The Jakarta Post, July 07, 2004
Blame game over the Aceh problem
Damien Kingsbury, Melbourne
The conflict in Aceh is perhaps Indonesia's most emotive and divisive. After the 'loss'
of East Timor in 1999, the Indonesian military (TNI) has committed itself to never
again suffering such a 'defeat'.
This is so much the case that it is effectively forbidden, by the TNI, to hold any view
other than that Aceh should remain as a part of the unitary state.
Genuine autonomy, that is, federalism, is not on the agenda. The corollary of that is
that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which is trying to establish a separate state,
must be demonized. This applies to foreigners at least as much as to Indonesians, at
least if they wish to visit, and especially work in, Indonesia.
To this end, the recent article here by Kirsten Schultz reflects a view that is entirely in
keeping with the TNI's official line on Aceh. Schultz' article does express one
legitimate concern, on the tragedy of war. Yet Schultz's focus on the victims of GAM
implies a type of equivalence that is inaccurate.
The Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin once said that the death of a person is a tragedy,
but that the death of a million is a statistic. He and Schultz are correct to note that for
every person killed, no matter by whom, there will be a grieving spouse, children and
friends. And every person that GAM kills adds to this tragic list.
As Schultz and I also agree, liberation movements should behave in as exemplary
manner as possible, if they are to retain the high moral ground their causes imply.
Yet death in greater numbers is not a statistic, but a greater tragedy. Schultz's focus
on the 'crimes' of GAM ignores the demonstrable fact that it is the TNI that is
responsible for the overwhelming majority of civilian deaths in Aceh, that targeting
civilians is a routine TNI tactic, and that as an institution that claims legitimacy in
Aceh its actions have only further delegitimized both itself and the state it represents.
Similarly, while GAM raises 'taxes', which can be called 'extortion' or even robbery if
one does not wish to comply, GAM argues that as the legitimate government of the
'state' taxation is its right, in the same way that the Indonesian state imposes taxes.
What Schultz neglected to mention,however, was that of the extortion and robbery
that plagues Aceh, members of the TNI undertake the overwhelming majority of it, with
the quasi-military police taking up most of the rest, including dressing as civilians and
holding up transport along the main roads, along with illegal logging, 'taxes' on fishing
and coffee.
Conversely, while GAM has targeted specific civilians it considers traitors or
opponents to its cause, it does not systematically target the Acehnese population as
such. Indeed, as a classic guerrilla army, it could not survive without the active
support of the vast majority of Acehnese people, and this cannot happen if they are
alienated.
Based on the TNI's own figures, from GAM's original force in May 2003, the equivalent
to its entire number has been either killed, captured or surrendered. Yet after more
than a year of the TNI's most concerted campaign ever, GAM's strength in the field
remains at around 80 percent. This reflects both the support it was able to receive
from among Acehnese people, as well as the TNI's failure to win their 'hearts and
minds'.
It is morally impossible to accept the harming of civilians in any conflict, even if this is
a reality of war. But if there is to be a demand for accountability, it defies logic to not
lay it at the feet of the organization that is responsible for the overwhelming majority of
civilian casualties.
This type of implied impunity for the TNI is expected in Aceh, and reflects a wider
problem of the role of the TNI in politics, in business and in criminal activity. It may be
that in any conflict no-one is entirely innocent, but by attacking the victim, in relative
terms, Schultz offers no solution to the Aceh problem or, by extension, for the reform
of the TNI upon which so much of Indonesia's process of democratization rests.
If one is to try to constructively address the Aceh problem, it might be more useful to
look at returning to a ceasefire between the TNI and GAM, ensuring that the ceasefire
holds, and then using the good will that can be built up over time to re-open a genuine
dialogue about Aceh's future with Indonesia.
* Dr. Damien Kingsbury is Senior Lecturer in International Development at Deakin
University, Melbourne, Australia, and is author of Power Politics and the Indonesian
Military.
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