Following the August 14, 2003, discovery of active Tuberculosis ("TB") at the Shasta County Jail ("JAIL"), the JAIL did little if anything to contain the tuberculosis bacteria and spread of the disease. JAIL authorities knew full well that their contract medical provider, California Forensic Medical Group ("CFMG"), had ignored the original inmate victim's complaints for several months, and therefore, should have expected tuberculosis exposure to already have spread among other inmates housed with the original TB victim. Thus, CFMG was only part of the problem. The JAIL staff themselves, with reckless disregard, failed to isolate these other exposed individuals prior to their being tested, instead, continuing to move them around within the JAIL and to other institutions. This, in addition to complained of ventilation problems which the JAIL was slow to correct, and sanitation problems that the JAIL, so far, refused to correct. Problems that are, and were, instrumental in the spread of airborne bacteria such as tuberculosis, and other pathogens common to close, closed environments such as jails.

On August 12, 2003, in the evening, the JAIL began testing some of the exposed inmates. On August 19, early in the morning, the JAIL transferred at least one exposed but not yet tested inmate, Maurice M., to High Desert State Prison, potentially sending TB to that institution. During the evening of August 20, the JAIL "read" the results of the first group of TB skin tests. Several inmates tested positive and were given chest x-rays on August 21, 2003. At some point in this time period, a second group of inmates received skin tests for TB.

Meanwhile, transfers continued internally and to other institutions, as well as regular movement to and from court proceedings, and other activities, with no attempt to keep these potentially infected inmates isolated from other persons. The laundry and commissary was delivered, without precautions, involving three separate weekly incursions into the infected Housing Unit ("POD"), thus involving both female inmate workers and various JAIL staff, both of which could potentially carry the tuberculosis bacteria throughout the rest of the facility.

Both JAIL staff and released inmates potentially carry exposure out to the general public. Rather than issue a warning, then practice and publicize preventative measures, the JAIL instead lied to the media, and thus the public, when stating they had been screening other inmates and "have so far found none infected" (Redding Record Searchlight, Aug. 22, 2003.), stating the danger is minimal, inferring the JAIL had everything under control.

It appears the JAIL actually lost control and made a too little--too late lackadaisical effort throughout this whole affair--which is far from over--beginning with ignoring the original TB victim's pleas for medical attention. In addition to the obvious isolation and containment of potentially infected inmates pending verification, there were many preventative measures which could have been done, such as, the wearing of protective clothing, gloves, and respirators, by those workers entering the infected POD, enhanced disinfecting and hygienic procedures, etc. After all, TB is an infectious airborne bacteria, and airborne bacteria does settle on surfaces which then need disinfecting. However, none of this was done. Instead as reported in detail in a previous article, the ventilation system went for near one year after repeated complaints before being repaired. Lack of proper air circulation is a known contributor to the spread of airborne diseases such as TB. Then, following the discovery of more infected inmates, on September 3, 2003, a group of inmates concerned with sanitation, killing TB and other bacteria from surfaces the bacteria may land or develop on, had an argument with Officer Carol Burch over an inadequate number of cleaning rags and no provisions for re-sanitizing those few provided. She told the inmates they must share the rags for all purposes. This attitude was typical of all officers approached. On September 4, 2003, the inmates filed a "Group Grievance" over this issue. It was ignored and never answered.

For the next two months, the transfers continued, the complained of practices continued, and the TB spread. On November 5, 2003, a new round of TB testing began in the infected POD. In addition to the four who tested positive in August: Gregory Barlise, the original victim; there was also, Sampong S.; Dustin S.' and Julien S. Also, James B. had a small reaction which was not considered positive at the time, even though he should have been considered the one most at risk of having been the cell mate of Barlise. The November 5, 2003, test which was read on November 7, produced an intensive reaction this time on James B., and also positives on three additional individuals of whom we are aware: John R.; Adam F.; and Mark O., who even though the test left a scar on his arm, the JAIL did not start him on TB medication as it did the others. Instead, he was ignored much the same as was James B. in August, who never should have been retested in November with a skin test as it was a horrible reaction that caused scarring.

On November 14, 2003, a letter was received from the Administrative Segregation ("AdSeg") POD from Mike F., reporting he tested positive and must go through the nine month TB treatment.  His cell mate Denver B. had been complaining that he has never been retested. Also this day, another inmate was moved from AdSeg to this POD, and he reported about 15 inmates in AdSeg had tested positive, but were being denied medication until medical staff had time to get to them. Inmates began immediately accusing the JAIL of trying to avoid the costs of this medication, and also the idea was raised that if the JAIL has insufficient time and resources to "get to" these infected inmates immediately, then the JAIL needs to cut its overcrowded population to meet its resources.

