Introduction

World War II and Postwar Era

World War II broke out in 1939 and was even more destructive than World War I. In 1945 Europe emerged from the war facing an overwhelming task of recovery. She had lost her position of dominance in the world, reflected in the successful independence movement among her colonies and the rise of the two new superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by the early 1960s, Europe had greatly recovered from the war and was enjoying considerable prosperity.

This chapter deals with six developments between 1939 and the early 1960s. First, almost all of Western civilization became embroiled in the war that broke out in 1939 and that did not end until two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in 1945. What were the origins of World War Il? What connections between Hitler, nazism, and appeasement might have led to the outbreak of the war in 1939? How can some of the destruction of the war be explained?

Second, by 1947 the growing hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union became formalized in speeches, policies, and alliances, resulting in a division between Eastern and Western Europe and more broadly between communist and noncommunist countries throughout the world: The Cold War had broken out. The Cold War remains a controversial issue among American historians as well as between Western and Soviet scholars. Why did it occur? What policies characterized the Cold War? How does the Soviet view of the Cold War differ from the American view?

Third, in the 1940s and 1950s there was a growing movement toward regional integration. This was stimulated in part by Cold War alliances and divisions. Specifically, Western European countries made a number of economic steps toward integration, above all through the formation of the Common Market in the 1950s. This trend toward European integration was of great potential significance. But to what extent was it more promise than performance? What concrete developments have occurred that allow us to say that European integration has in fact been taking place?

Fourth, Europe recovered from World War 11 more rapidly than expected. By the 1950s most countries were back on their feet, thanks in part to aid from the superpowers. By the early 1960s Western Europe was enjoying unprecedented prosperity and relative political and social stability. What were some of the political and social changes that occurred in this process of recovery? How are they exemplified by the establishment of a Labor government in Britain in 1945?

Fifth, nuclear weapons spread with unexpected rapidity. The potential of nuclear weapons was demonstrated in the final days of the war with Japan. The proliferation of nuclear arms in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to threaten civilization. How have nuclear weapons affected people? What has been the nature of the debate over nuclear weapons? What role could the United Nations play in international disputes that might lead to nuclear war?

Sixth, European powers were unable to hold on to all their colonies in the two decades following the war. What were some of the arguments made and the strategies used in the struggle over decolonization? What role did the United Nations play in this struggle?

While these developments have undergone some modification in the last twenty years, they remain part of the present along with other trends that will be examined in the next chapter.

Appeasement at Munich Attacked

George E Kennan

The traditional view in the debate over who was responsible for the outbreak of World War II is that Hitler was emboldened by the unnecessarily weak policy of appeasement pursued by the Western democracies during the 1930s. One element of this appeasement was the Munich Conference of 1938 at which England and France agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in return for Hitler's promise to demand no further territories. In the following selection, George F. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Pulitzer Prize winner for a two-volume work on Soviet-American relations, presents the traditional view of appeasement.

Consider: From the point of view of the French and British statesmen actually participating in the Munich Conference of 1938, whether Kennan's criticism is justified; the implications of the argument about the causes of or blame for World War II.

The Munich agreement was a tragically misconceived and desperate act of appeasement at the cost of the Czechoslovak state, performed by Chamberlain and the French premier, Daladier, in the vain hope that it would satis y Hitler's stormy ambition, and thus secure for Europe a peaceful future. We know today that it was unnecessary - unnecessary because the Czech defenses were very strong, and had the Czechs decided to fight they could have put up considerable resistance; even more unnecessary because the German generals, conscious of Germany's relative weakness at that moment, were actually prepared to attempt the removal of Hitler then and there, had he persisted in driving things to the point of war. It was the fact that the Western powers and the Czechoslovak government did yield at the last moment, and that Hitler once again achieved a bloodless triumph, which deprived the generals of any excuse for such a move. One sees again, as so often in the record of history, that it sometimes pays to stand up manfully to one's problems, even when no certain victory is in sight.

The Origins of the

Second World War:

Appeasement Defended

A. J.- P. Taylor

The traditional view attacking appeasement as unjustified and a major cause of World War II has been questioned from different perspectives. Perhaps the most controversial perspective comes from A. J. P. Taylor, a popular outspoken British historian who has written extensively on modern European history. In the following selection from The Origins of the Second World War, Taylor argues that the appeasers have been unfairly faulted for their policies.

