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Historical Evolution of the Korean Military Tradition
(Overview, questions of periodisation and reasons of decline)
Presented at the 1999 AKSE Conference, Hamburg, April 7-11
This paper is devoted to the field of Korean studies usually most neglected by historians for its complexity and necessity for precise analysis, namely the Korean military tradition - an important part of Korean national tradition and culture.
Needless to say that Korean military tradition proved itself by standing bravely against such a powerful military systems as those of Tang China (almost all resources of the Tang empire were mobilized in order to subdue Koguryo), Mongol (in fact, even conquering Koryo, they failed to establish direct rule over the country and were satisfied by making Korea an (in-law nation(), and Japanese (considered by some authors the mightiest one in in the whole contemporary world).
Meanwhile, despite of abundance of books and articles in this field most of them describe the local aspects of Korean military history, such as weaponry or ancient war literature; or the external side of events, dealing solely with what has happened (dates and locations of battles, the names of conquering generals and the those vanquished) , but not how and why - the reasons why a particular general went where he did and the methods for victory. This paper is an attempt to fill in this gap..
Before coming to the analysis itself, it is necessary to point out that we consider military tradition not just as an "art of war" in the standard meaning of these words, but as a complex, sophisticated self-organizing system, capable to reform itself in response to a new challenge. Inside the tradition, we can distinguish four components that constituted it. Each of them was connected with the others and they cross-influenced each other. Inside the tradition, we can distinguish four components that constituted it. Each of them was connected with the others and they cross-influenced each other. Those components are:
a) military technique, that included not merely arms and armament (including fortifications, battleships, siege warfare), but methods of its use as well ( thus, martial arts also belong here);
b) military organization (structural layout, complectation, problems with personnel, training, social stratification of the military, etc.);
c) moral spirit (general level of moral condition and its roots, methods of psycho-physiological training or raising the morale);
d) military art (complex of tactics and stratagems most typical for this tradition and most frequently used).
Next we should describe the most significant parts of each component and overview the general tendencies of its development..
Military technique.
From the very beginning we must admit that the main weaponry set of Korean military tradition is quite different from both Chinese or Japanese.
The main and most popular projectile weapon throughout the whole Korean history was the bow: shooting was a favorite pastime and sport among aristocracy from the times of Koguryo up to war diaries of Adm. Yi Sun-Shin , full of relevant records), and the test on horseback archery was the most important part of the military examinations. In the historical sources we often find Koreans shooting even in the phase of melee combat. This respect for the bow comes from Altaian roots of Korean ethnogenesis, where the main figure was the nomadic armed with a bow. Other evidence to suggest that these were Altaian types of bows is from the Mongolian style of shooting-the drawing of the bowstring with the thumb which was protected with a ring on it. Koreans modified the bow, making it of a composite and increasing their throwing ability.
The most typical Korean pole weapon was ch 'ang (spear), about 1.8-2 meters in length, and usually not very flexible. The spearhead is about 30 centimeters with a straight blade (shorter than the similar Japanese weapon and used only for slight cuts) and a ring to limit penetration. Occasionally, spears had extra points or blades, curved forward or back, which could have taken the place of the ring, or as an extra part of the weapon. The name of this three-ended spear was samjicb 'ang, and was used later as a trident. Korean horsemen of Yi Dynasty used a type of footman's flail. Tradition lacks the developed kinds of battle spidents, malberds, and other kinds of weaponry, analogy for which is absent in the West (like Da-dao glaive, weapon of Chinese General Guan Yu) - the trident is defined as three-pronged spear. As for the trident and glaive were primarily ceremonial weapons used by the elite warriors, guardsmen or officers, but not en masse.
Korean sword was longer and one-edged, with a straight or slightly curved blade without a garde (this later became the classic Japanese type, where in earlier chronicles this kind of sword was called "Korean" and was used by the guards or officials). Note that it is almost equal to Japanese in shape, but not from the technological point. Both the longer and shorter blades were known, but, unlike in Japan, weren't used in pairs. The swordsmanship emphasizes horizontal cuts and slashes, and use the handle or a free hand in close distance.
