Michael J. Green is the Olin Fellow for Asian Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has published a number of books and monographs on U.S.-Japan security relations, including Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (Columbia University, 1995) and Redefining the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (National Defense University, 1994).
Mike M. Mochizuki is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. His recent works include an edited volume Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Brookings Institution Press, 1997) and the monograph Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (RAND, 1995).
|
|
Preface
"Interests, Asymmetries, and Strategic Choices", by Michael
Green (1997)
"Japanese Security Policy", by Mike M. Mochizuki (1997)
A Report by the Study Group Project Director, James Shinn, has been published in English and Japanese. The two essays in this volume contributed to the deliberations of the Study Group by assessing underlying forces.
These essays demonstrate how tricky the business of reforming the alliance
will be. To begin with, both the United States and Japan have vested interests
in keeping things exactly as they are now. So do other countries in the
region, especially China and South Korea. Michael Green outlines a number
of scenarios that could challenge the alliance's tradition of slow evolution--including
a protracted war in Korea or confrontation with China--but warns that planning
for those scenarios could undermine rather than strengthen the alliance.
Furthermore, inside Japan, the end of the Cold War and the Liberal
Democratic Party's hegemony have eroded the generally pro-American consensus
that was the hallmark of Japan's postwar foreign policy. Indeed, younger
policymakers whose experience is not shaped by the lessons of the Second
World War and the Cold War have begun to question the merits of the pro-American
consensus. Mike Mochizuki argues that, although there is currently broad
Japanese agreement on maintaining security ties with the United States,
competing opinion clusters already vie for influence in shaping Japan's
post-Cold War identity as either a "civilian" or a "normal" power.
The governments of the United States and Japan would be wrong to cling to the status quo rather than face these challenges. The current alliance may be adequate to meet the requirements of stability and security in Northeast Asia today, but the dangers of tomorrow could severely test and even threaten the existence of an alliance that does not evolve. Radical change is neither necessary nor desirable. Rather, Washington and Tokyo should promote a slow and steady evolution that reflects changing regional and domestic conditions. Their September 1997 revision of the defense guidelines--which elucidated and moderately strengthened Japan's role within the alliance--showed an awareness of the need for periodic adaptation. In this fashion, the alliance must remain dynamic, if only through incremental change, to continue underpinning the stability of Asia.
Gary Hufbauer
Director of Studies
Are the structural realists wrong? Not necessarily. The alliance has thrived despite its asymmetries because it has served the fundamental interests of both parties throughout the Cold War and in the current strategic environment. In fact, the asymmetries themselves have arguably suited both parties. However, if the alliance's international context were to change--whether through a military crisis in the region, the emergence of a hegemonic rival to the United States, or the mitigation of strategic rivalry through regional economic integration--then the asymmetries could make the alliance unsustainable in its present form. Internal political factors in the United States and Japan, such as ascendant nationalism or isolationism, could further complicate matters.
To date, the alliance has successfully evolved in response to shifts in the domestic and international environments. The quid pro quo achieved at the April 1996 security summit (following the "Nye Initiative") is a recent example of an incremental "redefinition" of the security relationship: Japan agreed to consider a supporting role in a regional contingency (through the Guidelines Review) and the United States agreed to return facilities on Okinawa (Futenma Marine Corps Air Station).[2] Previous examples of redefinition of the alliance include the 1960 treaty revision, the 1969 Sato-Nixon Communiqu(, the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, and the evolution of the approach to roles and missions during the 1980s.[3]
The United States and Japan, therefore, have demonstrated a modest ability to adjust the alliance to meet changing strategic and domestic political contexts. Structural realists would argue, however, that more radical changes will be necessary if the alliance is to endure. Contemplation of more ambitious changes to the alliance structure, however, requires an appreciation of the reasons for the current asymmetries and the relative costs and benefits of attempting to change them.
The aim of this essay is to establish a framework for discussion of the strategic choices available to the United States and Japan. In pursuit of that goal, the paper:
The United States
Political and economic influence
Through its bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea, the United
States uses its military presence to influence political and economic developments
in the region (though its leverage is often squandered and may be declining).
Regional stability
The U.S.-Japan alliance helps to prevent the emergence of destabilizing
military rivalries between Japan, South Korea, and China.
Containment of rival hegemons
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan alliance prevented the expansion
of Soviet power in the region (and in the future it may be used for the
same purposes against an increasingly powerful China).
Economic access
The alliance contributes to the stability that is the basis for East
Asia's dynamic economic growth, from which the United States derives direct
economic benefit (including $400 billion in annual trans-Pacific trade
and 3 million American jobs linked to that trade and investment).
Burden-sharing
Paying over $4 billion annually in host nation support, Japan underwrites
a significant portion of the U.S. forward presence in the region (even
if expectations for greater burden-sharing in areas such as technology
have gone unfulfilled).
Deterrence/war-fighting capabilities
U.S. bases in Japan allow the United States to launch effective military
operations in the region.
Global partnership
The alliance forms the basis for bilateral cooperation on global issues
including the United Nations, arms control, and Middle East peace.
Japan
Regional stability
The United States and Japan share an interest in preventing the emergence
of military rivalry among the economic powers of Northeast Asia.
Domestic prosperity
In the postwar period, the U.S.-Japan alliance was essential to the
consolidation of a stable conservative political force--the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP)--that made Japan's economic growth possible.
Containment of rival hegemons
Japanese leaders came to accept and support U.S. strategies of containment
against the Soviet Union, and current uncertainty about China's future
has reinforced Japanese interest in this aspect of the alliance.
Avoidance of conflict
Japan's alliance management has consistently aimed at avoiding actual
participation (makikomareru) in U.S. conflicts, from Vietnam to
the Persian Gulf, which could undermine Japan's domestic stability and
regional role.
Mercantile freedom
The alliance undergirds the freedom of commercial activity in Asia
(and--until the 1970s--insulated Japan from U.S. competition in its domestic
market).
Global partnership
Japan's alliance with the United States has been a key factor in Tokyo's
growing role in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the
Asia Development Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). In recent years, U.S. and Japanese interests have diverged
somewhat in policy decisions at the World Bank and personnel decisions
at the United Nations, but on the whole, Japan still derives significant
benefit from partnership with the United States in regional and global
multilateral institutions.
Of course, specific asymmetries do not mean that the alliance in toto is asymmetrical; in fact, attempting to correct them would risk undermining American and Japanese interests at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, structural asymmetries serve the broad national interests of each side. At the micro level, key constituencies in each country also wish to maintain asymmetries. Several examples can be cited.
U.S. bases contribute to the defense of Japan and the stability of the region. Withdrawal of a significant part of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) from Okinawa, for example, would have operational consequences for U.S. capabilities and psychological consequences for regional stability. As an expeditionary force, III MEF also protects U.S.--and implicitly, Japanese--interests as far away as the Gulf. Given U.S. defense budget constraints and the fact that Japanese host nation support covers 70 percent of the cost of stationing the marines, it is questionable whether III MEF could exist anywhere but Okinawa. The loss of Okinawan bases, in other words, could mean the loss of Marine Corps presence in Japan, with consequences for a whole range of U.S. and Japanese security interests.
