On the same day, February 25, 2002, as the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Minnesota case, In re Martinelli, a Petition for A Write of Certiorari was filed in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the Illinois Supreme Court decision in the case of In re Detention of Varner, 198 Ill. 2d 78; 759 N.E. 2d 560; 2001 Ill. Lexis 1433; 259 Ill. Dec. 780 (October 18, 2001)(Docket No. 90151). 

The Petition to the high court requested the court consider the following: The Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (“SVPA”) requires a finding that the person suffers from a mental disorder.  “Mental disorder,” in turn, is defined as, “a cogenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.” (725 ILCS 207/5(b) and (f)(1998). 

The Petitioner asks this question: Does this language satisfy the rule in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, No. 00-975, decided January 22, 2002, that the State must prove that the person “has a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior” and that it is “difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior,” or, are the adjudications under the Illinois Act unconstitutional? 

It should be noted that Varner was decided by the Illinois Court well before the Crane decision, and the Varner Court held that no volitional control showing was necessary.  The Illinois Court held a prediction of future dangerousness linked to a mental disorder is all that is required to commit a defendant.  This is similar rational as to that overturned in Martinelli. 

On Monday, April 15, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated Leon G., et al. v. Arizona, No. 01-8107, and ordered the Arizona Supreme Court to reconsider the case in light of its January 22, 2002, decision in Kansas v. Crane (2002) 534 U.S. 407. 

The Arizona Supreme Court decided In re the Matter of Leon G., 200 Ariz. 298, 26 P. 3d 481 (2001), in July of 2001, where the Court found that Kansas v. Hendricks, (1997) 521 U.S. 346, did not impose a separate requirement of volitional impairment for civil commitment statutes. 

The media reported this could affect 149 men currently detained in Arizona and 1200 nationally.  Jamie McAlister, the Attorney who challenged the law said,, “As much as Arizona doesn’t want to, I think they’re going to have to release many of them, because they’ve all been incarcerated under the old law.”  She continued, “I think it’s going to change things substantially.” 

The Arizona Supreme Court decision that was vacated can be found on the web at: 
 http://www.supreme.state.az.us/opin/pdf2001/CV010062PRedit.pdf

On May 10, 2002, an Arizona Probate Judge held that the Arizona “Sexually Violent Persons Act” is unconstitutional, when deciding the case of In re Ronald D. (No. CV1998-021029). 

In reaching its decision the Probate Court stated: “The U.S. Supreme Court considered Leon G. and vacated the judgment, remanding it back to the Supreme Court of Arizona for further consideration in light of its findings in Crane.  A.R.S. §36-3702 (5) defines ‘mental disorder’ as a ‘paraphilia, personality disorder or conduct disorder or any combination [thereof]. . .that predisposes a person to commit sexual acts’ so as to render the person a danger to others.  No requirement of the necessary element of violation impairment is mentioned.  Indeed, no section of the Arizona Sexually Violent Persons Act (“the Act”), Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated sections 36-3701 through 36-3716 (Supp. 2000) mandates a finding of volitional impairment.” 

In vacating the order committing Ronald D., the Probate Court left open the possibility that when the Arizona Supreme Court reconsiders the Leon G. case, if that Court were to find the Act constitutional, then, “this Court believes that Ronald O is entitled to a new jury trial to determine whether he is a sexually violent person under the standard set forth in Hendricks and Crane.”