Keen hints that to view war as "…a disaster for almost everyone concerned," is in fact "dangerous and in many ways misleading. (21). In fact, much civil violence is "driven by powerful economic motives and agendas." (Berdal and Malone, 2000: 4). With the current stage of the Troubles lasting over 30 years, Berdal and Malone’s description of the circumstances as one where "what is usually considered to be the most basic of military objectives in war - that is, defeating the enemy in battle - has been replaced by economically-driven interests in continued fighting and the institutionalization of violence at what is for some clearly a profitable level of intensity," seems entirely appropriate. (2). In fact, the continued failure by outside parties "to account for the presence of economic agendas" in the conflict likely undermined previous peace agreements (Ibid.: 9).

Keen notes that violence can be "generated by particular political economies, which it in turn modifies (but does not destroy)." (22). In many ways, Northern Ireland provides an irrefutable example of just such a political economy. The economic circumstances in Northern Ireland have been some of the most dire in Western Europe. In 1979, in the beginning of a recession, all that prevented the living standard of Northern Ireland from descending into a freefall to the levels more commonly found in poorer regions of Latin America was regular cash infusions from Great Britain (Rowthorn and Wayne, 1988: 90). Even fifteen years later, Northern Ireland continued to have far higher levels of unemployment than other parts of Great Britain or Europe, with one of the highest levels of youth unemployment in the continent (Coogan, 1994: 333).

This is not to say that dire economic conditions effected the population of Northern Ireland equally. In a country where 53% of the population is Protestant and 41.5% is Catholic (Ibid.: xvi), over 90% of the commercial property is Protestant-owned (Hancock, 1996: 8). A 1978 reported showed that two-thirds of unemployed in Northern Ireland were Catholic, though they represent less than half the population (Coogan: 276). When they do find work, Catholics tend to occupy the lower ranks of whatever profession they enter. Even in the white-collar private and public sectors there is a clear "glass-ceiling effect", wherein Catholics are far more likely to serve in clerical rather than managerial positions (Whyte, 1980: 15).

Such differences are more than the result of bad luck or differences in human capital between the Catholic and Protestant populations. If one takes the view that the Northern Ireland political economy is based on a system of patronage, the questions come down to the manner in which the British regime prevents "all individuals from gaining unregulated access to markets." (Reno, 2000: 46). Operating as what William Reno calls a shadow state, the British "thus logically seek to make life less secure and more economically impoverished for subjects" by restricting access to public goods (such as personal security, economic opportunity and protection of property), which in turn encourages groups to seek the British regime’s favour "to secure exemption from these conditions." (Ibid., emphasis in original).

The shadow state in Northern Ireland rules through secretive and often informal networks of collusion and resource-sharing between the British forces and Protestant political and paramilitary entities. The collusion of the RUC and British military and intelligence institutions with Loyalist paramilitary groups, resulting in the systematic discrimination and repression of Catholics, has been well-established (Hancock: 10-11; Coogan: 455-461). One of the results of this collusion and resultant denial of public goods has been Protestant domination of "employment, housing allocations and educational revenues, where discrimination was more often the rule than the exception." (Hancock: 12).

Another result of the operation of the shadow state was the success of the RUC "supergrass" program. Supergrasses are informants paid exorbiant amounts to provide evidence against key Catholic leaders. Coogan reports that "supergrasses who retracted their evidence have mentioned astronomical sums of money being offered to them if they implicate Republicans. One such, David Lean, told reporters that he was offered £300,000 to implicate Gerry Adams, Danny Morrison and Martin McGuiness." Supergrasses as of March 1985 received an average payment of £187,500. (Coogan: 395). Given the many barriers to public goods erected by the shadow state and the Protestant hegemony, it is unsurprising that such a program would meet with success in Northern Ireland.

Another end result of the shadow state and the political economy of Northern Ireland, for Catholics, has been rampant housing discrimination, substandard educational spending, and job discrimination in both the private and public sectors. Coogan, in noting that Derry Catholics held just 11.1% of public service jobs in 1979, states that "out of such percentages gunmen are made." (265-266). His analysis describes what Keen calls "bottom-up violence," the kind of violence "actively embraced by a variety of ordinary people (either civilians or low-ranking soldiers) as a solution to problems of their own." (25). Collier predicts that any cohort of young men who "face only the option of poverty" are more likely to join a rebellion (94). This description perfectly fits most young Catholic men in Northern Ireland, and does much to explain the continued popularity and persistence of the IRA and other Catholic insurgency groups. As Keen notes, when "particular groups come to fall at least partially outside the physical and economic protection of the state," this can easily lead to "the generation of a sense of grievance and of rebellion among these exploited groups, and the hyper exploitation and hyper expropriation of "rebel suspects" that typically take place under the cover of an outright conflict (32). In Northern Ireland,