As for the artillery and war machines, - Kim Pu-sik mentioned Korean's stone-throwing machines, but the military terminology of this stone-throwing unit points to the absence of the use of special terminology like catapult (pao in Chinese; p'o in Korean) which had existed in contemporary China. We may then come to the conclusion that catapults were not highly developed, although Koreans were quite able to return a catapult fire, during the sieges (i.e., during the siege of Kuju). On the other side, Korean tradition has produced a large amount of various types of both cannons and gunnery. Although hand guns were almost unknown, we must mention a large number of other firearms, particularly organ cannons, grenades with delayed blast, mortars("wangu") and mobile rocket launchers. On the other side, proper moveable carriage was not implemented and most cannons were set on the walls or battleships - the reason why during the Imjin war Korean navy had much superior firepower (actually, one of the main reasons of Adm. Yi's victories).
Armor, shield and helmets in Korea are also different from other East Asian counterparts. The helmet is similar to the helmets of central Asian nationalities and was decorated with wings, leathers and horse tails. The shield was the main protection, was round or six-cornered and covered most of the soldier's body. This would suggest that the early Korean battle order might have been closed. Koreans adopted brigantine armor, more convenient and technologically advanced than scale or lamellar, early. However, with the growing of the Chinese military doctrine, shields almost vanished - widely used were large, movable shields, able to hide from one to four soldiers. These shields had holes for shooting through. Wearing an armor set has also become the privilege of the officers or champions.
Korean skill of fortification had repeatedly impressed both Chinese and Mongols. The most common form of the early Korean fortress was one made in the shape of the moon, located between the river and its tributary. The shores were connected by ditches and ground walls, strengthened with stones thus, before attacking the fortress itself, the enemy had to penetrate an extra defense line. Walls were surrounded by a ditch, with or without water, to prevent an underground attack, and equipped with guard towers. Each of the towers could have been forts themselves, and they served as observation points or special locations for artillery. The walls had bastions and wooden cages on them (to protect from enemy catapults). A second defense line was missing, although local stone houses or citadels might have been utilized for that purpose. The inside of the fortress were also divided into sections by stone walls.
Moreover, the larger cities, and especially the capital, were usually surrounded by mountain fortresses-attackers would have been caught in between the firing. Bigger fortifications, with ground walls, were occasionally built along the northern boundaries, but never played an important role. The reasons for these walls will become more evident in the section on morale and spirit.
First ironclad warship, the famous kobukson, was the major contribution to the treasure chamber of the world military encyclopedia. Generally speaking, Korean navy still was not able to cross large quantities of the open waters, but the art of shipbuilding and navigation was highly developed.
Korean swordsmanship and martial arts traditions, although not widely known, have also learned a right to be mentioned here.
However, judging the evolution of weaponry, we may notice its gradual (ceremonialization(. For example, trident is less effective in mass combat that a spear, armor and swords became a privilege of the officers or elite storm units, and flail as a second major weapon of the horsemen points out their function as a riot subjigators. Serious technical innovations were undertaken only as a response to an extreme treat, as it was with firearms, built against the wako; and a numerous examples of their tactical implementations, well-known from the sources, often meant one-time, and not regular, use.
Military organization.
We must note that a specific Korean feature was the classification of units by preferred weapons type. What was different from the Chinese system is the functional division in the Korean army. The Chinese system was based on the soldier, equally skilled in all kinds of weaponry, while Korean units were divided according to major weapons: two most frequently met are spearmen (some of the ancient spears were held by 2-3 men) and archers, both on foot and horseback; other, rarer types were axemen, sharp-shooters, heavy cavalry(armored and with heavy spears). Other specialist groups like the catapult units, wall-climbers and storm units were part of the special units and were added to the common. The tradition of classification of the units according to their major weapon remained in Korea until the Japanese Invasion of 1592. This specification allows us to analyze difficult tactical problems, considering the superiority of technique; for example, we are able to conclude that Korean's spearmen were better than the Chinese soldiers armed with the same weapon. The weak point is that it was impossible for one unit to take complex, tactical actions: such actions required the coordination of various units which proved extremely difficult to do without a centralized command structure.