Japan's operational role is still limited by Article IX of its Constitution to the defense of Japan. The constitutional ban on the right to collective defense has come under scrutiny with the current review of the Defense Guidelines, which explicitly expand cooperation to cover regional contingencies that affect Japan's security. However, for reasons relating to overall U.S. and Japanese interests, both governments are unlikely to push the issue of constitutionality ahead of the operational studies and planning that result from the review.[10] Pushing the right to collective defense would provide clarity (in terms of what Japan could do) for joint planning, but it might also undermine the Japanese domestic political consensus that has allowed the unprecedented review to occur; it could fuel uncertainty and rivalry in relations with the Koreas and China as well. Consequently, the most the review can accomplish at this stage is to advance the process of mutual preparation for Japan's "rear-area" support role in the event of a regional conflict. This is a significant step forward from the 1978 Guidelines, which left the issue of Japan's role in a regional contingency deliberately vague, but the alliance will still lack the military and operational symmetry of NATO.
Japan's political role has expanded to complement other elements of the alliance relationship. Japan is playing a larger role in multilateral institutions such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the United Nations, in arms control, in overseas development assistance, and in a variety of global issues captured under the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda. This global partnership is reaping diminishing returns, however, for two reasons related to the alliance structure. First, Japan's enthusiasm for a permanent U.N. Security Council seat has waned with the realization that Tokyo will be expected to pay more, take more diplomatic risks, and possibly play a larger military role in peacekeeping. Second, Japan does not fully benefit from a global security partnership with the United States because Japan insists that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies only to the "Far East." For example, Japanese support for the U.S. air strike on Iraq in September 1996 was political and implicitly operational (the Japanese press reported that U.S. bases in Japan were involved), but the Japanese government could only acknowledge its political support and consequently was relegated to a passive supporting role with limited influence on U.S. strategy.
Technological cooperation is still characterized by one-way flows of defense technology to Japan from the United States. While important precedents are being established for the reverse flow of technology through the Systems & Technology Forum (S&TF) and the F-2 project, reciprocity is still a long way off. The reasons for the continuing asymmetry are embedded in the interest group politics of each country. First, Japan's ban on arms exports (the Three Arms Export Principles) removes the incentive for Japanese defense companies to share technology, since there will not be a return on the investment at the development or production stages. Second, the Japanese companies that develop the most advanced dual-use technologies are not traditional defense contractors and are generally reluctant to work with the Pentagon. Third, U.S. defense contractors focus almost entirely on the Japanese defense market, and do not wish to unleash a new international competitor by advocating the end of the export ban. Finally, most U.S. program executive officers and defense labs see little advantage in disturbing and possibly tangling the complicated web of international cooperation, particularly with Japan.[11] The most important constituencies on each side are thus satisfied with the status quo, in spite of the resulting asymmetries.
Multilateral security was part of the focus of the April 1996 Security Declaration, a striking contrast to past joint summit statements on the alliance. Given the growing fluidity of power relations in East Asia, multilateral security dialogue could play an increasingly important role in regional stability. Nevertheless, the most developed forum at present (the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)( has addressed few substantive security issues beyond transparency. Meanwhile, a Northeast Asian security forum has been endorsed by many diplomats and scholars, but rejected by the two Koreas. Multilateral dialogue is no longer viewed as a threat to the bilateral alliance, but neither is it seen as a substitute.
Trade and investment are still out of balance between the United States and Japan. Japan's phenomenally low rate of foreign direct investment has not changed as a percentage of GNP in three decades; Japan continues to maintain many opaque public and private barriers to imports; and Japan persistently runs a large current account surplus with the rest of the world. But chronic imbalances have yet to seriously undermine American public support for the security relationship, possibly because the United States is presently "winning" the contest for economic growth.
Meanwhile, U.S. trade negotiators can expect diminishing returns as sectoral talks are replaced by firm-specific cases (e.g., within the insurance or film industries). While deregulation presents an opportunity, there are no powerful U.S. constituencies for Japanese deregulation per se. In fact, many are already "inside the moat" and thus quietly accept a regulated environment.
Trade and investment friction could poison the atmosphere of the alliance, though interdependence is probably too deeply rooted to allow a full-scale commercial war. At the same time, serious economic fatigue and limited U.S. resources have implications for America's ability to deploy troops abroad and thus to support the alliance.
The asymmetries in the alliance are thus awkward and potentially unsustainable, but continue to make sense because they serve critical U.S. and Japanese interests and are backed by powerful constituencies in each country. Dramatic steps to redistribute responsibilities within the alliance could lead to uncertain and potentially negative outcomes--an important consideration when East Asia is itself in an era of uncertainty.
The following matrix illustrates the potential consequences of structural change in the alliance in the current strategic environment. The horizontal axis lists the U.S. and Japanese interests described earlier, and the vertical axis lists the policy prescriptions for correcting asymmetries in the alliance. The contents of the box (positive, negative, or uncertain) are based on the considerations listed in this section.
A rear-area Japanese role has now become acceptable domestically and in the region: it represents not an expansion of Japan's role but a clarification. During the Cold War, Japan's location between the Soviet Union and the rest of Asia allowed it to explain its role in U.S. strategy as pure self-defense based on Article V of the treaty. The demise of the Soviet threat has forced Japan to explain its supporting role in the event Japan is not the first target, and to clarify its role under Article VI. The Japanese rear-area role preserves the current asymmetries in the alliance and in the short term will probably keep the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) within an expanded definition of self-defense without crossing the line to collective defense (although this will be decided by Japan's Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau in the wake of the Guidelines Review and the ensuing political debate).[12]
It is possible to speculate on any number of endogenous and exogenous changes that might threaten the current alliance structure, but four stand out: 1) a Korean contingency; 2) the emergence of a hostile Sino-U.S. relationship; 3) less sparkling U.S. economic performance; and 4) greater economic integration and confidence in the region.[13]
Korean Contingency
In the event of a North Korean attack on the South, the United States
would probably seek at a minimum Japanese rear-area support. If
the conflict were to spill offshore or involve missile or air attacks beyond
the Peninsula, Japan might contribute to air and sea-lane defense. Prompt,
robust, and well-planned Japanese support for U.S. forces would probably
bring the U.S.-Japan alliance safely through a Korean conflict, provided
that the termination of hostilities came quickly and the U.S.-R.O.K. side
was victorious.
However, this essay will focus on scenarios that would test the current alliance structure. One such scenario is a protracted and bloody Korean conflict in which international and domestic pressure is brought to bear on Japan to move beyond rear-area missions into areas that might involve front-line combat defense (for example, air cover in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula or antisubmarine warfare/minesweeping operations in Korean waters). Potential repercussions are:
The consequences of these pressures for the symmetry/asymmetry balance in various elements of the alliance are illustrated by Figure 3 (compared with the status quo, illustrated by Figure 1). The impact of changes in the elements of the alliance on U.S. and Japanese interests are illustrated by Figure 4.
