THE FINAL REPORT of the Fact-Finding Commission (Pursuant to R.A. No. 6832) October 1990

1. Short-Term prescriptions:

Since a coup d’etat is primarily a military operation which does not depend on mass civilian support for its success, immediate prescriptions should be directed at immobilizing, isolating, and capturing military rebels, both known or covert, before they can plan, recruit, or launch a coup.

Addressing the immediate problem of another coup requires a set of prescriptions that fully recognizes the complex interaction of internal factors and external factors and the different degrees of participation and motive, and hence culpability.

The Commission reiterates its recommendations in Interim Reports No. 1 (system of military justice), and No. 3 (needed legislation), and further recommends:

1. Administering a justice and rehabilitation program to military participants as follows:

1. Continual trial for those already charged.
2. Speedy process for those under investigation as well as those recommended for prosecution, investigation, or reinvestigation by the Commission.
3. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all benefits, in valid instances allowing the attachment of their properties, and punishment to the full extent of the law for those found guilty as principals. Those with lesser offenses should be meted graduated punishment.
4. Strict enforcement of AW 68 for failure to report contacts, solicitations and attempted recruitment to participate in coups.
5. Immediate release of those against whom there is insufficient evidence for prosecution, without prejudice to a reopening of the cases, if warranted.
6. The restoration of the lineal roster of all those already cleared as well as those released for insufficient evidence.
7. An amnesty program for young officers (majors and below) who are not principals and who have exceptional service records, provided they sincerely renounce all coups, pledge not to have any kind of involvement in any recruitment or planning for an coup, and agree to resign from the armed forces. This is without prejudice to their re-commissioning after two to three years without loss of seniority for those who express such intention at the time they apply for amnesty and engage in community and/or public service approved by the government during the "rehabilitation" period.
8. An early retirement program which is available to all but primarily directed at those lagging behind in the promotional ladder for reasons of non-performance, those who believe they are being discriminated upon for being identified with the Marcos-Ver or Enrile groups and those implicated with or suspected to be sympathetic to the rebels but against whom evidence may not be sufficient to prove guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The objective is not to invite the retirement of those officers the AFP wants to retain, but to give reasonable benefits to those who cannot meet the rigid requirements of a smaller officer corps and to provide an exit opportunity to those who believe that their careers have been impaired by their associations. It is the condition of such benefits that they no be found guilty subsequently of any crime against national security and public order. Otherwise, they are liable for the return of all the benefits plus interest.

1. The strengthening of security measures on those under detention, especially where there may be sympathetic guards, i.e. Muntinlupa.

The government should not forget the escapes of Honasan and Bibit who successfully co-opted or outwitted their guards. Nothing hurts the government’s image more or frustrates those who made the capture, than to see maximum security suspects escape with ease and impunity.

2. The intensification of efforts to capture key renegade officers with a special unit of trusted officers directly responsible to the CSAFP.

Honasan, Kapunan, Turingan, Batac, Bibit, Purugganan, and other central figures in the coup attempts should be specially targeted for capture. Despite the wide publicity given to the YOU and other military renegades as the potential source of new coups, the rebel cause would be set back considerably by the capture of the RAM-HF leaders. Furthermore, the public perception is that these renegades cannot be captured because they are protected by elements within the military itself. Their capture would be a clear signal that the military is unequivocally committed to enforce the law, as repeatedly stated by the Commander-in-Chief herself after each coup attempt. While several key rebels have been captured, the ability of the core group to elude capture after such tough talk tends to demoralize those who abide by the law and undermines the system of reward and punishment in the larger society itself.

3. A reinvestigation of the "God Save The Queen" plot and prosecution of all those implicated in it.

There appears to be sufficient basis for the military to conduct a formal investigation of the incident, and for the government to cause the prosecution of everyone found to have been involved. The original excuses for not conducting an investigation are not, nor were they ever, valid, i.e., no overt action, the risk of dividing the military, the independent character of the DND security force from the normal chain of command, the hope that those implicated can still be reformed, if not prosecuted. If there is to be a total approach to the problem of coups, it is important to close the book on the incident.

