe. Pre-established deductive conclusions lead to the problem of infinite regress; axioms are assumptions that introduce the uncertainty intrinsic to observation; and, lastly, foundational knowledge faces the slight obstacle of being nonexistent. Thus, in all three cases, a deductive argument may be meretricious. Reason, nonetheless, has extensive practical application in science, in which empiricism dominates, and in mathematics, in which axiomatic deduction holds a monopoly.
Reason contrasts with two other mechanisms of knowledge, the first of which is emotion. Higher-level reasoning is a uniquely human attribute; emotion, on the other hand, is the driving force behind the actions of all other life. It is equivalent to instinct, the collection of responses to stimuli that constitute the most natural drives and desires. An emotional response is immediate; sometimes it occurs so quickly that a corresponding action is taken before reason can be invoked into the decision-making process. Emotion is critical in the formation of beliefs, but these resulting beliefs are, for the most part, specious. The presence of truth in the universe is postulated upon its universality extrinsic to man. The appreciable fallibility of emotions is born of a nature that constructs reality as it most benefits man. Moreover, emotion exists wholly within man and, though it responds in a way optimally suited to the stimuli of reality, it does not reflect objectivity: it has, in other words, man, rather than truth, in mind.
The final mechanism of knowledge is faith. The apparatus of faith is a ternion consisting of revelation, suspension of reason, and devoted belief. The most accurate description of faith does not, in reality, exclude all reason, for the spark of faith is based either on evidence (revelation) or on influence (cultural)—these two cases are not exclusive of each other, but the latter is predicated upon the appeal to authority and thus obfuscates the reasonable aspect of faith in a greater potentiality of perfidiousness. The establishment of the belief comes from reason—though it may be an imperfect reflection of factuality—and the subsequent step in the genesis of faith is suspension of reason: it is, in simple terms, used once and then thrown out forever (unless, for some, reason happens to affirm the object of faith). Devoted belief follows. The validity of faith is substantially litigious, but the effectiveness with which faith may arrive at truth is, in reality, chimerical. There is a tremendous likelihood that, were a given individual born in a vastly different culture, he would have faith in other beliefs due to being presented with a different set of reasons, both revelatory and cultural. Therefore, the probability of any person arriving at the truth through faith is, at best, slightly better than the probability of being born into whatever the correct set of beliefs happens to be. Faith, in a sense, is solipsistic or, at best, merely self-absorbed: to assume that faith is a superior vehicle of knowledge than the exiguous probability would indicate requires one to assume that, for whatever reason, he has been lead into faith in the truth. This thought pattern adjures yet more faith—faith that faith is effective, essentially.
In modern times, faith has been fully subordinated to reason except in the arena of the supernatural. This distinction between faith and reason is proper because reason cannot effectively formulate truths regarding the supernatural. The very idea of the supernatural, however, exists because of faith: there is no reason to believe anything exists beyond the natural component of the universe. Thus faith is king in the kingdom it created, and rightly so. Regardless of its participation in supernatural or natural ideas, faith does not operate on any level better than the emotional because the secret of faith is that it is an anodyne; it is a leitmotif among all types of faith that the beliefs held are generally comforting. Faith is akin to an intellectual extension of emotion.
The determination of knowledge is not promising. There is uncertainty in every conclusion, be it derived from reason, emotion, or faith. The existence of universal truths is in itself heuristic but dubious, and a faculty for arriving at this potentially extant truth is even more speculative. Each of the three means of obtaining knowledge is beneficial in at least one way: reason can extrapolate reliably upon a premise; emotional responses and beliefs feel appropriate and satisfying on an instinctual level; and faith can reputedly provide comfort through answers, if not through truth.