If, however, China emerged as a political-military competitor to the United States, the impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance would be profound. As long as U.S. forward engagement remained credible, it is unlikely Japan would choose neutrality or appeasement if Beijing challenged U.S. hegemony. A U.S.-provoked confrontation over Taiwan would be more complex from Tokyo's standpoint. In either case, there would be pressure on both the United States and Japan to transform the U.S.-Japan alliance into precisely the instrument of containment that Beijing fears. In this case:
The Clinton administration's adversarial approach on trade collapsed due to a combination of four factors: 1) sparkling U.S. economic performance contrasted with the dismal post-1992 record in Japan; 2) the growth of strategic alliances between U.S. and Japanese multinationals; 3) the emergence of a "China problem"; and 4) the administration's "no bad news" strategy for the presidential election. Chances are that factors 2) and 3) will continue to mitigate U.S.-Japan trade friction, but factors 1) and 4) could change in ways that either increase trade friction or undermine support for a forward U.S. presence in Japan.
In a post-Korean reunification context in which China is not hostile, the potential for economic issues to affect alliance strategy increases. If U.S. economic performance does not keep up its recent pace, and if, meanwhile, Japan does much better, the alliance asymmetry would come under renewed scrutiny. To maintain domestic support for the alliance and U.S. forward presence, both Washington and Tokyo would feel pressure to redistribute alliance responsibilities, in spite of the possible strategic repercussions. In particular:
It should not be surprising, therefore, that changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance have always been incremental and rarely structural. Even the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Security Declaration, though billed as a "redefinition" of the alliance, took place within existing structures and only modestly altered the asymmetries in the alliance. In the declaration, the United States and Japan agreed to:
Though incremental, these steps were unprecedented, particularly with regard to regional security cooperation. The "Nye Initiative" and the April 1996 summit introduced into the bilateral security relationship a new confidence that will help both countries adjust to changing situations with more agility than was possible during the Cold War, when there was a simple linear logic to bilateral defense cooperation.
The first example of this new agility was the Okinawa incident. The closer dialogue between the two national security bureaucracies in the months before the rape incident facilitated the implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the introduction of creative solutions such as the return of Futenma MCAS and the consideration of a floating offshore structure to replace it. Japan's timely political support for the U.S. strike on Iraq in September also represented a new level of trust in the security relationship (despite Tokyo's inability to acknowledge the importance of U.S. bases in the operation).
The April 1996 Security Declaration, SACO, and the review of defense guidelines have all moved the alliance in the right direction and at the right speed. Whether these steps have prepared the alliance for challenges the United States and Japan might face in the next century remains doubtful. But it seems difficult if not impossible for Washington and Tokyo to prepare today for future threats without increasing the likelihood that they will actually materialize.
Rather, a strategy for the alliance over the next few years should aim to achieve greater interoperability and agility, by working within the existing allocation of roles and missions, constitutional framework, and level of political consensus--but by moving ahead whenever possible. Specifically, this translates into ten action points.
1) Complete the Guidelines Review and introduce enabling Diet legislation, joint training, and deliberate operational planning for coordinated responses to regional contingencies (but not restructuring the present division of roles and missions or Japan's constitutional framework in anticipation of the most extreme scenarios).
2) Expand joint R&D, particularly relating to theater missile defense, to develop enabling technologies that contribute to mutual security (but Washington should not insist on reciprocity, regardless of corporate or service interests.
3) Clearly articulate the role that U.S. bases in Japan play in regional and global security to ensure longer-term support for the U.S. presence.
4) Ensure real prior consultation--as opposed to "notification" of Tokyo--on the use of U.S. bases, so that Japan has an equity stake in the U.S. presence.
5) Enter into fuller bilateral dialogue on China, the Middle East, and the Korean peninsula, to include gaming and planning for various contingencies.
6) Hold trilateral defense talks with South Korea that lead to substantive crisis planning (which would be difficult if the structure of bilateral roles and missions were to change);
7) Hold defense talks between the United States, Japan, Russia, and China to build a basis for a future regional multilateral forum (promoting transparency and giving reassurances that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not "anti-Chinese").
8) Increase the level of congressional-Diet exchanges on East Asian security issues.
9) Move toward harmonization of bilateral procurement and enhanced interoperability.
10) Initiate bilateral planning for introduction of theater missile defense systems.
During the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan alliance was primarily a political alliance, represented at the operational level by U.S. bases in Japan. Only in the late 1970s did substantive bilateral defense cooperation begin, and even that was limited to the defense of Japan. The best way to prepare the alliance for the uncertainties of the next century is not to change the superstructure of the alliance, but to fill the operational gaps that remain from the Cold War era, particularly with regard to regional and global security.
The United States and Japan cannot rely on a static alliance to remain strong and vital. The alliance must be steadily redefined from the inside out if it is to be agile enough to protect the interests of both partners in a changing and unpredictable strategic environment.
a) The Constitution: Should the constitution be revised or reinterpreted, and in what way?
b) Terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance: What role should Japan play in U.S. military operations beyond the defense of Japan? What should the size and character of the U.S. military presence in Japan be? How much and what kind of diplomatic autonomy should Japan have in relation to the United States?
c) Japan Self-Defense Forces: What size, structure, and capabilities should the Self-Defense Forces have in the post-Cold War era, and what role should the forces play beyond the defense of Japan?
d) Nuclear policy: In what manner should Japan promote nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament? Should Japan continue to rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence? What kind of nuclear energy policy should Japan pursue?
e) Multilateral security: To what extent should Japan emphasize the building of multilateral security institutions?
f) Economic interdependence and security: To what extent can economic interdependence mitigate geopolitical suspicions and promote regional stability?
g) History: How should Japan deal with the issue of its militarist past?
h) Korea: How should Japan deal with the problem of a divided Korea and the possibility of a reunited Korea?
i) China: How should Japan deal with the rise of China and the Taiwan question?
Although mainstream views on each of these questions vary widely, opinion tends to cluster around two conceptions of national identity: Japan as a "normal country" and Japan as a "civilian power." The "civilian power" perspective probably still commands more support in the general public, reflecting the persistence of pacifistic norms. But international developments during the last seven years have significantly increased the influence of the "normal country" perspective. Recent opinion polls conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun show that over half the population now favors revising the constitution; a decade ago, the issue of constitutional revision was essentially taboo. And in April 1996, the influential organization of business executives, Keizai Doyukai, endorsed reinterpretation of the constitution so that Japan could exercise its right to collective self-defense.
In addition to these two mainstream perspectives, there are those who want Japan to become a "pacifist state" in a stricter sense and those who would like it to be an "autonomous great power." Both options lie outside the general policy consensus that exists today. Barring a radical change in the international environment, neither the "pacifist state" nor the "autonomous great power" view of Japan will become the predominant perspective. For the foreseeable future, the salient debate for policy will be the competition between the "normal country" and "civilian power" visions. But the other two visions will matter politically, in that they affect the relative influence of the two mainstream schools of thought.
What follows is a brief synopsis of the main positions found in each of these four opinion clusters. This summary will map each of the clusters according to the specific issues identified above, but the descriptions are not entirely comparable because one opinion cluster may not have as detailed views on a particular subject as another.
The "Normal Country" Perspective
The vision of Japan as a "normal country" has two versions: one based
on "collective security" centered around the United Nations, the other
on "collective defense" anchored in the alliance with the United States.
