LAKSAMANA.Net, March 14, 2005 09:39 PM
'TNI Threat to Human Rights & Democracy'
Laksamana.Net - Following are statements made by two former US diplomats to a
congressional hearing on the future of US relations with Indonesia.
Edmund McWilliams, a former Political Counselor with the US Embassy in Jakarta, is
now a director of the Indonesia Human Rights Network.
Alphonse La Porta, a former US Ambassador to Mongolia, is now president of the
United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO).
Their statements, made on Thursday (10/3/05), are via the website of the US House
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
The Indonesian Military's Threat to Human Rights and Democracy
Edmund McWilliams
Board of Directors, Indonesia Human Rights Network
(former Political Counselor with the US Embassy, Jakarta)
Testimony for Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing: Implications of
Recent Indonesia Reform
March 10, 2005
The Annual Human Rights Report regarding Indonesia, recently released by the State
Department accurately portrays the Indonesia as a fragile, fledgling democracy whose
government is not yet capable of protecting the fundamental human rights of its
people. As documented clearly in the State Department's report, the principal menace
to those rights and to that fledgling democratic government itself is a rogue institution
with vast wealth and power that has committed crimes against humanity and perhaps
genocide and which remains unaccountable.
That institution, the Indonesian military, recently saw its stature dangerously
enhanced by a decision of the U.S. administration to end a bipartisan Congressionally
imposed sanction against the military, imposed over a decade ago.
The decision, announced by Secretary of State Rice, restored International Military
Education and Training (IMET) assistance to the Indonesian military. The Congress
banned that assistance in 1992 in response to the military's murder of 276 peaceful
demonstrators in East Timor. The Congress reinforced the ban in 1999 in response to
the military's ravaging of East Timor following the Timorese people's courageous vote
for freedom. In 2004, the Congress narrowed the ban to a single condition. It required
that the State Department certify that the Indonesian government and military were
cooperating in an FBI investigation of an August 31, 2002 assault on a group of U.S.
citizens at the Freeport copper and gold mine in West Papua that saw two U.S.
citizens killed and eight wounded.
Dr. Rice's February 26 certification that the Indonesians were cooperating manifestly
misrepresents the obstructions and malign inaction of the Indonesian side with
regards to that investigation. Contrary to the State Department's contention that the
Indonesian side is "cooperating," the Indonesians have failed to bring charges against
or even detain the one individual indicted by a U.S. grand jury in the attack. Moreover,
for over eight months it has stalled a return of the FBI team to Indonesia to continue
its investigation.
This Indonesian obstruction of the FBI investigation is possibly explained by
indications that the Indonesian military itself was involved in the attack. The initial
Indonesian police report, as well as reports by independent researchers, journalists
and others, all point to military involvement. Recently, evidence of ties between the
one indicted individual and the military was provided to the FBI and the State
Department. Moreover, the military's presentation of false evidence and subsequent
military threats and intimidation targeting those Indonesian human rights advocates
who had assisted the FBI also suggest the military's culpability.
Ms. Patsy Spier who was wounded and widowed in the attack has asked me to share
with you her concern about the importance of genuine Indonesian cooperation in the
investigation:
"The investigation into the Timika Ambush, a terror attack, is completely in Americans
interest. Two American citizens who were working in Indonesia for an American
company were murdered on a secure road. The ambush lasted from 35 to 45 minutes
before help came. The eight Americans wounded were American citizens working in
Indonesia (the eighth American being a 6 year old girl). The investigation, and
cooperation needed, is in Americans interest to assure the safety of the other
thousands of Americans working and living in Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities
must cooperate fully with our US investigators. American companies working, and
thinking of working, in Indonesia must be assured that the murder of Americans is
taken seriously by the Indonesian Government...and cooperating with our investigators
would show that."
In addition to being indefensible on the basis of the "cooperation" criterion established
by the Congress, the decision was also a practical blunder. Restoration of IMET
assistance removes the only leverage available to the U.S. to press for the genuine
Indonesian cooperation essential to a successful completion of the FBI's investigation.
On the basis of this erroneous certification alone, the Congress should restore the
ban on IMET in FY2006. It is also imperative that the Congress maintain the ban on
FMF for the Indonesian military which remains in place despite the restoration of
IMET.
But there are broader issues in play than even the critical matter of ensuring justice in
this case of murdered and wounded U.S. citizens.
The restoration of IMET dangerously conveys to the Indonesian military that
long-standing U.S. concerns about its notorious and continuing human rights abuses,
its threats to its neighbors, illegal business empire and its impunity in committing
these acts is no longer on the U.S. agenda. Such a U.S. exoneration of the
Indonesian military removes a well-founded international censure that has given
Indonesian government and civil society members the political space to press for
reform of that notorious institution. It is not surprising that leading Indonesian human
rights activists reacted with dismay to the U.S. action.