4. A review of the subsequent actuations of those involved in the Manila Hotel incident, both military and civilian, who pledged never to engage in similar adventurism again, if spared from prosecution.

Those who are implicated or suspected with respect to the December 1989 or any other coup attempts and are found to have violated their pledge should also be prosecuted for the Manila Hotel incident.

5. An intensive follow-up investigation by government police agencies and the Justice Department of civilians implicated in the December 1989 attempt.

If the renegade soldiers are to be cut off from their support systems, the message to actual or potential civilian supporters must be clearly spelled out – there is no margin for tolerance when the survival of democracy is at stake. The Commission believes, based on selective cases (i.e. identifying the vessel that ferried the rebel troops from Bataan to Sangley, identifying the civilian network of Fusilero, examining the connection of the coup plotters with personalities in the Mindanao Freedom Movement, fund-raising activities from business, the Hawaii connection of certain civilians) that the investigation of civilians tends to concentrate on national figures. Thus, it is likely that the lower profile civilian support network for the rebels is still intact. This could include persons on which the Commission’s investigation has not been completed because, in its judgment, the incremental information that might be secured would not be justified by the cost. The investigation could be done by the DOJ in the course of its normal activities. This matter is covered by a formal resolution of the Commission to the DOJ.

6. Speedy action on appeals over decisions of AFP courts-martial.

This has already been mentioned in the Commission’s Interim Report No. 1. Related to this are the cases which are not being acted upon or are suffering undue delays. Actions on decisions on courts-martial which are subject to mandatory appellate review or which may eventually reach the President for confirmation should be speedily resolved.

7. The early passage of a comprehensive law on the establishment of the National Police.

Implementing the Constitutional provision would remove the anxiety and insecurity of those likely to be affected by the new law. Furthermore, the sooner such a law is enacted, the earlier could programs be implemented to separately strengthen the police and military organizations and resolve the confusion of overlapping jurisdictions.

8. The immediate implementation of a comprehensive program to provide timely rescue and medical assistance to troops wounded in combat.

The rebels have tried to claim credit for improving the benefits of soldiers. Unfortunately, the timing of such improvements (many have been instituted after coup attempts) have lent some credibility to these claims. The government is aware of the complaints about the inadequacy of medical and hospitalization benefits particularly of soldiers in combat. A comprehensive initiative of the government to help wounded soldiers would highlights its continuing concern, lift troop morale, and direct credit to where it belongs.

9. A review by the military of its decision to disband the Scout Ranger Regiment.

While Honasan and his group in some officers of the FSRR may have implanted the coup culture, it is not clear that it is permanently ingrained in the troops. It is also true that the military hierarchy may have unwittingly allowed it to happen and are, therefore, perceived to be arbitrary and unduly harsh. The FSRR may be one of the most effective units against the communist insurgency and should not end up being bitter and ineffective. Besides, attaching the Rangers to other units without first making sure they are rid of the coup "virus" would only facilitate the spread of the affliction. What makes the Rangers an elite unit, other than their training, is the spirit of oneness and collective pride. It is a spirit that must be harnessed rather than dispersed. The solution should be the assignment of officers who command the respect of the soldiers and who are themselves absolutely committed to democracy.

10. An immediate audit of the value formation program of the military and, with the help of civilian experts, the formulation of an intensive program (essentially constructive indoctrination), and the training of field commanders to carry it out.

The Commission received conflicting testimony on the effectiveness of the present program and noted that the military is reluctant to extensively use civilian expertise presumably in the belief that civilians cannot fully understand the military mind. The result, as played up also by newspaper reports, is a traditional, repetitive, and unimaginative approach such as that used with and ridiculed by some of the Scout Rangers. Thus, the results of the program in specific units are quite uneven, depending on the individual skill of its commander.

11. The immediate removal or reassignment of officers of less than 100 percent loyalty from sensitive positions in the military hierarchy, i.e., intelligence, operations, logistics, and training functions.