Reform politician Ichiro Ozawa supports the "collective security" version
by emphasizing the common ground that the Japanese constitution, the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, and the U.N. charter share. Without revising the constitution,
he believes that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces can and should move beyond
their current "exclusive defense strategy" and participate in U.N. peacekeeping
activities on both an ad hoc basis and as part of a U.N. standing force.
He suggests that Japan could even participate in U.N. "preventive or enforcement
measures" under Chapter 7 of the U.N. charter. What the present constitution
prohibits is "the use of military force abroad by the Japanese government
based on its own decision" (italics Ozawa's). [15]
Although Ozawa was the original popularizer of the "normal country"
concept, most Japanese analysts who subscribe to a "realist" view of international
politics question Ozawa's expectations for a U.N.-centered collective security
system and stress instead the concept of "collective defense" for reinvigorating
Japan's alliance with the United States.[16]
This view of Japanese normalization focuses on deterrence, crisis management,
and balance of power. Nevertheless, since Ozawa and traditional realists
share a commitment to enhance Japan's military role in international security,
the following summary of the "normal country" perspective treats the two
views together except the points on which they disagree.
Constitution
Ozawa argues that the current constitution permits Japan to participate
in virtually all U.N. collective security operations, if the forces are
under U.N. command. Most other "realists" believe that the government should
change its current interpretation of the constitution (and eventually move
to amend the constitution formally) so that Japan can exercise its right
to collective self-defense as well as its right to individual self-defense.[17]
U.S.-Japan Alliance and U.S. Forces:
Notwithstanding all the defense burden-sharing efforts of the Japanese
government, alliances face their greatest tests during crises. No amount
of "host-nation support" or checkbook diplomacy will satisfy the United
States if American lives are being sacrificed in an East Asia contingency--e.g.,
in Korea or over Taiwan--that is critical to Japanese interests while Japan
stands idly by because of its constitutional constraints. Therefore, the
"normal country" advocates argue that Japan should at least provide rear-area
support for U.S. troops during a regional military contingency. Some would
ultimately like Japanese soldiers to stand shoulder to shoulder with U.S.
forces in the defense of common interests.[18]
Most would like to have the United States maintain its military presence
in Japan at close to current levels, and they are willing to defer to the
Pentagon regarding what forces are required. Hosting U.S. forces is the
best guarantee of America's security commitment to Japan and the most effective
way to ensure U.S. strategic engagement in East Asia. But a few are beginning
to favor a reduction in the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa and an augmentation
of naval and air forces.
Japan should play a role in American power balancing in East Asia analogous
to the role that Britain plays for the United States in Europe--serving
as America's most reliable regional partner--the realists say.
Self-Defense Forces:
There is no need to acquire power projection capabilities, although
Japan should upgrade its air and missile defense and its intelligence-gathering
systems. A few advocate the acquisition of long-range transport capabilities
for peacekeeping missions and a small aircraft carrier for air defense.
Nuclear Policy:
Japan should continue to rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence,
a doctrine that allows Japan to sustain its three non-nuclear principles.
Japan should work with the United States to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation
regime, but also continue to develop its plutonium program for long-term
energy security.
Multilateral Security:
Ozawa has stated that, through multilateral diplomacy, Japan should
"develop a new security framework that can respond to the power vacuum
that would be left by an American withdrawal."[19]
But for most "collective defense" realists, rather than developing a regional
multilateral security framework to prepare for a possible U.S. military
withdrawal, Japan should strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance to insure the
continuation of America's security involvement in the Asia-Pacific region.
The bilateral alliance is the most important pillar of regional security;
multilateral security dialogues and institutions can only be supplemental.
Economic Interdependence:
For "normal country" advocates, growing economic interdependence is
insufficient to promote regional peace. In fact, economic growth in the
context of this interdependence is likely to provide East Asian states
the resources to enhance their military capabilities. Therefore the development
and maintenance of a stable balance of power is essential to regional security.
APEC may help to sustain regional economic growth and promote liberalization,
but its contribution to security is limited.
History:
Ozawa acknowledges the need to deal more forthrightly with Japan's
militarist past in order to win the trust of other Asian states, but he
also stresses the importance of having a balanced view of history (noting
the positive role Japan has played in the region).[20]
Others feel that the historical question persists primarily because some
Japanese politicians, journalists, and even officials "tip off" Koreans
and Chinese about "off-the-record" remarks or internal developments so
as to provoke an outcry. Japan must transcend the "history question" in
developing a forward-looking policy toward Asia. Ultimately, greater objectivity
is needed in analyzing Japan's historical role in Asia. Equating imperialist
Japan with Nazi Germany is misguided and unfair, they say.
Korea:
Japan should be prepared to cooperate militarily with the United States
and South Korea during a Korean crisis. It should also promote security
cooperation with the United States to strengthen deterrence against a North
Korean attack. Japan would, of course, prefer a reunited Korea that has
good relations with both Japan and the United States to one that is either
neutral or aligned with China. But a reunited Korea is not that problematic
whatever its strategic posture as long as Japan's alliance with the United
States is solid.
China/Taiwan:
According to the realists, the best way to ensure stability in the
Asia-Pacific region is to balance a rising China with a strong U.S.-Japan
alliance. Balancing China, however, does not mean pursuing a containment
strategy vis-a-vis China similar to the one pursued against the Soviet
Union. China is more an irredentist power than an expansionist power with
grand imperial designs like the old Soviet Union. If nationalism drives
China to become more assertive territorially, its targets are likely to
be limited to Taiwan, the South China Sea, and possibly Siberia. As long
as China's growing military power can be balanced by a robust U.S.-Japan
alliance (if need be, through a coalition with other states on China's
periphery), then both Japan and the United States should have no qualms
about assisting China's economic development and its integration into the
world economy.[21]
But in a Sino-American military confrontation over Taiwan, for example,
Japan has no choice but to support the United States.[22]
The "Civilian Power" Perspective
An Asahi Shimbun journalist, Yoichi Funabashi, first introduced
the concept of "civilian power" to a Japanese audience.[23]
Rather than turning Japan into an "ordinary" country, Funabashi and those
who share his basic outlook argue that Japan should build constructively
on its militarist past and strive to internationalize its current norms
about security and the use of military force. Increasing economic interdependence
and the end of the Cold War will attenuate the need to rely on traditional
"balance of power" approaches to security, and an opportunity to cultivate
"cooperative" approaches to security will instead emerge. Consequently
policymakers should place greater emphasis on nonmilitary and multilateral
means to enhance international security.[24]
The following summarizes the "civilian power" position on specific issues.
Constitution
Instead of viewing the postwar constitution as impeding a more prominent
Japanese role in international affairs, the Japanese should see it as an
enunciation of ideals that all states should work toward, ideals that Japan
should take the lead in promoting. Therefore, "civilian power" advocates
argue that the constitution should be preserved, not amended or reinterpreted.
U.S.-Japan Alliance and U.S. Forces
In this era of transition and uncertainty, the security alliance between
Japan and the United States must be maintained. But analysts in the "civilian
power" opinion cluster differ among themselves about how the U.S.-Japan
security relationship should evolve.