The notorious record of the Indonesian military is well documented by reliable
reporting of well-respected human rights organizations such as Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, Tapol as well as in the State Department's Annual Human
Rights Reports. Therefore, I will only summarize that record here and then focus the
rest of my remarks on the current activity of the Indonesian military, specifically its
ongoing abuse of human rights, its involvement in a broad range of criminal
enterprises, its contempt for and threat to democratic institutions and its
unaccountability.
In 1965-68 the Indonesian military engineered the slaughter of more than a half million
Indonesians whom it alleged had been involved in a "coup" against the sitting
President Soekarno. Employing a tactic it would resort to again in the current period,
the Indonesian military allied itself with Islamic forces that did much of the actual
killing. The Soeharto regime which rose to power as a consequence of the coup and
which directed the massive killings sought to justify them in U.S. and western eyes
by labeling the victims as "communists."
Following the Indonesian military's invasion of East Timor in 1975, an estimated
200,000 East Timorese, one quarter of the population, died as a consequence of living
conditions in TNI-organized re-location camps or as direct victims of Indonesian
security force violence.
In West Papua, it is estimated that over 100,000 Papuans died in the years following
the forced annexation of West Papua under a fraudulent "Act of Free Choice,"
perpetrated by the Soeharto regime in 1969. An April 2004 study by the Allard K.
Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at the Yale Law School concluded that
the atrocities in West Papua are "crimes against humanity" and may constitute
genocide.
In Aceh, over 12,000 civilians have fallen victim to military operations that have
included mass sweeps and forced relocations. These operations, almost constantly
since the late 1970's, have entailed brutal treatment of civilians including extra judicial
killings, rape, torture and beatings. While the military's quarry in these attacks, the
pro-independence Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM has also been responsible for
human rights abuses, the State Department's Annual Human Rights reports have
consistently reported that most of those civilians died at the hands of the military.
Throughout this period, extending from 1965 to the early 1990's the U.S. military
maintained a close relationship with the Indonesian military, providing training for
thousands of officers as well as arms. From the late 1970's to 1992, that training
included grant assistance under IMET. The arms provided by the U.S. were employed
by the Indonesian military not against foreign foes (the Indonesian military has never
confronted a foreign foe except for brief clashes with the Dutch in West Papua) but
rather against their own people. In the 70's and 80's, U.S.- provided OV-10 Broncos
bombed villages in East Timor and in West Papua. Military offensives conceived and
directed by IMET-trained officers against usually miniscule resistance caused
thousands of civilian deaths.
Even with the end of the cold war, the U.S. embrace of the dictator Soeharto and his
military continued as if U.S. policy were on auto pilot. That relationship endured
largely unquestioned until 1991 when the Indonesian military was caught on film by
U.S. journalists slaughtering peaceful East Timorese demonstrators. The murder of
over 270 East Timorese youth by Indonesian soldiers bearing U.S.-provided M-16's so
shocked the U.S. Congress that in 1992 it imposed tight restrictions on further U.S.
military-to-military aid, including training for the Indonesian military.
Since the imposition of those restrictions various U.S. Administrations, with the
support of non-governmental organizations bankrolled by U.S. corporations with major
interests in Indonesia have sought to expand military to military ties. Those efforts
were accompanied by claims that the Indonesian military had reformed or was on a
reform course.
Claims of Indonesian military reform were confounded in 1999, when, following an
overwhelming vote by East Timorese for independence from Indonesia, the Indonesian
military and its militia proxies devastated the tiny half island. U.N. and other
international observers were unable to prevent the killing of over 1,500 East Timorese,
the forced relocation of over 250,000 and the destruction of over 70 percent of East
Timor's infrastructure. The Indonesian justice system has failed to hold a single
military, police or civil official responsible for the mayhem. That failure to render justice
demonstrated that even when confronted by unanimous international condemnation,
the Indonesian military remained unaccountable.
Moreover, TNI abuse of human rights is not a matter only of history. Indonesian
military operations that began in mid-2004 in West Papua continue. Burning villages
and destroying food sources, the Indonesian military has forced thousands of villagers
into the forests where many are dying for lack of food and medicine. A government
ban on travel to the region by journalists and even West Papuan senior church leaders
has limited international awareness of this tragedy. More critically, the ban has
prevented Papuan church leaders and others from distributing humanitarian relief to
the thousands forced into the forests. A similar campaign in West Papua in the late
1990s led to the death of hundreds of civilians who did not survive their forced sojourn
in the deep jungles of West Papua.