Consistent with the policy of not taking any risks as this time, and of forging a military with unquestioning loyalty to the Constitution, those with any taint of the coup should first be tested in less sensitive positions (assuming they do not retire early) before being given choice assignments.

12. The immediate disbandment of GCFI and all other organizations not authorized by the military.

Such organizations encourage factionalism and give opportunities for those with hidden agendas to exploit and manipulate them.

13. The observance of a systematic selection process for the new Chief of Staff that generates the least controversy about the choice.

The possibility of deep selection should not be foreclosed. An important criterion should be an impeccable record and reputation for non-partisanship, since the 1992 elections will be a critical test for democratic and peaceful change.

14. Just as in the civilian government, a crackdown by the military on some "big fish" corrupt officers.

There are apparently officers known within the military establishment to be corrupt and are perceived to be protected for personal or political reasons. The value of example cannot be underestimated to restore the confidence of those alienated by reason of their own knowledge or experience of corruption in the military. In particular, those in "syndicates" engaged in illegal gambling should be dealt with uncompromisingly.

15. An immediate stop to unfair and/or humiliating treatment and criticism of military officers by Congress and other public officials, especially those before the Commission on Appointments.

Political "grandstanding" is especially grating to the troops in the field, who feel that they are risking their lives for the wrong people.

16. Speedy and firm disciplinary action and/or prosecution against members of the military involved in human rights violations as well as of civilian law enforcement personnel involved in victimizing military personnel.

There should be no "sacred cows" when it comes to dispensation of justice.

17. The purchase or charter by Congress of its own transportation facilities and prohibition on their use of military equipment and aircraft.

Another common complaint of both rebel and government military officers is the use by members of Congress of military equipment, particularly aircraft, for their own purposes. On the one hand, such assets are perceived to be badly needed to support the troops in the field. On the other hand, the legitimate function of the legislature to appropriate funds, monitor the use of public money, and enact measures, would not be fully served if it did not have access to field observations and dialogues with such an important sector as the military. The Commission, therefore, suggests that Congress be allowed to purchase or charter a pool of transportation equipment, including airplanes, that can be utilized for official purposes, such as field inspections of military operations, provincial consultations, monitoring of the use of funds in emergency operations and calamities, and other similar purposes. In the long run, such arrangements will prove to be the most economical, efficient, and practical way of dealing with the issue.

18. The expansion of the government’s information program which has considerably and commendably improved since December 1989, with more participation by local government officials.

One of the most common complaints of the rebel soldiers is the absence of local officials particularly in insurgency areas. The local officials are the frontliners in the delivery of government services. They should be required to be in the field and their activities duly recorded for dissemination through the government'’ public information program. Systematizing the flow of information between the executive and local government officials should also prove useful for other purposes, i.e. calamities, rebel troop movements.

19. The provision of sufficient resources and support to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.

The filling up of this position is consistent with the findings of the Commission. He must be given the resources to do his job since the appointment has raised expectations within the military that their grievances will be heard. In organizing the staff of the office, care should be taken not to appoint those with "scores to settle" and worn-out ideas. It is time for young blood with fresh ideas, if the problems of the military are to be resolved.

1. An Agenda for the Remaining Twenty-One Months of the Aquino Administration

The constitutional term of the present administration is 76 months. There are only 21 months left of that term to complete the successful transition of the country from a dictatorship to a full-fledged democracy. That tak is not that of the President alone, or of the government, but of the entire society itself.

Despite the installation of the formal structures and the advances in democratic processes, the EDSA Revolt that installed Corazon C Aquino as President did not result in the far-reaching revolution many people had hoped for. Most of these expectations were embodied in the new Constitution, but have largely remained unfulfilled. Therefore, stated simply, the job to be done in the next 21 months is to galvanize the people behind a national vision based on the agenda ratified by the people.

1. On the part of the Executive Department, a review of key policies and programs in the light of results, an acceptance of shortcomings where these exist, and a performance review of appointive officials.