Some would like the security relationship to move away from permanent
U.S. military forces stationed on Japanese territory (joji churyu naki
Ampó).[25]
Others argue that, without military bases in Japan, the United States would
have little incentive to continue its defense commitments to Japan. Nevertheless,
they still feel that the number of U.S. troops and bases in Japan should
be reduced to lighten the burden on various local communities, especially
Okinawa.[26]
Although many recoil at the thought of Japan cooperating militarily
with the United States in a Far East crisis beyond the homeland, some believe
that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces should support U.S. military operations
in regional contingencies--within the constraints of the constitution.
If a danger were to emerge in the region critically affecting Japan's defense,
then Japan could cooperate with U.S. forces as an extension of the right
to individual self-defense. But the iron law holds: Japan must renounce
the use of military force in foreign countries.[27]
Some would like Japan to assert its own diplomatic positions on important
issues such as relations with China, Taiwan policy, and nuclear nonproliferation--even
though they might be at odds with U.S. policy. They do not prescribe an
open break with the United States, but they do foresee the diplomatic independence
that Germany has exhibited in recent years.
Self-Defense Forces:
The JSDF should stick to their "exclusively defensive" military posture
and refrain from acquiring military systems that can project power or threaten
other countries. The JSDF should participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations
in non-combatant roles. They should not, however, join peacemaking or peace-enforcement
missions that would require the use of force overseas.
Nuclear Policy:
As the only country to suffer from a nuclear attack, Japan should become
more vigorous about preventing nuclear proliferation and supporting nuclear
arms control and disarmament. Japan should not be shy about criticizing
China for conducting nuclear tests and for building a nuclear arsenal.
A few in this cluster contemplate moving Japan out from under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella in order to give its nonnuclear policy greater moral force,
especially vis-a-vis China. At the same time, many favor plutonium reprocessing
as part of Japan's long-term energy strategy.
Multilateral Security:
Drawing on the lessons of the premature dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance in 1922, the U.S.-Japan alliance should not be replaced
with the untested alternative of a multilateral security arrangement in
the Asia Pacific.[28]
Still, the U.S.-centered bilateral security arrangements that were established
to deal principally with the Soviet threat are no longer sufficient to
manage the "plural and broadly defined threats" of the post-Cold War era.
Multilateral security dialogues are increasingly necessary to foster mutual
trust through a variety of communication channels.[29]
Economic Interdependence:
Although the Asia-Pacific region lacks treaty institutions such as
NATO or the EU, suffers from the absence of mature civil societies in many
countries, and manifests large differences in income and cultural traditions,
the focus on economic growth throughout the region will over time ameliorate
traditional geopolitical suspicions. In this context, APEC can play a decisive
role in fostering a sense of community in the region.[30]
History:
Japan still has not adequately dealt with its militarist past. Only
after fully acknowledging the atrocities that the Japanese military committed
in Asia during the Second World War will Japan gain the trust of its Asian
neighbors, "civilian power" supporters say. Greater school and public education
is necessary in Japan on this issue. Clearing the historical issue is a
precondition for Japan assuming a broader political-security role in the
region.
Korea:
Japan should put relations with South Korea on firmer ground by dealing
more effectively with the historical issues and by absorbing more imports
from South Korea. But at the same time, Japan should facilitate North Korea's
incorporation into the regional economic community as a way of defusing
military tensions on the Korean peninsula. The best way to ensure good
relations with a reunified Korea is to play a constructive role in the
reunification process.
China/Taiwan:
To develop a stable and cooperative balance among the United States,
Japan, and China, America and Japan should move quickly to integrate China
into the regional and international community. Otherwise Beijing will view
the U.S.-Japan alliance as a means to contain China.[31]
Therefore Japan should continue to facilitate China's economic development
and its accession to the World Trade Organization.
Some support a strict policy of noninterference on the Taiwan question--even
if China and the United States confront each other on this issue.
The "Pacifist State" Perspective
Unlike the "unarmed neutralists" of old, the leading commentators who
want Japan to be a "pacifist state" now recognize Japan's right to defend
itself and acknowledge the beneficial effects of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty, especially the clauses on economic cooperation and the settlement
of disputes by peaceful means. They even admit that the treaty has helped
to restrain Japanese rearmament and to make other Asian states receptive
to Japan's emergence as a regional economic leader. But they criticize
reliance on the security treaty with the United States to reassure the
region about Japanese intentions. It is far better to reaffirm unequivocally
Japan's status as a pacifist state and resist U.S. pressures to "militarize"
the alliance. The "pacifist state" view on specific issues is as follows.
Constitution:
The constitution should be neither revised nor reinterpreted. By preserving
its "peace constitution," Japan should act as a "conscientious objector"
nation, one that contributes to international society in exclusively nonmilitary
ways.
U.S.-Japan Alliance and U.S. Forces:
There is ultimately a tension between the U.S.-Japan alliance and the
creation of inclusive cooperative security arrangements. Therefore, in
the view of the pacifists, Japan and the United States should amicably
scale back the military aspects of the alliance and recast the relationship
as a political, economic, and cultural partnership. Over time, U.S. military
forces should be removed from Japanese territory. Only by transforming
the relationship with the United States in this manner can Japan pursue
a peace strategy as a truly sovereign nation.
Self-Defense Forces:
The Self-Defense Forces should be transformed from its current structure
as a traditional military force into a security organization similar to
the police or the coast guard. This "minimum defensive force" (saishogen
bogyoryoku) would be a "democratized" and open unit. Its aim would
be to protect the lives and property of Japanese citizens and its geographic
scope would be strictly limited to Japan's land, airspace, and territorial
waters.[32]
Japan should refrain from acquiring weapons that can be used to attack
other countries, from deploying military forces overseas, and from exercising
the right to collective self-defense. The JSDF should reduce its ground
forces by half and scale back advanced weapon systems like the Aegis naval
systems and P-3C antisubmarine warfare aircraft. [33]
To contribute actively to international peace, some favor establishing
a separate Peace Support Corps (Heiwa Shi-en Tai), limited to humanitarian
and economic operations. Pacifists say the use of military force or the
deployment of armed peacekeepers is unlikely to be effective in resolving
regional conflicts, and point out that such operations may even aggravate
the problem.
Nuclear Policy:
According to the "pacifist state" vision, Japan should adhere strictly
to its three non-nuclear principles and codify these principles into law.
It should promote the cause of nuclear disarmament by terminating its reliance
on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan should also end its plutonium recycling
policy to allay suspicions about Japan's nuclear intentions.
Multilateral Security:
In place of the security alliance, Japan should take the lead in developing
a multilateral, collective and cooperative security system for the Asia-Pacific
region that has the ability to impose sanctions and perform peacekeeping
functions.
Economic Interdependence:
As economic interdependence increases among East Asian states, a sense
of regional community will inevitably develop, obviating the need to rely
on geopolitical alliances to preserve security. At the same time, Japan
should work with countries in the region to reduce the negative environmental
consequences of economic development.