The recent devastating Indian Ocean tsunami turned international attention to Aceh,
another primary arena in which the Indonesian military continues a brutal military
campaign. Notwithstanding calls by President Yudhoyono for a ceasefire and
declaration by GAM of unilateral ceasefire the Indonesian military has continued to
conduct operations. These operations jeopardize relief operations and will likely stall
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Both GAM and the Government appear to be
genuinely pursuing a settlement through talks organized by former Finish President
Martti Atahisaari. But as the former Finnish President has emphasized, to be
successful, both sides must act with restraint in the field. With boasts that it has
killed over 230 GAM members since the tsunami struck, the TNI clearly is not acting
with restraint.
Throughout the Soeharto period (1965-1998) critics and dissenters generally were not
tolerated. Despite the genuine democratic progress made since the fall of the
Soeharto dictatorships, critics of the military and those whom the Indonesian military
regard as enemies are in grave jeopardy. Reflecting the Indonesian military's power in
"democratic" Indonesia, those critics who meet untimely ends are often the most
prominent. Indonesia's leading human rights advocate, Munir, a prominent critic of the
Indonesian military died of arsenic poisoning in 2004. An independent investigation
authorized by the Indonesian President has uncovered evidence of Government
involvement in this murder. In recent years Jafar Siddiq, a U.S. green card holder who
was in Aceh demanding justice for Achenese suffering military abuse was himself
tortured and murdered. Theys Eluay, the leading nonviolent Papuan proponent of
Papuan self-determination was abducted and strangled to death. In a rare trial of
military officials, his Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) killers received sentences
ranging up to three and one half years. Yet Army Chief of Staff, Ryamazad Ryacudu
publicly described the murderers as "heroes." Farid Faquih, a leading anti-corruption
campaigner who has targeted military and other government malfeasance recently
was badly beaten in Aceh by military officers as he sought to monitor tsunami aid
distribution. He was arrested and is now facing charges of theft of the assistance he
was monitoring. Papuan human rights advocates who supported FBI investigations of
the U.S. citizens murdered in 2002 in West Papua are under continuing intimidation
by the military and were sued by the regional military commander.
More generally, the Indonesian military poses a threat to the fledgling democratic
experiment in Indonesia. It receives over 70 percent of its budget from legal and illegal
businesses and as a result is not under direct budget control by the civilian president
or the parliament. Its vast wealth derives from numerous activities, including many
illegal ones that include extortion, prostitution rings, drug running, illegal logging and
other exploitation of Indonesia's great natural resources, and as charged in a recent
Voice of Australia broadcast (August 2, 2004), human trafficking. With its great
institutional wealth it maintains a bureaucratic structure that functions as a shadow
government paralleling the civil administration structure from the central level down to
sub-district and even village level.
There are also reasons why many of us should be directly concerned about the TNI's
lawlessness. As investors – through our pension and mutual funds – our hard-earned
wealth is invested with U.S.-based corporations: ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan
Copper & Gold, Inc., among others – that are subject to extortion of "protection
money" from the TNI for their Indonesian operations. Recognizing the reputational
risks and potential and actual shareholder liabilities resulting from these financial
relationships between U.S. companies and the TNI, institutional investors including all
of New York City's employee pension funds have brought shareholder resolutions this
year calling on Freeport and ExxonMobil management to review and report to
shareholders about the risks associated with corporate ties to the TNI. In short,
investors should be concerned, too, about the TNI's human rights record and the
implications for the bottom line.
For much of the last decade, advocates of closer ties between the Indonesian military
and the U.S. military have contended that a warmer U.S. embrace entailing training
programs and education courses for TNI officers could expose them to democratic
ideals and afford a professional military perspective. This argument ignores the
decades of close U.S. - Indonesian military ties extending from the 1960's to the early
1990's when U.S. training was provided to over 8,000 Indonesian military officers. This
30-year period also encompasses the period when the Indonesian military committed
some of its gravest atrocities and when a culture of impunity became ingrained.
The argument for reform through engagement also ignores the fact that the U.S.
Defense Department already maintains extensive ties and channels for assistance
under the guise of "conferences" and joint operations billed as humanitarian or
security-related.
In the wake of 9/11, proponents of restored U.S.-Indonesian military ties have also
argued that the U.S. needs the Indonesian military as a partner in the war on
terrorism. This argument overlooks the Indonesian military's close ties to and support
for domestic fundamentalist Islamic terror groups, including the Laskar Mujahidin and
Front for the Defense of Islam. The Laskar Jihad militia, which the Indonesian military
helped form and train, engaged in a savage communal war in the Maluku Islands in
the years 2000 to 2002 that left thousands dead. Many thousands more died in
Central Sulawesi in the same period, in fighting that involved militias with security
force ties.