Form the structural point of view we may distinguish central armies, located in or around the capital; provincial armies, located in the provinces (usually without a constant commander for fear of regional mutiny - the scheme taken after the fall of the Tang dynasty); military garrisons in fortresses and places of the like such as in mountain passes or near important bridges, and finally, private armies of the feudal lords like the guard of Yon Kaesomun, Pyolch'o of the Ch'oe rulers or the army of Yi Songgye. The last ones appeared only in uncommon historical circumstances like the end of Koryo dynasty.
Organizational layout, however, was marked by traditional vices, such as heavy and complicated chain of command, strong impact of Chinese principles of military organization that put civilians over the military. It lead to the general absence of the professional military class or estate, and civil bureaucratic state often tried to solve military problems in civilian way. Even field army during the war was often led by the appointed civil official, whose skills in command lore were at least questionable . Men like Yun Gwang, able to understand the specific points of warcraft and prove themselves as a commanders, were a rare exception as the conception of "war is too important to leave it to the military" led not to the securing the interests of the state, but with the absence of competency at all.
The division between the army and the navy was also absent and the military official could has been switched from one position to another - even the famous Yi Sun-Sin was an army commander of the Northern border in the early stages of his career.
The system of upbringing military personnel was also China-borrowed and satisfied the army needs incompletely, stressing not the development of the strategic mind or knowledge of "warcraft:, but one's skills in individual combat and the general knowledge of a Chinese classics, - but a good fighter does not necessarily make a good commander.
The system of army manning evolved from the militia through the soldier estate of Koryo (kunban) - the only attempt to create a professional soldier class. The soldiers of Koryo were the families who inherited military services through family inheritance. The family records of the professional military families were kept in a different way from those of the aristocrats or peasants. The system eventually collapsed in the course of time due to a vicious circle which involved the tendency of imposing increasing amount of corvee services on soldiers, (the diminution of the amount of military lands or the decrease in the already allotted lands, and the consequent collapse or flight of soldiers. After the decline of the system, Koryo saw the rise of a variety of new institutions such as the Special Troops (Pyolmubang), a private army system of military officials(pyolch'o), and, finally, in the late Koryo period, a hasty reorganization of a military system based on the principle of universal conscription and the peasant-soldier principle and (military cloth tax(, That final scheme, appreciated by the Yi dynasty, made army well-numbered, but poorly trained and equipped, as the wickedness of civil society (corruption, etc.) found their way into army ranks.
Besides, social position of a soldier was low, and the military system was viewed as another heavy obligation. All these reasons did not allow the army to respond quickly to the serious foreign threat. In addition, civil officials tend to look down on the military ones and this caused the rebellion of military officials in 1170. However, the impact of the behavoir patterns was so predominating that no serious attempta to reorganize the army or raise the status of the military were made.
Among the other achievements, an original army self-provision program, introduced by Yi Sunsin, is worth remembering.
Moral spirit.
The morale of the early Korean soldiers During the time of Three Kingdoms was extremely high -this is certified by partisan units in the Chinese rear and the high pathos of soldiers during the battle, by people, who by their own will, left their homes when Uilji Mundok implemented his scorched earth policy. After the unification of the Three Kingdoms general moral condition could be easily raised in exceptional circumstances, producing, for example, Uibyong guerrilla during the Imjin War.
Koreans do have a quantity of methods of invigorating the morale, but most of them gave short-time effects and were aimed to the compensation of the lack of constant awe-inspiring roots.
The reason is that usual sources like ethnic consciousness or political leadership of the royalty were gradually weakened by the state system and the vassal status of the country itself. China was seen as a 'father country', and the establishment of nationalistic,and thus anti-Chinese state ideology was impossible. There were a few periods of raised ethnic self-consciousness, but all of them were sponsored by the struggle either versus Mongols or versus Japanese. Another expression emphasizing the consciousness of state was the wall along its boundaries, strictly demarcating the land of Korean.