History:
If Japan is to be trusted by its neighbors, it must address more sincerely
the legacy of its militarist past. Unfortunately, many of the pro-defense
politicians and opinion leaders are the least willing to admit to the wrongs
that Japan committed against other Asians. Until Japan can clear the hurdle
of the historical question, revising the constitution to clarify Japan's
international role will be misconstrued and may even become a destabilizing
factor in the region.
Korea:
With the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework and the improvement in relations
between China and South Korea, the basic trend is positive for defusing
tensions on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, according to the pacifists,
Japan should not undermine this trend by expanding the military dimension
of its relationship with the United States. Although its nuclear program
is worrisome, North Korea does not pose an immediate threat to Japanese
security.
China/Taiwan:
China is modernizing its military, but its military power is not directed
at Japan, and it will take some time before China becomes a military threat
to the region. In the meantime, Japan should continue to support China's
economic development and its integration into the regional and global community
and encourage China to become a force for peace. Japan should not be shy
about criticizing China for its nuclear tests and even using foreign economic
assistance as leverage.
The best way to deal with China is to develop multilateral security
institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum and to deepen the dialogue with
China. So far, multilateral approaches have helped to manage territorial
disputes in the South China Sea. Redefining the U.S.-Japan alliance so
that Japan's security role is expanded geographically will only alarm the
Chinese and undermine efforts to cultivate a cooperative security regime.
The best way to promote peace across the Taiwan Strait is to encourage
deeper economic links between mainland China and Taiwan. Japan, however,
should refrain from intervening politically or militarily on this issue,
according to pacifist advocates.
The "Autonomous Great Power" Perspective
Like the "pacifist state" advocates, proponents of the "autonomous
great power" vision would like Japan to pursue a strategy more independent
of the United States. Rather than adhering to the constitution, which they
see as imposed by an external power, they favor rewriting the constitution
so that it better reflects indigenous values. Although in the past "great
power nationalists" supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons, few in
this cluster openly recommend nuclear acquisition today. In fact, they
hardly say anything at all about the details of military policy. But they
do criticize the bilateral security treaty and the U.S. military presence
in Japan as primarily serving American interests and not those of Japan.
In recent years, the main theme of "autonomous great power" supporters
has been the decline of the United States and the West and the rise of
Asia. Rather than blindly following the American lead or Western models,
Japan should replant its roots in Asia.[34]
This "Asianist" evolution of "great power nationalism" has meant that advocates
are much less specific about concrete security policy questions than their
counterparts in the other opinion clusters, as is evident in the following
summary.
Constitution:
The constitution, which was imposed by the United States, should be
revised so that Japan can take greater responsibility for its own defense.
U.S.-Japan Alliance and U.S. Forces:
The bilateral security framework should ultimately be revised to make
the relationship more equal and symmetrical. Japan should change the view
that U.S. forces are in Japan to defend Japan. The reality is that U.S.
forces are in Japan to promote U.S. strategic interests beyond Japan. The
notion that Japan is a free rider of U.S. security policy is therefore
a myth. The United States has worked to keep Japan from becoming a truly
sovereign nation.
Many favor a reduction of U.S. bases throughout Japan, not just Okinawa.
For example, Shintaro Ishihara has called for a return of the Yokota Air
Force Base as the price for sustained Japanese support for the bilateral
alliance.[35]
Self-Defense Forces:
"Autonomous great power" proponents believe that, at the very least,
the JSDF should be able to participate fully in U.N. peacekeeping forces.
However, to defuse the concerns of Asian countries, Japan should be transparent
about the structure of its military forces.[36]
According to this cluster, it is of paramount importance for the Japanese
military to gain full legitimacy, and for defense planning to be focused
on ensuring Japanese security, rather than bogged down in esoteric constitutional
questions.
Nuclear Policy:
Since the end of the cold war, most in this opinion cluster no longer
advocate the acquisition of nuclear weapons.[37]
However, they are certainly aware that, with its technical know-how and
plutonium reprocessing facilities, Japan could acquire nuclear weapons
in short order.
Multilateral Security:
The world is moving toward a tripolar structure centered around North
America, Europe, and East Asia. The notion that Japan should play a mediating
role between East and West is naive. Japan should clearly articulate its
position of being a member of the "East." Although relations with the United
States will remain important, it is much more natural for Japan to put
greater emphasis on its relations with Asia.[38]
Economic Interdependence and Security:
Japan's primary mission should be the promotion of Asia's economic
development, and it can contribute to regional stability by creating a
yen-based economic sphere.[39]
History:
Japan should not be preoccupied with the historical issue. In fact,
the Tokyo war crimes trial version of the Pacific war is inaccurate and
biased against Japan. Reports of Japanese atrocities in World War II are
grossly exaggerated. Moreover, many of the countries in East Asia are now
willing to put aside the past and are looking to Japan for more international
leadership.[40]
Relations with East Asia:
Advocates of a "great power" Japan offer very little in the way of
concrete measures for dealing with either Korea or China. Most write vaguely
about deepening Japan's relations with the East Asian countries by stressing
the common Toyo (Eastern) philosophy and civilization they share. A few
discuss the need to "neutralize" a reunited Korea in cooperation with the
other great powers (China, Russia, and the United States).
THE DYNAMICS OF THE STRATEGIC DEBATE
Four general points can be made about this strategic debate. First,
while the influence of the "normal country" perspective has grown, the
"civilian power" view still commands enough support to obstruct Japan's
"normalization" process and ensure an incremental pace of change in Japanese
security policy. Much of the Japanese population continues to have an aversion
to the military. Not only does the newly formed Democratic Party back the
"civilian power" perspective (and to a significant extent even the "pacifist
state" view) but sizable groups in both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
and the New Frontier Party (NFP) embrace this dovish vision. The complex
web of competing bureaucratic interests, as well as the weakness of the
prime minister as an agent of change, favor the "civilian power" perspective
by slowing down the expansion of Japan's security role.
Second, the relative influence of the "normal country" and "civilian
power" opinion clusters will depend on the evolution of the international
environment. What will matter most is the balance between the level of
security threat to Japan and the robustness of America's defense commitment.
If the environment becomes more threatening to Japan while the U.S. security
commitment to Japan continues as before, then support for the "normal country"
perspective will increase: the Japanese people will become more convinced
of their nation's security vulnerability and the need to strengthen the
alliance with the United States. But if the threat increases while the
U.S. commitment decreases, Japan may move beyond the "normal country" perspective
to the "autonomous great power perspective." Or Japan could even go in
the opposite direction of appeasing the threat by adhering to a "civilian
power" stance or a more pacifistic version.
If the environment moves in a more benign direction (such as a reduction
of tensions in Korea or across the Taiwan Strait), however, then the influence
of the "civilian power" perspective will grow. The public would see no
need to broaden Japan's military role beyond defense of the home islands,
nor to strengthen the military dimension of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.
Third, the "normal country" and "civilian power" visions both have
their deficiencies. Although the "normal country" view may have a more
realistic grasp of regional security trends, its treatment of the history
question complicates Japan's ability to assume a broader security role
without exacerbating regional tensions. The legacy of Japan's colonization
of Korea, its aggression against China, and its war with the United States
still makes Asia uncomfortable about Japan. Conversely, while the "civilian
power" vision may create a Japan that could be more active in the security
realm without destabilizing the region, it expects too much from economic
interdependence and multilateral security dialogues for dealing with geopolitical
tensions.
