Council on Foreign Relations

U.S. Security Objectives after Korean Unification

Morton H. Halperin

U.S. Security Interests after Korean Unification

1. The United States should aim for a unified, democratic Korea consisting of all of the territory now controlled by North and South Korea.

The objective of a unified, democratic Korea, whose territory consists of that currently controlled by North and South Korea, is obvious. This outcome, however, is by no means assured. If the North collapses, for example, China could feel compelled to militarily intervene in order to prevent the establishment of a unified government that is allied with the United States and hostile to China. In order to prevent such Chinese intervention, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) should seek to reassure China that a unified democratic Korea allied to the United States would not pose a threat to Chinese interests and is, in fact, the outcome that is most consistent with China's long-term security needs.

2. The United States should seek the application of the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to the new, unified Korean nation.

Since 1954, the U.S. security assurances (which include protection by the U.S. nuclear umbrella) guaranteed to South Korea by the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty have contributed to stability and deterrence in the region. The continuation of this bilateral security treaty--and its application to a unified Korea--is critical to ensuring that Korea will not decide that its national defense demands developing its own nuclear weapons in order to remain independent from the control of any of its more powerful neighbors.

In order to accomplish this objective, the United States needs to persuade Korean elites that the alliance is compatible with Korea's security interests and their own ability to maintain domestic power. In addition, the Korean people must see continuing the alliance as a sovereign decision of a Korean government and one not imposed by the United States. This will not be easy, and will require both changes in the command arrangements and movement of U.S. forces and bases away from densely populated areas.

3. The United States should seek to retain U.S. troops in unified Korea at current or moderately reduced levels.

The role U.S. security guarantees is integral to regional stability, and the stationing of U.S. troops on the peninsula will contribute to the deterrence. There will be great pressure within Korea to have all U.S. troops leave after unification, so as to establish the complete independence of the Korean nation. Some will argue that allowing U.S. troops to remain will run the risk of dragging Korea into Sino-American conflicts, in which it has no real stake.

The secure long term stationing of U.S. troops in Korea will require not only overcoming obstacles within Korea, but also persuading the Chinese not to make this issue a continuing point of contention in Sino-Korean relations. In order to gain Chinese assent to such a U.S. presence, the United States will have to provide certain assurances, particularly regarding the stationing of U.S. forces. The Chinese are unlikely to agree to any arrangement that permits U.S. troops to be stationed at the Chinese border, but they might acquiesce to their presence below the 40th parallel. Any accord on the location of U.S. forces should be accompanied by other confidence-building measures, including limits on the forces stationed by China and Russia in the border areas close to Korea and notification of military exercises by any state in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula.

4. The United States should seek to ensure that Korea is denuclearized and committed by international treaty to remain non-nuclear.

By virtue of their adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)--and less formal understandings reached in the past few years--the governments of North and South Korea have both agreed to refrain from developing their own nuclear weapons. This understanding should be codified in an international treaty that creates a nuclear free zone in northeast Asia, prohibiting Korea and Japan from both developing nuclear weapons and allowing them to be stationed on their territory. The treaty should furthermore prohibit the United States, China and Russia from threatening to use, or using, nuclear weapons against Korea or Japan, and include a pledge by these three nuclear weapons states to abstain from using nuclear weapons against each other in the region.

Negotiating this treaty will not be easy, but the first and most critical step is for the U.S. government to decide that it wants such an agreement and to work actively to get it, rather than to continue to tacitly oppose such suggestions. The proposed new multilateral framework discussed below would be the right forum in which to discuss this issue and ultimately negotiate a treaty.

5. The United States should seek a solution that satisfies China, Japan and Russia, so that the outcome and manner in which it is reached are consistent with each country's security interests as it defines them.

The U.S. objective of satisfying China, Russia, and Japan with both the process and the outcome of Korean unification is critical.

The 1994 "Agreed Framework" between the United States and North Korea--which resolved the nuclear proliferation threat from the North and thus contributed to stability on the peninsula--came about only because the United States, South Korea, and Japan were willing to seriously consider North Korea's security interests as its leaders defined them and then enlist the support of China and Russia. Likewise, the United States must work with China, Russia, and Japan to satisfy their respective security interests in the region within an explicit and transparent process; in this manner, Korea can be peacefully unified and the sense of trust among the great powers in the region strengthened.

If the United States is truly interested in "engaging" China in the issue of Korean unification, it must draw Chinese leaders into a serious dialogue on cooperative security in northeast Asia and establish a cooperative security framework in which all key countries with interests in the region can seek solutions to security problems.

Achieving U.S. Security Objectives

If the United States is to achieve its security objectives in the unified Korea, it must first discuss on a bilateral basis its long-term security interests--particularly its interests in Korea--with its allies, the ROK and Japan, and then with China and Russia. If the United States can find agreement with these nations on the desired outcomes of unification, then discussion can begin on what steps should be taken in the short term to ensure a peaceful transition on the peninsula.

As a basis for such negotiation, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan should first agree to:

• consult urgently with the others about appropriate steps if North Korea collapses, rather than intervene militarily;
• provide North Korea with humanitarian assistance based on needs determined by the appropriate international institutions, rather than isolate the North economically or politically; and
• provide development assistance to North Korea if its leaders institute necessary economic reforms.

Long-term U.S. Security Interests in Northeast Asia: A New Security Arrangement

Important, long-term security interests of the United States would be served by such a forum, which would provide a venue to discuss arms control and confidence-building measures for the region, as well as any other security concerns that might emerge.

Structurally, the organization might include a small, informal secretariat that assists in setting the agenda for meetings of heads of government as well as foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of staffs. However, the NACSO would not seek to displace existing collective security treaties, including the bilateral treaties between the United States and Korea. Rather, these treaties would be viewed as a second line of defense in case these cooperative security measures failed. For example, in the event of a regional security threat, the United States and Korea would consult first with the NACSO, resorting to discussion within the framework of these treaties only if this approach failed.

Conclusion

1. Creation of a united, democratic Korea allied to the United States and committed to remaining non-nuclear;

2. application of the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to the new, unified Korean nation;

3. retention of U.S. troops in unified Korea at current or reduced levels;

4. ratification of an international treaty that creates a nuclear-free zone in northeast Asia and prohibits the nuclear weapons states from storing or using nuclear weapons in the zone covered by the treaty; and

5. establishment of a Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Organization that convenes key players to discuss these regional security issues on a cooperative basis.

Success in negotiating this set of arrangements would contribute toward the peaceful unification of the two Korean states while satisfying the United States' own vital national security interests, as well as contribute toward the stability of northeast Asia as a whole.