After months of siege, the
army of Sherman marched into the abandoned works in and around the city of
Atlanta. For a month
General William Tecumseh Sherman had tried to capture Atlanta using
cavalry and artillery to no avail. General Hood's army had clung to its
lifeline, the Macon and Western Railroad, using it to resupply his troops
in the City. In
late August, Sherman determined to cut Hood's supply lines, the Macon
& Western and the Atlanta & West Point Railroads.
If this vital supply line were cut, Gen. Hood would have to
evacuate Atlanta. Sherman did
in fact, move six of his seven infantry corps against Gen. Hood’s supply
lines. The Federal army began pulling out of its positions on August 25 to
hit the Macon & Western Railroad between Rough and Ready and
Jonesborough. From our
position, we could see the Yankees begin movements of troops to the west,
then south. Six Federal
divisions estimates of 60,000 or more men were on the move making a
semi-circle around the city towards small Jonesborough.
It was clear that the Yankees intended to get between General Hood
and his supplies by cutting the railroad that Hood depended upon.
The Yankees hoped to force our well-entrenched boys to retreat.
To counter the move, Hood sent Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee with two corps
to halt and possibly rout the Yankee troops. General Hood sent the two
corps against what he believed to be a small Federal diversionary force,
but almost all of Sherman's entire army was there in force. Just west
of Jonesboro the Flint River afforded the Macon and Western Railroad some
semblance of protection. Federals advanced to the Flint River, crossed the
river after a brief struggle with Confederate cavalry and gained the high
ground east of the river. The Federals having gained more ground than
thought possible, the Yankees entrenched and regrouped. Hood was informed shortly after that a significant amount of
the Union army was within a couple of miles of the Macon and Western
Railroad. By nightfall on August 30 Hardee’s troops began to take
positions west of Jonesboro, preparing to attack.
With some of our forces delayed by supporting Federals, it would
not be until the mid afternoon of August 31 that Hardee and Lee were in
place and ready to attack. As General Patrick Cleburne advanced and
engaged the Yankees from the north, General S. D. Lee ordered his corps to
advance from the west. Disheartened from bloody attempts to take Union
entrenchments at Utoy Creek, East Atlanta and Peach Tree Creek, these
brave veterans stopped when they came under heavy Federal fire.
Hardee had
attacked two Federal corps west of Jonesborough but was easily repulsed
suffering heavy casualties. When
reports began to come into Hoods headquarters, General Hood, silent and
with his head down, was in deep thought of what next to do.
The fact was, Gen. Sherman had brought a mighty force around
General Hood and was causing Gen. Hood confusion and panic. Cleburne's
attack was more successful than Lee's. In command of Hardee's Corps, the
Arkansas Irishman advanced, broke through the outer Union lines and
crossed the Flint River, capturing two pieces of artillery. Lee's
unsuccessful assault spelled the end to Cleburne's advance, as he had to
withdraw to reinforce Lee. After the attack of Lee's and Hardee's Corps on the Yankee
entrenchments west of Jonesboro during the afternoon of the 31st, General
Hood sent orders for Hardee to return Lee's Corps to Atlanta. Hood knew
that the Federal trenches were now only lightly defended by a single
Federal Corps, and additionally, both the commander of the remaining
Confederate cavalry and General Hardee himself had informed Hood that
significant amounts of Union forces were threatening his rear. With
General Joseph Wheeler and his cavalry off disrupting the rear echelons,
Hood refused to believe the only reliable reports of troop strength and
location that he had and arrogantly reinforced himself
fearing an attack on Atlanta. Gen. Hood withdrew one corps from Hardee's
force that night leaving Gen. Hardee to continue his fight with one less
corps. Hardee
faced a logistical nightmare. Sixty thousand Federals were concentrating
south of Atlanta, with some of the best forces marching on his position.
Ordinance and subsistence trains, hastily sent south for protection from
the Atlanta attack envisioned by Gen. Hood, Gen.Hardee now had additional
problems, since the trains could not travel unescorted because of Yankee
cavalry.
The next day, a Federal corps broke through Hardee's
depleted troops, which retreated to Lovejoy Station.
General Sherman commanded the Federal attack personally and
this had the greatest effect upon the Yankee attackers.
Gen. Hardee reported that Jonesboro offered no natural defense
perimeter and he did not have the time to construct additional defenses.
With the rail lines cut, Hardee was forced to move to Lovejoy Station on
the Macon and Western Railroad south of Jonesboro. With
the actions of August 30 and 31, Hardee driven back, and the supply lines
readily cut, Gen. Hood issued his marching orders. On the night of September 1, Gen. Hood was left with no
choice, but to evacuate Atlanta and the city was open to Sherman’s army.
Sherman did cut Hood's supply line but failed to destroy Hardee's
command. After
three and a half months of incessant maneuvering and much hard fighting,
Gen. Sherman has forced Gen. Hood to abandon Atlanta, the munitions center
of the Confederacy.
Tom
R. Grandy
Daily
Richmond Examiner