Religious factor also played less important role in bestowing high moral spirit, as none of the religions in Korea was able to act a rallying one. Buddhism, while it had been a spiritual banner of the unification during the times of Three Kingdoms, later became a state religion and opposed the military when they seized power in 1170, and finally lost this position in times of the Yi dynasty. As for the warrior monks, I would say, that, unlike Japanese sohei, this was uncommon and these warriors were more an armed monks serverd like a teple guard than a monks studying martial arts as a part of their spiritual training. Buddhists' goal was to secure the country in the mythical level. One can remember warrior monks fighting Japanese during the Imjin war, but certain historians state the organization of such units was viewed as deviation from vinaya and the attempt to gain favor from the state).
Confucianism, despite the promotion of the loyalty to the state, has a negative outlook at army and warfare in general. Shamanism had the lowest status among the religious beliefs, and the only attempt to develop an original doctrine - (Way of the Warrior( based on the Five Principles of Wonggwang, was too endemic and perished with the end of Silla state.
As a result, Korean military tradition had developed a number of propagandistic tricks aimed to the temporary moral boost in each particular case. The use of benevolent divination created the feeling that victory or defeat was in their hands. Bad omens were misinterpreted or driven off. Same meaning had a demonstrative destruction of enemy symbols. Other measures were to prevent the alienation between the commander and the soldier, as generals like Yi Sun-sin were indeed a rare exception - showing respect to the elder or demonstration of own modesty Straight attack on the enemy general (and his subsequent killing) was a good way to raise own prestige and lower the morale of the enemy units. Often killing a general was enough to make his unit flee. Also, the example of the general in the first line of troops significantly raised the morale of the troops, but this trick was used either by generals like Yi Songgye (a man of martial prowess) or during the naval battles, where the admiral is locked with his crew - Sun-Sin often took part in battle, shooting Japanese commanders from his bow.
The methods of psycho-physiological training of the military, based on ancestral traditions or Buddhist techniques of self-development existed and varied-military exercises brought out one's ability to pull oneself together, be sharp and cold-blooded; overcome fear and death. Knowing that death was not the end of existence, people followed the words of Wuzi:"Those who look at death on the battlefield as unavoidable will survive, those who search for life will die.".
Military art.
The exact battle orders are difficult to recreate (I tried to perform this in respect to possible battle order of Koguryo army) , but among the most typical features of Korean military doctrine the following may be called out: favoring missile combat over the melee and tendency to use the elements of guerrilla warfare (night strikes, ambushes, hit-and-run tactics) in large-scale war.
As for the naval tactics, Koreans prefer not to board the enemy, but keep a close distance and shoot, using cannons and bows, either surrounding the foe or charging inside the enemy ranks. Most notable among particular orders was the "crane formation", close to the Eagle formation of European fleet, but with the additional wedge for the second strike.
Special tactics were employed to prevent a siege on the fortresses. For example, extra wooden towers were built on the most dangerous places, or attacks not through the gates but by rope. Koreans often successfully destroyed foes' siege engines, usually by fire. Molten lead or boiling water were hurled down. Holes in walls were closed off by wooden cages, and the height of town walls were increased to prevent both shooting and enemy bulwarks.
Korean art of war is a good example of turning one(s weaknesses into strength. As such, general weakness of Korean field army evolved into highly developed tradition of (bottle-neck( fighting either in besieged fortress or on the battleship, when there is (no escape, no retreat(. So the desperate situation with the heroic breakthrough as the only possible solution would be able to compensate lack of training by high morale and superior use of positive elements of the tradition.
Korean military art must be understood in conjunction with main type of Korean terrain - the mountains which limited opportunities for both the secret moving of troops or for sophisticated maneuvers of large units. The mountains provided good fortifications by themselves, securing, i.e., main grain resources of the country, located in Cholla region, from the direct assault. Bridges and forts at the end of the rivers had the same important function as the mountain passes, preventing penetration by the enemy in the middle of the country. Lightly armored Korean soldiers and even horsemen, whose horses were small but were strong and skilled, may have easily operated in the mountains. Successful enemy attacks employing river crossings were also known by the Korean and widely used, with one of the most exciting episodes of Korean military history (the obliteration of an expedition corps by Uiji Mundok) associated with this maneuver.