Chapter III of this report describes how the "rainbow coalition" of 1986 quickly unraveled because there was no organic unity 9in the first place, only a common goal of removing a dictator. Yet, the disunity is not necessarily an affliction of the grassroots. All the social surveys indicate a discernible consensus of the people on major issues, some of them considered as controversial, i.e., agrarian reform foreign debt, US military facilities, coup d’etat. Unfortunately, these are often obscured by the posturing of politicians and extremist groups, and the indecision of the Executive Department.

The first step, therefore, in putting the country back on track is to galvanize national unity.

As part of the process of self-reflection, the Executive Department must review existing policies and programs and establish clear directions for the next 21 months, particularly in the area of basic services. Government officials who have not performed or are responsible for failed programs have to be replaced. The economic situation and shortfalls in performance relative to targets cannot all be blamed on external factors and inherited problems. Furthermore, much can still be accomplished in 21 months. That is approximately the difference between the first term of a reelectable president under the 1935 Constitution and the six-year term of a non-reelectable president under the new Constitution. The expectation is a president will act as a statesman during that period rather than as a politician seeking another term. However, the appointment of new people would only make sense if the correct policies and programs are in place. Two major revamps occurred after coup attempts and were perceived to have been a reaction to the coups rather than a genuine effort to address issues of substance. Subsequent events tended to validate this perception. What is being asked of the Executive Department is to enforce the same principle of accountability being required of the military.

While there is understandably a reluctance by President Aquino to exercise power in a manner that might be compared with former President Marcos, a democracy in a crisis of transition calls for a firmer and more direct hand at the helm. People understand that a ship is never always on course. But the ship that arrives safely at its destination is theone which constantly checks its bearings, corrects itself on time, and accelerates ts speed when it is firmly on course.

The leader who transcends himself will be followed by his crew, even those who may believe that there is a shorter and safer route. It is the vision and the decisiveness that count.

2. On the part of the President, a categorical declaration of her position with respect to the issue of re-election.

In view of the unsettled constitutional issue of her right to seek re-election in 1992 and the continuing speculation on her intent to run despite her past pronouncements to the contrary, an unambiguous declaration on her part would be timely and would be perceived as an act of statesmanship rather than a politician’s ploy.

3. On the part of the President, the immediate convening of the National Security Council and an initiative to invite all political parties to enter into a compact, to which peoples organizations and citizen groups would also subscribe, to defend and preserve our democracy, abjure the use of force and violence to effect change, commit to the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections in 1992, and arrive at solutions to our national problems through an honest and open debate of issues and programs; and on the part of the political opposition, a positive response to the call for a united front against unconstitutional means to change the government and for upholding democratic processes.

The ruling coalition and the opposition must agree on a constructive relationship to save and strengthen democracy. Both must learn the distinction between political debate on the basis of issues and the exigencies of political maneuvering to take or keep power. The climate of distrust, extra-constitutional tendencies, and the politics of personalities must somehow be changed. In the case of Vice President Laurel, the government must decide either to file charges or carry out an initiative to provide him with a role befitting an official elected by the people to the second highest position of government.

The President can take the initiative in creating a new climate of "unity in diversity" by immediately convening the National Security Council. Then, she can issue a call for all political parties to sign a solemn compact before the people to uphold democracy, to resist with all the resources at their command any attempt to subvert or destroy it, and to participate fully in the elections in 1992.

The political opposition must be willing to respond positively to this initiative, following the example of their counterparts in such countries as Venezuela and Argentina where they actualized a vow to set aside their differences when democracy is threatened by military adventurism. One does not have to be in power to contribute in nation-building.

The Nacionalista Party led by Blas Ople and Senator Enrile missed a historic opportunity to put into practice what it preaches by way of reconciliation and commitment to democracy. Its press conference on 2 December 1989 turned out to be an opportunistic attempt to play up to therebels and gain political points at a time of great peril for democracy. Vice President Laurel likewise fumbled his own opportunity for statesmanship while in Hong Kong at the time. There is, however, no reason, given the shifting tide of politics, why the opposition cannot recover from the widespread disapproval of the people of its behavior during the December 1989 coup attempt, f it is perceived to be unequivocal about its commitment to democratic processes.