Numerous potentially infected inmates have been transferred to other institutions since the infection was discovered. However, only one has reported back to fellow inmates, and Chris M. reported that he has also has tested positive and is receiving TB medication at the California Correctional Center at Susanville. How many others are there?

As before, inmates continued moving in and out of this obviously infected POD, with the inmates therein becoming extremely concerned over the JAIL's failure and refusal to take effective affirmative preventative and corrective action. Because TB is an airborne bacterial pathogen, and airborne bacteria can and does eventually land on and contaminate surfaces, the "cleaning rags" and sanitation issue again arose. Tom Watson, this writer, authored another "Group Grievance" on November 9, 2003, which was joined by 20 additional inmates. The text of this Grievance explains the problems as follows:

"There is a jail caused sanitation and hygiene problem in this POD, and probably the entire facility, associated with the POD cleaning rags. Sanitation again becomes an issue following three more inmates testing positive for Tuberculosis ("TB") exposure on 11/7/03, bringing the total now to seven inmates--who previously tested negative--who have become infected from TB exposure in this POD. The problem: an insufficient number of clean cleaning rags are being provided, and these few rags must be used for several days without provisions for re-sterilization, or for example as commonly happens, at the 11/9/03 laundry exchange, no clean rags whatsoever were left and the dirty rags were not exchanged; thereby endangering the health of all inmates in violation of Penal Code §§673 and 2652. Following the initial TB exposures, inmates repeatedly verbally complained about these rag problems. On 9/3/03, the inmates were told: all inmates must share the same rags for all purposes. On 9/4/03, a Group Grievance was filed over the issue. It was never answered, nor were the problems corrected. Thus, inmates who carry infectious diseases, such as, HIV, AIDS, Hepatitis, Meningitis, Tuberculosis, etc., are forced to share toilet cleaning rags, and also to use these same unsanitized shared rags to clean the POD tables--the food eating areas and surfaces--prior to meals. This and other unhealthy jail policies, practices, and procedures, recently caused inmates in this POD to become exposed to active tuberculosis, and who knows what else, and therefore, need correcting."

This Group Grievance was answered on November 10, 2003, by the Facility Administrator, Captain Don VanBuskirk, who by law is ultimately responsible for the health and welfare of the inmates, and under Title 15, §1200, of the California Code of Regulations has such a ministerial duty. Here is Captain VanBuskirk's answer to the cleaning rag and sanitation grievance:

"Mr. Watson--We are always concerned about cleanliness, hygiene and control of any type of disease. Should any POD or inmate need cleaning equipment, or cleaning cloths, they should request the Housing Officer."

This patronizing answer ignores the complained of problems, then blindly without further investigation, circuitously sends the problem right back to the "Housing Officers." The very officers the Grievance points out are causing the problems--and also have ignored and not answered written grievances. This avoidance of the ministerial duties of Jail Administration is typical of the lack of supervision, and lackadaisical approach to the health and welfare of the inmates throughout this tuberculosis fiasco. The JAIL Administration has been made aware of this sanitation problem which could effect the spread or control of the tuberculosis and other bacteria, yet failed to correct the problem.

For example, on November 13, 2003, only five clean rags were left on a table, with a like amount thrown into the bottom of the dirty mop sink, and mixed with the dirty rags from the previous "exchange" which were never picked up. With no sanitation provisions for this mixture of clean and dirty rags, 32 individuals in a tuberculosis infected environment are expected to share these same rags to clean both their eating areas and their toilets. Nothing has changed. The November 16, 2003, laundry exchange was no different.

On November 16, 2003, four additional inmates in this POD tested positive for TB infection: Robert K. and Garry G., who had a severe reaction with swelling and blistering of the skin; Richard M. and David S., who had some swelling and a small blister; and myself, with no blister, but with some swelling and an approximate one inch diameter area of bright red skin which was considered negative. However, at the time, we could only get evasive answers from CFMG medical staff when asking what these reactions mean, and what actions would be taken.  A little bit of candor and communications would have gone a long way towards easing worry and confusion throughout this entire fiasco.

Inmate movement continues, and inmates bring back stories from other areas of the JAIL reporting that virtually every housing unit now has TB infected inmates. This has not been verified. Some inmates have reported their families have complained to the State Department of Health, only to be told these things are taken care of at the county level, with the County Health Department apparently deferring to what they are being told by the JAIL, with the JAIL Administration deferring to what is being told by the Housing Officers and CFMG. Further example of those at the bottom of this chain creating an illusion, if not a delusion, that they have this situation under control. This circuitous responsibility shifting must stop. Someone in authority must take charge and stop this spread of tuberculosis. By allowing this "wag the dog" scenario to continue, public health is at risk, and the taxpayers of Shasta County will be facing many nasty and undefendable expensive lawsuits.
 

Political Prisoner Tom Watson
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