Keen notes that for insurgency groups in civil conflict, violence can often serve "more immediate functions, often economic in nature." (24). Often, these economic functions consist of creating for insurgents "opportunities for profit that are not available during peace." (Collier: 101). This, in part, helps to solve the free-rider problem faced by insurgency groups by confining the "economic benefits of rebellion…to those who participate in it." (Ibid.: 100). The types of opportunities available to insurgents "usually involve activities that breach national codes," in a "highly criminalized" war economy. (Duffield, 2000: 84). It is unsurprising then, given the Protestant control of the economy and the discrimination faced by Catholics in Northern Ireland, to see Republican insurgents engage in these types of economic activities. It should be equally unsurprising to see Loyalist paramilitaries engage in illegal economic activities to a lesser extent, and for much of their activities to be tied to British collusion.

The British army estimates the Provisional IRA's annual income to be £1.5 million, though many consider that to be a conservative estimate (Coogan: 328). This income is obtained in a variety of ways, forming a continuum of legality. The Provisionals run drinking clubs and pubs, hold collections, implement systems of levies and subscriptions, provide ‘protection’ "and in fact so control West Belfast that no builder could operate there without Provisional consent." (Ibid.).

In addition to these somewhat more innocuous economic activities, the IRA also engaged in "highly illegal and reprehensible activities, such as bank robberies, kidnapping, and building site scams." (Ibid.: 442). In the period 1971-1979, 7,990 IRA robberies netted the organization an average of £460,000 each year (Ibid.: 287). INLA appeared to be even more adept at bank robbery, with one INLA bank robbery in 1979 netting half a million pounds and two others in Cork in the early 1980’s netting £400,000. According to Coogan, "the INLA is largely financed through raiding banks in Ireland (Ibid.: 349; 410).

The economic activities of Loyalist paramilitaries are both similar to and slightly different from those of their Republican counterparts. Like the Provisionals, the UDA also maintains a tight control on construction in East Belfast and control many Protestant pubs and drinking establishments (Ibid.: 328). The UDA, like INLA, has also been heavily-involved in arms dealing (Ibid.: 457). And, similar to the IRA, evidence exists as to Loyalist involvement in drug dealing, despite a very severe public stance against such activities. When senior UVF member Billy Wright was expelled from the organization in August of 1997 for drugs trafficking, an INLA supporter commented that "the UVF are bloody hypocrites – they’ve known for years about his dealing. He’s the biggest Ecstasy dealer in Belfast!" Wright went on to form the breakaway Loyalist Volunteer Force, which he ran until his imprisonment and assassination (Author Unknown).

Differences do exist between the economic resources and activities of Loyalist and Republican insurgents. For one, Loyalist groups lack the overseas funding enjoyed by the IRA, forcing paramilitaries like the UDA to rely more heavily on racketeering (Coogan: 343). Constraints like this are perhaps more than compensated for by British strategy in Northern Ireland. Evidence of a pattern of collusion between the British state and Loyalist paramilitaries points to a number of activities undertaken to assist the economic efforts of the UDA, UVF and others, including providing weapons to loyalist paramilitaries or failing to hold illegal Loyalist activities up to the same scrutiny as that endured by Republican insurgents.

One illustrative case involved the head of intelligence for the UDA, Brian Nelson, who traveled to South Africa in 1985 to buy arms (Ibid.: 457). The question of how a Protestant Irishman would have the connections, resources and wherewithal to organize an international arms deal such as this quickly raised suspicions of British involvement. A BBC documentary later revealed that British intelligence, using Brian Nelson as an agent, facilitated the arms deal, bought Nelson a taxi and provided Nelson with intelligence information (Sinn Féin, 1997).

This case illustrates what Reno refers to as an "elite strategy of control" that "puts weapons into the hands of agents who obey no bureaucratic rules" encouraging them "to invade economic activities of other people, especially those who have little to offer the shadow state beyond existing as targets for direct exploitation." (50).

