The National State, Nationalism, and Imperialism:  1850-1914

Between 1850 and 1914 Europe was characterized politically by the development of the national state, the spread of nationalism, and the rise of the 11 new imperialism." The development of the national state took place after 1848. Governments, responding to economic and social pressures, increased their involvement in the economic and social life of their countries. This was apparent both in liberal England and in more conservative France under Louis Napoleon. There were similar trends during the national unification movements in Italy and particularly in Germany, where the state took on a wide range of new functions.

Nationalism had deep roots, notably in the experience of and reactions to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic invasions. Nationalism also played a central role in the revolutions of 1848. During the second half of the nineteenth century, nationalism continued to grow and to be capitalized upon by national governments. The most striking manifestations of nationalism came in the successful unification movements in Italy and Germany.   The rise of the new imperialism occurred in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. The European powers engaged in a sudden quest for control over new territories in Asia and Africa. Explorers, missionaries, traders, troops, and government officials quickly followed one another into these lands and established direct political control. In this process the West greatly increased its dominance over much of the rest of the world, bringing Western culture and institutions to the indigenous societies whether they wanted it or not.

The sources in this chapter explore each of these three developments. Some of the documents concentrate on the growth of the national state, particularly in Germany, where the authoritarian government expanded in an effort to adapt to the social and economic pressures of the times, and France, where forces for radical change were still strong. Some of the questions addressed are: How did the government in Germany react to demands for social legislation? What was the role of conservative forces in the German unification process, and how did their dominance affect the subsequent history of Germany? Other documents concern nationalism, particularly its meaning, its appeal, and its connections to liberalism and conservatism. How did nationalism change over the nineteenth century? What role did nationalism play in the unification movements in Germany and Italy? How was nationalism tied to the new imperialism of the period? Finally, most of the selections deal with imperialism, for not only was imperialism of far-reaching significance for much of the world, it has been a topic of considerable debate among historians. What were the nationalistic and economic motives for imperialism? What were some of the attitudes toward imperialism, particularly as reflected in materials glorifying it as a Christian and humanitarian movement? How is imperialism understood from a Marxist perspective? What were some of the consequences of imperialism?

Throughout these selections there is evidence for an increasing competitiveness among European states and political strains within those states. As will be seen in Chapter 11, these contributed to the outbreak of World War I and the revolutions that accompanied it.

Speeches on Pragmatism and State Socialism

Otto von Bismarck

The revolutions of 1848 were ultimately a blow to idealistic reform. Therea er, governments pursued more limited goals. They tended to resort to more authoritarian measures, to avoid doctrinaire policies, and even to adopt certain programs of opposing groups in the hopes of weakening determined opposition to the government. Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) did this in Germany. Born into a noble Prussian family, Bismarck rose to the position of chief minister under the king in 1862. The first selection below is from an 1862 speech to the Reichstag, in which he argues that the idealism of 1848 must be replaced by a conservative realism.

Bismarck remained in power until 1890. During this time he and his conservative supporters faced opposition from some liberals and from a growing number of socialists representing the working class. In the 1880s Bismarck supported some of the workers' demands for social insurance and pushed through such legislation as the German Workers' Insurance Laws. The remaining excerpts below Bismarck's speeches indicate the rationale behind these policies.

Consider: What Bismarck means when he says the great quesilions of the day will be decided by iron and blood; how Bismarck justifies his support of Òsocialist" policies; why Bismarck would support such policies; what conservatives have to gain and who stands to lose by enactment of these policies.

IRON AND BLOOD

. . . It is true that we can hardly escape complications in Germany, although we do not seek them. Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to her power. The south German States -Bavaria, Wfirttemberg, and Baden -would like to indulge in liberalism. and because of that no one will assign Prussia's role to theml Prussia must collect her forces and hold them in reserve for an opportune moment, which has already come and gone several times. Since the Treaty of Vienna, our frontiers have not been favorably designed for a healthy body politic. Not by speeches and majorities will the great questions of the day be decided -that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 -but by iron and blood.