Consider: The ways that Taylor and Kennan would disagree about the legitimacy of appeasement rather than the facts of appeasement; the implications of Taylor's argument about the causes of or blame for World War II; the advantages and dangers of looking at appeasement in the 1930s as a historical lesson to be learned for dealing with more recent circumstances.

He got as far as he did because others did not know what to do with him. Here again I want to understand the "appeasers", not to vindicate or to condemn them. Historians do a bad day's work when they write the appeasers off as stupid or as cowards. They were men confronted with real problems, doing their best in the circumstances of their time. They recognised that an independent and powerful Germany had somehow to be fitted into Europe. Later experience suggests that they were right. At any rate, we are still going round and round the German problem. Can any sane man suppose, for instance, that other countries could have intervened by armed force in 1933 to overthrow Hitler when he had come to power by constitutional means and was apparently supported by a large majority of the German people? Could anything have been designed to make him more popular in Germany, unless perhaps it was intervening to turn him out of the Rhineland in 1936? The Germans put Hitler into power; they were the only ones who could turn him out. Again the "appeasers" feared that the defeat of Germany would be followed by a Russian domination over much of Europe. Later experience suggests that they were right here also. Only those who wanted Soviet Russia to take the place of Germany are entitled to condemn the 11 appeasers 11 ; and I cannot understand how most of those who condemn them are now equally indignant at the inevitable result of their failure.

Nor is it true that the "appeasers" were a narrow circle, widely opposed at the time. To judge by what is said now, one would suppose that practically all Conservatives were for strenuous resistance to Germany in alliance with Soviet Russia and that all the Labour party were clamouring for great armaments. On the contrary, few causes have been more popular. Every newspaper in the country applauded the Munich settlement with the exception of Reynolds'News. Yet so powerful are the legends that even when I write this sentence down I can hardly believe it. Of course the "appeasers" thought firstly of their own countries as most statesmen do and are usually praised for doing. But they thought of others also. They doubted whether the peoples of eastern Europe would be best served by war. The British stand in September 1939 was no doubt heroic; but it was heroism mainly at the expense of others. The British people suffered comparatively little during six years of war. The Poles suffered catastrophe during the war, and did not regain their independence after it. In 1938 Czechoslovakia was betrayed. In 1939 Poland was saved. Less than one hundred thousand Czechs died during the war. Six and a half million Poles were killed. Which was better - to be a betrayed Czech or a saved Pole? I am glad Germany was defeated and Hitler destroyed. I also appreciate that others paid the price for this, and I recognise the honesty of those who thought the price too high.

The Origins of World War 11

Keith Eubank

The issues involved with appeasement, which have so often been a focus for analysis, lead to the broader questions of why war broke out in 1939 and whether it could have been prevented. Keith Eubank, a diplomatic historian from the City University of New York, takes a balanced approach in attempting to answer these questions.

Consider: Whether anything might have prevented war; how Kennan would react to Eubank's interpretation; the extent to which World War II was a direct consequence of the ideas and doctrines of nazism rather than of political and diplomatic developments of the 1930s.

The war that came to Europe in 1939 came because the only alternative for Hitler - when faced with a country that would not succumb to threats - was war. Hitler had promised to restore Germany to its rightful place in the world. Poland had received German territory through the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, Hitler could not back down from Poland; he had to proceed with his objectives, and the only thing that would be able to alter his course would be war.

Many political commentators since 1939 have claimed that, if nations had acted earlier, there would have been no war. If the League had fought Japan over Manchuria, they claim, or if the League had defended Ethiopia, in 1935, or if France and Britain had invaded the Rhineland in 1936, then Hitler could not have attacked Poland. But it would have been impossible for Britain and France to have entered any kind of war -offensive or defensive, small-scale or large-scale -before 1939, because neither the people nor the governments of the two countries were conditioned to the idea of war. The only way they could accept war after 1918 was for it to be thrust upon them by a series of crises, such as those that finally culminated in the German invasion of Poland. Arguments over when and where Hitler should have been halted, then, are purely academic, because before September 1, 1939 Hitler had done nothing that any major power considered dangerous enough to warrant precipitating a major European war.