One key manifestation of this effect has to do with the control and policing of Catholic and Protestant areas of Northern Ireland. In order to manage their economic environments, insurgents must use violence "in lieu of state provision of public order." (Reno: 54-55). For Loyalist communities, the 88% Protestant RUC (Darby, 1976: 59) and its linkages with Loyalist paramilitaries acts as the main vehicle for this economic environment management. This, in turn, ensured that the Provisional IRA (and, in Falls Road in Belfast, INLA) acted as the defacto police force in Catholic communities, where residents regarded the RUC as "a partisan force" that frequently faced off "with Catholic demonstrators while ignoring violence from Protestant corners." (Ibid.). The end result was the creation of RUC "no-go" zones in Catholic areas, where government-sanctioned police forces could not enter without the protection of armoured cars. Into this social control vacuum stepped the IRA, who tried to organize local policing and protection of residents (Coogan: 365), both from Loyalist aggression and from other forms of crime – not committed in the name of the Republican cause!

Another interesting effect of the economic situation of the Troubles was the creation of the "supergrass" – a police informant paid exboriant sums for information implicating important Republican figures. One such supergrass, who later retracted his testimony, was David Lean, who "told reporters that he was offered £300,000 to implicate Gerry Adams, Danny Morrison and Martin McGuiness." As of March, 1985, supergrasses received an average payment of £187,500 from the RUC and British authorities in exchange for testimony (Ibid.: 395). Given the tremendous amount of social cohesion in Catholic communities (Brewer, Lockhart, and Rodgers 1998, 576), the amounts offered supergrasses had to be substantial. On the other hand, the dismal economic futures of most young Catholics must certainly have factored into the decision of whether or not to "grass."

Another effect of both the political economy of Northern Ireland and the effects of the conflict upon it was "that groups of young men, uprooted by the Troubles, roamed around the country pulling off robberies." (Coogan: 327). It is highly likely that IRA control of Catholic communities and RUC/Loyalist control of Protestant communities, along with a subsequent influx of arms into those communities, facilitated an increase in crimes directed at legitimate "targets" of both sides.

Finally, the economic effects of the Troubles extend into the borders of other countries as well. Both the Republic of Ireland and Britain itself pay an enormous economic cost with every year of the continuation of the conflict. Northern Ireland drains over £3 billion annually from the British treasury while increased security and border patrols cost the Irish Republic over one-quarter of its annual budget. (Hancock: 1996).

Berdal and Malon note that "the failure to account for the presence of economic agendas in conflicts has, at times, seriously undermined international efforts to consolidate fragile peace agreements." (9). There may be evidence to point the failure of previous peace negotiations precisely in this direction. The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 may be a prime example.

This was mostly due to a "criminally low" corporate tax rate and an educated but low-waged workforce, which attracted foreign investors eager to launch into the European market or to avoid higher taxes in other countries, resulting in seven billion dollars in direct investment in 1997 (Ibid.). From 1995 (one year after the Downing Street Declaration left the peace process in utter disarray) to 2000, the economy of the Republic of Ireland grew more than eight per cent per year (Black: 2000). The Celtic Tiger was born.

There is every reason to believe that the combatants to the north were paying close attention to the transformation of the south and that they were eager to follow suit. Nine months after Gerry Adams’ dire prognosis for peace, the IRA announced a surprise ceasefire. Perhaps equally surprising to the belligerents were the immediate economic benefits of the ceasefire. Coogan attributes a massive mobilization of foreign investment and economic assistance for Northern Ireland to this historic ceasefire (501). Evidently, the increase in economic assets was enough to demonstrate to all parties to the conflict the benefits of a lasting peace, in the proper economic (read: boom) climate. Just six weeks later, both the UDA and the UVF reciprocated the IRA’s cessation of military operations, less than a year after Gerry Adams’ essentially declared the peace process dead.

Three years into the Celtic Tiger economic phenomenon, peace talks started to make rapid progress, particularly after talks chair George Mitchell set a deadline of April 9, 1998 for an agreement. In a feat comparable in astonishment to pulling a rabbit out of a hat, Senator Mitchell produced what was to become known as the Good Friday Agreement at 1700 hours on April 10, 1998, with a referendum on the agreement announced for May 22^nd.