STATE SOCIALISM

Herr Richter has called attention to the responsibility of the State for what it does. But it is my opinion that the State can also be responsible for what it does not do. I do not think that doctrines like those of 'Laissez-faire, laissezaller,' 'Pure Manchesterdom in politics,' 'He who is not strong enough to stand must be knocked down and trodden to the ground.-To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath,'-that doctrines like these should be applied in the State, and especially in a monarchically, paternally governed State. On the other hand, I believe that those who profess horror at the intervention of the State for the protection of the weak lay themselves open to the suspicion that they are desirous of using their strength -be it that of capital, that of rhetoric, or whatever it be-for the benefit of a section, for the oppression of the rest, for the introduction of party domination, and that they will be chagrined as soon as this design is disturbed by any action of the Government.

The White Man's Burden

Rudyard Kipling

Imperialism was often glorified both by those actively involved in it and by the public at home. Part of this glorification involved perceiving imperialism as a Christian and nationalistic venture. More broadly it involved portraying imperialism as a heroic deed carried out by idealistic leaders of Western civilization in an effort to spread the "benefits" of "true civilization" to 'less advanced" peoples of the world. One of the most popular expressions of this is found in the writings of Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), particularly in his poem "The White Man's Burden," written in 1899 to celebrate the American annexation of the Philippines.

Consider: What Kipling means by "the White Man's burden"; how Kipling justifies imperialism; why such a justification might be so appealing.

Take up the White Man's burden

Send forth the best ye breed

Go, bind your sons to exile

To serve your captives' need;

To wait, in heavy harness,

On fluttered folk and wild

Your new-caught sullen peoples,

Half devil and half child.

Take up the White Man's burden

In patience to abide,

To veil the threat of terror

And check the show of pride;

By open speech and simple,

An hundred times made plain,

To seek another's profit

And work another's gain.

Take up the White Man's burden

The savage wars of peace

Fill full the mouth of Famine,

And bid the sickness cease;

And when your goal is nearest

(The end for others sought)

Watch sloth and heathen folly

Bring all your hope to nought.

Take up the White Man's burden

No iron rule of kings,

But toil of serf and sweeper -

The tale of common things.

The ports ye shall not enter,

The roads ye shall not tread,

Go, make them with your living

And mark them with your dead.

Take up the White Man's burden,

And reap his old reward

The blame of those ye better

The hate of those ye guard

The cry of hosts ye humour

(Ah, slowlyl) toward the light:

"Why brought ye us from bondage,

Our loved Egyptian night?"

Take up the White Man's burden -

Ye dare not stoop to less

Nor call too loud on Freedom

To cloke your weariness.

By all ye will or whisper,

By all ye leave or do,

The silent sullen peoples

Shall weigh your God and you.

Take up the White Man's burdenI

Have done with childish days

The lightly-proffered laurel,

The easy ungrudged praise:

Comes now, to search your manhood

Through all the thankless years,

Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,

The judgment of your peers.

Nationalism: Myth and Reality

Boyd Shafer

Although growing nationalism was a general pattern during the nineteenth century, the forms that nationalism took and its actual meaning differed over time and in various areas. Indeed, "nationalism" is a term that historians have usually used quite loosely, adding to problems of understanding its meaning. In the following selection, Boyd Shafer attempts to define nationalism by listing ten characteristics it embodies.

Consider: What it would mean to be a German or Italian "nationalist" during the second half of the nineteenth century, according to Shafer's definition of nationalism; what the political implications are of nationalism so defined; the elements of this definition that make nationalism such a powerful force.

1.    A certain defined (often vaguely) unit of territory (whether possessed or coveted).

2.    Some common cultural characteristics such as language (or widely understood languages), customs, manners, and literature (folk tales and lore are a beginning). If an individual believes he shares these, and wishes to continue sharing them, he is usually said to be a member of the nationality.

3.    Some common dominant social (as Christian) and economic (as capitalistic or recently communistic) institutions.

4.    A common independent or sovereign government (type does not matter) or the desire for one. The "principle" that each nationality should be separate and independent is involved here.