Absent tangible evidence of Indonesian military action to curb abuses, to allow itself
to be held accountable, to end corruption, to submit itself to civilian rule and to end its
sponsorship of terrorist militias, the Indonesian military should be seen for what it is: a
rogue institution that directly threatens democracy in Indonesia. Existing restrictions
on military-to-military ties between the United States and Indonesia must remain in
place, conditionality should be strengthened and the IMET ban reinstated in FY 2006.
Finally, a word about the future. The Indonesian people, Indonesian non-governmental
organizations, the Indonesian media and individual Indonesians have demonstrated
great courage in standing up to the intimidation of entrenched corrupt interests in their
society and most especially its security forces to demand their right to live in a
democratic society. The brave students who rallied in the streets in 1998 wrought a
revolution, though since that historic victory, entrenched undemocratic elements have
sought to undo reforms. Sadly, in some parts of Indonesia the 1998 reforms have had
little meaning. The military, often employing terrorist militias, have most brutally
repressed the popular struggle for reform in Aceh, West Papua and the Maluku
Islands. It is vital that the central government engage civil society in these areas in
peaceful dialogue and, in order to make such a dialogue viable, demilitarize those
areas.
The U.S. should encourage reform and peaceful dialogue where it can. It should
encourage the Government to enforce worker rights, to make far more serious efforts
and to end injurious exploitation of child labor and human trafficking. The U.S. should
encourage the Indonesian Government to pass legislation implementing the U.N.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The
U.S. should also urge an end to intimidation of journalists through physical threat and
intimidation through misuse of the courts. Moreover, the U.S. Government should
itself recognize the importance of social, economic and cultural rights and encourage
the Government of Indonesia to pursue development strategies that address the
urgent health, education and shelter needs of the poor.
But direct U.S. involvement in Indonesian affairs would be unwelcome and most likely
ineffective. Critical questions such as the role of Islam in modern Indonesia and the
shape and character of its economy are for Indonesians to decide. The most
pro-active course for the U.S. at this time is to step back from its growing embrace of
the Indonesian military that remains the gravest threat to democracy and human
rights throughout the archipelago.
Alphonse F. La Porta
President, United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO)
(former American Ambassador to Mongolia)
"Opportunities for United States Relations with Indonesia"
Thursday, March 10, 2005
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, I welcome the
opportunity to appear before this committee today to discuss United States relations
with Indonesia – a country which you, Mr. Chairman, aptly observed is the "single
largest country in the world where the U.S. remains only tangentially involved."
My remarks today are my own and are based on over 38 years of diplomatic
experience in the U.S. Foreign Service and close involvement with Indonesia. They do
not necessarily reflect those of USINDO and its Board of Trustees.
Mr. Chairman, we have a tremendous opportunity before us to strengthen our
relationship with Indonesia and to support Indonesia in its journey of democracy. With
the recent free and open election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono last
September, and a new determination among the Indonesian government and people to
pursue fundamental democratic reforms, we can truly say that Indonesia is a nation
striving for democracy. Furthermore, the tragic earthquake and devastating tsunami of
December 26, 2004 has provided both the United States and Indonesia with a new
opportunity for positive cooperation. It is essential that the United States take
advantage of these opportunities so that we can support Indonesia in its efforts at
democratization and pursue our mutual interests.
I need not remind this committee of the important role that Indonesia can play in our
world at this time. It is not only the largest democratic nation in the world with a
predominantly Muslim population. But as an Asian nation Indonesia is a vital partner
for the United States in a new century where an expanding Asia indisputably has a
main economic and political role.
Today I would like to share with you some views on Indonesia's recent efforts at
democratization and in the process discuss how the United States can further support
Indonesia by offering some specific policy recommendations in four key areas:
- Strengthen Indonesia's political system and regard for human values through
legislative and executive cooperation;
- Assist tsunami reconstruction in northern Sumatra, following on the crucial
assistance provided by the United States in the immediate relief phase;
- Expand United States-Indonesian cooperation in education; and
- Upgrade defense cooperation to achieve real gains in Indonesian military
professionalism and capabilities, together with strengthening civilian control.
Indonesia is a Nation Striving for Democracy.
Mr. Chairman, the Indonesian government and people have demonstrated that they
are now a nation truly striving for democracy. In the past few years, Indonesia has
held three free and open political elections, has put an end to dwifungsi or "dual
function," signifying the end of direct involvement of the military in politics and society,
has increased the freedom of the media and press, has created a stable
macro-economic environment, and has demonstrated progress in implementing the
rule of the law.