Tactic is the art of winning battles, but strategy is the art of winning wars. A good example is taken from a war in Russia, where the great tactician Napoleon won all big battles, but was defeated by the great strategist Kutuzov. Clearly understanding that the invading army is usually too large to stand up against in the field battle, Koreans implemented tactics taken from the Old Choson period - a strategy of active defense based on cities. Remember that besieging is the most unwelcome type of war described in the Chinese classics-slowly taking fort by fort, instead of cutting a wide swath. Incomplete seizes along with scorched earth tactics exhausted the enemy and weakened his morale. Besides the walled cities and fortified camps -and this is why I call this strategy "active defense," this system used small units of light cavalry to continuously harass the enemy, de-blockade units and strong reserves, consisting of the elite soldiers, to strike hard at the end. The most detailed example of the system working was the defeat of the Sui expedition sent to the Korean capital in 611. A similar stratagems were offered by one a military advisors to General Ko Yon-su in 645, by Kang Kamch'ang during the Qitan invasions etc...
Military intelligence and special tactics are an important part of the strategy. The art of gathering information was well-known. Koreans were good at misinformation. The most popular military trick was a false offering of peace and a desire to serve, which was an opportunity to weaken the enemy's alertness, gain strength and make a diversion. Another trick was to provoke the enemy general to make a tactical error by infuriating him. A tactical trick involved the periodic attacks on the enemy's rear guard. After the first strike, the enemy would think that "two bombs will not fall in one hole," when suddenly the reserve forces would strike again.
We may mention a good knowledge of Chinese art of war and its further development. Chinese books on the art of war were required reading for young students. We also can name a number of their own texts, with Tongguk Pyonggam, Pyonghak Chinam, Hwathong Togam, Panggye Surok and Muye Tobo T'ongji as most well-known.
However, traditional weaknesses of the system were rather dogmatic approach to strategy and lack of mutual support between units. Although Korean generals could memorize a lot of traditional strategic maneuvers (counterattack, scorched earth tactics, etc.) their ability to practically implement then was restricted by lack of both discipline and organization, preventing necessary coordination and ideological restraints, originated from ethical base of the state. In other words, creativity was impeded by the centralization of bureaucratic system.
Conclusion
Upon looking through the history of Korean military tradition from the times of Old Choson till the end of the second Manchu invasion, we may divide the periodization of Korean military tradition into the phases described below. Note that these stages often are not coincide with a traditional, dynasty-based periodisation.
Stage one (4th century ? 7th century). Growth of basic elements of the tradition in each of the Three Kingdoms, that still were different from each other due to the difference in cultural types. However, the cultural type (in Korean case it is based on the strong roots of the paleo-Asian hunter and Altaic nomadic people) that forms general complex of weaponry and responding strategy, as well as traditional national consciousness. Role of this component is extremely high on the early stages of the state formation and development when the original tradition was not yet changed under the influence of bureaucratic government. At this time all Three kingdoms are actively engaged in wars between both themselves and the neighbors, particularly China. This necessity to resist frequent aggressions from China led to the development of certain counter-measures on the fields of strategy and technics.
Stage two (8th century ? 11th century). Under the Unified Silla common tradition is formed that was based on the elements from all parts of the country. Despite the general prevalence of the agricultural type, the elements of the nomadic origin such as composite bow or high attitude to cavalry were still present. Since that time main (general) complex of weaponry (short composite bow, spear and sword) had been formed and had not undergone serious changes further. Note again that it was different from basic weaponry of China or Japan, and for the later, had even posed as an ancestor, for the shape of famous Japanese katana sword has Korean origins. With further fashioning of the state system, the most influential component becomes a level of social and political organization of the state credited with setup of military organization and training, maintaining the moral spirit through the state ideology and, to a lesser degree, influencing the choice of weapons and strategy.. The country entered Chinese cultural region and began borrowing certain elements of Chinese tradition such as modified form of professional soldier estate.