5.    A belief in a common history (it can be invented) and in a common origin (often mistakenly conceived to be racial in nature).

6.    A love or esteem for fellow nationals (not necessarily as individuals).

7.    A devotion to the entity (however little comprehended) called the nation, which embodies the common territory, culture, social and economic institutions, government, and the fellow nationals, and which is at the same time (whether organism or not) more than their sum.

8.    A common pride in the achievements (often the military more than the cultural) of this nation and a common sorrow in its tragedies (particularly its defeats).

9.    A disregard for or hostility to other (not necessarily all) like groups, especially if these prevent or seem to threaten the separate national existence.

10.   A hope that the nation will have a great and glorious future (usually in territorial expansion) and become supreme in some way (in world power if the nation is already large).

A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: Nationalism, Liberalism . and Conservatism

Raymond Grew

During the first half of the nineteenth century, nationalism was most often connected to liberalism. After the revolutions of 1848 there were increasing ties between nationalism and conservatism, particularly in the movements for national unification. In the following selection Raymond Grew, an advocate of comparative history from the University of Michigan, analyzes the relationships among nationalism, liberalism, and conservatism in a comparative context.

Consider: How nationalism could appeal to both liberals and conservatives; why, during the second half of the nineteenth century, liberal ideals were often sacrificed in the name of nationalism; using this and the preceding document, the bases on which nationalism might have been opposed.

Insofar as politics was the public battle of ideas and interests, then nationalism was a denial of politics. For in stressing the values of unity, loyalty, and duty, nationalism saw political dispute as a source of weakness. It denied that there was conflict in the true interests of classes, groups or regions. The effect of nationalism was therefore inherently conservative in that it provided reason for supporting anyone thought to wield the power of the state effectively in behalf of national unity and strength, Disraeli or Gladstone, Napoleon III or Bismarck. Since order and unity, the cry of the political conservative, are essential to a strong state, and since, to the nationalist, most worthy ends required that strength, the nationalist was always tempted under pressure to move toward the political right, to sacrifice liberty to unity, discussion to authority, ends to means.

Yet the origins of nationalism were usually liberal and reformist; for everywhere it was a demand for change, the doctrine of the modernizers who, while they had too much to lose to want a social revolution, were selfconsciously aware that theirs was an "underdeveloped" country. Nationalism could make its denial of politics effective because its ends were so clear, so easily defined in the model of the modern state. For the French that model had been England; for the Italians it was England and France. Italian nationalists were usually liberals, but their liberalism was primarily an admiration for the achievements of the liberal state. Because their model already existed, they looked directly to it, anxious to achieve an efficient bureaucracy, a responsible government, a progressive economic structure, all based on accepted and universally applied laws. Nationalism was a program to obtain these things quickly, not to evolve toward them but, if necessary, to superimpose them. The hurry to achieve these goals where nationalism itself was seriously opposed made a doctrinaire concern for means appear pedantic and unrealistic. Italian nationalists needed nothing so brutal as cynicism to justify "postponement" of controversy or the choice of practical means, though often this meant whittling away at the practices necessary to viable liberalism.

xGerman Unification

Hajo Holborn

As in the I case of Italy, nationalism in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century was closely connected to liberalism. This was particularly so in the early stages of the revolutions of 1848. But with the failure of liberal nationalists to gain the concrete changes they strove for, steps toward unification over the next two decades followed a different path. In the following selection, Hajo Holborn, a noted historian of Germany, analyzes the significance of that path for German history until the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

Consider: The ways in which liberalism was sacrificed during this period; how the relation between liberalism and nationalism was affected by the position of different social groups in Germany; how Bismarck's social policies support Holborn's interpretation.