Given that the Protestants of Northern Ireland had enjoyed near-exclusive control over the distribution of public goods, it is difficult to explain the referendum results, in which 70% of the votes cast in Northern Ireland joined 90% of the votes cast in the Republic in accepting the agreement (Fianna Fáil, 1998). One way to explain this has to do with the celtic tiger and the economic dividends of the peace process apparent to all even prior to 1998. If the primary objection of the Loyalists in Northern Ireland stemmed from concerns about diminishing their economic circumstances, these concerns may well have been assuaged by the economic bounty of the celtic tiger economy, thereby greatly reducing concerns involving public goods. This further explains why previous peacebuilding initiatives, including the Downing Street Declaration, failed – the economic incentive created by the celtic tiger was missing, which effectively reduced the economic interest of the Protestant community "in sustaining or reviving conflict." (Collier: 106). The rod of Collier’s prescriptive of reducing the profiteering of insurgent groups has a corresponding carrot of offering additional profits through a successful peace. In this case, diversification of the economy does not reduce economic incentives for the insurgent groups (Ibid.) as much as it creates other viable economic opportunities for them to pursue, reducing poverty and increasing economic growth (Ibid.: 107).

That the majority of combatants, and virtually all of the key combatants, understand the situation thusly is demonstrated by the inability of extremist factions on both sides to completely derail the peace process. On the contrary, the Official IRA bombing of Omagh on August 15, 1998 backfired, bringing Sinn Féin in closer cooperation with Protestant political parties to form a governing body (Author Unknown).

The success of the Good Friday Agreement, which has inarguably brought Northern Ireland closer to a lasting peace than any previous effort, can be largely attributed to the economic consequences of the celtic tiger economy of the Republic of Ireland to the south, as well as to the immediate economic benefits accrued as a result of the 1994 IRA ceasefire. The ceasefire encouraged enough foreign investment and aid to convince everyone that peace could well yield economic benefits that would increase the availability of public goods for all.

The elusiveness of peace in Northern Ireland largely evaporated not when the profitability of those with economic interests in sustaining the conflict was reduced, as Collier suggests be done (106), but when it became obvious that even greater profits could be made through peace, thanks largely to economic diversification enabled by generous foreign investment and aid. This in turn reduces the poverty from which many of the grievances of the Republicans stem. Collier predicts that peace "will depend upon those groups that gain from peace being more influential than those that gain from war." (105). In Northern Ireland, we see that an alternate route for peace becomes available when those that gain from war benefit more from peace, because the economic interests inherent to the conflict no longer become barriers to peace (Reno: 64), but opportunities for peace.

The economic interests of outside actors are also of importance for the future. Coogan notes that the Republic of Ireland, despite its fantastic economic record of recent years, is still in no position to take over the £3 billion tab for the six counties of Ulster from the British. But, the burden of the British taxpayer will be lightened thanks to diminished security expenditures. There have also been very encouraging pledges of financial assistance from other countries, most notably the United States (499).

The strength of the current peace process may be facing its most crucial test with the possibility of an impending recession reducing the availability of public goods and therefore increasing the economic incentives for a continuation of the conflict. How much gets accomplished under the peace process before such a time comes may have much to do with whether or not hostilities resume. But should they resume, at least the importance of economic concerns will have been convincingly demonstrated, pointing the way for future peacebuilding initiatives to take.

 SOURCES

Author Unknown. " 1996-1998: The Second Ceasefire And The Good Friday Agreement." History of Ireland website: www.fortunecity.com/bally/sligo/93/past/history/19961998.html.

Bew, Paul, Peter Gibbon, and Henry Patterson, eds. The State of Northern Ireland 1921-72: Political Forces and Social Classes. (New York: St. Martin's Press), 1979.

Black, Jane. "Celtic Tiger." November 27, 2000. ZDNet website: www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2657203,00.html.

Brewer, John D., Bill Lockhart and Paula Rodgers. "Informal Social Control and Crime Management in Belfast." British Journal of Sociology. Vol. 49, No. 4. Dec. 1998, pp. 570-85.

Darby, John. Conflict In Northern Ireland: The Development Of A Polarised Community. (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan), 1976.

Fianna Fáil. "Good Friday Agreement Referendum Result." Press Release. May 29, 1998. Fr. Fianna Fáil website: www.fiannafail.ie/whatsnew/archives/pr_290598b.html

Rowthorn, Bob, and Naomi Wayne. Northern Ireland: The Political Economy of Conflict. (London: Polity Press), 1988.

Sinn Féin. "’An Appalling Vista:’ Collusion, British Military Intelligence And Brian Nelson - A Case for an Independent Public Inquiry." 1997. From the Conflict Archive on the Internet website: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/sf31398.htm.

Whyte, John Henry. Church And State in Modern Ireland, 1923-1979. (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan), 1980.