It is especially significant that the armed forces and police did not involve themselves
in the three elections held in 2004, except for a very few minor localized instances. As
I observed as a member of the Carter Center's delegation for the first round
presidential election last July, grassroots democracy is prospering and accountability
will be further enhanced by the first-ever popular election of provincial and local
officials beginning this year.
Indonesia's democratic experience since the fall of Soeharto and the first free
elections in 1999 clearly show that Indonesia is not only on the road to democracy,
but that democracy and Islam can exist side by side. Indonesia exemplifies to the
world how Islam can play a positive and healthy role in a society. Within Indonesia, as
well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there exists vigorous discussion over the nature
of how Islam should be practiced. Indonesians think critically about Islam and the role
of religion in their lives. The positive role it has played in Indonesian society, with its
strong and unique culture, far outweighs the negative consequences generated by
fringe groups of the Muslim body politic.
The United States has already played a significant role in contributing to Indonesia's
progress both as a democratic nation and progressive Muslim nation. Most welcome
is the continuing support that USAID is providing for the direct election of provincial
and local officials beginning this year and continuing assistance to develop local
government capabilities and political party effectiveness. On the national level,
maintaining U.S. assistance to the Parliament (DPR), civil society organizations, and
pushing forward on judicial reform and other measures to promote the Rule of Law are
likewise to be applauded.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to underscore that U.S. assistance in tsunami relief has been
exemplary and a strong determinant in generating support among the Indonesian
people for improved ties with the United States. Indeed, there may already be a
turning of the tide of public opinion as shown in a poll sponsored by a U.S.
non-governmental organization, Terror Free Tomorrow, which was conducted by the
authoritative Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia). The results,
released only last Friday, March 4, indicate that the role of the U.S. armed forces in
tsunami relief was viewed positively by 65% of the 1,200 poll respondents. Moreover,
the poll showed that appreciation of U.S. counter-terrorist actions has increased and
regard for Osama bin Laden has dropped to less than half of former levels. It is
important to note however, that while this poll found overall U.S. popularity increased
from 15% in 2003 to almost 34%, we still have a long way to go in establishing an
overall positive opinion of the United States.
Recommendations
I would like now to suggest how the United States can enlarge its support of
democracy in Indonesia and Indonesia's role as a progressive Muslim-majority society
by implementing policies in four key areas: legislative and executive level exchanges;
continuing to assist in tsunami recovery and reconstruction; assistance to higher
education; and defense cooperation.
1. Continuing to Strengthen Indonesia's Democratic Political System
Mr. Chairman, the United States can continue to strengthen Indonesian
democratization through interactions on the executive and parliamentary levels. High
level dialogue not only fosters increased understanding of democracy and its global
benefits, but also increases the political will and enthusiasm of elected Indonesian
officials for sound democratic practices.
As you may know, last week a delegation of Indonesian parliamentarians, members of
the People's Consultative Assembly or DPR, visited Washington and had a wide
range of meetings with Members of Congress. Dialogues and exchanges such as this
lead to knowledge-sharing in key areas such as foreign affairs and defense, a transfer
of skills in budgeting, legislative drafting and research, and the promotion of sound
oversight practices. It is important that the United States continue to promote
interaction through Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) mechanisms and through
Indonesian participation in the new congressional Democracy Assistance Initiative.
The United States Congress should also send a strong delegation to the Asian
Parliamentary Union (APU) meeting to be held in Indonesia in January 2006.
The continued advancement of democracy in Indonesia depends on establishing a
closer pattern of relations and mutual understanding with the Yudhoyono government.
Recent visits of high administration officials and Members of Congress have been
instrumental in identifying areas of common concern, and these contacts have a
beneficial public impact. Consideration also should be given to establishing a high
level continuing Leadership Dialogue, comprising the public sector, business and
industry, academia, the media and civil society representatives, similar to the bilateral
dialogues with China, Australia and others in the Asia region.
2. Earthquake and Tsunami Reconstruction.
Mr. Chairman, the terrible disaster that struck northern Sumatra on December 26,
2004 has drawn an unprecedented response from the American people and around
the world. The Yudhoyono government is grappling with the enormous task of
reconstruction planning, the management of millions, indeed billions, of dollars in
external assistance, and establishing the processes to guide the rebuilding effort.