Nor was there any existing coalition that could have opposed Hitler's massive forces. For Britain sought to appease Hitler, the French feared a repetition of the bloody sacrifices of 1914-1918, Stalin wanted an agreement with Hitler on partitioning Europe, and the United States rejected all responsibility for Europe. Peace would have been possible in 1939 only if there had existed a great military alliance, including both France and Britain, but headed by the United States and the Soviet Union, that was prepared to defend the governments of eastern Europe. But, until Hitler would force them into an alliance, capitalism and communism were prevented from cooperating to oppose nazism by their ideological differences, jealousies, suspicions, and power politics.

Origins of the Cold War

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

The period between the end of World War II and the mid-1960s was marked by the Cold War between the two superpowers emerging from World War II, the United States and the U.S.S.R. Initially American historians analyzed the Cold War with assumptions not too different from policymakers: The United States was only responding defensively to an aggressive Soviet Union intent on spreading its control and communist ideology over the world. But by the 1960s other interpretations were being offered, most notably a revisionist position holding the Cold War to be at least in part a result of an aggressive, provocative American foreign policy. The following is a selection from one of the most influential interpretations o the Cold War, presented in 1967 by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a modern American historian from the City University of New York and former adviser to President Kennedy. Here Schlesinger combines elements of both the orthodox and revisionist interpretations.

Consider: Whether the Cold War was inevitable or could have been avoided; how the speeches by Truman and Marshall support this position.

The Cold War had now begun. It was the product not of a decision but of a dilemma. Each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of the peace. Each then felt compelled to undertake defensive measures. Thus the Russians saw no choice but to consolidate their security in Eastern Europe. The Americans, regarding Eastern Europe as the first step toward Western Europe, responded by asserting, their interest in the zone the Russians deemed vital to their security. The Russians concluded that the West was resuming its old course of capitalist encirclement; that it was purposefully laying the foundation for anti-Soviet r6gimes in the area defined by the blood of centuries as crucial to Russian survival. Each side believed with passion that future international stability depended on the success of its own conception of world order. Each side, in pursuing its own clearly indicated and deeply cherished principles, was only confirming the fear of the other that it was bent on aggression.

Very soon the process began to acquire a cumulative momentum. The impending collapse of Germany thus provoked new troubles: the Russians, for example, sincerely feared that the West was planning a separate surrender of the German armies in Italy in a way which would release troops for Hitler's eastern front, as they subsequently feared that the Nazis might succeed in surrendering Berlin to the West. This was the context in which the atomic bomb now appeared. Though the revisionist argument that Truman dropped the bomb less to defeat Japan than to intimidate Russia is not convincing, this thought unquestionably appealed to some in Washington as at least an advantageous side-effect of Hiroshima.

So the machinery of suspicion and counter-suspicion, action and counteraction, was set in motion.

The Cold War:

The Communist Perspective

B. N. Ponomaryov

The Cold War and indeed modern history are interpreted differently in the Soviet Union. While it is sometimes tempting for Americans to pass off such interpretations as pure propaganda, it must be recognized that perceptions differ greatly in the communist and capitalist worlds; indeed, Communists argue that most American historians are tainted by capitalist ideology and propaganda. The following excerpt is taken from History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1960), an official publication of the Soviet government. Here the focus is on the end of World War II and the early Cold War period.

Consider: The elements of this interpretation most likely to be accepted by Western non-Marxist historians; how this interpretation differs from the perceptions of Truman, Marshall, and Schlesinger, and how these differences help explain the existence of the Cold War.

