The history of the 20th century has been dominated by the conflict between two competing economic and social structures: capitalism and socialism. This conflict was played out intensely during a period referred to as the cold war. The Cold War was a power struggle rooted in the ideological differences between the two global superpowers of the United States and the United Soviet Socialist Republics.
After World War II a great division was created throughout Europe between pro-U.S. NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact Socialist nations of the East that sided with the USSR. Membership in each of these organizations created a certain amount of conformity in the internal and external policies of these nations to the will of the superpowers that dominated them. Within the Warsaw Pact nations hegemony with Soviet policies was enforced through the intimidating presence of the Red Army. By entering into the Warsaw Pact, the countries of Eastern Europe agreed to "officially limiting their scope of independent action, and legalizing the presence (and hence the political influence) of the Soviet troops stationed on their territory." (1) Adherence to the strict dictates of the Soviet Communist Party were demanded within the Socialist Programs of these Warsaw Pact satellite states. The economies and internal structures of these socialist states were severely retarded as they were prevented from following their own independent "path to socialism". Pursuit of a socialist program seperate from Moscow warranted intervention by the Soviets through military and economic resources.
In 1968 a new leader named Alexander Dubcek rose to power in Czechoslovakia to replace a hardline neo-Stalinist named Novotny. Dubcek and his comrades started pursuing a path of reform and democratization seperate from Moscow. This new Czech path developed in their Action Program was seen as a threat by hardliners in Moscow and leaders throughout the Warsaw Pact nations. In August of 1968 an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops occurred. This invasion sent shocks throughout Europe, the world, and crushed the aspirations of reform communists throughout the International community.
The Rise of Dubcek and the "Action Program"
Under the leadership of Dubcek's predecessor Novotny, Czechoslovakia suffered a considerable stagnation in economic growth and considerable criticism from the intellectual community. In October of 1967 the Czechoslovak Party's Central Committee advocated the establishment of economic reforms and for the separation of the party from the state. This position was directly opposed by Novotny who advocated a hard-line Stalinist model for economic planing and party control of the state. Intimidated by his opposition, Novotny called upon the Soviet leader Brezhnev to intervene in the growing dissident undercurrent of the Czech party. Upon consulting with members of the Presidium Brezhnev determined that Novotny's support was too weak and that he needed to be replaced. In January of 1968 the Central Committee voted to relieve Novotny of his position as Party Secretary and elected Dubcek as his successor.(2)
Under the leadership of Dubcek the liberal reform communists were able to begin a reform process of creating "socialism with a human face". The new reforms were laid out and published in The Action Program during April of 1968. The reformers of the Communist party believed in impeding the people's disillusions with communism by advocating plurality and dynamic economic prosperity towards the goal of a successful socialist nation. The Action Program laid out the foundations for creating a new Socialist structure involving political plurality, assurance of civil liberties, and massive economic reforms including the creation of a small private sector. These reforms were focused on creating a new dedication to democracy and freedom for the Czech and Slovak people through a "democratic socialist" system.
Hardline Hostility to Reform
The reforms initiated by Dubcek and his allies were met with resentment and hostility by the hardline leaders of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. This resentment was based in the general disagreement between hardliners and reformers. The hardliners believed that in order to preserve the socialist system repressive measures needed to be followed to secure the power of the Communist party. The communist reformers rejected the Stalinist systems of rigid control and advocated liberal reforms in order to preserve socialism and increase the system's prosperity. These hardline communist leaders believed that Dubcek's reforms were going too far and were presenting a direct threat to their internal and external security. Their biggest fear was that these party initiated reforms would unleash a spontaneous civic movement against communism.(3) In March of 1968 leaders of the Warsaw Pact (minus Romania's President Ceausescu) met in Dresden to express their concerns over the internal development of Czechoslovakia. In July of 1968 these leaders drafted a letter to the Czech Central Committee attacking their reform process as threatening the "liquidation of socialist democracy and the socialist system."(4) Within this letter the leaders expressed their support of limited reform in Czechoslovakia but expressed their deep concern over the possibilities of the Czech system being undermined by counter revolutionaries if the party relinquished its monopoly on power.
Dubcek reacted to these concerns by publicly addressing the Czechoslovakian commitment to socialism and the Warsaw Pact. Dubcek and the reformers argued that their program would strengthen the Socialist system in Czechoslovakia. Zdenek Mlynar, a policy drafter for the party stated that:
"Unless there is a change in the position of the people in the political system, this state of affairs will not change; without an alteration in people's economic relationships (which the new system should be trying to create), an efficient and dynamic socialist economy cannot be created.....And only in this way will people begin to turn their initiative, activity, and talent away from advancing their own private affairs, toward the goal of the social whole, to the search for ways to satisfy their own needs and interests in harmony with the whole development of society...."(5)
Despite Dubcek's good intentions and his reassurances to Moscow and the Warsaw Pact, he achieved very limited success in appeasing tensions and criticism within the East Bloc. The letter issued in Warsaw was to serve as an ultimatum to Dubcek and the Czech reformers. Instead of submitting to the demands of the Kremlin Dubcek held a televised speech on July 18. In his speech Dubcek reaffirmed the party's personal dedication to the reforms of the Action Program and their role as the true servants of the people.