The achievement of German unity gave Bismarck the power to force the German liberals to decide whether they were more eager to see unity or liberty achieved in Germany. The majority of them proved willing to compromise with Bismarck. Since centralization went rather far under the new constitution he needed the liberal movement to some extent to counterbalance the particularistic German forces represented chiefly by the German princes. The constitution of the new German empire was, therefore, a bit more centralized and more liberal than Bismarck wished, but he maintained control of the crucial policy-making positions. No decisive power over military and foreign affairs by the constituted popular bodies was allowed in the second German empire. Bismarck made all sorts of concessions in the field of social and economic reform but was absolutely adamant with regard to the powers of the parliament. The direction of foreign and military matters remained a privilege of the Crown.

The pseudo -constitutional character of the new German empire was even more accentuated when in 1878 Bismarck decided to give up free trade and imposed a policy protecting the interests of the Prussian Junker agrarians against the importation of cheap Russian and American grain while at the same time introducing tariffs benefiting the growing German iron industries. just as in 1866 and 1871 the German liberals had had to sacrifice the core of their political faith, so they were forced to jettison the major part of their economic program after 1878. The leading industrial groups of German society readily accepted a protectionist trade policy, and the unity of the liberal bourgeoisie crumbled. Thirty years after German liberalism had burst into existence in the Revolution of 1848, it ceased to be an independent political movement. Thereafter the majority of the German bourgeoisie, if they did not, like the higher bourgeoisie, become absolute supporters of the regime, were driven to further concession and compromise. The appearance of a powerful socialist workers' movement extinguished the last remaining fervor for reform among, the liberal bourgeoisie and made them take cover under the wings of the established government. The second German empire was founded "by blood and iron" and socially stabilized by "iron and grain." For more than fifty years the German political scene was overshadowed by the alliance of the "barons of the halm" and the "barons of the smokestack," who maintained the army and bureaucracy in power.

Imperialism

V. I. Lenin

Imperialism has been interpreted from a number of perspectives since the early twentieth century. The way that scholars view imperialism often reveals much about their own political and ideological views. Some of the earlier interpretations, such as those by J. H. Hobson and V. I. Lenin, were economic. They criticized imperialism as an outgrowth of capitalism, Hobson from the perspective of a liberal socialist, Lenin as a Marxist theorist and political leader. Indeed for Lenin, imperialism was not only economically determined, it was also a crucial element in a Marxist explanation of how capitalism was evolving historically. This view is illustrated in the following selection from his Imperialism, written in 1916 when Lenin was a Bolshevik leader in exile and not yet in power.

Consider: Why imperialism is connected to monopoly capitalism; the interest groups that would benefit most from imperialism; in Lenin's view, why England was the greatest imperial nation and why other nations would want to join in the imperial struggle.

Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves in all spheres. Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. Free competition is the basic feature of capitalism, and of commodity production generally; monopoly is the exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our eyes, creating large-scale industry and forcing out small industry, replacing large-scale by still larger-scale industry, and carrying concentration of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown and is growing monopoly: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks, which manipulate thousands of millions. At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist above it and alongside it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system. . . .

We must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following five of its basic features:

(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital". of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in

which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.

Imperialism as a

Nationalistic Phenomenon

Carlton Hayes

Although the economic interpretation of imperialism has not lost its strength, other views have been offered recently as supplements and sometimes as direct alter natives to an economic interpretation. A direct alternative appears in the following selection by Carlton J. H. Hayes. One of the earliest historians to develop a sophisticated understanding of nationalism, Hayes argues that economic motives were at best secondary; on the whole, imperialism was a nationalistic phenomenon.

Consider: The evidence Hayes uses to reject economic interpretations of nationalism; how Lenin might reply to this interpretation; the ways in which this view ts with the documents on nationalism in this chapter.

The founding of new colonial empires and the fortifying of old ones antedated the establishment of neo- mercantilism, and that the economic arguments adduced in support of imperialism seem to have been a rationalization ex post facto. In the main, it was not Liberal parties, with their super abundance of industrials and bankers, who sponsored the outward imperialistic thrusts of the '70 1 s and early '80's. Instead, it was Conservative parties, with a preponderantly agricultural clientele notoriously suspicious of moneylenders and big business, and, above all, it was patriotic professors and publicists regardless of political affiliation and unmindful of personal economic interest. These put forth the economic arguments which eventually drew bankers and traders and industrialists into the imperialist camp.