Based on my visit to Indonesia two weeks ago, reports from USINDO colleagues who
have visited Aceh and other information available to us, we hope that our government
will collaborate closely with and support the Yudhoyono government in the following
five areas to help ensure success in the reconstruction:
- Listen to the people to ensure that reconstruction projects, planning for new
human settlements and economic recovery have a sound popular basis;
- Energetically pursue efforts to achieve a political settlement of the
long-festering insurgency, but also change the model. In addition to political
talks with the expatriate leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka or GAM), there should also be a wide consultative process involving
local leaders and the people's elected representatives in the regional assembly
and the national Parliament. A new consensus should be found to implement
the special autonomy law in order to fulfill Aceh's potential within a united
Indonesia;
- Ensure that there is effective accountability and transparency in the use of
external assistance flows; the United States can make special expertise
available to ensure that maximum possible financial integrity is maintained and
institutions are strengthened against corruption. The millions of Americans who
have contributed to this northern Sumatra relief and reconstruction effort
demand no less.
- Enlist the help of the Indonesian and foreign private sectors by establishing a
"one-stop shop" for project approvals to rebuild schools and other public
facilities, restore economic livelihoods and promote dignity and self-reliance.
The projected U.S. "private sector summit," now envisaged for May will be an
important step in ensuring public and business support for long term
reconstruction needs. USINDO is cooperating with the Asia Society, the Asia
Foundation, the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce in this private sector initiative.
- Keep Aceh open to bona fide organizations, experts and visitors assisting in
reconstruction. International media coverage is also important to tell the story
of Aceh reconstruction to the world, among other things to engender long term
support. Although exercising prudence regarding personal security is
necessary in certain areas, the people of Aceh will benefit from working closely
with foreign donors in ways that will open up new choices other than siding
with the GAM rebels.
Mr. Chairman, based on my experience as principal officer of the U.S. Consulate in
Medan in the late 1970's, the people of Aceh and neighboring areas are resourceful,
direct and action-oriented. Aceh's human resources should be mobilized through
community development, civil society organizations and open-handedness to create a
new society in the stricken areas and to strengthen the integration of reconstructed
communities into the regional economy and infrastructure of northern Sumatra as a
whole.
Indeed, there is already good news. A USINDO colleague who is developing our Aceh
school reconstruction project visited the devastated west coast of Aceh last week. On
the ruins of the flattened town of Calang, Indonesian Marines were establishing
schools for orphaned and homeless children and were helping local citizens to
construct temporary housing. Signs of new growth, both physical and psychological,
are beginning to emerge and the always resourceful Acehnese are developing their
own plans for reconstituting their communities.
I would submit that opportunities also should be found, through the wise use of
external assistance, to upgrade priority national sectors, particularly tertiary
education, Islamic schools and universities, and secondary schools so that no region
is left behind. Creating a "gold standard" for only the hardest-hit disaster areas will not
contribute in my view to national solidarity or democracy building.
3. Education, Education, Education
USINDO Co-Chair Edward Masters testified before this committee a year ago about
the importance of human resource development to strengthen United
States-Indonesian relations. As recommended in the National Commission report 18
months ago, there is a pressing need to expand cooperation between educational
institutions of our two countries as existed in the 1970's and 1980's when U.S.
assistance programs were better funded and centered on a web of university-level
collaborations. Reductions in U.S. development assistance, public diplomacy and
other programs in the 1990's have taken a serious toll.
President Bush's initiative to channel US$157 million into mainly basic education over
the next six years is an excellent start, but U.S. educational assistance should be
increased to focus especially on developing university centers of excellence to
increase the numbers of Ph.D.'s, vastly upgrading tertiary-level teacher training, and
enhancing English language and other academic skills. Attention should also be given
to encourage the development of first-class academic research capabilities and
enlarging the flow of students to the United States (presently less than 9000
Indonesians are in American colleges and universities in contrast to 60,000 Chinese
and 80,000 Indians). Finally, it is important that the United States continue to assist
mainstream Islamic schools, universities and civil society organizations in a balanced
and non-intrusive way.
Mr. Chairman, USINDO has been very active during the past year to promote
university-to-university partnerships, the development of which will be pursued further
in a conference in Jakarta on March 17-18, 2005. The United States should provide
additional assistance to Indonesian higher education, and it is hoped that concrete
proposals for a Presidential Scholars Initiative, named for President Bush and
President Yudhoyono, will emerge from these deliberations, together with expanded
individual university cooperative programs. Other bi-national and multilateral donors
should also contribute to this effort, which is also aimed at restoring tertiary education
in badly hit institutions in Aceh where over 100 Ph.D. scholars were lost in the
tsunami disaster.
4. New Cooperation in Defense Relations
Mr. Chairman, the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - still less
than six months old - and its renewed commitment to democratic reforms offer
unparalleled opportunities to expand bilateral defense cooperation. It is little secret
that Indonesian military capabilities have suffered from nearly 15 years of constrained
assistance and contacts with the United States. This was seen in command and
control deficiencies, airlift and technical shortcomings, and diminished interoperability
skills during the recent disaster relief operations.
