Interventionism 1945-1963: A Profile

Since the turn of the century, the United States has embraced many various and diverse foreign policies. Almost all of them, regardless of label, can be separated into two different, conflicting schools of thought: interventionism and isolationism.
Isolationism stands on the theory that the United States should take no actions to interfere or alter the political or social climate of other nations. It goes so far as to say that we should not get involved with other nations other than in defense of our homeland borders, suggesting that America should be self-sufficient and unconcerned with the rest of the world. Initially, the concept was largely one of pure neutrality, allowing for free trade across the globe. It would later become a theory calling for complete and total removal of the United States from the world arena, standing alone and staying alone. This theory is largely founded in xenophobia, the fear that the other nations of the world and our involvement with them will do nothing but cause harm to the American way of life.
Interventionism, on the other hand, is founded on the principle of directly intervening in the affairs of other nations. Essentially, since the United States views itself as the most decent and proper way of living and governing, we should take strides to ensure that others lean in the same direction. This theory stems largely from the ethnocentric idea that other countries are incapable of handling their affairs or of acting in a proper and just fashion. Both schools of thought have their pros and cons, and both have held the popular support of vast amounts of the population in the past century. How can the United States be a part of the world community if we adhere to either, choosing to intervene on every issue slightly contrary to our way of thinking or completely and totally deny relations with any and all foreign powers? To come closer to a compromise of two valid but flawed political ideologies, the United States should embrace a foreign policy of selective interventionism.
This argument and fluctuation in American society and foreign policy has played a drastic and powerful role in the course of the history of not only the United States, but also of the entire world in the 20th century. This paper will include a summary of the events and policies prior to and during the Cold War that led up to the consistent policies of interventionism between 1946 and the 1960s. Some of the key players for and against will be described, as well as various policies that were tied to some of these influential figures. Some statistics from the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict will be provided to demonstrate the cost to the US for their involvement.
In the late 19th century, Theodore Roosevelt took the first strides towards forming a basis for interventionist policies. Prior to this, the United States had been a largely non-interventionist state, preferring to focus on domestic affairs and paying attention to economic policies abroad. Roosevelt’s practices were initiated by economic reasons, but his “gunboat diplomacy” was one dramatic example of pre-emptive interventionism. Roosevelt mandated that the American continents were to be left alone by the powers of the rest of the world, and that wayward nations within this sphere of influence would be brought into line through military force.
Until the middle of the 1910s, there was little need for any active intervention on the part of the United States, and the public opinion once again returned its focus to domestic policies. When World War I started, Americans tried to ignore it, hoping neutrality would leave economic trade unaffected. It wasn’t until complications with Germany led to US ships being sunk; the American public was outraged. After the losses of the First World War, sentiment returned to isolationism, bolstered by extreme nationalistic paranoia. Public outrage created a paranoid, sometimes violent era known as the Red Scare. Widespread deportations and legislation forced America into an isolationist role. The Red Scare diminished, but within a decade Americans were finding new reasons to close the borders and shun the outside world.
The Great Depression was devastating, and American once again turned its focus inward. When the economy was stabilizing, war broke out in Europe. The US, again, hoped that neutrality would keep the problems in Europe. But in December of 1941, as it had 1914, the problems in Europe hit home when Japanese pilots bombed the naval base at Pearl Harbor. America dived into the war. This time, Americans would not regret their involvement in such a violent affair. The moral issues of the war forever altered the popular view of interventionism, giving Americans the idea that they had to intervene in a timely fashion for moral reasons.
The Cold War would prove to be the greatest example of interventionism triumphing over isolationism. The looming menace of communism and the threat of the Soviet Union influenced every foreign policy the United States adopted. The impact of each major conflict during the Cold War will be weighed later. In the early years, the main conflict surrounded the Soviet policies in East Berlin, but the separation of the nation into spheres of influence and the threat of all-out war so soon after the costly World War kept this conflict a purely philosophical one. When it seemed Greece and Turkey would fall under Communist influence when Britain could no longer sustain them, Congress gave aid to Turkey and Greece. In 1948, Congress passed the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, sending relief funds into Western Europe. This strategy helped stabilize the nations of Western Europe and created and influx of business for the US. Meanwhile, America worked to liberate nations in what came to be known as the third world. They practiced a policy of self-determination, no longer seeking conquest or economic control, but installing governments that were friendly.
The fall of China to Communism in 1949 was viewed as a failure to stem the tide of communism; politicians vowed never again to let a nation fall. The threat of Communism and the policies of containment were so important that logistics and reality made little impact on decisions.
Negotiations between Red China and the new Taiwanese Nationalist government were overshadowed in 1950 when war broke out between the Communist government of North Korea and the Republic of Korea. Neither the US nor the Soviet Union had troops stationed in their respective friendly Korea. The Communist government of North Korea has simply decided to invade South Korea, and had sent 90,000 troops across the border at the 38th parallel. Truman felt significant responsibility to intervene when he learned of the defeats suffered by the ROK forces on June 26, 1950:

"There was no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed help at once if it was not to be overrun. More seriously, a communist success in Korea would put Red troops and planes within easy striking distance of Japan, and Okinawa and Formosa would be open to attack from two sides." (qtd. in Leckie, 53)

The US, via the United Nations, jumped into the fray, but widespread sentiments decried the war, which was finally settled in 1953, the borders almost exactly the same as they were three years earlier.
Stemming further back, the conflict in Vietnam was started in 1945 when the Vietminh declared Vietnam independent from France. This war for freedom rages for nearly a decade. Vietnam freed itself from French control in 1954, although this should have been no easy task. French forces in Vietnam were well prepared and well-equipped and had nearly even numbers. Gary Donaldson estimated that at the start of the clash in 1947, French troops numbered at nearly 100,000, while the Vietminh had about 150,000. These numbers were offset by the lack of modern technologies, since the Vietminh had less than 1,000 automatic weapons, 50 pieces of artillery, and 150 mortars (78).
Elections were planned for 1956 to unite the two separate nations under one democratically elected official. The US promised to accept the results of the election, but in 1956 they ignored it, providing weapons and training for the friendly faction in Vietnam and sending CIA operatives to destabilize the Vietminh covertly.
During the 1950s, the US government had supported a change in control in Cuba, supporting the revolution led by Fidel Castro. Soon after coming into power, Castro severed all ties with the United States and became more open about his socialist leanings. In 1961, a coup led by troops trained and funded by the US attempted to wrest control from Castro failed massively in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. According to John Blight, the relations between Castro’s government and America were at least indirectly responsible for the alliance between Cuba and the USSR, which was unlikely before (2). The end of insurgence by the US led the USSR to view the US as weak, willing to accept an enemy so close to their borders because of world opinions. Missile launch sites were soon constructed on Cuban soil with help from the USSR, which led to a blockade of Cuba by the US. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a special assistant to President John F. Kennedy who was the liaison with the exiled Cuban leadership during the Bay of Pigs crisis explained Kennedy’s attitude towards Communism:

"There was an overreaction in the Kennedy administration to the Kruschev speech of January 1961. Kruschev made a speech a fortnight before Kennedy’s inauguration. He predicted the irresistible victory for communism as a result of wars of national liberation in the Third World." (qtd. in Blight, 63)

