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For lack of a superior extant term, I refer to a certain philosophical complex as natural skepticism. The groundwork of the philosophy is more a mindset than a system of particular beliefs. It is, in other words, a lens through which one can see the world. The titular endowment of “natural skepticism” refers to several complementary interpretations of reality: the negation of a supernatural; an emphasis on skepticism; rejection of objective morality or purpose; doubt regarding the certainty of truth and the degree to which the verisimilitude of the visibilia reflects it; denial of sanctity and intrinsic value; agnosticism in re the existence of all but the self and the characteristics of all entities including the self; and pragmatism of daily living despite the latent uncertainty and nihilistic implications of the other tenets. Nihilism and natural skepticism are highly compatible, but the connotations are subtly different. The overtone of the above facets of the philosophy is the abnegation of assumption in fact and the acceptance of a pragmatic lifestyle in practice due to philosophical noncognitivism (that is, the idea that the questions of philosophy are meaningless). Natural skepticism thus allows for a plenary disjunction between beliefs and actions. Though perhaps the best word to convey the meaning, “belief” here is an imperfect descriptor of the ideas of natural skepticism because, for the most part, the beliefs are more statements of a lack of belief than of beliefs in themselves.
Although this philosophical model eludes many issues due to its discursive skepticism, it is, at the same time, no quietus to criticism. In many cases, the flaws (or, if you will, the disagreeable points) of the philosophy are scurrilous ramifications of the central beliefs outlined above. One instance relates to the idea of the sanctity of life. Natural skepticism rejects the supposition that life is innately valuable, and this stance is opprobrious in the eyes of most people. The natural skeptic, however, recognizes that morality is merely an evolutionary bestowal; one of the components of typical human morality is the extolment of life, but this belief is biological in origin.
Another example of the unsympathetic disposition of natural skepticism relates to charity. Our society unconsciously rewards selfish behavior but still has a conscious bias in favor of those who devote themselves to charitable causes. Most people acknowledge that charity is desirable. But the natural skeptic sees no value in charity except the reward of pleasure that an eleemosynary deed brings the giver. This benefit, too, is biological, and so the act of charity is philosophically empty.
Evolutionary development and environmental pressures are the progenitors of morality. The most objective philosophy tears away this moral veil that at least guides humankind to productivity as defined by the parameters of evolution and at best prevents the self-destruction of man. Most belief systems express philosophies that can be reconciled with the proper way of life; in fact, it is an attractive trait of philosophies that they determine how to live. The exceptional philosophies that do not exhibit this trait (nihilism, solipsism, cosmicism, natural skepticism, et al) seek to outline reality as it actually exists, with no influence from how man would like it to exist. Natural skepticism, unlike nihilism, is not defeatist: it offers a nod to reality as it exists, but does not exhort the correct lifestyle as derived from this perception of reality. The natural skeptic admits that man’s actions are not—and should not—be congruous with reality. On the contrary, in this philosophy, man defaults to his evolutionary and environmental past as the determinant of his actions, and not because it is right, but because it feels right. In a universe in which no action is any better than the next, the natural skeptic reasons, the one that satisfies the humanistic view of existence is quite valid.