Fourth, the "pacifist state" and "autonomous great power" visions are
declining in influence, but they still attract more attention in Japan
than their influence would warrant, because of Japanese frustrations about
relations with the United States. This is particularly true of the "autonomous
great power" vision. The role of these two opinion clusters on policy should
not be entirely dismissed. The overlap between the "civilian power" and
"pacifist state" views and between the "normal country" and "autonomous
great power" views is considerable and has probably increased over time.
The "civilian power" and the "pacifist state" opinion clusters now
agree not only about the constitutional legitimacy of the Self-Defense
Forces and the benefits of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but also about
the need for (and inevitability of) a reduction in U.S. forces in Japan.
The "normal country" and "great power" advocates now agree about the need
to revise or reinterpret the constitution. As support for nuclear weapons
has waned in the "great power" group, the gap between them regarding military
policy has narrowed. Consequently the two extreme views may play a more
prominent role in the competition between the two mainstream views. The
"normal country" and "great power" advocates could cooperate more, on a
political level, to promote their common agenda, and the "civilian power"
and "pacifist state" proponents could do the same.
JAPANESE POLITICS AND THE STATE
From a domestic point of view, how the above strategic debate influences
the world of concrete policy will depend largely on party and bureaucratic
politics.
Party Politics
When the ruling Liberal Democratic Party split in 1993, Japanese commentators
heralded the end of the so-called 1955 system. Under this system, the LDP
had maintained political hegemony, while the competition (and later collusion)
between the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) shaped much of the
dynamics of party and parliamentary politics. In reality, the events of
the last three years amounted more to a culmination of the post-1955 system
than its collapse. By uniting to form the LDP in 1955, the conservatives
in Japan were pursuing their political objective of containing, taming,
dividing, and ultimately incorporating the political left led by the JSP.
The conservatives succeeded in this hegemonic program all too well. From
a historical perspective, the most significant development of the past
few years was not the temporary ouster of the LDP from power but the demise
of the JSP as a political force. The end of the Cold War and the decline
of socialism as an ideology dissolved the glue that helped to keep the
factionalized LDP together. Conservative reformers outmaneuvered the JSP
and trapped the party into acquiescing to an electoral reform that certainly
spelled the party's annihilation.
As the sharp ideological conflict over security policy faded into a
broad public consensus, policy positions have waned as a decisive factor
in party affiliation and alignments. Much more important now are calculations
about electoral and office opportunities. And despite the overhaul of the
electoral system in 1994, debates about policy are no more important than
before in electoral competition and performance.
The LDP and NFP are virtually indistinguishable in terms of positions
on foreign and security policy. Advocates of both the "normal country"
and the "civilian power" visions reside in both parties. At present, differences
within these two parties perhaps matter more politically than the differences
between them. Ozawa and his colleagues in the NFP were unable to get the
party to endorse a platform along the lines of the "normal country" vision
because of strong internal opposition. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
has been constrained from pushing more aggressively on defense cooperation
with the United States not only because his LDP must rely on the surviving
Social Democrats for votes in the upper house, but also because he faces
resistance from within his own party. These intraparty divisions discourage
an open partisan debate about foreign and security policies, as was evident
in the tone of the October 1996 election campaign. The Democratic Party
is somewhat more cohesive, but even here members range from "civilian power"
to "pacifist state" proponents. Perhaps only the Japan Communist Party
(JCP) has a coherent and consistent position (terminating the security
relationship with the United States and pursuing an autonomous diplomatic
policy), but its views are very much the minority.
Although Japanese politics is now in a confusing transitional phase,
one can still draw several tentative implications about the connection
between party politics and strategic policy:
1) Most Diet members, irrespective of party affiliation, fall within
the general policy parameters noted earlier: maintenance of the U.S.-Japan
alliance, U.S. military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, the legitimacy
of the Self-Defense Forces, the three nonnuclear principles, and the growing
importance of East Asian economic development and security stability for
Japanese interests.
2) Despite the cross-cutting cleavages between parties and policy position,
an international crisis--e.g., over Korea, Taiwan, or relations with the
United States--could provoke a political realignment around the different
strategic visions. Under such circumstances, the intellectual debate between
the "normal country" and "civilian power" visions would at last become
linked to party competition. And if the crisis revealed an acute security
vulnerability, the "autonomous great power" view could become ascendant,
while the "pacifist state" perspective could wither away.
Much depends on the balance of power and the balance of commitment
between the United States and China. If China's power and influence grew
enormously, while U.S. power or commitment in East Asia declined proportionally,
then Japan could "bandwagon" with China, rather than "balance" against
China by adopting an accommodationist line similar to the "civilian power"
concept.
3) Most of the influential conservative politicians who managed the
normalization of relations with China have passed from the scene. As a
result, political leaders are now more likely to view China soberly and
make policy decisions based on calculations of national interest rather
than feelings of guilt or romanticism.
4) As the political ranks are increasingly dominated by those born
after World War II, politicians of all parties will press for greater diplomatic
autonomy from the United States and a bilateral alliance on more equal
terms. They will, of course, disagree about the concrete content of this
autonomy and equality, but that is a matter of tactics, not strategy.
5) While the "political space" in which stridently pacifist politicians
can operate has shrunk with the demise of the JSP, the space for nationalist
politicians is likely to expand. In the era of one-party dominance, the
nationalist right was subsumed and tamed within the LDP. With the split
in the conservative camp, the voice of hard-core nationalists may become
louder in the LDP, and the New Frontier Party could serve as an alternative
outlet for their views. Although its direct impact on policymaking is likely
to remain limited, the nationalist right could become increasingly unruly.
It could complicate Japanese diplomacy by making more frequent statements
about its interpretation of history and being more assertive about Japan's
disputed territorial claims.
Bureaucratic Politics
The nature of policymaking at the bureaucratic level suggests incremental
change, rather than dramatic shifts, in Japanese security policy. The power
of the Japanese prime minister over the administrative agencies is limited
compared to that of the U.S. president (or even the chief executives in
most of the major Western European states), and the bureaucratic agencies
primarily in charge of security policy prefer the incremental and consensual
approach.
The following is a brief snapshot of the key state actors in security
policy.
The Prime Minister:
In the past, factionalism within the ruling LDP and the need to manage
a pacifist and neutralist opposition in the Diet prevented the prime minister
from exercising strong leadership in foreign policy. Factional politics
are less decisive in selecting the prime minister, and the opposition parties
are now less ideological about foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the need
to maintain interparty coalitions and manage policy divisions within the
ruling party or parties continues to constrain the prime minister from
pushing dramatic policy change.
During the mid-1980s, then-Prime Minister Nakasone tried to enhance
his decisionmaking powers over the established ministries by creating foreign
affairs and security policy offices within the prime minister's secretariat.
The aim was to create something akin to the National Security Council staff
in the United States. But this institutional innovation has yet to meet
the objectives Nakasone had in mind.
