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March 2001

What is the Nature of Emotions - Part Three

The Motivational Theory of Emotions A third alternative theory of emotion is that each emotion is comprised of certain motives derived from perceiving a thing as desirable or undesirable, leading the person to be inclined to act in a certain way; Alston calls this the motivational theory. Arguably desires do seem to play a part in emotions; fear seems to be a desire to run away, love a desire to be with somebody. However, as Alston points out, emotions cannot really be identified only as certain tendencies to act, as there are no special tendencies and desires people have for certain other emotions, such as happiness, or at least there are no special tendencies, such as in sadness, which comprises a desire that things could be different but no specific tendencies. Desires do seem important, but they are not sufficient to be able to comprise an emotion.

Actually, Emotions Are A Mixture Of Judgments, Motivations and Feelings Theory

A common recourse taken by emotion theorists in the face of the problems associated with feeling, motivational (desire) and judgment theories is to claim that emotions consist of a combination of these various theories. Lyons’ causal-evaluative theory of emotions is one such theory, as is Alston’s Comprehensive theory. Alston views emotions as comprising of evaluation, bodily upset (bodily changes which may not be registered by the person who is experiencing them), and sensation. Lyons’ theory is similar; typically an emotion involves a person’s beliefs about their situation, which may, but need not, be caused by the perception of an event or object, upon which an evaluation of their situation is based. The person’s behaviour is based on desires arising from the evaluation, while feelings and physiological changes are caused by the desires and evaluation. Similarly, Oakley argues that emotions are comprised of affects, cognitions and desires. Each of these ‘hybrid’ views demand that there is a causal connection between the various aspects for there to be a genuine emotion.

Evaluating This Mixed Bag Emotions Theory

These theories seem to be, initially at least, intelligible and convincing accounts of the nature of emotions. However, even these views can be criticised. Examine what Lyons’ description of love would be : a person makes a favourable judgment of another, which is probably accompanied by a desire to stay near to the person, and appropriate physiological feelings. These are not necessary conditions for love, for as Hamlyn argues, you can love a person contrary to your judgments. He argues that loving a person is not incompatible with ‘having no respect for them, finding them in many ways distasteful’(p13). Indeed, it can be witnessed in newspaper articles that people sometimes still love friends or relatives who have committed horrific crimes, although they are disgusted by the person. So now we are in a situation which suggests that particular emotions do not necessarily involve particular types of judgment.
This is a strange situation. We feel that emotion definitions should include reference to feelings, though we can conceive of instances where this is not the case, and anyway, feelings are not sufficient for explaining emotions. Judgments/evaluations are seen as important in emotions, but now Hamlyn illustrates that we can be in a state of emotion without making a particular type of judgment. Desires seem to be important, but some emotions seem to have no particular desire in mind. Feelings, judgments/evaluations and desires are never sufficient in themselves to be emotions, but combinations of the three do not seem sufficient for all of the emotions either.
Alston argues that his Comprehensive theory seems to work best for the most typical cases of emotions. When all the various emotions are examined, the only thing they necessarily all have is some kind of bodily feeling, he argues, but as we have seen, that is not a sufficient condition for there being an emotion. These circumstances have led Alston to conclude that ‘ the full range of cases [of emotions] exhibits what Wittgenstein called “family resemblances”. There is a list of typical features, such that some are present in all cases, and only paradigm cases exhibit all of the features.’ (p486).

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