The solidarity of the political leadership is a giant step in addressing the issue of a military that is isolated from the society it is supposed to protect.

4. On the part of the Legislative Department and the President, the establishment of a special full-time commission to implement a post-insurgency program for the military that will modernize, professionalize, and bring it within the mainstream of national life.

Since the insurgency problem appears to be close to a solution, the government must design a post-insurgency program for the military, within the framework of the Constitution. The establishment of a Commission of respected civilian and military experts appointed by the President - with full powers and a budget to carry out its task - would deliver a strong message to the military that the government cares about their future, recognizes the existence of deep-seated and complex problems, and is determined to solve them. The program itself should evoke a resolve in the military to perform better in the field and thus hasten the victory over both the communist and Muslim insurgencies. A vital component of the program is its thorough modernization and the termination of its dependency on the US for its weaponry. Another component is a reformulation of the education system and training of officers. This would include a review of the program at the PMA and the establishment of other service academies. Although no direct correlation has been established between the PMA curriculum and the disposition of officers to engage in coups, testimonies of senior military officers call attention to the need to:

1. Intensively inculcate civilian values among the military;
2. Cultivate a peer relationship between officers and civilians starting at the college level by examining the desirability of making the military academies the last two years of a college degree or of requiring the cadet to spend his junior year in a civilian university.
3. Institute measures to further democratize access to military academies and to discourage the emergence of an elitist military class that isolates the officers from the rest of society and negates the constitutional concept of a citizen army. Related to this is the problem of factionalism that is exacerbated by the dominance of PMA graduates in leadership and key positions in the military.
4. Upgrade the status of the teaching function in military academies to the level of combat command with financial incentives, performance credits, and promotional advantages, and invite more civilian instructors to handle non-military subjects, and
5. Temper the overly idealistic orientation at the PMA, and emphasize love of country as the most desirable value in an officer.

The Commission considered other options than the appointment of a new independent body in order to avoid any incremental burden on the budget. Among the alternatives considered were: (a) a task force under the Department of Defense, (b) a special unit under the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, (c) a composite committee under the Office of the President to be supervised by the Executive Secretary, (d) the National Security Council, and (e) a special commission under the Office of the Vice-President.

A special commission under the DND, the NSC, or the Executive Secretary would have the handicap of having to use people who have other responsibilities and who might not be able to impart the sense of importance and urgency to the task at hand. In any case, the core of new staff has to be appointed. With respect to the Office of the Vice President, the same staffing requirement would apply with the additional handicap that the office is an elective one and the task of the special commission is unlikely to be finished by mid-1992. The Deputy Ombudsman has a fixed tenure. However, his office would also need to recruit new staff. In the ultimate analysis, the same incremental cost of staffing would be incurred for all the alternatives, with the only difference being the additional cost of the commissioners who will oversee the program on a full-time basis, with respect to this Report’s recommendations.

More importantly, a new task-oriented commission, possibly with a fixed term, provides the necessary continuity, urgency, and sense of priority, that may well prove to be more economical than the cost in lives, money, and lost opportunities of military adventurism.

For having made this suggestion, members of the Fact-Finding Commission should not be considered for appointment to this commission.

1. On the part of the Legislative Department, the immediate enactment of laws to ensure the democratization of the electoral process and the validity and public acceptance of its results, with particular reference to the critical 1992 synchronized election.

The 1992 elections will be a critical test of democracy since the electoral process is often perceived as a way to legitimize the continued political domination of a few.

Both the Executive and the Legislative Departments should make urgent decisions regarding the synchronization in 1992 of elections as mandated by the Constitution. A lead-time of two years is necessary for planning and for the procedures, equipment, selective computerization, and organization to be firmly in place on time. The legislation and budget for such preparations should already be enacted. Since elections is a process, procedures partake of the substance of the right to vote.