The Soviet Union played the decisive role in the victorious conclusion of the second world war, and above all in the annihilation of the most dangerous hotbed of fascism and aggression - Hitler's Germany. The Soviet people bore the brunt of the most terrible war against fascist Germany and her accomplices. In grim battles against their enemies, the Soviet people victoriously defended their Socialist achievements, the most progressive social and political system, and the freedom and independence of the U.S.S.R., and strengthened the security of their State frontiers.  By their heroic war effort the Soviet people saved the peoples of Europe from the yoke of German imperialism. The Red Army, assisted by the peoples of Europe, expelled the German fascist invaders from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Austria, Denmark and northern Norway, fulfilling with honour its liberating mission.  The second world war aggravated the general crisis of capitalism. This was most strikingly manifested in the weakening of the world capitalist system, which suffered a serious blow from the break-away of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. By smashing German fascism, which represented the interests of the most reactionary and aggressive imperialism, the Red Army helped the German people as well. The foundation was laid for the establishment of a peaceloving German Democratic Republic. The defeat of the Japanese imperialists and the liberation of China from the Japanese invaders paved the way for the victory of the people's revolution and people's democratic system in China, North Korea and Vietnam. . . .

The main foreign policy aim of the Party was to secure a stable and lasting peace, to strengthen Socialism's positions in the world arena, to help the nations that had broken away from capitalism to build a new life. One of the most significant features of the international situation was the radical change that had taken place in the balance of forces in the world arena, in favour of Socialism and to the detriment of capitalism. . . . As a result of the war the capitalist system sustained enormous losses and became weaker. The second stage of the general crisis of capitalism set in, manifesting itself chiefly in a new wave of revolutions. Albania, Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia broke away from the system of capitalism. The revolutions in these countries were governed by the general laws of development, yet they had their specific features, engendered by different social and economic conditions. The people's governments established in these countries carried out a number of important democratic reforms: the people acquired extensive democratic rights and liberties, an agrarian reform was carried out in the countryside, landlord property rights, where they existed, were abolished, and the peasants were given land.

As democratic measures were pushed to their conclusion, the working class in these countries passed to Socialist changes in political and economic life. The new people's governments everywhere confiscated the property of the German and Italian imperialists and of the people who had collaborated with the enemy. The bourgeois elements were smashed in a bitter class struggle. The question of power was thus settled. The dictatorship of the proletariat, in the form of people's democratic republic, triumphed in the countries of Central and South-East Europe. Industry, the banks and transport were nationalised. The economy began to develop along the Socialist path. . . .

In their relations with the People's Democracies the Communist Party and the Soviet Government strictly adhered to the principle of noninterference in their internal affairs. The U.S.S.R. recognised the people's governments in these States and supported them politically. True to its internationalist duty, the U.S.S.R. came to the aid of the People's Democracies with grain, seed and raw materials, although its own stocks had been badly depleted during the war. This helped to provide the population with foodstuffs and also to speed up the recommissioning of many industrial enterprises. The presence of the Soviet armed forces in the People's Democracies prevented domestic counter-revolution from unleashing a civil war and averted intervention. The Soviet Union paralysed the attempts of the foreign imperialists to interfere in the internal affairs of the democratic States. Major breaches were made in the imperialist chain in Asia too. After years of armed struggle against the landlords, the compradore bourgeoisie and foreign imperialists, the Chinese people, headed by the working class and under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the Kuomintang government and took power into their hands. The People's Republic of China was established in October, 1949, on the basis of the alliance of the workers and peasants with the working class playing the leading role. The bourgeois democratic revolution developed into a Socialist revolution. The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat opened the way to the Socialist development of China. . . . The U.S.A. decided to take advantage of the economic and political difficulties in the other leading capitalist countries and bring them under its sway. Under the pretext of economic aid the U.S.A. began to infiltrate into their economy and interfere in their internal affairs. Such big capitalist countries as Japan, West Germany, Italy, France and Britain all became dependent on the U.S.A. to a greater or lesser degree. The people of Western Europe were confronted with the task of defending their national sovereignty against the encroachments of American imperialism. . . .

The capitalist world headed by the U.S.A. turned with all its strength to the task of reinforcing its weakened links and retaining them in the system of imperialism. To suppress the revolutionary movement it resorted to armed force, economic pressure and direct interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In 1947-1949, the combined forces of international reaction crushed the popular movement in Greece and dealt heavy blows to the liberation struggle waged by the working people of Italy, France and other countries. The monopoly capitalists of the U.S.A., France, Italy and Britain embarked on a large-scale political offensive, with the object of destroying democracy and crushing the working-class movement in their countries. A crusade was organised against the forces of democracy, fascist tendencies in political life became more pronounced and there began the unbridled persecution of Communists. The attacks of the fascist and semi-fascist forces, however, were in the main beaten off and the proletariat retained its most important positions. In some countries the Communists preserved their influence among the masses, in others they even extended it. The strike movement grew in scope and became more militant. The proletariat became better organised and politically more conscious.

