-But, use of violence by SMOâs is usually regarding as self-defeating (Ibid.) in that it alienates and undermines support for the movement and invites harsh repression by the state. Given this, why do SMOâs continue to employ violence? Why is it so commonly seen as a tactic used by a variety of SMOâs?

-Why should we examine SMO use of violence instead of SMO tactics generally? We regard violence as a special kind of tactic in that it goes beyond "the limitations of the normative political process" (Lipsett and Raab: 5), embuing it with a seriousness and gravity not characteristics of other tactical choices.

-But the assumption of gravity as regards SMO violence may be an a priori assumption. Hobsbawn believes that this special treatment of violence evidences a meta-conscious, bourgeois perception of violence that reflects the view of the ruling elite but not necessarily that of, say, striking miners, for whom scabbing is a far worse offense. (1984: 10-11).

-Rational action refers to utility maximization, or the choice of the option that best serves a groupâs objectives. (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 14).

-Collective action occurs when individuals see it as the most efficient way to achieve their common goals. (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 15-16).

-Rational choice theory is useful for studying the strategic decision-making of radical groups and their attempts to exploit available resources (Blee, Kathleen, "White-Knuckle Research: Emotional Dynamics in Fieldwork with Racist Activists," Qualitative Sociology, Winter 1998, p. 389).

-SMOâs donât resort to violence out of desperation. If they did, it would only legitimize official use of force and increase hostility. Instead, violence is viewed as an instrumental, purposeful and rational act, aimed at furthering the purposes of the group that uses it when they have some reason to think it will help their cause." (Gamson: 81; Rule: 170).

-Two main schools here: resource mobilization theory and relative deprivation theory.

-Any given SMO has "a limited repetoire of collective action within which its members ordinarily make choices when they have collective aims to advance." (Tilly, Charles, 1981: 19).

-for a movement to survive the pressures imposed upon it by its resource limitations, it must develop a battery of specialized tactics that can be carried out by an activist cadre without the support of a mass base. (Taylor, 1980: 771).

-for some social movements, resource limitations enhance the attractiveness of violence as a means to "gain power over their opponents" via physical intimidation. (Blee: 393).

-The kinds of resources available to social movement organizations are as important as what is not available. Charles Tilly believes that activists select methods based on available resources. (in Dobratz and Shanks-Meile: 165).

-Violence is often an effective tactic for movements facing resource constraints and can achieve many movement objectives, such as media attention, with even limited resources.

-But does it do anything for "irrational" violent acts?

-Relative deprivation theory is touted as a way to overcome the shortfalls of pure rational choice theory (Lipsett and Raab: 509).

-"People are Îrelatively deprivedâ if their resources do not let them meet the social demands of membership of their society ö expectations which are then translated into an income threshold required for meeting them." (Hollis, 1994: 215).

-There is "almost no hope that any single event will achieve its (the social movementâs) stated objective." (Tilly: 467).

-"A true social dilemma·arises not from distaste for the interest group or its methods, but from strategic behaviour predicated on the realization that one can consume the collective good produced by the group regardless of oneâs own contribution." (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 77).

-"To be successful, groups must find some way of overcoming the free-rider problem." (Gamson: 60).

-Olson brings up the free-rider problem by noting that rational people will not voluntarily make sacrifices for the group, especially if they can still benefit without group participation. (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 16-17).

-There is dispute as to how effective group loyalty or solidarity is in overcoming the free rider effect.

-Two ways in which the free rider problem is typically dealt with by SMOâs:

-Organizers of SMO face extreme personal costs in organizing, especially in the initial stages. The fact that they nevertheless organize attests to something greater at stake than divisible self-interest. (Rule: 61).

-Olsen argues that collective actions are acted upon when selective incentives ö inducements that can be gained or lost, depending on participation ö are present. Social action is only rational when the actorâs utility is maximized by gaining both the selective incentives and/or the public good itself. (Rule: 33; Gamson: 58).

-Large SMOâs do well when they employ selective incentives to do battle with the free rider problem. (Gamson: 70).

-ONE WAY SMOâS THWART THIS FREE-RIDER DILEMMS IS W/ FEAR! (SEE BLEE!)

-Olson notes that threats for not participating are also effective in resolving the free rider dilemma for SMOâs. (Gamson: 58).

-SMO use of violence and the fear of to solve the free-rider problem creates for their organization the kind of sovereign authority discussed in HobbesâLeviathan ö one which secures SMO members in their "covenants with one another." (Hollis, 1994: 133).

-Blee notes that this fear is born of the violence that racist extremist activists witness, participate in, and are potential victims of. "Within racist groups, fear is a common currency. Both official and informal leaders find fear to be a useful motivating emotion among members." (pp. 393-394).

-Some rational choice theorists have conceded that organized collective action is not well-explained by any "plausible variant of the theory." (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 44).

-The idea that SMO actors will engage in violence is not explained by self-interest. The costs of individuals engaging in SMO violence, particularly at the outset of a campaign, and without any hope for a specific campaign to attain movement objectives, and with only the cold comfort of the martydom carrot vs. the whip of threats from oneâs supposed "comrades" as motivating forces, makes it irrational for any individual to participate in a violent campaign.

-Rational choice works well when a violent repetoire has been employed but not so well at explaining its initial employment. (Rule: 52).

-MARTYDOM EXPLAINS A BIT, BUT ITâS FALSIFIED BY ANY EXAMPLE WHERE MARTYRDOM ISNâT SALIENT!

-Rational choice theory "continues to be distinguished by applying assumptions of narrow self-interest to problems of collective choice." (Rule: 36).

-Rational choice refuses "to deal sensibly with the existence of motives other than narrow self-interest." (Rule: 36).