In addition, legislation to implement the constitutional mandate to democratize political power, as part of the social justice program, should be enacted before the elections in 1992 to pre-empt the rationalization of rebel soldiers and the CPP/NPA for political intervention because of what they will describe as elitist and, therefore, meaningless results of elections.

Specifically, Congress should enact laws on the empowerment of independent people’s organizations, the party-list system of representation, anti-dynasty, equal access to media time and space, subsidy program for poor but deserving candidates or their watchers, and procedures to enable the disabled and the illiterate to participate fully in the process.

2. The supremacy of civilian authority over the military should be established by the appointment as soon as practicable of civilians with the capability, integrity, and leadership to head the Department of National Defense (DND), the National Security Council (NSC), and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). The NICA should have its own intelligence capability that can complement as well as validate military intelligence information.

This recommendation does not detract from the outstanding and loyal service of Secretary Fidel Ramos in defending the government against attacks from both leftist and rightist extremists. The policy of appointing a civilian as head of DND should be adopted not only by this government but subsequent ones in compliance with the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional principle of the supremacy of civilian authority. Establishing the policy would integrate the military into the civilian government and induce a continuous supply of knowledgeable career civilians with the authority of expertise in military affairs. Eventually, military resentment about alleged "interference" of civilians would be muted.

The need for an independent and civilian-controlled intelligence network responsible directly to the President is highlighted by the fact that the Office of the President is totally dependent on the military for intelligence and in several instances appeared to be less than fully informed of developments. No matter how well meaning the military intelligence community may be, the idea of sharing "top secret" information with a civilian does not appear to be accepted practice, even if that civilian happens to carry the title of Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C).

Secondly, J2 or the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (AFP) reports to the Chief of Staff who, in practice, does not really function as "staff" to the C-in-C. The common perception within the military and, for that matter, among the public, is that the responsibility for military decisions ends at the desk of the CSAFP. This has less to do with the fact that the present C-in-C is a woman than the presumption that the man in uniform knows best on such matters, and the culture of enduring fraternal ties within the military.

3. The institutionalization of necessary improvements in the military in the areas of promotion and assignments, purchasing and auditing, educational benefits abroad, and compulsory attendance at military command schools.

The Commission’s recommendations cannot be exhaustive. These improvements would be part of the terms of reference of the proposed special full-time commission to define the role of the military in the post-insurgency period. Examples, however, would be a review of the policy of merely rotating incompetent officers rather than weeding them out, instituting measures to decongest the "bunching" of middle level officers as a result of the accelerated expansion of a military in the mid-1970’s on the one hand and the relative shortage of junior field officers on the other, the laxity of allowing Lt Cols to avoid going to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), where their fitness for promotion or separation from the service is determined.

With respect to purchasing and audit procedures, the military and the Commission on Audit (COA) must work out a practical solution to the problem of "conversion", i.e. spending the money for other than the budgeted purpose not necessarily because of graft and corruption but because of the needs of the field and the bureaucratic tape involved in complying with all the technicalities of disbursement. The Commission suggests that the military and the COA agree on a standard method by which the principle of transparency is practiced all the way down to the smallest unit by providing all the information about its budget to the soldiers. Although this is already being practiced in many units, much still needs to be done particularly in the matter of "conversion". The philosophy should be to challenge the military to perform better through a system of decentralization, transparency, and an appeal to the traditional military values of integrity and discipline, and relying on formal and informal sanctions for enforcement.

With respect to availments of educational benefits and rotational assignments abroad, special efforts must be made to eliminate the tayo-tayo system and to use the reward system to broaden the linkages of the military and reduce its dependence on the US, and recognize performance and loyalty to the Constitution.

4. The President and the Commission on Appointments must work out a system by which recommendations for promotions can be categorized in practice to avoid the exploitation of the confirmation process for political purposes.

The appointments to the Chief of Staff position and the top positions in the major service commands have a political dimension which requires the exhaustive inquiry of the Commission on Appointments in the proper exercise of the principle of checks and balances. However, other appointments might merit a progressively different treatment based on institutional courtesy.