Dubcek was not alone in his struggle against the pragmatic dictatorship proposed by the Soviets and other hardliners. President Ceausescu of Romania, President Tito of Yugoslavia, and the heads of the French and Italian Communist parties openly condemned the threats of military intervention by the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. Ceausescu stated in a speech that, "When the Warsaw Pact was founded it was conceived as an instrument of collective defense. At no point was it visualized that the Warsaw treaty could be used to justify interference in the internal affairs of other countries.... The Romanian Communist Party does not share the view of those alarmed over what is allegedly happening in Czechoslovakia and who would like to intervene to force Czechoslovakia onto a particular socialist road."(6)
Despite the bleak situation, Dubcek attempted to prove his loyalty to the USSR and also defend his reform programs at a meeting with Brezhnev. This meeting took place in a small Slovak town on the Soviet border from July 29th to August 1st. At this meeting Brezhnev attempted to convince Dubcek to dismiss the "liberal" party leaders, reimpose censorship, and to dissolve "reactionary organizations".(7) From these talks Brezhnev assumed that the Czechoslovakian party leaders would follow his decrees according the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and party discipline. When Dubcek returned to Prague he addressed the people and announced that the Soviets had agreed to allow Czechoslovakia to develop it's own path to socialism. These meetings between Brezhnev and Dubcek alleviated some public feelings of insecurity but did not prevent the military intervention of late August.
Intervention Through Military Invasion
On the evening of August 20th Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invaded the territory of Czechoslovakia like a thief in the night to crush the counter-revolutionary liberals, give aid to their comrades, and preserve the future of socialism. The tanks rolled into their peaceful neighbor's sovereign land and stole away the hopes and aspirations of the Czechoslovakian people. The predators slipped into the land by stealth and took strategic positions to greet their periled comrades in the morning. The troops sent into Czechoslovakia had been told that they would be greeted cheerfully by the people as their grand liberators. Due to this grave misunderstanding the troops brought very few rations and supplies. As the troops rolled through the streets of Czechoslovakia they were met with angry citizens who booed and spat at the troops.(8)
The invasion of August 1968 was part of a coup attempt by the reactionary conservative forces in the Czech party led by Alois Indra. Indra and his associates planned on setting up a pro-Soviet "workers and peasants government" that would replace the Dubcek regime after the invasion. The conservative quisling regime was defeated in it's pursuit of power by a secret meeting of the 14th Party Congress. This meeting was held in a factory conference room of a Prague suburb and resulted in a declaration condemning the invasion and the election of a new 160-member Central Committee.
Dubcek had heard news of the invasion late in the night of the 20th but did not believe the news fully. Early in the morning of the 21st a Russian Embassy car arrived at the Central Committee's headquarters leading a caravan of armored vehicles. Soviet KGB officials stormed the office and arrested Dubcek, Smrkovsky, and Kriegel. The party leaders were kidnaped out of the country and taken to a Soviet military unit to be detained.(9)
The invading troops were met with resistance throughout the country. The Czech Army was radically outnumbered by the invading troops and were not able to offer an armed resistance. The Army also faced the problem that they had never planned on an invasion by the Warsaw Pact. All of their defense and communication systems had been set up to battle NATO troops and they were easily rendered useless against the Warsaw invaders. The Czech citizens offered no help to the invading troops when they requested food and water to supplement their dwindling rations. In some areas water had to be transported into the troops by helicopter because the local Czech citizens had turned off the water supplies or spread rumors that the water supply had been poisoned by counter-revolutionaries.
Students and youth offered mass resistance to the invading troops through direct confrontation in the streets. As tank divisions rolled through the streets youth chalked insignias of swastikas in their armor. Other youth hurled bricks and Molotov cocktails at the advancing divisions to try to slow down the invading troops. Slogans of resistance like "Dirty Fascists go home" and "At least Hitler had manners; he declared war before he invaded" appeared on the streets to condemn the invading troops.(10)
The radio and press played a vital role in the resistance of the invading troops. When the troops entered Czechoslovakia they attempted to take control of the radio stations and stop broadcasts by randomly cutting wires. Under a few circumstances the troops cut the wrong wires and unknowingly allowed broadcasting to still proceed. Somehow the press was able to smuggle a taped message from President Svoboda to the people out of his occupied castle and broadcast it throughout Czechoslovakia. In areas like Wenceslas Square the underground press was able to circulate pamphlets and flyers calling for resistance and a national strike to protest the invasion.