-"the distinction between Înarrowâ self-interest and other kinds of interests that move people is much fuzzier than rational choice analysts will allow. (Rule: 38). TAKE MORAL MOTIVATIONS OR ANONYMOUS BENEFACTORS!

-Rational choice theory seems weak when looking at non-strategic targets of SMO violence.

-"Rational choice theoristsâ model of individual rather than collective interests as the mainspring of collective action places them on a theoretical collision course with virtually all sociological theories of civil violence." (Rule: 32).

-Irrationalists theorize that violence results from the intensified, emotional influence of others, which disrupts the social controls on violence. (Rule: 92).

-Opposite of the rational choice explanation of SMO violence being caused when people come together to achieve common goals is the "tension-release" explanation of violence as mass catharsis in rapidly changing times. (Tilly, Charles, 1981: 14).

-Irrationalists look to collective behaviour theoryâs view of violence as a contagion ö a symbolic exchange between actors. (Rule: 99).

-Collective behaviour communicates emergent norms different from the norms embedded in other types of interactions. (Rule: 101).

-The problem of falsifying irrational theories of violence is to specify what a collective mentality is, since it is the supposed cause of violent action. Likewise contagion! (Rule: 102).

-Value integration theory (Talcott Parsons!) first posited that humans can have commitments to abstract principles that transcend self-interest. (Rule: 132).

-These values only lead to concrete social arrangements - and action ö if institutionalized. (Rule: 148). SMOâS CAN BE THIS INSTITUTIONALIZATION!

-But, value integration theory doesnât lend itself to establishing empirical criteria readily! (Rule: 150).

-Marxist theorists predict social movement violence in times when groups feel a genuine shot at improving their condition, or at least preventing it from deteriorating. (Rule: 61).

-an empirical implication of Marxism is the expectation of SMO violence during periods of transition in class rule. (Rule: 57).

-Marxists think that actos calculate whether or not violence is likely to advance the struggle for public goods or not. But it is calculated as a collective interest, not as individual self-interests! (Rule: 61). BIG DISTINCTION HERE BETWEEN RATIONAL CHOICE AND MARXISM!

-Olson argues that class uprisings wonât occur if class members are rational, because of the free rider problem. TAKE THAT, MARX! In fact, individuals will only organize to pursue collective interests in certain conditions. (Gamson: 57).

-Any Marxist hypothesis is rife w/ conceptual ambiguities! (Rule: 62).

-But itâs at least falsifiable ö SMO violence wonât occur if there is no hope of advancing the collective interest or obtaining the public goods. (Rule: 63). BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ETA?

-Coserâs ideas concerning "greedy institutions" and social conflict lead to the postulation of violence when an SMO claims total loyalty or involvement from its members. FALSIFIABLE! (Rule: 130).

-In fact differntial identification theorists would predict that the impetus to commit violent acts will be transmitted from the social movement organization employing them to current and potential followers through the media and that the skillful use of media images by the social movement can create a "copy-cat" effect. (Hamm:138).

-"Individuals have strong identifications and affiliations with solidarity groups at different levels·these solidarities overlap and cut across each other in a complex web which creates multiple memberships linking individuals with different sets of others. (Gamson: 7). ANOTHER CONSTRAINT ON VIOLENCE!

-Strategic choices of social movements are largely influenced by the political opportunity structure. (Blee: 387).

-Mass society theory predicts violence "when people are inadequately embedded in institutional political life." In these cases, they will seek political ends directly. (Kornhauser, William, in Rule: 109). THIS COMPLEMENTS RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, DONâT YA THINK?

-Critics of Kornhauserâs mass society theory point out that "extremists" are often well-connected to the neighbourhood, community and polity! (Rule: 110).

-Tilly see civil violence as "another manifestation of pursuit of normal collective interest." (Rule: 10).

-Charles Tilly notes that most episodes of civil violence grow from nonviolent forms of collective action. (in Rule: 184).

-Tilly thinks that the sudden imposition of suffering spurs violent reaction. (Rule: 173). COUNTERING MARXIST HOPES OF THE MASSES RISING UP!

-Tilly sees collective violence as just another form of collective action. (Rule: 175). PROGRESS, BECAUSE IT DOES AWAY WITH THE A PRIORI!

-Political theorists like Tilly see civil violence as an outgrowth of nonviolent collective action. (Rule: 184). EASILY-FALSIFIED!

-But the purposefulness of political violence doesnât make rational sense due to its high costs. (Rule: 188).

-But maybe these costs lose their restraining powers on certain occasions, like when vengeance is an especially salient motive. (Rule: 190).

-SMOâs donât resort to violence out of desperation. If they did, it would only legitimize official use of force and increase hostility. Instead, "violence should be viewed as an instrumental act, aimed at furthering the purposes of the group that uses it when they have some reason to think it will help their cause." (Gamson: 81).

-The response of authorities to forms of collective action reshapes subsequent action. (Tilly, Charles, 1981: 21). SO, VIOLENCE SHOULD GO AWAY ö EXCEPT ITâS SO SUCCESSFUL ö SEE GAMSON!

-Forms of collective action are shaped by both structural factors and repression. (Tilly, Louise, 1981: 240).

-SMOâs that employ violence have a better chance of success. (Gamson: 79).

-Groups that use violence "have better-than-average success." (Gamson: 87).

-"State repression of the more overly political challenges (LIKE PETITIONING!) forced working-class collective action into the narrow form of the strike." (Tilly, Louise, 1981: 241). AND MAYBE THE NATURE OF STRIKES MAKES THEM MORE PRONE TO VIOLENCE, THEREFORE THE CONTINUANCE OF VIOLENCE NOTED BY GAMSON!