Of course, much depends on the personality of the prime minister. With
the dovish and weak Toshiki Kaifu as prime minister during the Persian
Gulf crisis, the office of the prime minister exerted little leadership.
By contrast, Hashimoto has been much more effective than his predecessor
Tomiichi Murayama at defusing tensions in Okinawa in the wake of the rape
incident. But it will remain difficult for even the best of prime ministers
to achieve centralized executive coordination and leadership over the traditional
ministries dominated by elite careerists.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA):
MOFA continues to be the agency that places the greatest priority on
maintaining good relations with the United States. To some extent, MOFA
is divided between its "Americanists" and "Asianists." For example, "Asianists"
might be more receptive to Asian groupings like the East Asian Economic
Caucus that excludes the United States. Another intra-MOFA subgroup is
the so-called "China school," the diplomats with Chinese-language training
and numerous postings in China-related jobs. Unlike the MOFA "Soviet school,"
which held hard-line views against the Soviet Union, the "China school"
tends to favor accommodation to Chinese concerns.
Of late, MOFA has taken steps that have diminished the division between
"Americanists" on the one hand and "Asianists" and the "China school" on
the other. The creation of the General Foreign Policy Bureau (Sogo Gaiko
Seisaku Kyoku) as a "super-bureau" has not only weakened the traditionally
powerful North American Bureau, but has also strengthened MOFA's ability
to integrate the various strands of foreign policy. The appointment of
a prominent "Americanist" as director-general of the Asia Bureau has helped
minimize tensions between Japanese policy toward the United States and
that toward Asia. For example, during the March 1996 Taiwan crisis, MOFA
moved quickly to endorse the deployment of two U.S. carriers to the area.
And now some MOFA "Asianists" see the wisdom of enhancing Japan's relations
with East Asian states as a way of balancing Chinese influence. Nevertheless,
the "China school" want to avoid a deterioration in relations with China.
Japan Defense Agency (JDA):
In addition to managing the process of defense modernization, the JDA
has traditionally stressed two missions: 1) strengthening public support
for Japan's defense policy and the alliance with the United States, and
2) institutionalizing its control over the military. Although the JDA never
managed to upgrade its status to a full-fledged ministry, and continues
to have some of its top officials come from other ministries (like MOFA,
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
and the Police Agency), the agency's prestige has increased gradually as
indicated by the higher quality of its younger recruits. The JDA will cease
to be a "colonized" agency as career JDA officials fill more and more of
the agency's top posts.
Despite these trends, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the
LDP amounted to a setback for the JDA. JDA officials managed to revive
some of their influence by cooperating closely with Pentagon officials
to initiate a U.S.-Japan dialogue on security issues and by revising the
National Defense Program Outline. But the limits of JDA influence became
apparent when Prime Minister Hashimoto marginalized the agency in dealing
with the Okinawa base issue.
The MOFA-JDA relationship:
Despite sharing a strong commitment to the U.S.-Japan security relationship,
MOFA and the JDA have long been bureaucratic rivals. MOFA's involvement
in the details of defense policy derives primarily from having the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty Division (Ampo-ka), which is housed in MOFA's North
American Bureau. The MOFA-JDA competition was especially intense during
the Persian Gulf crisis, when some MOFA officials entertained a proposal
to create an "international peace cooperation" unit separate from the Self-Defense
Forces. The MOFA reorganization that placed U.N. policy within the General
Foreign Policy Bureau is likely to perpetuate this bureaucratic rivalry.
Rivalry notwithstanding, both MOFA and JDA embrace an incrementalist
approach to expanding Japan's security role and promoting defense cooperation
with the United States. On the whole, MOFA officials do not want to complicate
policymaking by provoking a constitutional debate, and they don't want
to aggravate concerns in Asia by moving too quickly. JDA officials want
to avoid jeopardizing the delicate public consensus on defense policy that
they worked so diligently to nurture.
Ministry of Finance (MOF):
Despite the recent campaign to reform and even break up the Ministry
of Finance, this fiscally conservative ministry will wield strong influence
to restrain defense-related expenditures, and MOF will work with like-minded
politicians to achieve its goals. At a time when Japan is again experiencing
sizable budget deficits, and faces huge health and pension outlays for
an aging population, the MOF may demand hard choices among different defense
funding requirements--e.g., host-nation support versus the cost of relocating
Okinawa bases versus funds for theater missile defense.
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI):
MITI will continue to play an influential role in managing relations
with the United States on issues of military technology. Although it might
gingerly seek to relax restrictions on arms exports, it will also strive
to protect the technological interests of Japanese firms. MITI will work
energetically to sustain the current nuclear energy policy of plutonium
recycling.
The Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications:
These two ministries will impede JDA efforts to strengthen defense
cooperation with the United States at the operational level during crises,
especially for the use of civilian facilities.
Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau: This bureau will insist on maintaining
a restrictive interpretation of the constitution, especially regarding
the use of force and the exercise of the collective self-defense right.
The above complex of bureaucratic interests makes it highly unlikely
that there will be more than an incremental evolution in Japanese security
policy without a major shift in the international environment, a structural
realignment of party politics, or a serious domestic economic crisis. The
limits on the prime minister's power also constrain the chief executive
from pushing more dramatic change and could even hamper his ability to
respond effectively to international crises.
The current dynamics of domestic politics suggest that Japan will make
incremental changes to strengthen the alliance with the United States along
the following lines:
1. Revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines and the
eventual passage of enabling legislation so that Japan can provide logistical
support to U.S. forces in regional contingencies within the constraints
of the current interpretation of the constitution;
2. Cooperation with the United States to reduce some of the bases in
Okinawa by creating new facilities (e.g., to compensate for the return
of the Futenma Marine Air Station) and transferring some of the functions
to other areas, but not altering significantly the level and character
of the U.S. military presence in Japan;
3. Modest enhancement of JSDF capabilities while implementing the force
restructuring mandated by the new National Defense Program Outline, but
no procurement of systems that can be construed as giving Japan a power
projection capability (e.g., long-range transport capability and an aircraft
carrier);
4. Some support for joint R&D on theater missile defense, but little
or no movement on acquisition and deployment.
Japan will also continue to promote the APEC process by modestly pushing
economic liberalization while remaining sensitive to Asian concerns about
development. Efforts will be made to maintain cordial relations with both
South Korea and China, but no decisive steps will be taken that successfully
convince Koreans and Chinese that Japan has sincerely dealt with its militarist
past. Therefore, the concerns these countries express about Japanese remilitarization
will feed back into the Japanese polity and obstruct a policy of expanding
Japan's security role beyond the defense of the home islands. Japan will
continue to cultivate the ARF as a multilateral security forum and perhaps
move forward on a comparable dialogue for Northeast Asia.
The advantage of this incremental approach is that it builds on rather
than upsets the domestic consensus that has emerged over the years in favor
of the security alliance with the United States. It also reassures the
rest of East Asia that Japan will not evolve into a great military power.
But the danger of incrementalism is that these adjustments in the U.S.-Japan
security relationship might not be enough to meet American expectations
and that Japan might not be able to respond effectively to a regional security
crisis (e.g., in Korea or over Taiwan). It might also prevent Japan from
doing more to help prevent a regional security crisis from emerging.