INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
INVESTIGATION NO. 3093
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT AT COLUMBIA
CITY, IND., ON APRIL 7, 1947
SUMMARY
Railroad: Pennsylvania
Date: April 7, 1947
Location: Columbia City, Ind.
Kind of accident: Derailment
Train involved: Passenger
Train number: 54
Engine number: 5514
Consist: 15 cars
Estimated speed: 55 m. p. h.
Operation: Movements with current of traffic by signal indications; movements against
current of traffic by train orders and manual-block system; interlocking
limits
Tracks: Double; tangent; 0.31 percent descending grade eastward
Weather: Clear
Time: 12:27 a.m.
Casualties: 10 injured
Cause: Train entering crossover at high rate of speed
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
INVESTIGATION NO. 3093
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE
ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY
April 30, 1947
Accident at Columbia City, on April 7, 1947, caused by a train entering a crossover at a high rate
of speed.
RETORT OF THE COMMISSION 1
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On April 7, 1947, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Pennsylvania Railroad at
Columbia City, Ind., which resulted in the injury of six passengers, two railway mail clerks and two
Pullman employees, This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the
Indiana Public Service Commission.
Diagram
Inv. No. 3093 Pennsylvania Railroad Columbia City, Ind. April 7, 1947
Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part of the Fort Wayne Division extending between Division Post,
near East Bail, and Fort Wayne, Ind., 113.3 miles, a double-track line, over which trains moving
with the current of traffic are operated by signal indications, and trains moving against the current
of traffic are operated by train orders and a manual-block system. The main tracks from south to
north are designated as No. 1, eastward., and No. 2, westward. Within interlocking limits at
Vandale Block Station, 93.8 miles cast of Division Post and 0.60 mile west of the station at
Columbia City, a racing-point crossover 186 feet long connects the two main tracks. The west switch
of this crossover is 455 feet east of the block station. The derailment occurred. on the turnout of
the west crossover switch, at a point 35 feet east of the switch. The main tracks are tangent
throughout a distance of 3.21 miles immediately west of the west crossover-switch and a considerable
distance eastward. The grade for east-bound trains varies between 0.38 percent and 0.31 percent
descending throughout a distance of 1.94 miles west of the west crossover-switch, where it is 0.31
percent descending.
The structure of the crossover consists of No. 10 turnouts, rigid-type frogs 23 tent in length,
131-pound switch-points and rail sections, and 9-foot guard rails. The curvature of each turnout is
7 degrees 32' 24" and the angle of each frog is 5 degrees 43' 29.3". The crossover is laid on about
115 switch ties. No superelevation is provided. The distance between the centerline of the main
tracks is 13 feet. The track is ballasted with crushed stone to a depth of 24 inches.
Approach signal 12R and home signal 60-59, governing east-bound movements, are, respectively, 2.02
miles and 1,507 feet west of the point of accident. Those signals are of the position-light type,
and are continuously lighted. The involved aspects and corresponding indications and names are as
follows:
Signal Aspect Indication Name
12R Three white lights Proceed prepared to stop Approach.
in diagonal position at next signal. Train
to the right exceeding Medium speed
must at once reduce
to that speed.
60-59) Three white lights Stop. Stop-signal
) in horizontal position
)
) Three white lights in Proceed at restricted speed Restricting
) horizontal position over
) three white lights
) in diagonal position to the left
The interlocking at Vandale consists of an electromechanical machine having 43 working levers in an
84-lever frame. Electric time, indication and route locking and mechanical locking are provided.
Time releases in connection with the time locking are provided. The controlling circuits are so
arranged that when the levers in control of the switches of the crossover involved are placed in
position for the switches to he lined for movement from track No. 1 through the crossover to track
No. 2 and the lover in control of signal 60-59 is placed in position for either a stop indication or
a proceed-at-restricted-speed indication to be displayed by that signal, signal 12R displays
proceed-prepared-to-stop-at-next-signal. The time release is arranged to operate in 4 minutes 6
seconds.
Operating rules read in part as follows:
DEFINITIONS
* * *
Fixed Signal---A signal of fixed location indicating a condition affecting the movement of a train
or engine.
* * *
Medium Speed--Not exceeding one-half the speed authorized for passenger trains but not exceeding 30
miles per hour.
* * *
Restricted Speed--Not exceeding 15 miles per hour prepared to stop short of train, obstruction or
switch not properly lined and to look out for broken rails.
221a. When an order is to be delivered to a train at a train order office, the fixed signal must be
displayed at Stop for the track and in the direction of the approaching train and a Train order
signal must be displayed in the place provided for the purpose.
The operator must not clear these signals for an approaching train unless he knows that the train is
not the one to which orders are addressed.
This combination of signals must be acknowledged by the engineman by two short sounds of the engine
whistle.
* * *
When the Train-order signal is displayed, the speed of the train must be reduced sufficiently to
enable the operator to deliver the order. If delivery is not effected on the engine the train must
be stopped.
Forms of Train Orders
* * *
D-R
Providing for a Movement Against the Current of Traffic
(1) No 1 Eng 461 has right over opposing trains on No 2 track C to F.
* * *
330. A signalman having train orders for a train, must display the home signal at Stop and in
addition the Train-order signal. He may permit trains to proceed under block signal rules after
complying with riles for movement by train orders.