The radical changes that took place after the second world war substantially altered the political map of the world. There emerged two main world social and political camps: the Socialist and democratic camp, and the imperialist and anti-democratic camp. . . . The ruling circles of the U.S.A., striving for world supremacy, openly declared that they could achieve their aims only from "positions of strength." The American imperialists unleashed the so-called cold war, and sought to kindle the flames of a third world war. In 1949, the U.S.A. set up an aggressive military bloc known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As early as 1946, the Western States began to pursue a policy of splitting Germany, which was essentially completed in 1949 with the creation of a West German State. Subsequently they set out to militarise West Germany. This further deepened the division of Germany and made her reunification exceptionally difficult. A dangerous hotbed of war began to form in Europe. In the Far East the United States strove to create a hotbed of war in Japan, stationing its armed forces and building military bases on her territory.

In 1950, the United States resorted to open aggression in the Far East. It occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan, provoked an armed clash between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and South Korea and began an aggressive war against the Korean people. The war in Korea was a threat to the People's Republic of China, and Chinese people's volunteers came to the assistance of the Korean people.

The military adventure of the U.S.A. in Korea sharply aggravated international tension. The U.S.A. started a frantic arms drive and stepped up the production of atomic, thermonuclear, bacteriological and other types of weapons of mass annihilation. American military bases, spearheaded primarily against the U.S.S.R., China and the other Socialist countries, were hastily built at various points of the capitalist world. Military blocs were rapidly knocked together. The threat of a third world war with the use of mass destruction weapons increased considerably.

Patterns in West European Integration

Donald J. Puchala

Since World War II there have been various moves toward internationalism. One was the formation of the United Nations. A second was the formation of alliances on opposing sides of the Cold War. A third has been regional cooperation and integration in different parts of the world. One of the most striking examples of regional cooperation and integration has been in Western Europe. It was initiated by the formation of the European Steel and Coal Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community (Common Market) in 1958. It has continued to grow. In the following selection Donald J. Puchala, a political scientist from Columbia University, analyzes,the extent and significance of Western European integration.

Consider: Why there was such strong movement toward integration in Western Europe during this period; how this movement toward integration was related to the Cold War; the prospects for further European integration.

A review of the postwar history of Western Europe makes one immediately aware that a great deal of a political, economic, social and psychological nature has happened in the course of the last two decades' relations among Frenchmen, West Germans, Italians, Belgians, Dutchmen, Luxembourgers and others. Furthermore, almost all of 'what has happened' has had something to do with international integration on the Continent.

First, the great powers of Western Europe, France and West Germany most notably, have ceased preparing for war against one another. We now tend to take the new West European security community for granted. But our nonchalance must not blur the fact that the emergence of a 'no war' community on the Continent between 1945 and 1955 was an historically momentous occurrence.

Second, aspects of the national sovereignty and governmental prerogative of several Western European states have been voluntarily transferred to regional policy-making bodies. Over several years these international organizations and supranational institutions have grown in stature in the estimations of European elites. They have found popularity among mass populations. In addition, they have been accorded legitimacy by almost all political strata. Not least important, international and supranational bodies have moved toward expanded functions and jurisdictions.

Third, political transnationality in Western Europe has been increasingly evidenced in the structure and functioning of parties, interest groups and other lobbying organizations. Regional 'umbrella' organizations. established to inject specialized points of view into policy making in the European Economic Community, are the best known transnational groups. But these conspicuous lobbies are really only a small fraction of the total number of newly formed regional associations within which West Europeans of different nationalities share, explore and jointly promote a seemingly unlimited range of political, economic, social and cultural interests.

Fourth, gross transaction flows among Western European countries have both increased greatly in volume and expanded notably in range during the postwar era. West Europeans in the postwar era have been paying a great deal more attention to one another than ever before in history. . . .