At the same time, the US demanded for disarmament of the already-constructed launch sites. The USSR backed down from military conflict, but the stage was set for difficulties in the future as the USSR becomes aware that the US is not only unfriendly to their government, but actively seeking to stop the spread of Russia’s influence and communism worldwide.
Now that we have seen the various events that were caused by interventionist thinking after World War II, and understand some of the historical events that led to the interventionist policies of the Cold War, some of the notable figures should be mentioned, as well. We have already discussed Theodore Roosevelt’s policies of “gunboat diplomacy,” now we should look at some of the policy makers who adopted his ideas and refined them into the new interventionism.
After the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson (1912-1920) had realized that America could not remain solely isolated. He had participated in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and hoped to bring the United States into the League of Nations that his vision had created. However, he faced strong opposition from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, who placed so many reservations on the Congressional bill to ratify that treaty that the United States never managed to join the League of Nations.
President Warren G. Harding (1920-1923) attempted to remove American from the world forum as much as possible. He passed laws restricting immigration, raised tariffs, enacted price supports of agriculture, and refused to aid Europe in the devastation following the war. Instead, Harding demanded payment of loans given during the war. He did take steps to ensure peaceful neutrality, though, completing treaties with the Triple Entente to remove America from oversight. Hoping to maintain peace without joining the League of Nations, he brought Britain, France, Japan, and Italy together at the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921, attempting to restrict naval power across the globe.
George F. Kennan, a career diplomat, wrote a memo (later published under the pseudonym Mr. X) in 1946, predicting the inevitable attempts by Russia to spread communism. He predicted that they would retreat if met with resistance from other nations, and called for a plan of containment, meeting any force from Russia with counterforce, causing them to “face frustration indefinitely” (Kennan). This policy was already the trend in the government, but he defined it and set down lengthy observation first hand as credibility to his theories.
Another major advocate of interventionism was President Harry S Truman (1945-1952), who set before Congress his domino theory that if one pertinent nation fell to communism, it would drag its neighbors along with it. This led to the creation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which called not only for the fight against communism, but to step up to a new moral obligation:

"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." (Shaver)