Stage three (beginning of 12th century ? first half of 14th century). Military tradition suffered a crisis and searched for the new ways of development, with Pyolmubang as the first attempt. Final sinification of the state system led to the elimination of certain original elements at the expense of Chinese ones. Moreover, Confucian outlook at the army remained in place even when the military seized political power - no serious upgrading was made. Opportunity for the breakthrough was missed, and only the struggle against the Qitan, Urchin and Mongols preserved the tradition..
Stage four (second half of 14th century ? first half of 15th century). New temporary revival of tradition, inspired by both general disturbances in the end of Koryo dynasty and the measures aimed at strengthening the army in the beginning of Yi dynasty. The borders of the country are finally settled and the military tradition takes its final shape.
Stage five (second half of 15th century ? 18th century). That was a period of stagnation and slow decline of the tradition, briefly interrupted by strong external impact only, namely, the Imjin War. However, the rise of interest towards military affairs during the war and shortly after it quickly dissipated and no positive conclusions were made.
Armed with that understanding, we can nominate the components which had formed the tradition, such as:
* Ethnical cultural type-formed main weaponry, their own strategy and a tradition of ethnic self-consciousness;
* Level of sociopolitical organization of the state-is credited with developing the organization system, training, and, to a lesser degree, the weapons and strategy;
* Enemy military traditions as a source of subsequent modernization, directed against them.
We can explain now four clear reasons for the decline of Korean military tradition. They are different from the standard reasons historians claim (lack of the professional army or continual finance support)
1. Geographical/geopolitical position of the country. Peninsular position limited the direction of territorial expansion in the first place. Additionally, 90 per cent of known world around the country was China. Besides, gradual expansion to the north was not the conquest of the new land, but the retribution of traditional Korean realms lost after the unification under Silla. Furthermore, Korea could expand its borders at the expense of the northern tribes only, and that limit has come the end by 15th century. In addition such a position prevented direct Korean contacts on the continent with countries other than China, while those contacts, if possible, could offer an alternative model of military development. Geopolitical position formed Korean military tradition as primarily defensive, lacking the passionate vigor, and political dependence upon China strengthened the ties between the two military traditions and weakened the Korean one by an unreliable hope that (in big trouble elder brother will always come to help(.
2. Changes in cultural type and political system. Traditionally, agricultural societies have less fighting prowess, as time-consuming production cycle leaves less time for free military or para-military activity out of work in comparison with hunters or nomads. This exactly was the case of decline of Korean archery art and archers as the military unit, as peasants did not have time for continuous practice that was vital for archery training. Usually this kind of society is defended by hereditary aristocratic estate, but in Korea bureaucracy took over aristocracy, and the military issues were governed by civilian bureaucratic system, less competent in military affairs.
3. Impact of Chinese military tradition. Despite of a certain amount of common elements, original roots of the two traditions were quite different. Although Chinese in origin application of smoke powder, naval tactics or complicated methods of military training were creatively enhanced by Koreans, adopted to the local conditions and brought a good fruits on the Korean soil, most of the borrowed elements of military tradition were copied without special consideration and suppressed local tradition, as they were controversial to its core. Thus the cavalry units were dissipated, provincial troops were weakened in style of Chinese Sung dynasty in fear of regional mutiny, distinction between army and navy was nullified, social status of military was lowered, system of officers( training was not really suitable for military needs and so on.
4. Continuous periods of "long peace time".This statement does not mean actual absence of external treat, but the absence of any kind of military tension. During those periods army could not prove its necessity. Devoid from the sources of replenishment, the military tradition stopped and any positive innovations achieved during the (active( periods would erase. Functions of army were reduced to pure ceremonial role and to the (law and order enforcement( (needless to say that army and police are different institutions with different goals and different training). Limited experience gained in victories over disorganized barbarians or rebels created a dangerous illusion of invincibility and self-assurance, leaving the military tradition helpless in times of serious threats that has loomed over Korean in the end of 19th century.
Before the end, I 'd like to commit this paper as first step on the long road to studying Korean military history. Even this brief overview shows that the Korean military tradition is an approval of the long cultural traditions of the Korean people and an important point in the history of Korea.
Copyright by K. Asmolov, all rights reserved
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