Fifth, by almost any attitudinal measure, the twenty-five years since World War 11 have been a period of fairly dramatic social -psychological change at all levels of Western European societies. National identifications have not altered very much. But, in interesting fashion they have been supplemented by regional identifications. Or, less emphatically phrased, persisting national identifications have not greatly hindered the growth of sympathies for regional integration schemes, nor have they much interfered with federative drives. More than this, and perhaps more significant, West European peoples' feelings about each other have been changing, and most of these shifts in attitude have been in positive directions from enmity to amity and from suspicion to trust.

Sixth, all of the positive features of postwar intra-European relations among governments and peoples must not hide the fact that newspapers published over the years between 1945 and 1970 were cluttered with descriptions of diplomatic crises, debates, confrontations and impasses among West European governments. Several integration schemes failed. Some are failing at present. Conflict has been as conspicuous along the pathway to integration as cooperation has. Whether we choose to use the term 'high politics' or not is a matter of semantic choice. But what we cannot ignore is that certain political issues have continually divided, and continue to divide, West European governments and peoples along strictly national lines. Intermittent crises have been part of European integration.

The Positive Role of the United Nations in a

Split World

Dag Hammarskid1d

One of the most idealistic institutions stemming from World War II was the United Nations, formed by agreement of the major powers in 1945 and eventually including most nations of the world. Its primary purpose is to preserve peace, which has become even more pressing with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But despite some successes, the United Nations has come under attack for favoring policies in opposition to a perceived national interest and for being unable to take effective action when armed conflicts broke out. In the following selection Dag Hammarshold, secretary general of the United Nations from 1953 to 1961, analyzes and defends the position and actions of the U.N.

Consider: Why, according to Hammarski6ld, the U.N. has been unable to resolve many major international problems; how one might respond to this argument; whether policies such as those enunciated by Truman and Marshall support or conflict with the goals and e rts of the U.N.

With its constitution and structure, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations to exercise an influence on problems which are clearly and definitely within the orbit of present-day conflicts between power blocs. If a specific conflict is within that orbit, it can be assumed that the Security Council is rendered inactive, and it may be feared that even positions taken by the General Assembly would follow lines strongly influenced by considerations only indirectly related to the concrete difficulty under consideration. Whatever the attitude of the General Assembly and the Security Council, it is in such cases also practically impossible for the Secretary- General to operate effectively with the means put at his disposal, short of risking seriously to impair the usefulness of his office for the Organization in all the other cases for which the services of the United Nations Secretariat are needed.

This clearly defines the main field of useful activity of the United Nations in its efforts to prevent conflicts or to solve conflicts. Those efforts must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences. Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences, the United Nations should seek to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localization. In doing so, the Organization and its agents have to lay down a policy line, but this will then not be for one party against another, but for the general purpose of avoiding an extension or achieving a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrate. . . .

Those who look with impatience at present-day efforts by the United Nations to resolve major international problems are inclined to neglect, or to misread, the significance of the efforts which can be made by the United Nations in the field of practical politics in order to guide the international community in a direction of growing stability. They see the incapacity of the United Nations to resolve the major bloc conflicts as an argument against the very form of international cooperation which the Organization represents. In doing so, they forget what the Organization has achieved and can achieve, through its activities regarding conflicts which are initially only on the margin of, or outside, the bloc conflicts, but which, unless solved or localized, might widen the bloc conflicts and seriously aggravate them. Thus the Organization in fact also exercises a most important, though indirect, influence on the conflicts between the power blocs by preventing the widening of the geographical and political area covered by these conflicts and by providing for solutions whenever the interests of all parties in a localization of conflict can be mobilized in favor of its efforts.

Chapter Questions on WWII and Post-War World

1.    To what extent do the trends described in this chapter give further support to the argument that Western civilization has been on the decline since World War I in comparison to the heights it reached in the nineteenth century? What developments might be cited to refute this argument?

2.    How might one make an argument that the fundamental historical shift in the last two hundred years did not come with World War I but rather with World War 11, as indicated by the consequences of that war and the developments of the postwar period?

3.    Do you think the Cold War was caused primarily by developments related to World War II or by the ideological differences between communist and noncommunist countries? Were there any ways in which the Cold War might have been averted?