The reasons for the downturn in military-to-military cooperation have also permeated
the overarching U.S.-Indonesian political relationship. But let me be clear: no one is
arguing for impunity in alleged abuses that have been cited over the years, whether
related to East Timor, domestic insurgencies, the suppression of democratic rights in
connection with the reformasi movement beginning in 1999, inter-ethnic and
inter-religious strife, or the killings of Americans and others in the well known Timika
incident of August 2002 in Papua. Accountability, personal and national reconciliation,
new efforts to promote political accommodation, and the application of internationally
accepted human rights standards should pervade the more intensive relations now
manifest between our two nations.
Mr. Chairman, within this frame of reference, there are important opportunities not to
be lost.
An experts' review of United States-Indonesia defense relations, supported by a
private foundation, was issued by USINDO in December 2004 and was discussed in
conferences held in Washington, D.C. and Jakarta. USINDO soon will publish three
monographs in the important areas of internal stability and defense reform,
counter-terrorism and maritime security. The overriding conclusion of these experts
(copies of their report are available) was that urgent and overlapping interests
regarding maritime security and counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia require expanded
U.S. assistance to the Indonesian armed forces in addition to substantial upgrading of
police (POLRI) capabilities. Furthermore, access to U.S. training in order to upgrade
the professionalism of middle grade officers is a cardinal requirement, combined with
assistance to modernize logistical and other systems, in order to promote defense
reform and contribute to internal stability, taking into account the new roles of the TNI
and POLRI in a democratic society.
Mr. Chairman, my view is that future United States assistance should be addressed in
two ways: first, build up TNI capabilities, and second, advance defense reform in the
government and civil sectors.
Core military priorities are:
1. Training: IMET, Enhanced IMET and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) should be
devoted to a five-year "crash" program to retrain captains, majors and lieutenant
colonels in essential military skills, the humanitarian and other roles of today's
military forces, and international standards of conduct. Improved military
professionalism not only will lead to better individual performance, but also will
promote interoperability with foreign forces (a need evidenced in Aceh relief
operations), update international peacekeeping skills, and enhance sensitivity to the
human rights aspects of military operations. This upgrading of military skills across
the board is needed to fulfill the TNI's valid internal security role until police
capabilities can be considerably improved.
2. Air transport and logistics: It is gratifying to know that, due to the U.S. release of
impounded spare parts and equipment, 13 C-130 aircraft are operating now in contrast
to 4 before the tsunami disaster. Other forms of air transport and logistical systems of
the air force, navy and ground forces should be upgraded to minimum operational
standards. If there is to be effective regional cooperation in counter-terrorism and
maritime security, the TNI must have the support platforms necessary to sustain
patrolling and interdiction operations.
3. Maritime security: The full US$6 million in FMF, as proposed in 2004, should be
provided for the Indonesian Navy in 2005 to upgrade its sea patrolling operations.
Additional assistance should be sought from South Korea and Japan, which also have
important interests in maintaining maritime vigilance in Southeast Asia. The United
States should also assist Indonesia and its neighbors to develop a Common Maritime
Picture, entailing the integration of information from all sources, to track ship traffic in
the Malacca Strait and critical sea space in the surrounding region. Secure,
compartmented and reliable communications are also required to facilitate exchanges
of information relating to counter-terrorism and maritime law enforcement.
Consequently, I recommend that the United States fund a modern multi-nodal
communications network whereby military, intelligence and law enforcement officials
in the region can readily exchange sensitive operational information.
Mr. Chairman, an essential part of the advancement of democracy is capacity building
to promote effective command and control of the armed forces as well as to enhance
civil society's role in national defense and security affairs. My suggestions for priority
U.S. assistance in the civil sector would include:
1. National command authority: The Aceh experience showed that Indonesia's
command and control system requires upgrading and connectivity with the President's
Office, the Coordinating Minister for Justice, Political and Security Affairs, the Ministry
of Defense, TNI headquarters at all levels, the Police, associated national security
bodies, and disaster management agencies. Any chief executive in today's world
must have reliable and redundant means of communicating with all key elements of
government. The United States is uniquely qualified to help Indonesia construct a
modern command, control and communications (C3) network to provide connectivity
with the top-most level of government that would also include an effective, real-time
reporting system for all echelons of the national security structure.
2. National Defense Council and expert staff: There already is provision in law for the
creation of a National Defense Council and U.S. experience is directly applicable to
Indonesia's needs. The United States should provide advisory assistance to establish
a system in the President's Office to ensure that the chief executive is able to
coordinate with his key national security advisors and that processes are in place to
expedite essential advice on important policy and operational matters.