5. If justice is going to be a living principle of governance, the budgets of the Judiciary and the Department of Justice (DOJ) must be increased in order to upgrade the physical facilities, recording, investigative and prosecutive capability, and staffing of the system.

The budget of the Judiciary amounts to 1.08% of the 1990 national budget. It is grossly inadequate amount and should be increased in view of its critical role and the national scale of its responsibility as the conscience of the nation.

The Commission recommends the same approach with respect to the budget of the DOJ. The existence of honest judges and efficient courts would not result in a better administration of justice without a corresponding improvement in the investigative and prosecutorial capability of the DOJ. The courts can only decide on the evidence before it. If that evidence is inadequate and its presentation flawed and incompetent, the wheels of justice will not turn efficiently. The DOJ’s budget for 1990 is only .5% (one-half of 1%) of the national budget. A significant increase in its budget should be considered to modernize facilities and equipment, provide funding for proper investigation and preparation of cases, and keep and attract the best people for the job.

6. The business sector, as the engine of growth of the economy, is the key sector, in addition to the government, in avoiding a severe economic crisis that could invite military adventurism. This is the time to stake its resources for democracy as the only political system under which it can survive and thrive, and thereby help others overcome their poverty.

The business sector is not a homogeneous group – a set of economic policies that favors one industry can hurt another – and engages in a broad range of partisan political activity. But its long-term interest is in strengthening democracy regardless of partisan politics or of any temporary advantage to business that authoritarianism may appear to offer. Authoritarianism in the Philippine experience eventually means arbitrary interference in private business, and lack of progress. This is the painful lesson we have learned, the same lesson which is being validated by the experience of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe today. Therefore, business should act as one – to help restore confidence in the economy by keeping and investing its resources in the country, to deny support to military rebels, to resist the temptation to subvert the electoral process to advance business interests, to pay correct taxes, and to keep honest rather than corrupt the bureaucracy. Beyond that, business must be willing to transcend itself by supporting rather than obstructing policies that dismantle the economic privileges of a few and diffuse the fruits of progress to the greatest number. In an economic slowdown, its social responsibility is to protect the jobs of its employees and to relieve them, as much as possible, from the burden of adjustment to adverse business conditions.

7. The non-governmental and peoples organizations are intermediating institutions, which can help unify a factionalized society. By mobilizing communities and resources to improve the lives of the poor, they help the grassroots create a stake in democracy.

The task of such organizations in deterring coups is to strengthen the bond of nationhood and propagate by deeds the values of pagkakaisa at pagmamalasakit, self-reliance, and participation in fair and clean electoral exercises. The role of people’s organizations is spelled out in the Constitution, and should be exercised by the people themselves without waiting for the formality of legislation. On the other hand, while the NGOs have a role to play in people empowerment, they should take care not to become a bureaucracy of the private sector by accumulating power rather than facilitating its transfer to the basic sectors. In a truly participatory democracy, these sectors must speak with their own voice in the formation of national consensus.

8. The church occupies a unique position in Philippine society, acting as an arbiter on moral issues even in the realm of politics, i.e., the condemnation of the election fraud by the Marcos administration in February 1986, although inhibited by the constitutional mandate of separation of church and state, the boundaries of which may shift from time to time.

The biblical passages condemning rebellion, the exhortation against contributing to it, the moral duty to uphold duly constituted authority, provide the church with a strong moral suasion to deter rebels and to unite people behind democracy. Its influence should also be brought to bear on solving the problems of gambling, graft and corruption, and structural poverty. In the more immediate future, the role of the church is to catalyze the peace process and to progressively expand it, regardless of the obstacles placed in its path. The success of the peace process would heal the festering wounds of the nation and also pave the way to a meaningful electoral process and democratic change in 1992.

9. The resolution of the dilemma faced by media in crisis reporting lies more in the media itself rather than government regulations.