663. A rain or engine must stop clear of an interlocking signal indicating Stop. A train or engine
must not pass a Stop-signal except when authorized * * *
The train-order signal at Vandale consists of a metallic banner painted yellow. At night a lighted
yellow lantern is attached to the banner. When there is a train order for delivery to an east-bound
train, the signal is displayed from the north wall of the block station, which is 38 feet south of
the centerline of track No. 1.
The maximum authorized speed for the train involved was 80 miles per hour. The maximum authorized
speed for all trains through the crossover involved was 15 miles per hour.
Description of Accident
Train order No. 101, Form 19, addressed to the operator at Junction, 18.1 miles east of Vandale,
was made complete at 12:13 a.m., and read as follows:
Hold all westward trains clear of No 2 track between Junction and Vandale
Train order No. 102, Form 19, addressed to all trains west at Junction and to the operator and No.
54 at Vandale, was made complete at 12:16 a.m. and read a follows:
No 54 eng 5514 has right over opposing trains on No 2 track Vandale to Junction
No. 54, an east-hound passenger train, consisted of engine 5514, a non-articulated single-expansion
engine of the 4-4-4-4 type, one mall car, one express car, one baggage car, three coaches, one dining
car and eight sleeping cars, in the order named. The second car was of steel-underframe
construction, and the remainder of the care were of all-steel construction. This train passed
Warsaw, 19.8 miles west of Vandale, at 12:10 a.m., on time, passed signal 12R without reducing
speed, passed signal 69-59, which displayed stop, passed the train-order signal which displayed at
the block station at Vandale, and while moving on track No. 1 at an estimated speed of 55 miles per
hour it entered the crossover at Vandale, which was lined for movement from track No. 1 to track
No. 2, and the engine and the first 13 cars were derailed.
The engine and tender, remaining coupled, stopped practically upright and in line with the main
tracks, with the front end of the engine 974 feet east of the west crossover switch The derailed
cars stopped practically upright various positions across the main tracks and in line with them. The
engine and the first to ninth cars were considerably damaged, and the tenth to thirteenth cars were
slightly damaged.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 12:27 a.m.
Discussion
About 11:52 p.m. the operator at Vandale observed an overheated journal on a car of an east-bound
freight train moving on track No. 1, and he immediately informed the train dispatcher. No. 54, an
east-bound passenger train was due to pass Vandale at 12:27 a.m. and, to avoid possible delay to
that train, the train dispatcher issued train orders to the operator at Vandale for delivery to No.
54 and to the operator at Junction, 18.1 miles eastward, authorizing No. 54 to proceed from Vandale
to Junction against the current of traffic on the westward main track. The last of those orders was
made complete at 12:16 a.m. At that time the lever in control of home signal 60-59, governing
east-bound movements through the interlocking at Vandale, was in position for this signal to display
stop. About 12:17 a.m. the operator at Vandale placed the levers in control of the crossover
switches in position for the switches to be lined for movement from the eastward main track through
the crossover to the westward main track, and displayed the train-order signal for No. 54. About 10
minutes later, after No. 54 had passed signal 12R, which should have displayed
proceed-prepared-to-stop-at-next signal, this train passed signal 60-59, which displayed stop, passed
the train-order signal, and was moving at a speed of about 55 miles per hour when it entered the
crossover at the west switch and was derailed. The maximum authorized speed for movement through
this crossover is 15 miles per hour. The maximum safe speed and the overturning speed for the engine
involved moving on this crossover are respectively, 33 miles per hour and 61 miles per hour.
The operator said that when No. 54 was approaching signal 60-59 he was in position to observe
whether the engineer acknowledged the train-order signal indication by sounding two short blasts on
the engine whistle, in compliance with the rules, Because the acknowledging signal was not sounded
and because the operator observed that No. 54 was approaching signal 60-59 at an excessive rate of
speed, he did not place the lever in control of signal 60-59 in position for this signal to display
other than a stop indication, and he was giving stop signals with lighted white lantern when the
engine of No. 54 passed the block station.
The enginemen of No. 54 said that as their train was approaching signal 12R the speed was about 85
miles per hour. They were maintaining a lookout ahead and were positive that this signal displayed
proceed for their train. When the engine was about 0.5 mile rest of signal 60-59 the engineer
observed that this signal was displaying stop, and he immediately made a service brake-pipe
reduction. He said that, because he was operating his train as though a proceed indication was
displayed by signal 12R until he observed the stop indication displayed by signal 60-59, he did not
anticipate that any switch within the interlocking would be lined for a diverging route.
Consequently, he did not apply the brakes of the train in emergency.
Under the conditions present, signal 12R should have displayed a
proceed-prepared-to-stop-at-next-signal indication for No. 54. The speed of a train operating under
this indication is required to be reduced immediately to not exceeding 30 miles per hour, and the
train must be so operated that it can be stopped short of a signal displaying a stop indication.
Immediately after thc accident tests were made of the interlocking, and during a subsequent period of
48 hours the signals were under constant observation to determine whether any condition was present
that would cause signal 12R to display a phantom or a false indication. No condition was found that
would prevent the display of proper indications by the signals in this territory.
Cause
It is found that this accident was caused by a train entering a crossover at a high rate of Speed.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this thirtieth day of April, 1947.
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.
W. P. BARTEL,
(SEAL)
Secretary.
FOOTNOTE
1 Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled
proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and
disposition.