TEMPO, No. 40/II/June 11 - 17, 2002
Cover Story
Neutralizing the Enemies Within
The settlement of problems related to deserters involved in the conflict is very
important for lasting peace in Maluku. Is Commander Djoko up to his job?
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ABUNDLE of intelligence reports has recently arrived at the office of Maluku Governor,
Saleh Latuconsina, also the province's civil emergency ruler. He was surprised and
knitted his brows after browsing their content: an invisible group is involved in the
Ambon conflict. They are strongly suspected to be former members of the military and
the police. Allegedly, they have been actively involved in the conflict in this province
and have masterminded various recent incidents there.
These confidential reports also map out their areas of activities. In simple terms, there
are three groups. Group A, actively working among the Muslim population, comprises
Muslim members of the military and police, deserters and also members of the
security apparatus who have been dismissed. Group B, made up of Christians, has
the same composition of members as Group A and works among Christians.
Groups A and B are comprised of Ambonese local security apparatus members and
ex-members whose family members have become victims in the conflict. Their motive
is plain revenge.
"Their forces are not big but they have a strong influence. The bravado of the Laskar
Jihad militant group is attributable to the support from this Group A," said a TEMPO
source at the governor's office. Laskar Jihad, led by Ustad (Teacher) Ja'far Umar
Thalib, caused a stir in late April when they held a grand religious meeting in Ambon.
Ja'far is now detained at police headquarters in Jakarta.
The third is Group AB, a combination of Muslim and Christian security apparatus
members, "seasonal" deserters and those fired from their military and police units.
They are mercenaries and, according to the TEMPO source, hate Kopassus, the
Army Special Forces with a passion.
These three groups share some things in common. Highly skilled, especially at
shooting, they are death squads that move swiftly and are ready to take on
instruments of the state. They usually move on Sundays, seeking to pit the public
against the military. "In every incident, they wear their battle fatigues," said TEMPO's
source, who regularly monitors the movement of these shadowy troops in Ambon.
Their movement is also being monitored by Pattimura Regional Military Command.
Chief spokesperson of this military command, Maj. Herry Suhardi, said the regional
military command was not unaware of the role played by some security apparatus
members affected by the conflict, especially those indigenous to the area. "Surely,
the commander will not be lax against them," he said, referring to Pattimura Regional
Military Command chief, Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso, also chief of the Security
Restoration Operation Command.
Acts of deterrence have also been taken. In June 2000, for example, the then
Pattimura military chief, I Made Yasa, ordered all troops from Java specially assigned
in Maluku to be withdrawn and report to the quarters for a battle troop battalion. There
was suspicion that some illegal troops were maneuvering in Ambon. Even former
Maluku police chief, Insp. Gen. Firman Gani (now chief of South Sulawesi police)
admitted that these deserters were in action in Ambon. He said that there were about
50 of them but that they were difficult to detect even today.
Even Maj. (Inf) Imam Santosa, chief of the Kopassus battle intelligence detachment in
Maluku, has said that some Kopassus members have deserted. When some
hoodlums claiming to have undergone basic military training and who'd made to act as
informers for the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM) by Kopassus were nabbed, these
"coker"—the local name given to them—mentioned the names of Kopassus members
who'd given them the training.
Santosa, however, denied the existence of these names among his troops. "They
may be deserters who have come to Ambon. Most have come from Java," Imam said.
Regardless of where they have come from, unless they can be brought under control,
they may pose a great danger. Then there are still conflicts involving state security
apparatuses. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, has said the new military
command under the command of Djoko is assigned to synchronize the units in
Maluku.
The latest armed clash between the military (TNI) and the police broke out on May 13
at Kuda Mati, not far from the city of Ambon. Members of the elite forces of the
police—Brimob—and the army—Kopassus—exchanged fire, leading to the arrest of two
Kopassus members and Berty Loupatty, an Ambonese youth claiming to be a
Kopassus infomer. The two army personnel were beaten up by the police. This
incident was believed to have been caused by a misunderstanding on the part of the
two security apparatuses carrying out their respective duties in Ambon.
That the military does not go along with the police is a frequent case in Maluku. Now,
this disagreement has developed into a potential conflict which can erupt at any time.
The Soya incident, preceded by an outage across the entire city of Ambon, was an
example of this spontaneity. The attackers, who, according to eyewitnesses, were
wearing battle fatigues and headcovers, moved swiftly in the pre-dawn darkness,
dynamiting and burning churches and killed 12 civilians.
Governor Latuconsina admitted there was something like a new pattern to trigger the
conflict: a sudden clash involving security forces despite its allegedly "highly
personal" nature such as religious antipathy, family revenge or economic urging.
Speaking before the Maluku legislative assembly, he said that 11 incidents had flared
after the signing of the Malino II peace treaty last February. "This pattern can be
dangerous as it will continue to create conflicts in Ambon," he said.
All these problems stemmed from the first conflict that broke out on January 19, 1999.
At that time many members of the military and police left their units without
permission to go home and maintain the security of their hometowns. Later on, some
members of the military and police assigned outside Maluku even returned home to
protect their birthplaces. The situation worsened with the presence of these deserters.
They trained locals and took sides with the disputing groups.
So, the armed contacts and conflicts in Ambon have assumed more military
characteristics not just in the style of assaults but also in the types of the weapons
used. According to Latuconsina, these delinquent members of the security forces
have carried out their activities beyond official working hours. Some conduct their
maneuvers using ninja masks or as shadowy troops. This shows the involvement of
deserters. "I bet few members of the public can move as swiftly as they do," he said,
half wondering.
Discipline violations have also led to an investigation. An investigating team from the
military police unit of the Pattimura Military Regional Command has been specially
assigned to probe this serious matter. "But, this matter is yet to be thoroughly
handled as some perpetrators are still allowed to carry their guns," retired army
brigadier general and former chief of Ambon military command Rustam Kastor told L.
N. Idayanie of TEMPO.
The then military region chief, Made Yasa, also made his move. He conducted a joint
army raid at Hotel Wijaya II on January 15, 2001. In the resulting exchange of fire,
Made Yasa's troops nabbed 29 TNI and police personnel, some of whom were
mid-ranking officers. Those arrested in the raid usually acted as snipers in this area.
The issue of weapons is no less complicated. A TEMPO source at Pattimura
Regional Military Command said some 1,000 guns of TNI and police issue "fell" into
the hands of community members. Most of the weapons have come from Brimob's
arsenal in Tantui. Mobs looted the weapons depot when Brimob quarters were
attacked on June 21, 2000. There are also, of course, some weapons from the
deserters. "As long as these weapons are not in proper hands, they will remain a
source of danger," said Pattimura military command spokesman, Maj. Herry Suhardi.
So, Commander Djoko spared no time to get to Ambon. After his installation in
Jakarta two weeks ago, he went to Ambon right away. For four days he briefed a
number of units there. "What's important is that we are consolidating the army and
improving our integration with the police," said Djoko on the priority of his command
operations. He returned to Jakarta briefly to attend the installation of Endriartono
Sutarto and Ryamizard Ryacudu as—respectively—TNI commander in chief and army
chief of staff. "We are making an inventory, detecting, appealing and then arresting,"
he said when asked how he would deal with deserters. A new tactic but its
effectiveness remains to be seen. Bina Bektiati, Tomi Lebang, Friets Kerlely, Yusnita
Tiakoly (Ambon)
@ tempointeractive.com
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