In 1949, Truman laid out his Point IV Program, intended to give technical aid to third world nations, and aided the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, intended to counter the Soviet threat in Western Europe.
After Truman, President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1952-1960) followed his predecessors’ footsteps of interventionist policies. In 1953, he used the CIA to stage coups and overthrow unfriendly governments in Guatemala and Iran. He also played a major role in the development of the problems that would come to a head as the Vietnam Conflict. In his attempts to keep communism out of Asia, Eisenhower helped form the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization after the fall of Vietnam from French control to Vietminh control in 1954. Before the internationally endorsed election of 1956 that was intended to unite North and South Vietnam by democratically selecting one ruling body, Eisenhower revived Truman’s domino theory to stir support in Congress (Rhodes).
Now that we know the background, events, and people involved in the various aspects of American interventionism after the Second World War, we should look at specific sides of the debate for and against interventionism. The major controversy was voiced by early isolationists like Hiram Johnson and Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., who argued that getting embroiled in foreign affairs would remove the US’ ability to decide what we became involved with and would only lead to the same devastations they had seen in previous efforts. With the growing importance of international treaties, it became clear that enjoining in foreign politics would draw the US into wars unrelated to domestic circumstances. A major factor in this criticism was the drain on resources that would be caused by containment and interventionism, as the US jumped into every minor fray around the globe with troops and funds. They questioned why money, equipment, and human life should be wasted in defense of other nations.
Others argued that the reasons for intervention were not as noble as the government might have indicated. They cited the capitalistic goals behind many major conflicts, and the imposition of American ideals and policies on foreign nations. They claimed that the real American goal was not the containment of communism, but the spread of American democracy. To these critics, this didn’t mean protecting the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but protecting American rights to resources, labor, and trade. While these things might not be bad for anyone involved, they asserted that the US had no right to intervene in the internal politics of foreign nations to ensure we would be able to maintain amicable trade agreements.
Still others, in support of containment and intervention, truly believed that every country should have the right to democratic processes and justice. They argued that communism was little more than a brutal dictatorship, something that was antithetical to the moralistic concepts that stood as the basis for the American system of government. It was the aggressive nature of communism that concerned these people. They believed that the active attempt to subvert governments all over the world to their way of thinking through propaganda and military force was unacceptable. Communism was seen as an empire of evil, seeking to cover the entire globe through taking advantage of economic turmoil in crippled nations. The goal, many asserted, was to provide people the right to democracy and let them choose which political party they supported.
While the moral debate raged on, the statistics from just two of the major conflicts reveal a great deal about the cost to the US to maintain containment. In Vietnam, the US was supporting France’s efforts to maintain their hold on the rebellious colony with constantly growing funding. In 1947, the US provided $160,000,000 to the war effort. In 1951, $450,000,000 was sent, paying 40% of the total cost to France to fight to maintain its colony. At the end of the Korean War in 1953, the US sent $785,000,000 to aid the French troops in Vietnam (Donaldson, 78). Between 1955 and 1961, the United States funneled over $1 billion to the South Vietnamese army. Clearly, the US was interested in keeping Vietnam out of the hands of the Vietminh, even before troops landed. But there was no significant loss of US life by the end of 1960. The statistics of the Korean War tell a different story, however.
Between both sides fighting from 1950 to 1953, a total of approximately 2,415,601 people died fighting in Korea. Of those, 5.6% were US troops, totaling 136,528 lives lost. The total loss of lives of UN forces (excluding the Republic of Korea) was only 6.3% of those 2.4 million casualties (Leckie, 429). Clearly, the US push to get the UN involved may have stopped communism from spreading into South Korea, but it cost 150,000 lives. After only two days of battle between the Republic of Korea and the North Korean army, the war was largely settled. It was clear that the initial push of 90,000 troops across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 was likely to completely conquer the Republic of Korea. Without the intervention of the United Nations, it is obvious that only a most minute fraction of that toll would have died in the battle for Korea.
Weighing all of these arguments and the evidence regarding the various issues over which the United States intervened between 1945 and 1961, it seems clear that the United States should embrace a practice of selective interventionism. Instead of being drawn into every conflict across the globe that could impact us in the slightest, whether economically or philosophically, each situation should be analyzed and assessed to meet certain criteria. Certainly it is true that the United States should have intervened earlier during the Second World War. The amount of lives which may have been spared is hard to calculate, but it could easily be numbered in the millions. The Cold War, however, was fought over differences in political ideology and based largely on a faulty theoretical model. In many instances, governments were assaulted for nothing more than having political opinions that differed with the United States, as in the cases of the CIA operations of 1954 in Guatemala and Iran. There was no great ethical reason to enter into war with Korea or Vietnam. Each nation was attempting to shape its own fate and identity. The very notion runs counter to the things which formed this country. When a people feel they are oppressed, it is their right to attempt to bring about a more favorable form of government. If a people are incapable of bringing about change from within, organizations like the United Nations exist to provide aid. An individual nation dictating global policy defeats the most basic ideas behind entities such as the United Nations.
The evidence provided must be evaluated somewhat critically, however. Most sources of information on the factors behind the Cold War have been written by scholars living in the Western Hemisphere, whether it is the Americas or Europe, so some truths may be veiled or skewed based on their own inherent perceptions of the reality of the conflict between the two superpowers. The raw statistics can provide a great deal of insight, though, when logic is applied. Throughout the course of the Cold War, the United States funneled billions of dollars into interests outside of our borders, as well as a varying supply of manpower in the form of troops, equipment, and training. How many lives might have been spared had the United States been more selective about where they intervened? How much sooner might the various conflicts have been resolved internally?
In the case of the Vietnam Conflict, we are faced with the idea that 21 years of violent conflict might have been averted had the election of 1956 been unhindered by US aggression. In Korea, a civil war that became a three year struggle for the supremacy of American democracy versus Russian/Chinese communism resulted in a prolific loss of life and little real change to the borders of the two countries. In Cuba, the United States nearly faced nuclear devastation, endangering the entirety of the world’s population with guaranteed destruction if one missile had been fired thanks to the tripling of America’s nuclear arsenal between 1958 and 1960. If, instead, the United States had never intervened in internal Cuban politics, Fidel Castro would likely not have come into power, nor would he have had so much reason to stand against the United States. That very sequence of events forever damaged any hopes for peaceful coexistence between the two superpowers, as it proved that both operated antithetically to the others’ ideals.
Looking at all of these factors, it becomes clear that intervention should be measured and evaluated very carefully before any active steps are taken to impede the natural course of another nation’s evolution. If the factors contributing to US intervention have no real basis in the protection of human rights or the defense of innocents against abusive governments or regimes, then there could be little reasons to intervene. While it might seem that some nations act in an irrational or unfriendly way, the answer to unfavorable trade or differences in political opinions is not military force or covert attempts to overthrow governments. The answer, instead, is to build the bridges of diplomacy and international friendship. The world will always be faced with nations that are aggressive, but it is no single nation’s duty or moral obligation to intervene on every front that springs up between two unsatisfied neighbors.