Basically the new imperialism was a nationalistic phenomenon. It followed hard upon the national wars which created an all-powerful Germany and a united Italy, which carried Russia within sight of Constantinople, and which left England fearful and France eclipsed. It expressed a resulting psychological reaction, an ardent desire to maintain or recover national prestige. France sought compensation for European loss in oversea gain. England would offset her European isolation by enlarging and glorifying the British Empire. Russia, halted in the Balkans, would turn anew to Asia, and before long Germany and Italy would show the world that the prestige they had won by might inside Europe they were entitled to enhance by imperial exploits outside. The lesser powers, with no great prestige at stake, managed to get on without any new imperialism, though Portugal and Holland displayed a revived pride in the empires they already possessed and the latter's was administered with renewed vigor. . . .

Most simply, the sequence of imperialism after 1870 appears to have been, first, pleas for colonies on the ground of national prestige; second, getting them; third, disarming critics by economic argument; and fourth, carrying this into effect and relating the results to the neo-mercantilism of tariff protection and social legislation at home.

The Effects of Imperialism

David Landes

Earlier in the twentieth century, historians, even those quite critical of imperialism, saw its impact mainly in European terms. In recent decades, the effects of imperialism have been viewed more from the perspective of native populations subject to imperial control. This has led to a more subtle understanding of imperialism and helps explain some of the persisting problems between the West and many "underdeveloped" or "third world" countries. This perspective is illustrated in the following selection by David Landes, an economic historian from Harvard. Here he focuses on Egypt.

Consider: The nature of the double standard described by Landes; how this double standard affected people's and nations' attitudes; whether this view fits best with the nationalistic or the economic interpretation o imperialism.

While most Europeans in Egypt lived according to principles, they had two sets of principles: the same rules did not apply in dealing with the in-group of Westerners and the out-group of natives. Some Europeans drew the line between the two societies more sharply than others. There were those for whom the Turk was of his nature treacherous, Moslem justice hopelessly corrupt, the native population mean and despicable. There were others who found the Turk not deliberately false, but lazy and neglectful; who recognized the validity of Moslem law within the framework of Egyptian society, but felt that it offered little protection to foreigners habituated to other codes and that the native tribunals were excessively submissive to government pressure; who had more sympathy than scorn for the Arab, and deplored his inadaptability to the discipline and precision implicit in modern industry and trade. Some saw in every Egyptian a potential enemy whose ill faith required constant vigilance and strong remedies; others looked upon the natives as children whose fumblings and misconduct were best handled by the paternal chastisement of their European friends and protectors. All, however, were agreed that Egyptian society was backward and Egyptian civilization inferior; that the European could not afford to submit to the customs of the country, but that the Egyptian would have to learn the ways and accept the justice of the European; that the standards of behaviour accepted in Europe, the values of honesty, fair play, reasonableness, and so on that shaped - at least in principle the social and business relations of the West, had to be modified to fit the circumstances of a strange environment. . . .

More than anything, more even than the enormous material costs of imperialism, it was the imposition of inferior social and moral status that shaped the reaction of the Egyptian to the European. Actually, the one implies the other: material exploitation is difficult if not impossible without the sanction of a double set of values and a corresponding double code of behaviour; if they were not there to begin with, the exploiter would have to create them. The fact remains, however, that in the many-sided impact of imperialism, it is the injury to self-respect that hurts most. It is the resentment aroused by spiritual humiliation that gives rise to an irrational response to rational exploitation. The apparently unreasonable, and certainly unprofitable, resistance of many of the world's underdeveloped countries today to Western business enterprise makes sense only in this context.

Chapter Questions On Italy and Germany

1.    What historical links are there between nationalism, the national state, and imperialism during the nineteenth century? How might all three be connected to industrialization, discussed in the previous chapter?

2.    How would you explain the rise of imperialism in the late nineteenth       century?

3.    In what ways have some of our perceptions of imperialism changed since the late nineteenth century?