When this case was first decided by the California Supreme Court on August 22, 2002, the news media headlines stated:  "The state's high court ruled that a sex predator law allowing offenders to be detained in mental hospitals after they are released from prison applies only to criminals who victimize strangers."  Opponents of this draconian law first thought this decision to be the 'silver bullet' they hoped would force application of this law to only the truly dangerous predators that violently attack or kidnap their victims. 

However, the news media had truncated the statement changing the meaning.  The Court actually quotes Welfare & Institutions Code §6600(e), which in pertinent parts states:  the judge or jury must determine "whether sexually violent behavior is likely to be directed 'toward a stranger, or person of casual acquaintance with whon no substantial relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." (§660, subd. (e))." 

The part that comes after "stranger" was ignored by the media, and this is the area that has always been in question.  How does one determine the purpose for establishing any relationship?  In this case, Mr. Hurtado approached three minors at a Pizza Hut while they were playing video games, took them to his residence where they engaged in various sex acts, and then threatened to kill them if they told anyone.  This incident clearly shows a relationship that was established for the purpose of having sex.  However, was it truly predatory without the threats of death?  Had these minors been of legal age, absent the threats, this would mirror the typical American friday night game of seduction.  We must now decide if this scenario by itself is predatory.  Certainly the added threat of death makes this decision easier in the Hurtado example. 

Other situations may not be so clear.  A person who has known his victim for a substantial period of time before the abuse occurred, and who never used force, violence, threats, or intimidation, certainly is not as dangerous to the public at large as one who victimizes strangers the court indicated.  The problem is:  where does one draw the line in these cases? 

The Department of Mental Health ("DMH") contracts to private psychologist called "Evaluators" to make these determinations.  In the name of job security, these professional prosecution witnesses have a vested interest in categorizing defendants as predators.  This, no matter what the actual relationship between defendant and victim. 

Before the Hurtado decision, the DMH Evaluators needed only to present this predator classification to a judge at a probable cause hearing under a "reasonable suspicion" standard, it was never decided at the actual trial.  The judge always accepted these DMH allegations.  This element of the law's requirements was never proven, but became cast in stone based on mere suspicion.  Insofar as the mere mention of a sex offense is highly inflammatory by nature, all that remained for the prosecutor to prove to the jury was that the defendant has a "mental adnormality" or "personality disorder," something they diagnose 70% of the general prison population as suffering from.  Then the Evaluator states the already determined predator label which has never been proven.  Next the prosecutory further inflames the jury with rhetoric because the defendant is now officially a predator.  The defendant was automatically committed based more on emotion than fact. 

What the Hurtado decision does is to force the prosecution to now prove beyond a reasonable doubt, to the jury at the trial, that the person is a predator, and that his relationship to the victim was predatory. 

The Hurtado decision also applies Addison v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, the 1979 U.S. Supreme Court decision to SVPA cases in California. Addison held that the preponderance of evidence standard of proof was constitutionally inadequate in a civil commitment proceeding.  This appears to open further areas to challenge, such as, the DMH Evaluators misuse of Actuarial Instruments such as the "Static 99." 

The DMH presently uses what is effectively a preponderance of evidence scheme to commit defendants.  They utilize an Actuarial tool, the "Static 99," that was originally designed for use in Canada to screen inmates' program needs within their prison system.  The DMH Experts would recommend commitment when a defendant mathematically scores over 50% on the Actuarial, and if need be, they add to a lower Actuarial score their own subjective opinion number to reach over 50%.  They do this even though the Actuarial Instructions discourage this practice as being highly unreliable.  This is 'Crystal Ball' stuff, and it comes nowhere near meeting the beyond a reasonable doubt standard now required on all elements to a SVPA  commitment.  Hopefully, the standard of proof, in practice, will now be raised above the current level of a no better than chance prediction. 

Overall, this appeared to be a huge victory for SVPA defendants, and the  taxpayers that pay for these very expensive commitments, as it now may serve to limit the commitments to the truly dangerous offenders.