While government should take whatever measures it considers appropriate to defend itself, such measures, when perceived to impair press freedom, should be immediately questioned, until a body of jurisprudence and tradition is accumulated. Because the preferred option is self-regulation and self-discipline, media should proceed with their initiatives in formulating their own ethical standards, strictly enforce them, and inform the public of such efforts. It is also incumbent on media to define the boundaries of their profession not only during crisis but also in conflict of interest situations. Media should accept the responsibility to discipline erring members, to provide training and guidance to its apprentices, and to establish linkages with responsible counterparts abroad their experience and perspective.

1. Recommendations Over the Long-Term

A crisis does not develop overnight. It passes through symptomatic, acute, and chronic stages with progressive indicators on the severity of the situation. The task of leadership is to read the signals early enough so that the acute and chronic stages are bypassed and the problems resolved even before the crisis is reached.

A coup d’etat does not happen overnight. Neither does a revolution or popular uprising of the citizenry itself. The responsibility of the political leadership is to build a national consensus on what must be done to address the underlying problems indicated by the symptoms. Since many of the problems of the country are structural in character, there are no quick solutions, although one can resort to "damage control" and short-term alleviation to buy time. The longer-term solutions, however, must start today.

1. Love of Country as the Highest Value

On the premise that the soldier is first a citizen before he becomes a military man and officers do not enter military school until after high school, it follows that our system of education has not been successful in transmitting the proper values to our students. The extent of the overhaul of the educational system is a matter for legislation, but the greater responsibility is in the entire education sector, public and private, for it does appear that it must do a better job at value formation, with love of country as the highest value. This will take time and will need to be reinforced by the family and the Church. In addition, something must be done about public school teachers. How can they impart correct values when they themselves are demoralized, badly trained, and lack dedication and discipline? The Executive and the Legislative Departments have a joint responsibility to formulate a long-term and properly funded program to improve the educational system.

2. Social Justice

The full implementation of the social justice provisions of the Constitution. Until the gross inequalities of wealth and power are corrected, the ferment for change and the vulnerability of the men-at-arms to political intervention will continue. For the great majority of the military belong to the underprivileged class as well.

3. Citizen Army

The full implementation of the citizen army concept and the designated role of small, modernized, and professional military in a democratic society. The de-linking of the military from the US on weaponry, its assumption of the external defense responsibility, and the immediate phase-out of the US facilities in Philippine bases and removal of all the vestiges of its colonialism would constitute the basic military-related steps toward becoming a truly sovereign and independent nation.

4. Decentralization

The decentralization of the national government as a precondition for the efficient delivery of government services. The devolution of power to local communities would bring the government closer to the people and reduce the isolation of rural communities whose poverty tends to politicize officers in the field.

5. The Constitution

After an appropriate period, to give the present Constitution an opportunity to be tested, formal consultations should be conducted at the grassroots on the desirability of constitutional amendments and of the specific proposals advanced by the different sectors. A rush to amend the Constitution, including the basic structure of government, to suit contemporary problems is not always an answer. The people must be prepared to make amendments if it is clear that the fundamental law has proven to be irrelevant or inapplicable to the times. But the best way to test the relevance of the Constitution is not by speculative theories but the implementation of its key provisions, particularly on the diffusion of wealth and political power (social justice), and on economic progress with equity.

1. Choosing Democracy

If a coup d’etat starts in the minds of men, then it is the collective will of a unified people that can prevent and overcome it.

The people must choose democracy.

To flourish, democracy must become the living mortar that binds us. To work, it must come from a people that have willed their own liberation from poverty, dependency, and disunity. For it has truly been said "democracy is based upon the conviction that there are extraordinary possibilities in ordinary people."

When there are forces that would destroy democracy, only the strength that comes from such a people can protect and uphold it. And the irreducible minimum to peaceful and orderly change, both societal and political, is for all the contenders in the political arena to agree to use the ballot and forego the bullet – for the path of peace is that path to progress, social justice, and nationhood.

Chairman, Hilario G Davide Jr

Commissioners: Ricardo J Romulo, Delfin L Lazaro, Carolina G Hernandez, and Christian S Monsod.