Raymond Boudon has written a book that masterfully expands Simmelâs ideas concerning a priori by illustrating the negative effects these necessary components of both ordinary and scientific (methodological) thinking beget.

The strength of false ideas, Boudon emphasizes, is their very origins in sound reasoning (ix). And the element in sound reasoning that produces false ideas are the apparently self-evident frameworks metaconsciously applied to questions and problems. This, Boudon refers to as "the Simmel effect." (xii). This effect is universal, in that all theories necessarily introduce a priori (28), a statement that causes one to wonder about the effects of the a priori that led to this conclusion!

In Chapter Two, Boudon stresses Simmelâs point about the implicit components of reasoning, the a priori, leading to distorted conclusions. This occurs when we rely on inductive a priori to lead us to a false final conclusion instead of remaining at the valid intermediary conclusion (42). This is illustrative best by examples from cognitive psychology, in which subjects arrive at erroneous conclusions due to implicit reasons considered so self-evident that they operate meta-consciously, though they may be inappropriately applied to the situation at hand. The key to overcoming this substantial obstacle to the progression of knowledge, then, is to identify and eliminate distortions caused in this manner in the final analysis (60). The problem is that Simmel and Boudon are not explicit enough in how to actually go about accomplishing this formidable task.

Instead, Boudon moves into a discussion on Karl Popper and his objections to universality. Popper claims that theories can only be falsified but never verified because, even if it is possible to examine all previous and existing cases, it is impossible to examine all potential and future ones (78). For Radnitzky, the "truth" of any theory merely implies that alternative explanations were considered to costly to defend (87) ö a nice rational choice take on Popperâs point.

Boudon takes this a step further, arguing that the same points made against verifying theories also apply to falsifying theories. If a theory can never be true but only probable, asks Boudon, isnât it just as true that a theory can never be false but only improbable? (88). In this, Boudon appears to use the a priori framework on universality, which does not withstand the introduction of empirical evidence to falsify theories. Using his own example, a yellow crow would render the theory "all crows are black" not merely improbable, but false.

Boudonâs other critiques of Popper stand on firmer ground, most notably that Popperâs "theory of falsification is hyperbolic, leading to conclusions whose extreme degree of generality is the effect not only of the explicit arguments on which hit is based, but also

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of implicit arguments which are much less restrictive (97)." In this way, Boudon introduces the hyperbolic effects of implicit hypotheses, which restrict the conditions of any theoryâs validity, yet are only detected when a theory suffers setbacks (98) (i.e. the yellow crow example). Again, Boudon arrives at a prescriptive of making implicit hypotheses explicit, but does not explain how, exactly, this can be accomplished.

How we select the logical frameworks in which we frame questions will ultimately determine the answers we arrive at. In fact, the most restrictive frameworks are often selected metaconsciously, allowing us to arrive at the most limited number of possible answers ö a classic ploy of murder mysteries, as Boudon points out (113). He then tackles Durkheimâs theory of religion on these grounds, and appears successful in pointing out the possibility that Durkheim metaconsciously introduces a closed-world hypothesis that guides him to his conclusions, thus weakening his argument significantly (120-122).

From here the reader is led to a discussion of Hubnerâs views on the "truth" of scientific theories, (which may have been better-served in the discussion of Popper) the outcome of which denies the concepts of truth or objectivity any content (131). As with Popper, Boudon is able to dismiss Hubnerâs claims by pointing to the hyperbolic reasoning in his choice of logical frameworks (141), a charge he also applies to parts of Kuhn.

The next two chapters are devoted to addressing two common a priori ö "everything has a cause" and "truth is unique." These epistemological propositions, just two of a "halo" of epistemologies surrounding any theory (143), often lead to the choice of inappropriate frameworks (144). Logically, then (and barring any a priori I am not aware of), the solution lies in the careful selection of frameworks, which could only be accomplished by being conscious of them. Boudon would do well to solve the problem of how to accomplish this, but he does not.

One of the major problems the limits the universality of the epistemologic proposition "everything has a cause" is the amibiguous meaning of "cause." (146). Boudon also points out how this a priori can result in phenomenon being "endowed" with causes when none are present (153).

The a priori that "truth is unique" is very common, forming the core of skeptical reasoning, for example (174). Yet, this is obviously not universal, since many things have equally-valid multiple explanations (175). Nevertheless, Boudon proposes this to be a major source of erroneous thinking, charging the likes of Descartes, Locke and Kant with the invalid application of this proposition (176). The very fact that truth is often not unique seems to once again threaten the very concept of truth, which, by definition, is unique (178). Boudon explains this multivariate notion of truth by pointing out that a the truth of a matter can be explained differently using different languages ö the language and explanations of a historian and a sociologist for the same phenomenon will differ, but both may still hold true.

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The problem with this a priori is that it assumes universality and creates dichotomous, mutually-exclusive double-truths (186). As soon as an explanation is arrived at using two different languages, reasons are given to show which is the "correct" one (188), when in fact both can peacefully co-exist. Often, this is a debate between teleological and causal explanations (194).

Throughout The Art of Self-Persuasion, Boudon persuasively convinces the reader of the effects of a priori elements in all theories often leading to the wrong conclusions because of their inappropriateness to answer the question at hand. But in bringing this metaconscious process to the consciousness of his readers, Boudon naturally (but implicitly) invites his readers to consider the a priori salient in his argument, which is never clearly explicated. A more astute reader than myself may well point out the leap Boudon makes from valid intermediary conclusions to false final conclusions, but I could find no more than minor quibbles (such as that concerning yellow crows) with Boudonâs reason. In persuading himself, so too has Boudon managed to persuade me.