3. Ministry of Defense: Training and advisory assistance, in addition to expanded
technical staffs in strategic planning, management, budgeting, logistics, and force
planning are needed to enable the ministry under its present farsighted and
experienced leader, Minister Juwono Sudarsono (who will visit Washington next week)
to fulfill its essential constitutional role. The United States should set up special
programs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey and elsewhere to
provide intensive assistance and training on a multi-year basis. Additionally, the
Center of Excellence of the Pacific Command should provide intensive training and
other assistance to develop an effective national disaster management system.
4. Civil Sector: U.S. assistance should not only be confined to the government and
armed forces, but civilian capacities also should be built up, perhaps through a
qualified non-governmental organization (NGO) or think tank, to expand academic
courses and research for the study of military affairs, civil-military policy development
and institutional reform. Elevating public discussion of important politico-military policy
matters will enrich national policy making as appropriate in a democratic society.
5. Military Justice System: In a little heralded development last September, the
military justice system was placed under the Supreme Court which is undergoing its
own wide-scale reform and restructuring. Targeted U.S. assistance could be provided
through a qualified NGO to help mesh the military and civil systems, provide
cross-training, enhance judicial accountability, and sponsor training in international
humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict.
6. Parliamentary Oversight: As evidenced in the visit to Washington of a parliamentary
delegation last week, there is scope for improving linkages between the U.S.
Congress and the DPR, as well as providing training and orientation in key defense
and foreign relations subjects, international human rights law and practice, legislative
drafting and research support. USAID assistance and direct Congress-DPR programs
should be expanded to promote effective oversight by Indonesia's democratically
elected representatives.
7. Reconciliation with East Timor: With the imminent launching of a Commission of
Truth and Friendship (CTF) by Indonesia and East Timor, it should be possible for the
United States to provide legal and other advisory assistance through a qualified NGO
to make this process more meaningful. As the former head of the U.S. Department of
State's Cambodian Genocide Initiative, I believe that American specialists can offer a
great deal to enrich the work of the commission in a non-intrusive and politically
neutral fashion, while correctly upholding the responsibility of the two governments to
guide this process.
8. Aceh and Papua Demobilization: As done in the southern Philippines, the United
States should support qualified organizations to retrain and resettle demobilized
insurgents in war-torn Aceh and also in Papua. Providing insurgents with new
livelihoods, reuniting them with their families, and relocating them in stable and
non-threatening environments would facilitate political accommodations within the
framework of Indonesia's special autonomy law.
9. Police Assistance: The United States should help marshal international assistance
to increase the size national police (POLRI) to over 1 million officers, closer to the
United Nations civil policing standard. Community policing should also be expanded,
as should the number of indigenous police officers in Aceh and Papua taking into
account special autonomy provisions. U.S. counter-terrorism assistance to the police
should also be maintained.
10. Privatization: The Ministry of Defense, under national law, has already begun to
regularize the status of military-run businesses and to try to supplant extra-budgetary
support with annual allocations from the national budget. This process should be
enhanced and there is an opportunity for the United States to provide assistance,
perhaps in connection with the World Bank, to bring military businesses under
appropriate national surveillance, prepare them for privatization, and provide
compensatory budgetary support.
Mr. Chairman, I fully realize that the foregoing menu of areas for potential U.S.
engagement with Indonesia is extensive, if not overly ambitious. We at USINDO are
hopeful that next week's visit to Washington of Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono,
who is a well-recognized authority on defense reform, will launch the United States
and Indonesia on a path of collaborative, multi-year cooperation to address foremost
professional, capabilities, structural and civil sector needs. Strong United States
commitment to advance democracy is fully justified in light of developments in
Indonesia since 1999. In my personal view, the Bush Administration's decision to lift
restrictions on U.S. training and assistance is timely, if overdue, in terms of pressing
joint interests in maritime security and counter-terrorism as well as the recent
earthquake and tsunami tragedy.
Concluding, Mr. Chairman, my assessment is that the government of President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono offers the best opportunity in well over a decade to deepen
cooperation along a broad front for the purpose of locking in democracy for all the
people within a united Indonesia. As Professor Karl Jackson of Johns Hopkins
University, a prominent expert on Indonesia, remarked at a USINDO seminar last
November, "If not SBY, who? If not now, when?"
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time and attention of this eminent committee.
[Ambassador La Porta's remarks are his own and do not necessarily represent those
of the USINDO boards of trustees and advisors, corporate supporters or Friends of
the Society.]
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