President Svoboda played his part in the resistance by refusing to recognize the quisling government of Indra and his conservative comrades. Moscow attempted to pressure President Svoboda into dismissing the kidnaped party leaders and to replace them with a pro-Soviet leadership. President Svoboda rejected the Soviet demands and refused to participate in any further proposed discussions without the presence of Dubcek and his arrested comrades.(11) The talks that proceeded resulted in the tragic end of the Czechoslovakian experiment of "socialism with a human face" and the return of hardline rule to the formerly progressive Czech Socialist nation.
Results of Hardline Intervention
The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was condemned world-wide by both NATO and other Communist nations. The military intervention was a gross violation of the Marxist-Leninist principles of "proletarian internationalism". The official statement of the Soviet Union justified the invasion as an attempt to: 1) prevent the union between Czechoslovakia and West Germany; 2) to preserve and protect the socialist system in Czechoslovakia; 3) and that the invasion occurred at the request of party and state authorities in Czechoslovakia.(12)
Although the invasion in 1968 was a risky move internationally the Soviets knew that there was no reason to fear military reaction from NATO or the United States. Brezhnev knew that the U.S. would not risk war over the issue of Czech independence. At the time the U.S. military was also totally absorbed in its focus on the Vietnam war.
Although the invasion would not provoke a direct physical threat to the Soviets it did have drastically negative ramifications for the Soviets internationally by causing:1) The further disorientation and division of the world communist movement.
2) The weakening of Communist Parties in non-communist countries and the erosion of their electoral support, particularly in France, Italy, and India.
3) The further disorganization and fracturing of the Communist bloc into factional and hostile groupings, particularly in Eastern Europe.
4) The tarnishing of its carefully cultivated image as a mature and responsible global power that exercised its enormous power with consummate self-restraint and prudence.
5)The exposure of its government as a blatant violator of the elemental norms of international law (nonintervention, noninterference, independence, and sovereignty) which Moscow has repeatedly proclaimed before various forums of sacrosanct.
6)The revelation that Russia has little concern for "world public opinion".
7) The threat to a Soviet-American detente by jeopardizing Senate ratification of the non-proliferation treaty and providing Bonn with a credible justification for refusing to accede to it, by arousing and encouraging the hardliners in the United States and risking the revitalization of NATO as well as assuring that there would be little or no withdrawal of United States troops from Europe.
8) The provision of precedent and justification for the intervention of the United States and other great powers in the affairs of smaller states.(13)
The Soviet Intervention in 1968 also resulted in the creation of the Brezhnev doctrine. This doctrine was a significant aspect of Soviet foreign policy up until 1989 when it was revoked by Grobachev. The Brezhnev doctrine stated that it was the right and duty of the Soviet Union to intercede in the internal development s of socialist nations if their comrades were under any threat. This doctrine and the actions of the Soviets in 1968 helped to intimidate Eastern Europe into falling in line with Moscow.
Another lasting affect was the disillusionment of citizens and leaders in communist nations to the prospects of reforming the communist system. The violent suppression of the democratic reforms initiated by loyal party members in Czechoslovakia made people realize that Moscow would not permit nations to develop their own national "path to socialism". This growing disillusionment with the system caused former loyal followers to question the legitimacy of the communist ruling party. The neo-Stalinist actions of Brezhnev and his conservative comrades brought a massive blow to a system that was already founded on unstable support and legitimacy. By invading and deterring the reform process in Czechoslovakia the hardliners prevented the possibilities of creating a vibrant and prosperous nation that could ensure political, social, and economic freedom and democracy for its citizens in the original Marxist humanitarian sense.
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4. Excerpt from The Warsaw Letter of July 1968
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1975. P 120
6. Chapman, Colin. August 21: The Rape of Czechoslovakia. J.B. Lippincott Company: Philadelphia.
1968. P 23
7. Cienciala , Anna. The Rise and Fall of Communist Nations. University of Kansas. 1996.
http://kuhttp.cc.ukans.edu/kansas/cienciala/342/ch7.html
8. Chapman, Colin. August 21: The Rape of Czechoslovakia. J.B. Lippincott Company: Philadelphia.
1968. P 7
9. Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel. The Free Press:
New York City. 1992. P 101
10. Chapman, Colin. August 21: The Rape of Czechoslovakia. J.B. Lippincott Company: Philadelphia.
1968. P 47
11. Laquer, Walter. Europe In Our Time. Penguin Books: New York City. 1992. P 359
12. Cienciala , Anna. The Rise and Fall of Communist Nations. University of Kansas. 1996.
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13. Zartman, William. Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact. New York University Press: New York
City. 1970. P 16-17 *This is a direct Quote from an Essay by Vernon Aspaturin contained within this
collection.